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ABSTRACT 
When historians have addressed the issue of maritime 
lawlessness in the English colonies of North America their 
attention almost invariably has been drawn to New England 
where, according to the commonly held belief, opposition to 
the navigation system of the home government was ~ost 
fervent, concerted, and pervasive. Rarely have researchers 
examined local involvement in piracy, illicit trade, and the 
unauthorized salvage of stranded or sunken vessels, or 
wrecking, in the Chesapeake region where, scholars 
customarily have maintained, the colonists willingly 
participated in the imperial navigation scheme. Moreover, 
historical investigations of freebooters and smugglers 
traditionally have focused on the lawbreakers themselves, 
generally neglecting the activities of coastal inhabitants 
without whose support the outlaws could not have operated 
and prospered. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, not only 
did residents of the greater Chesapeake personally engage in 
piracy, contraband trade, customs fraud, and wrecking, but 
many more supported their actions by assisting and harboring 
the perpetrators or by refusing to convict them in the 
common-law courts. In the provincial assemblies, other 
colonists opposed legislative initiatives designed to 
improve the enforcement of imperial policy in the maritime 
sphere. Compounding the enforcement problem in the greater 
Chesapeake was the participation of both royal and 
provincial officials -- including customs officers, 
guardship commanders, and even colonial governors -- in 
various contraband, duty fraud, and piratical schemes 
themselves. If British authorities wondered about the 
sources of such behavior they did not have far to look for 
precedents. English piracy, smuggling, and wrecking 
often tacitly approved and even actively promoted by high-
ranking government officials -- dated back centuries before 
the colonial era. 
The coincidence of the periods of greatest complaint 
about maritime lawbreaking in the Chesapeake with the 
intervals of most active regulation of colonial affairs by 
the home government suggests that inhabitants of the bay 
region conducted illegal maritime activities continuously 
between 1650 and 1750 and beyond. Reports by customs 
officials and guardship captains in the decade preceding the 
Revolution, including accounts of violent resistance to 
royal authority, indicate that compliance with the 
Navigation Acts was no better than it had been in the late 
seventeenth century when English authorities undertook a 
major reform initiative designed to end abuses of the 
system. 
vi 
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CHAPTER I 
Lawlessness on the "sea frontiers'': The English Precedent 
In the spring of 1722 Governor Alexander Spotswood 
reported to England's Board of Trade that Virginia's 
defenses finally had been strengthened sufficiently to 
safeguard the colony's "sea frontiers" against attack by 
pirates and other sea marauders. 1 Spotswood's statement is 
significant in two respects: first, as a telling indication 
that piracy had plagued the greater Chesapeake for over half 
a century and, second, for the governor's use of the phrase 
"sea frontiers." In modern parlance "frontier" normally 
refers to an unexplored or uninhabited region adjacent to a 
settled, civilized country. The governor's use of the term 
to describe the interface between the land masses and the 
estuaries, bays, and ocean of his colony clearly connotes 
something different, however, since these regions in 
Virginia had already been explored and to a considerable 
extent developed well before Spotswood's tenure. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
"frontiers" referred to national borders, often military 
1 CSPC, XXXIII, #175, p. 86. 
2 
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boundaries between hostile nations. 2 Although no foreign 
enemy effectively occupied the waters and shorelines of 
Virginia for any extended period during the colonial era, 
British officials were nevertheless engaged in an almost 
continual struggle against covert forces of lawlessness that 
threatened the authority of the colonial government and the 
exercise of royal prerogatives, particularly the collection 
of royal revenues. To be sure, the governors and Royal Navy 
guardship commanders assigned to the Chesapeake were mainly 
concerned with threats posed by outside interlopers: foreign 
invaders, displaced pirates from the Caribbean, and traders 
from other colonies and nations who came in violation of the 
En0lish navigation acts. 3 But official anxiety also 
extended to the residents of Virginia, Maryland, and North 
Carolina, a significant (though essentially indeterminate) 
number of whom engaged in smuggling, aided and abetted 
pirates, looted stranded vessels, and generally ignored 
English maritime law as it was intended to apply to them. 
2 The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1961), val. 
IV, 565-66. 
3 Although the term "sea frontier" was not commonly 
employed, even in Spotswood's time, the idea that it 
represented undoubtedly was familiar to coastal residents of 
the Chesapeake. A Virginia statute of 1700 entitled "An act 
for the better strengthening the frontiers and discovering 
the approaches of the enemy," for example, contained 
provisions for the establishment of continuous watches in 
Elizabeth City, Accomack, and Northampton Counties in order 
to "keep a constant looke out to seaward by night and by 
day" (William w. Hening, ed., The Statutes At Lar e: Bein 
Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, 13 vols., 
1809-1823], III, 204, 208). 
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4 
Ironically, most of these individuals did not consider 
themselves outlaws, at least not in the usual sense. For 
many, the pursuit of material gain -- especially in the 
maritime sphere -- justified technical breaches of the law, 
an attitude which seems to have derived from a long-standing 
English tradition. 4 Furthermore, the social, political, and 
economic transformation that colonial America was undergoing 
in the 1650-1750 period, particularly during the last 
quarter of the seventeenth century, helped to create an 
environment in which objective right and wrong were not 
always universally recognized or even readily 
identifiable. Accordingly, the concept of a "maritime 
frontier," as used in this study, is meant to convey an idea 
beyond a literal or historical definition of the term: 
rather a place to which not only declared enemies and 
habitual criminals, but also otherwise law-abiding citizens 
resorted as a haven for conducting ''illegitimate" 
enterprises beyond lawful control. Such a maritime frontier 
was defined not so much by political or geographical 
boundaries as by a state of mind in which private 
individuals and public administrators far from the seat of 
4 Concerning popular attitudes toward illicit trade and 
customs fraud in medieval England, for example, one 
historian has concluded that "in the eyes of any 
representative gathering of twelve good and lawful men, 
smuggling was not an offence. The smuggler was an honest 
thief, not a criminal" (Neville Williams, Contraband 
Cargoes: Seven Centuries of Smuggling [Hamden, Conn., 1961], 
15) • 
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imperial authority felt themselves at liberty to observe 
those laws which suited them and disregard those which did 
not. 
5 
The objectives of this study are to examine the various 
forms of maritime lawlessness in which the colonists and 
officials of the greater Chesapeake participated, trace the 
development and perpetuation of attitudes in England that 
contributed to the adoption of similar practices in the 
colonies, assess the extent to which Chesapeake colonists 
engaged in or supported such illegal enterprises, and 
evaluate the procedures implemented by English and colonial 
officials to control lawlessness in the maritime sphere. A 
concluding chapter attempts to establish the connections 
between the different types of maritime illegality and those 
who engaged in them and to define the social milieu in which 
these activities were pursued. 
The analysis focuses on three types of maritime 
lawlessness: illicit trade, piracy, and the unauthorized 
salvage of stranded or sunken vessels, commonly referred to 
as "wrecking." Although a number of studies on piracy in 
colonial Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina have been 
produced already, these works tend to focus more or less 
exclusively on the escapades and personalities of the 
freebooters themselves, generally ignoring the colonists' 
roles as sympathizers, trading partners, and defenders of 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the pirates.
5 
With regard to illicit trade, most scholars 
have concentrated their attention on the northern 
(especially the New England) colonies where noncompliance 
with English trade and navigation laws was more overt and 
opposition more openly defiant. As an early royal colony, 
Virginia in particular has been widely regarded as an 
obedient outpost of British economic imperialism where a 
6 
relatively submissive population found advantage in a closed 
imperial trading system and had little difficulty complying 
with the mercantile policies of the crown. The documentary 
record suggests, however, that the attitudes and illegal 
trade activities of the Virginia colonists may not have 
differed from their northern neighbors as much as we 
believe. Apart from piracy and illicit trade, other acts of 
maritime lawlessness such as the wrecking and looting of 
ships have rarely received more than the passing attention 
of scholars. 
One of the most significant and revealing aspects of 
the "maritime frontier" mentality is that the attitudes and 
behavior associated with it were by no means restricted to 
5 See, for example, Hugh Rankin, The Golden Age of 
Piracy (New York, 1969); Donald Shomette, Pirates on the 
Chesapeake, (Centerville, Md, 1985); and Lloyd H. Will1ams, 
Pirates of Colonial Virginia (Richmond, 1937). Robert E. 
Lee, Blackbeard the Pirate: A Reappraisal of His Life and 
Times (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1974) takes a legal approach to 
the questions surrounding the notorious pirate's criminal 
career while in North Carolina, especially his relationship 
with the proprietary colony's authorities and the role of 
Virginia's royal governor and Royal Navy personnel in the 
buccaneer's defeat and the distribution of his booty. 
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the colonies or to individuals of low socioeconomic status. 
The notion that activities which were proscribed on land 
might be tolerated, even encouraged, in the maritime sphere 
had clear and ancient precedents in the home country. The 
fourteenth-century reign of Richard II, for example, has 
been characterized as one "remarkable for the number of 
pardons granted for acts of ••• wrecking, p-iracy, and 
smuggling." 6 By the seventeenth century, lawlessness 
7 
involving gentlemen of high rank on the maritime frontier of 
England had become a fairly commonplace affair and one which 
would demonstrably influence the attitudes and actions of 
England's overseas emigrants and descendants during the 
col~nial era. As a result, not only slaves and servants, 
common criminals, and free persons of modest means but some 
of the foremost citizens and colonial officials -- including 
customs collectors, Royal Navy officers, and governors --
actively participated in various forms of illicit trade and 
revenue fraud, illegally sought to benefit personally from 
shipwreck episodes, and even colluded with pirates. 
Understanding maritime lawlessness in a greater 
Chesapeake that includes Maryland and northeast North 
Carolina -- in many respects a single economic region 
requires that the phenomenon be viewed not as an isolated 
aberration, but rather as consistent with, and a product of, 
6 Henry Atton and Henry H. Holland, The King's Customs: 
An Account of Maritime Revenue and Contraband Traffic in 
England, 2 vols. (New York 1967), I, 28. 
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an ethical environment which tolerated and even encouraged 
such illegal activity during the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries in both the colonies and the home 
country. 7 Nor, of course, was it a problem confined to the 
Chesapeake. In sentencing the "gentleman" pirate Stede 
8 
Bonnet to death in 1718, the chief justice of South Carolina 
attributed the pirate's misdeeds directly to the harmful 
effects of such a degenerate moral climate, expressing 
regret that the principles of religion instilled in Bonnet 
through his education had been corrupted, "if not entirely 
defaced, by the Scepticism and Infidelity of this wicked 
Age." 8 So pervasive and threatening had the manifestations 
of the prevailing morality become by the end of the 
seventeenth century, warned a New Jersey governor, that if 
something was not done to curb the general spirit of 
lawlessness "the strongest hand and the longest sword" would 
constitute "the best titles to estates in the colonies." 9 
It was convenient, of course, and perhaps only natural, 
for English officials to identify distant or external 
factors in the colonies as the source of the trouble: the 
colonists' loose morals, the venality of provincial 
7 Clive Senior, A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in 
Its Heyday (New York, 1976), 126-28. 
8 Daniel Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, 
Manuel Schonhorn, ed., (Columbia, S.C., 1972), 1~8. 
9 CSPC, XV, il2~3, p. 565; Joseph D. Doty, The British 
Admiralty:Board as a Factor in Colonial Administration, 
1689-1763 (Philadelphia, 193~), 69. 
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9 
officials, irresponsible proprietary administrators, and 
even, perhaps, the occasional corrupt royal governor. 
Seldom did anyone, much less crown authorities themselves, 
suggest that the root causes might lie closer to home. on 
rare occasions, however, an astute social critic would 
pierce the veil of hypocrisy. Commenting on the second 
volume of A General History of the Pyrates, for example, a 
modern scholar has observed that contemporary author Daniel 
Defoe "suddenly revealed another world shockingly analogous" 
to that of the pirates and smugglers, "a world of 
politicians and statesmen, in which a more sophisticated 
group of robbers, thieves, and profligates" shamelessly 
exploited their status and influence to violate, with 
virtual impunity, the very same prohibitions which they and 
their associates complained about so indignantly. 10 
In defense of the influential men of Defoe's era, 
official encouragement and support of illicit maritime 
activities such as piracy and smuggling already had achieved 
the status of time-honored traditions by the eighteenth 
century. Despite periodic attempts to suppress piracy as 
early as the 1300s, the practice of conducting depredations 
against foreign ships achieved respectability in England 
1° Manuel Schonhorn in Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 
xxxvii. 
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10 
during the following centuries. 11 The distinction between 
piracy and privateering, never clear in the first place, 
grew particularly blurred during the yea~s of Anglo-Spanish 
rivalry in the reign of Elizabeth I. As a result, piracy 
became established rather firmly as an English institution, 
a development regretfully acknowledged by the virgin queen's 
successor, James I, who, as early as 1620, lamented that 
"this accursed plague introduced by Queen Elizabeth by 
permitting piracy to her subjects, is even now too deeply 
rooted among these people."12 
If English sea marauding had a redeeming characteristic 
(apart from contributing to the national treasury ar.d 
serving as a "nursery" for English seamen), it was that 
piracy constituted a remarkably egalitarian phenomenon for 
its time, drawing active participation as well as financial 
and logistical support from all classes of society.l3 
Although most pirate captains appear to have come from 
lower-class backgrounds, these maritime outlaws often were 
11 c. L. Ewen, "Organized Piracy Around England in the 
Sixteenth Century," Mariners Mirror, 34 (1949), 30-31; Helen 
J. Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Seventeenth 
Century (London, 1931), 7; c. L. Kingsford, "West Country 
Piracy: The School of English Seamen" in Prejudice and 
Promise in Fifteenth-Century England (London, 1962) 92. 
12 senior, Nation of Pirates, 8-9, 75. 
13 Ewen, "Organized Piracy," 33; M. Oppenheim, 
"Maritime History" in The Victoria History of the County of 
Cornwall, William Page, ed., (London 1906) I, 489; Senior, 
Nation of Pirates, 56; Henry Manwaring, The Life and Works 
of Sir Henry Mainwaring, G.E. Manwaring and W.G. Perrin, 
eds., 2 vols., (London, 1920-21), II: 41 n. 2. 
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well connected socially. 14 A late sixteenth-century 
freebooter (who had developed a particularly dastardly 
reputation for brutality toward his victims) boasted, for 
example, that he had 11 better friendes in Englande than eanye 
alderman or merchants of London, .. a claim echoed over a 
century later by the infamous pirate Blackbeard who was 
heard to brag that there was no home in North Carolina where 
he was not a welcome guest.l5 
Sponsorship by members of the English gentry and the 
collusion of local officials and even England's lord high 
admiral helped to promote piratical ventures and the 
development of trading networks to dispose of the 
freebooters' loot. 16 With so many men of high rank 
investing a personal stake in the pirates' success, official 
efforts to control the marauders were, not surprisingly, 
11 hesitating and ineffectual 11 and legal prosecutions often 
amounted to little more than sham proceedings. 17 The case 
of two Cornish squires who served on government commissions 
14 B. Richard Burg, 11 Legitimacy and Authority: A Case 
Study of Pirate Commanders in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, .. American Neptune, 37 (1977), 45-47. 
1 5 Ewen, "Organized Piracy, .. 38~ Lee, Blackbeard, 66~ 
Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 77. 
16 Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against 
the Pirates (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 12-14~ David Mathew, 
11 The Cornish and Welsh Pirates in the Reign of Elizabeth, .. 
English Historical Review, 39 (1924), 337~ Ewen, 11 0rganized 
Piracy," 38-41~ Senior, Nation of Pirates, 46, 84. 
17 Cyrus H. Karraker, Piracy Was a Business (Rindge, 
N.H., 1953), 34. 
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inquiring into piracy while simultaneously engaging in or 
actively sponsoring similar ventures themselves does not 
appear to have been uncommon. 18 
Local inhabitants collaborated with pirates most 
intensively in the southwest of England and southern 
Ireland. 19 Piracy had so many investors in Cornwall and 
12 
Devon, in fact, that any serious initiative to eradicate the 
industry, one historian has speculated, might have incited 
an insurrection in those counties. 20 Support was also 
strong in London where many residents (known by their 
contemporaries as "land pirates") defied royal authority by 
aiding the sea robbers and facilitating their escape from 
law enforcement officials. 21 
Despite James I's efforts to suppress piracy, it was 
his son, Charles I, paradoxically, who sanctioned acts of 
piracy in the Red Sea and accepted a share of the proceeds 
himself.22 James's grandson, Charles II, contributed to the 
18 Kingsford, "West Country Piracy," 95-102. 
19 senior, Nation of Pirates, 46; Ritchie, Captain 
Kidd, 12. In the second decade of the seventeenth century 
~famous reformed pirate Sir Henry Mainwaring expressed 
his conviction that, although acts of piracy were committed 
more often in English waters, "yet in proportion Ireland 
doth much exceed it, for it may be well called the Nursery 
and storehouse of Pirates, in regard of the general good 
entertainment they receive there" (Mainwaring, Life and 
works, II, 15-16, 46-48). 
20 Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 35. 
21 Senior, Nation of Pirates, 120-24. 
22 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 14. 
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westward expansion of piracy into the Caribbean by not only 
condoning the allegedly brutal exploits of Henry Morgan, but 
by knighting the marauder and elevating him to the post of 
deputy governor of Jamaica. 23 As long as piracy continued 
to serve the economic interests of both the Jamaican 
colonists and the royal government, the crown had little 
incentive to discourage the practice. England could not 
afford to assign a naval fleet to the island, but Jamaican 
governors, acting in accordance with the prevailing "no 
peace beyond the line" doctrine that defined relations 
between European powers in the New World, found that they 
could promote the home country's imperial ambitions by 
issuing buccaneers privateering commissions to attack 
Spanish settlements and shipping. 24 Island merchants 
23 Shirley Carter Hughson, The Carolina Pirates and 
Colonial Commerce, 1670-1740 (Baltimore, 1894), 17; A. o. 
Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America: Comprising a 
pertinent and truthful description of the principal acts of 
de redation and inhuman cruelt committed b the English and 
French buccaneers against the Spaniards in America Lon on, 
1973), passim; P. K. Kemp and Christopher Lloyd, The 
Brethren of the Coast: British and French Buccaneers in the 
south Seas (London, 1960), 21, 30-31; Violet Barbour, 
"Privateers and Pirates in the West Indies," American 
Historical Review, XVI (April 1911), 555, 563; RichardS. 
Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the 
English West Indies, 1624-1713 (New York, 1973), xv; 
Bartholomew R. Carroll, Historical Collections of South 
Carolina; Embracing Many Rare and Valuable Documents, 
Relating to the History of that State from its First 
Discovery to its Independence in the Year 1776, (New York, 
1836), I, 86. 
24 
"Beyond the line" referred to the area in the 
Atlantic Ocean west of the prime meridian and south of the 
Tropic of Cancer in which European rivals were free, by 
mutual agreement, to challenge one another's territorial 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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benefited both as purveyors of provisions to the pirates and 
as recipients, in turn, of desirable goods at low cost. 25 
When the European colonial powers decided in the final 
quarter of the seventeenth century that it was in their 
collective and individual interests to suppress piracy in 
the Caribbean, they undertook stern measures ·to effect its 
eradication. 26 Many buccaneers who feared the hangman's 
noose but were unprepared to abandon their profession 
consequently gravitated toward the North American mainland 
where they received favorable treatment from English 
colonists. When considering attitudes sympathetic toward 
buccaneers in the Chesapeake in particular, it may be of 
some significance that the vast majority of immigrants to 
the region in the seventeenth century embarked from London 
claims and rights of free passage without endangering 
peaceful relations at home. The result, as one historian 
has described it, was that the Caribbean became "the Wild 
west of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (Dunn, 
Sugar and Slaves, chapter 1, especially pp. 9-11; Carl and 
Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line: The English 
in the Caribbean 1624-1690 [New York, 1972], 169-70). 
25 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 15. Pennsylvania proprietor 
William Penn underscored the importance of Jamaica's role in 
the proliferation of English New World piracy when he 
identified the island as the "seminary, where pirates have 
commenced Masters of Art, after having practised upon the 
Spaniard and then launched for the Red and Arabian Seas" 
(CSPC, XVIII, i366, p. 211). 
26 John H. Parry, Trade and Dominion: The European 
overseas Empires in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1971), 
44. 
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and the southwestern port of Bristol, two areas associated 
with extensive popular support for piracy. 27 
The documented history of illicit trade In England, 
like that of piracy, dates back centuries before the 
colonial era.2 8 Two salient insights derived from 
15 
research on this early contraband trade have implications of 
special relevance for the greater Chesapeake. The first, 
that illegal trade was conducted primarily through the 
outports rather than London because of the difficulty 
associated with smuggling near a principal port and 
administrative center, suggests that an area like the 
greater Chesapeake, which lacked major commercial entrep8ts 
and urban centers, would have been even more conducive to 
such activity.29 The second, that the bulk of the 
unlawful commerce was performed with the connivance and, in 
many instances, the active participation of the same 
27 James Horn, 11 Servant Immigration to the Chesapeake 
in the Seventeenth Century 11 in The Chesapeake in the 
Seventeenth Centur : Essa s on An lo-American Society and 
Politics, Thad w. Tate and David Ammerman, eds. New York, 
1979)' 66. 
28 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, chapters 1-4 offers 
the most comprehensive analysis of English smuggling in the 
precolonial and colonial eras. For additional background 
see Atton and Holland, King's Customs, I; Charles G. Harper, 
The Smu lers: Pictures ue Cha ters in the Stor of an 
Ancient Craft London, 1909); and Neville Williams, The 
Maritime Trade of the East Anglian Ports, 1550-1590 (Oxford, 
1988) • 
29 Williams, East Anglian Ports, 25. 
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government functionaries who were charged with detecting and 
preventing it, indicates a long-standing precedent for 
official corruption and collaboration at the local 
leve1. 3 ~ 
Early customs violations in England generally involved 
the unlicensed exportation of domestic wool, wine, and 
foodstuffs. 31 Repeated government attempts to restrict 
foreign imports through legislation like the Corn Laws 
(dating from 1361) were openly derided and, in fact, only 
served to encourage contraband trafficking. 32 Many of the 
related institutional abuses, including bribery and 
extortion, and certain contraband techniques such as the use 
of counterfeit customs certificates that would play integral 
parts in the illicit trade of the greater Chesapeake are 
well documented in the precolonial history of the home 
country. 33 
While these offenses continued into the seventeenth 
century, the founding of an overseas colony in Virginia led 
to the delineation of a navigation system for the whole 
empire. Debates as early as 1619 over the Virginia 
3~ Ibid.; Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 6~. 
31 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 27-29; Oppenheim, 
"Maritime History," 478; Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 3; 
Williams, East Anglian Ports, 27. 
32 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 31. 
33 Ibid., 19, 29, 31, 32; Williams, East Anglian Ports, 
25-33; Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 6~. 
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Company's tobacco contract with the crown resulted in the 
formation of a policy by which colonial planters were 
granted a monopoly of the English rnarket. 34 In return, 
the colonists assumed obligations to export their produce 
17 
exclusively to the mother country, to conduct no trade with 
foreigners nor ship their goods aboard foreign vessels, and 
to pay duties on colonial imports into England.35 
Virginia's compliance with the scheme was spotty, at best, 
with frequent violations involving tobacco exports to 
Holland and Dutch colonies and the importation of European 
manufactured goods into Virginia aboard Dutch ships. 36 
Back in the horne country the codification of this 
commercial policy, beginning with Parliament's passage of 
the first Navigation Act in 1651, appears to have inspired a 
significant increase in smuggling in response to the 
additional restrictions imposed on international 
cornrnerce.3 7 To some degree, then, the development of 
illicit trade in the American colonies (where the Navigation 
34 Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American 
History, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1934-1938), IV, 13. 
35 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
12-20. 
36 Ibid., I, 158-59 n. 6; IV, 17. Also see, for 
example, Jennings c. Wise, Ye Kingdorne of Accawrnacke or the 
Eastern Shore of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century 
(Richmond, 1911), 147-48 and Susie M. Ames, Studies of the 
Virginia Eastern Shore in the Seventeenth Century (Richmond, 
1940), 45-49, 95. 
37 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 94, 116, 129-30. 
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Acts also introduced new regulations to tighten the 
commercial system) paralleled, and was contemporary with, 
comparable illegal activity in England. 38 As was the case 
with other social, cultural, and economic institutions, 
18 
however, the nature of the central regulatory agencies which 
eventually would evolve in England undoubtedly influenced 
the character of their colonial derivatives and subsidiaries 
to a significant degree. 
So if, as scholars have alleged, the English customs 
administration of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
truly was "riddled with abuses" and if smuggling actually 
amounted, as some historians and contemporaries have 
liberally estimated, to anywhere from a third to half of. all 
English commerce, then it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that similar problems may have plagued the trade of colonial 
38 In one category of customs abuse, violence committed 
against revenue officers, residents of the greater 
Chesapeake actually may have played a leading role. 
According to Neville Williams, attacks against customs 
officers were fairly common in medieval England, but seem to 
have dissipated considerably during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries (Contraband Cargoes, 12). The 
greatest physical harm to customs collectors in any of the 
American colonies before 1750 was perpetrated by Marylanders 
and North Carolinians in the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century, while most of the comparable documented instances 
in England during the colonial era appear to have occurred 
no earlier than the second decade of the eighteenth (Atton 
and Holland, The King's Customs, 179, 181, 230-31, 255, 465; 
Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 505; Harper, The Smugglers, 
passim, especially chapters III-V). 
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North America. 39 Practical innovations in smuggling 
methods and the increased sophistication of contraband 
networks during the period also contributed to the 
development of illicit trade as a significant, though 
basically immeasurable, element of the Anglo-American 
colonial trade system.40 
Not surprisingly, the generally tolerant attitude 
19 
toward smuggling (or, at least, the inability to control it 
effectively) manifested itself in England's New World trade 
activities as well. Parliament's approval of an act 
creating the South Sea Company in 1711 represented, in its 
time, only the latest and least overtly hostile expression 
of the long-standing British desire to penetrate illegally 
the Spanish commercial monopoly in the West Indies and the 
Central and South American mainland. 41 Historians usually 
39 G. D. Ramsey, "The Smuggler's Trade: A Neglected 
Aspect of English Commercial Development," Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, ser. 5, vol. 2 (1952), 133, 
135; Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 28. Though such 
calculations are clearly on the high side, historian Marcus 
Rediker has deemed it "safe -- and conservative -- to 
estimate that the trade of the empire exceeded customs 
accounts by 15 to 20 percent," a significant figure by any 
measure (Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant 
Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 
1700-1750 [Cambridge, 1987], 73 n. 144). 
40 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 72; James F. Shepherd and 
Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade and the Economic 
Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge, 1972), 
205; Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 63, 71. 
41 Barbour, "Privateers and Pirates," passim; John G. 
Sperling, The South Sea Company: An Historical Essay and 
Bibliographical Finding List (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 1, 
8-11; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 140, 
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identify the malfeasance of company directors most directly 
with the defrauding of corporation shareholders in the 
scandal known as the South Sea Bubble, but the "aura of 
corruption," as one scholar has characterized prevailing 
business attitudes within the company, filtered down to the 
field agents as well.42 
Since the parameters of the trade agreement that 
England negotiated with Spain at the conclusion of Queen 
Anne's War were so restrictive, the English project was 
doomed to failure as a legitimate financial venture from the 
start. At the stockholders' expense, however, servants of 
the government-sanctioned enterprise engaged in an extensive 
illicit trade with the Spanish New World colonies, sharing 
their profits with company directors and, frequently, Royal 
Navy officers who provided protection for the smugglers. 43 
Not only did the crown tacitly approve of the illicit 
trading activity, but, during the War of Jenkins' Ear, it 
also permitted the deployment of Royal Navy ships to protect 
British contrabandists, prompting English contemporaries as 
249, 354. 
42 Sperling, South Sea Company, 23, 27; John Carswell, 
The South Sea Bubble (Stanford, Calif., 1960). 
43 Sperling, South Sea Company, 7-8, 23-24, 40, 44; 
Vera L. Brown, "The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade," 
American Historical Review, XXXI no. 4 (July 1926), 672, 
676; Marcus Rediker, "Society and Culture among 
Anglo-American Deep Sea Sailors, 1700-1750," Ph.D. 
dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1983), 39; 
Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 142. 
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well as modern historians to suggest that the government 
prosecuted the war principally to allow British smugglers to 
continue to violate Spanish prohibitions against foreign 
commerce. 44 Small wonder, then, in view of their own 
rulers' disregard for the restrictive trade regulations of 
other nations, that many Anglo-American colonists showed 
little respect for, or inclination to comply with, the 
mercantilist policies of their own government. 
The home country not only promoted illegal trade in the 
colonies incidentally by its example in the eighteenth 
century, but directly as a result of its penal policies. In 
1719 Parliament decreed that the most dangerous 
contrabandists of all, those convicted of armed smuggling, 
would be transported to the colonies. 45 The government 
dispatched so many of these criminals overseas, according to 
one historian, that contemporary Englishmen believed that 
the crown was nurturing its empire on the doctrine of 
illicit trade. 46 
The looting of wrecked and stranded vessels represents 
another type of maritime illegality which had clear 
44 Brown, "The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade," 
667; Parry, Trade and Dominion, lle; Williams, Contraband 
cargoes, 143; Rediker, "Anglo-American Sailors," 42. 
45 Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws: A 
Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Social Engineering (New 
York, 1973), 217. 
46 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 140. 
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precedents in both the home country and the early New World 
colonies. According to an English statute of 1275, 
disposition of the effects of vessels cast ashore was the 
king's prerogative. Owners of the cargo might sue for the 
return of their goods and, upon presenting proof of 
ownership within a year, their claim would be honored. 47 
In the absence of such a claim, proceeds from the sale of 
the effects would be distributed among the salvors with the 
king, and possibly an assig~ee, receiving a share. 
Notwithstanding these theoretical safeguards, numerous 
destructive episodes in which the law was openly violated 
have been documented in England from as early as the 
mid-fourteenth century. 48 By 1526 an English judge had to 
explain to the distressed owner of a plundered vessel which 
had stranded on the Cornwall coast that no redress could be 
expected since wrecking was simply "the custom of the 
country," a custom, according to a modern scholar, which 
remained "immutable through the centuries." 49 As late as 
1771 a Scotsman incurred the wrath of his community for 
rescuing some shipwrecked mariners and assisting in the 
47 3 Ed. I. c. 4. Danby Pickering, ed., The Statutes 
at Large ••• of Great Britain, continued as Statutes of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Cambridge 
and London, 1762-1869), I, 79. Cited hereafter as 
Pickering, English Statutes. 
48 Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 478-79, 496, 499, 
502. 
49 Ibid., 486. 
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recovery of their cargo. Irate neighbors rewarded the good 
samaritan by ransacking his house and attempting to burn it 
down. Eventually, they persuaded him to leave the region 
altogether for daring to interfere with what they regarded, 
according to historian Bernard Bailyn, as their "ancient 
right of pillage."5B 
For the most part, shipwrecks were considered 
fortuitous occurrences which offered opportunities to 
coastal inhabitants, and even shipwrecked sailors, to 
"committ very great Ravage and Plunder" with little feir of 
retribution. 51 English law provided that local residents 
and seamen who recovered provisions and other goods from 
shipwrecks were entitled to salvage fees under certain 
conditions, one of which was that only an incapacitated 
vessel having no survivors could be condemned legally, a 
requirement which, it has been alleged, induced some 
unscrupulous wreckers, particularly on the coast of 
Cornwall, to see to it that those who managed to reach shore 
alive did not remain so for long. 52 While there does not 
appear to be any reliable evidence to substantiate the 
50 Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in 
the Peo~ling of America on the Eve of the Revolution (New 
York, 1 86), SBB-502. 
51 Cited in Rediker, "Anglo-American Sailors," 14~. 
Also see Birse Shepard, The Lore of the Wreckers (Boston, 
1962), 34. 
52 Arthur H. Norway, Highways and Byways in Devon and 
Cornwall (London, 1911), 279; Shepard, Lore of the 
Wreckers, 35. 
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charge of murder, many instances of local opposition to the 
efforts of royal agents to secure wrecks for the benefit of 
the crown or the shipowner have been documented. 5 3 such 
resistance often was accompanied by threats of physical 
violence against those who tried to interfere, causing 
horrified English authorities to denounce "the cruelty and 
inhumanity of the people inhabiting the coasts" after one 
wrecking episode and the "dishonest and savage practices of 
the common people" after another.54 
When the English began colonizing the New World, royal 
authorities had to take the potential for such abuses into 
consideration. In fact, historians have identified the need 
to protect the lives and interests of shipwreck survivors as 
a principal reason for establishing a vice-admiralty court 
in Bermuda in the late seventeenth century. 55 The royal 
government also customarily granted to certain favored 
companies and individuals admiralty rights, or droits, which 
included a percentage of the proceeds from sales of 
condemned goods from shipwrecks. As a colonizing enterprise 
which enjoyed the protection of the other legal safeguards 
related to wrecks, the Bermuda Company benefited from the 
53 Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 496, 5~2~ Atton and 
Holland, King's Customs, 255~ Norway, Devon and Cornwall, 
294-96. 
54 Cited in Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 5~2. 
5 5 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 78-79, 117~ 
Harper, English Navigation Laws, 185. 
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establishment of vice-admiralty jurisdiction in this respect 
as well. 56 Along with the privilege, however, went the 
responsibility of insuring that proper procedures would be 
followed with respect to the rights of other legitimate 
claimants. 57 
In 1621 Spanish authorities complained to company 
officials that local Bermudians had pillaged the wreck and 
abused the passengers of a Spanish treasure ship that was 
cast away on the English island. In a similar situation two 
decades later, officials in the home country demonstrated 
that their primary concern was neither the safety of 
surviving passengers nor the illegality of wrecking per se, 
but rather securing the crown's share of the loot. 
England's lord high admiral implied that the company's 
failure to remand the royal allotment in this instance was 
the result, moreover, of collusion between the wreckers and 
colonial officials. Bermuda's governor subsequently managed 
to compel several individuals to give up their pillaged 
goods, but they, in turn, had the temerity to sue the royal 
5 6 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 78-79. In 
the greater Chesapeake similar droits are recorded as having 
been claimed by Samuel Tilghman in Maryland in 1659, Robert 
Brent in Virginia in 1693, and Robert Houlden on behalf of 
the Carolina proprietors in 1679 (Md. A., XLI, 302-303; 
Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 61; VMHB, XIV, 100; 
CRNC, I, 240; David Stick, The Outer Banks of North 
carolina, 1584-1958 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1958), 24. 
57 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 84. 
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official and, perhaps to no one's surprise, won their 
case. 58 
26 
Shortly after mid-century the company and the colonial 
government were still trying, without success, to recover 
those effects from the Spanish ship that remained in the 
islanders' possession. Various attempts to chasten the 
colonists in subsequent years through legal mechanisms and 
official proclamations appear to have achieved negligible 
results. A series of looting incidents over the next two 
decades involving stranded English merchant ships 
demonstrates that the wreckers also were impartial as far as 
the nationality of their prey was concerned.59 
The same patterns of behavior -- the virtually 
unrestricted plundering of wrecked vessels without regard to 
ownership or origin, the reluctance to cooperate with 
colonial authorities in safeguarding wrecks for the king and 
distributing the proceeds from the sale of salvaged effects 
in the lawfully prescribed manner, and the unwillingness of 
general court juries to convict fellow colonists who 
participated in the plunder -- all were repeated 
periodically on the North American mainland along the 
Eastern Shore and Outer Banks of the greater Chesapeake 
during the colonial era. 
58 Ibid., 83-84. 
59 ~., 84-85. 
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Admittedly, the ability to demonstrate the existence 
and especially the precise extent of lawlessness on the 
maritime frontier is difficult. Most of those who engaged 
in illegitimate enterprises had no desire to publicize their 
affairs and undoubtedly went to great pains to suppress any 
evidence of such illicit activities, particularly their own 
involvement. Consequently, first-hand accounts of 
participation in smuggling, customs fraud, aiding or trading 
with pirates, wrecking, etc. are practically nonexistent. 
Any attempt to quantify that which was never intended to be 
discovered would almost certainly be futile. That dearth of 
hard evidence explains why estimates of the actual extent of 
smuggling, for example, range from as little as five to as 
much as fifty percent of all English overseas commerce for 
the years in question. 60 Additionally, the destruction of 
most Virginia cou~ty court records during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries severely limits the amount of judicial 
proceedings and trial testimony available to the researcher. 
But documentary evidence of illicit activities is 
available in a number of primary sources including official 
records and reports of the home and colonial governments; 
contemporary newspapers; official correspondence between 
colonial governors, surveyors of the customs, the Board of 
Trade, and the Treasury; and the private papers of various 
60 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 72; Andrews, Colonial Period 
of American History, IV, 241; Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 
28. 
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officials and colonists. Since maritime lawbreakers usually 
were extremely adept at concealing their activities from 
public and official notice it sometimes becomes necessary, 
as one researcher has remarked, "to focus attention mainly 
upon the fumblings of the government" in its efforts to stem 
the tide of lawlessness on the "sea frontiers." 61 In 
addition to actual reports of maritime illegality, 
inferences about the existence and extent of illicit affairs 
and official corruption can be made on the basis of the 
content and tone of government proclamations warning 
colonists and governors about the consequences of various 
illegal actions and the frequency with which these warnings 
were issued. 
Naturally, such official declarations must also be 
viewed with a degree of skepticism. Just as the 
perpetrators went to considerable lengths to obscure their 
activities, so too were some officials inclined to 
exaggerate the extent of lawlessness in the greater 
Chesapeake either to discredit proprietary rule or, 
especially in the case of customs agents whose compensation 
was tied to a percentage of seizures and condemnations, to 
persuade crown authorities to commit greater resources to 
the capture of maritime lawbreakers. On the other hand, one 
must also take into account, as the officials themselves 
certainly must have done, that too much hyperbole about 
6 1 Ramsey, "The Smuggler's Trade," 156. 
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maritime lawlessness might produce the undesirable result of 
suggesting that the enforcers simply were not doing their 
jobs or, at the very least, not doing them well. 
Although the extent to which Chesapeake inhabitants 
actually engaged in or abetted maritime illegality cannot be 
deduced with accuracy from official statements, still the 
constant fretting of authorities is itself inherently 
significant as a tacit admission that the government could 
not effectively enforce the Navigation Acts or the laws 
designed to prevent collaboration with freebooters. 
Conversely, the almost complete absence of comment or 
complaint by Chesapeake residents about the evils of illicit 
trade, assisting pirates, or looting stranded vessels 
implies that the colonists did not regard any of these 
undertakings as serious transgressions, much less as the 
heinous crimes against which royal officials continually 
inveighed. 
Colonists rarely denounced their neighbors for 
participating in such activities, partly because, as one 
deponent reported, anyone who informed ran the risk of being 
ostracized or, worse, suffering bodily harm. On the 
infrequent occasions when Chesapeake inhabitants did 
complain to royal authorities about the perpetration of 
maritime illegalities, it was usually because the colonists 
believed that their own safety or financial interests were 
in jeopardy. Apart from these instances, colonial 
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Virginians, Marylanders, and North Carolinians generally 
failed to support, and in many cases actively opposed, 
government officials in the effort to execute the laws 
against smuggling, piracy, and wrecking. Such defiance not 
only took the form of continued lawbreaking, but also 
manifested itself in common-law courts where juries 
consistently failed to convict alleged perpetrators, and in 
colonial assemblies where legislators refused to enact 
statutes to help implement crown policies. And so, despite 
the difficulty of discovering the full evidence and 
interpreting that which is available, a pattern nevertheless 
emerges from the documents that do survive of a widespread 
and systematic violation of the Navigation Acts and other 
maritime laws in the greater Chesapeake, one that employed 
an impressive variety of methods of evasion and defiance. 
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CHAPTER II 
"Turbulent spirits, stubborn and disloyal hearts and 
treacherous and wicked inclinations": The Political and 
Economic Context of Illicit Trade in the Greater Chesapeake 
In October 171~ the newly installed governor of 
Virginia, Alexander Spotswood, sent the bishop of London a 
glowing character appraisal of his colony's inhabitants: "I 
have observed here less swearing and Prophaneness, less 
Drunkenness and Debauchery, less uncharitable feuds and 
animositys, and less Knaverys and Villanys than in any other 
part of the world where my Lot has been." But the governor 
also felt constrained to add, "Whether the natural cause of 
this blessing be the people's living under less worldly 
Temptations ••• or that they are more dextrous in 
concealing from me their Vices, I will not as yet pretend to 
decide ••• whether this be the real or my imaginary State 
of Virginia."1 
What caused Spotswood to qualify his laudatory 
assessment? Perhaps it was simply the prudent caution of a 
1 Alexander Spotswood, The Official Letters of 
Alexander Spotswood, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of 
Virginia, 171~-1722, Robert A. Brock, ed., 2 vols. 
(Richmond, 1882-85), I, 28. 
31 
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political appointee and career military man who sought to 
avoid being judged naive in light of subsequent, 
unforeseeable developments. There is reason to believe, 
however, that the governor already had grounds for 
s~spicion. On the same day he wrote the bishop, Spotswood 
also sent a report to the Council of Trade in which he was 
obliged to admit that, despite his conscientious efforts, he 
had failed to discover who was responsible for conducting 
unlawful commerce between Virginia and the Dutch West 
Indies. In view of the meticulous investigation detailed in 
the report, it is evident that the perpetrators had been 
very "dextrous" indeed in concealing from the authorities "a 
Trade so pernitious to her Majesty's Interest and 
Service." 2 
Like other forms of maritime lawlessness, illicit trade 
originated in the greater Chesapeake well before Spotswood's 
time and, like the others, continued long after. A series 
of navigation acts legislated by Parliament during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries established the 
restrictions which defined illicit commerce. The first of 
these, passed in 1651 and principally aimed at undermining 
the Dutch carrying trade, specified that no European goods 
could be imported into England or her colonies except on 
English ships. The Navigation Act of 166g reiterated the 
2 Ibid., I, 19. 
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previous legislation and also restricted the exportation of 
certain enumerated commodities, including tobacco, from the 
colonies exclusively to England or other English ports. 
Already by 1662, however, the home government's 
dissatisfaction with the level of compliance in Virginia was 
evident in the royal instructions to Governor William 
Berkeley: "we have certain knowledge that there is greater 
endeavors used by the Ill arts of some and negligence of 
others to defraud us of the freight and benefit which would 
accrue by the act of Parliament concerning Navigation if the 
same was carefully and faithfully executed and observed." 3 
In 1673 Parliament passed the Plantation Duty Act which 
established a penny per pound tax on the exportation of 
enumerated goods from one English colony to another. 
According to the Commissioners of the Customs, the duty was 
imposed "less for revenue than to prevent exportation of 
goods from Colony to Colony and so to foreign countries in 
Europe, evading the English customs." 4 Nevertheless, the 
attempt to collect the duty retroactively against a New 
England merchant trading to North Carolina provided the 
catalyst for Culpeper's Rebellion in 1677. Efforts to 
enforce the Navigation Acts continued to meet strong, 
sometimes violent opposition from residents of the greater 
3 VMHB, III, 18; Harold B. Gill, Jr., "The Naval Office 
in Virginia, 1692-17gg," M.A. thesis (College of William and 
Mary, 1959), 6. 
4 CSPC, XIII, #23g6, p. 662. 
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Chesapeake. Political disturbances in Virginia and Maryland 
in succeeding decades resulted in the death of royal customs 
collectors in each colony. 
For the remainder of the seventeenth century English 
authorities continued to express their annoyance with the 
failure to curtail illicit trade and customs fraud in the 
greater Chesapeake. The home government's concern extended 
beyond the nefarious activities of the colonists to the 
officials who had been appointed to enforce the trade laws, 
but whose negligence or complicity had done little to 
advance the crown's cause. Nearing the century's end with 
no appreciable improvement in trade law enforcement, the 
Board of Trade (successor to the Lords of Trade, a committee 
of the Privy Council) undertook a major legislative and 
administrative initiative which resulted in passage of the 
Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the 
Plantation Trade in 1696. 
The reforms mandated by the act succeeded in correcting 
many of the most glaring abuses, but smuggling, official 
corruption, and a more generalized opposition to the royal 
authority embodied in the navigation laws and other 
regulations in the maritime sphere continued well into the 
next century. Although the number of official complaints 
about illicit commerce and related abuses in the Chesapeake 
appear to have declined during the half century ending in 
1750, evidence suggests that the reduction may have been due 
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to the laxity of British imperial administration, 
particularly after 1725, and to greater sophistication in 
the smuggler's trade and among those who practiced customs 
fraud. And while the overtly hostile, sometimes violent 
opposition that characterized the colonists' attitude toward 
royal customs agents moderated considerably after the turn 
of the century, the generally more comfortable relationship 
that developed between customs officials and colonial 
traders did not always necessarily redound to the benefit of 
the imperial treasury. 
In response to the imposition of the trade laws, 
smugglers in the greater Chesapeake and the rest of colonial 
America pursued several principal objectives: the evasion of 
customs duties, the shipment of enumerated goods to 
non-English ports, and the direct importation of foreign 
goods into the colonies. Technically, not all types of duty 
evasion constituted violations of the Navigation Acts since 
the colonial governments also assessed their own levies on 
exports such as furs and skins (which were not enumerated 
until 1721) and imports such as molasses (not enumerated 
until 1704), distilled liquors, indentured servants, and 
slaves. 5 Although the royal treasury did not suffer 
directly from the perpetration of these particular forms of 
5 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
98-101, 105. 
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customs fraud, the revenue from the provincial duties often 
provided a significant percentage of a colony's operating 
expenses which the crown otherwise would have had to 
subsidize. The historical record attests to efforts by 
Chesapeake merchants and shippers to circumvent all these 
tariffs, but by far the greatest volume of contraband 
traffic involved the smuggling of tobacco exports and 
imports of foreign manufactured goods. 6 
Predictably, most of the official correspondence 
between England and the Chesapeake colonies regarding trade 
during the 1650-1750 period reflects a paramount concern 
with the economic priorities of commerce regulation and 
revenue collection, but the historical documents also reveal 
that the broader issue of illegal trade included a 
significant political dimension as well. The first 
Navigation Act, for example, was designed not only to 
subvert the Dutch carrying trade with the English 
settlements, but also to punish colonies like Virginia for 
supporting the crown during the English Civil War. 7 Apart 
6 For examples of recorded attempts to smuggle skins, 
liquor, and slaves see Md. A., XX, 284; XXIV, 8; XXVII, 240, 
241; EJC, II, 42-43; NCHCR, 1702-1708, 470-71; CSPC, XVIII, 
#152,-p7 80; George Reese, ed., Proceedings in ~Court of 
Vice-Admiralty of Virginia 1698-1775 (Richmond, 1983), x, 20 
n. 47; Margaret s. Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 
1689-1715, Johns Hopkins University, Studies in Historical 
and Political Science, 32, no. 3 (Baltimore, 1914), 129. 
7 Leo F. Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the 
British Parliaments Respecting North America, 1542-1754, 
(Washington 1924-41), I, 218 n., 381; Andrews, Colonial 
Period of American History, IV, 35-36. 
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from the consequences to the regional economy of the 
Chesapeake, the legislation also may have had profound 
ramifications in terms of perceptions about the significance 
of illicit trade in the relationship between England and the 
colonies. By creating hardship in the realm of maritime 
commerce as a disciplinary measure for undesirable political 
behavior, the Commonwealth government may have unwittingly 
established a symbolic association between the two in the 
minds of Chesapeake colonists. Whether the 1651 Navigation 
Act actually crystallized this notion is purely conjectural, 
but it is clear that in time many of the region's 
inhabitants came to regard the maritime trade sphere as a 
principal arena for expressing opposition to the authority 
of the home government, whether Protectorate or royal. 8 
Some English officials viewed the colonists' disregard 
for the navigation laws not only as evidence of colonial 
defiance and intransigence, but also as an indication of 
weak or incompetent local administration. Although the home 
government certainly did not appreciate such ineffectual 
leadership, some crown officers nevertheless perceived in 
8 Such an association already may have existed in the 
minds of Englishmen involved in maritime commerce. In a 
landmark case in 1606 English judges ruled against a 
merchant who had refused to pay a certain duty because 
Parliament had not specifically authorized it, thereby 
upholding the king's prerogative to levy duties at will. 
"Henceforth," Neville Williams maintains, "the smuggler took 
on the role of a guardian of English liberties against the 
increasing despotism of the Crown" (Contraband Cargoes, 65). 
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the situation an opportunity to strengthen and consolidate 
imperial control in the recalcitrant regions as a remedy. 
One of the major law enforcement problems that royal 
authorities had to address, for example, was the almost 
universal unwillingness of the general courts in the greater 
Chesapeake to convict illicit traders, pirates, and their 
collaborators regardless of the persuasiveness of the 
evidence. As a result, Virginia governor Francis Nicholson 
predicted in 17~~ that maritime lawlessness would be "almost 
impossible to prevent ••• in this part of the world, 
except the Courts of Vice-Admiralty," that is, courts 
without juries presided over by judges appointed by the 
governors, "be well established." 9 Accordingly, a 
principal provision of the Act of 1696 called for the 
creation in the colonies of vice-admiralty courts whose 
judges would be far less sympathetic to contraband trade and 
piracy than the average denizens of the region. 1 ~ The 
measure unquestionably provided a useful tool in the 
campaign against illicit commerce, but it also conveniently 
served another, perhaps larger, imperial purpose. As 
Governor Nicholson explained, "These parts, being trading 
9 CSPC, XVIII, #523, p. 31~. 
1~ See, for example, Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 313 and 
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 251. 
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Colonies, seem to want and require such a Court, in order to 
keep them within their bounds of dependance."!! 
Political considerations related to the Navigation Acts 
in turn affected perceptions about the prevalence of illicit 
trade and who was responsible for it. Until North Carolina 
became a royal colony in 1729, one of the refrains most 
consistently voiced by royal officials was the difficulty, 
if not impossibility, of effectively enforcing the trade 
laws in the greater Chesapeake as long as one or more of the 
colonies remained under proprietary contro1. 12 In 1721 
the Board of Trade represented to the king that, although 
North Carolina had the benefit of a full complement of 
customs officials, "daily experience shows that illegal 
Trade is not to be prevented in a Proprietary 
Government." 13 
As was the case with piracy, the alleged involvement of 
colonists and officials in illicit trade in proprietary 
Maryland and North Carolina provided a convenient pretext 
for the advocates of charter nullification. Several years 
after the passage of the 1696 legislation, royal authorities 
ll CSPC, XVIII, #523, p. 31~. 
12 Edward Randolph, Edward Randolph 1676-17~3, 
Including His Letters and Official Papers from the New 
England, Middle and Southern Colonies in America, Robert N. 
Tappan and Alfred T. Goodrick, eds., 7 vols. (New York, 
1967), V: 135, 264-66, 27~-71; CRNC, I, 545-47; CSPC, XV, 
#149 i, p. 72; XVI, #451, p. 21r:-- ----
lJ CRNC, II 42n , v • 
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complained to the Carolina proprietors that, despite many 
previous laws and instructions for preventing fraud in the 
plantation trade, "very great Abuses have been and continue 
still to be practiced." Any failure to enforce "strict and 
punctual! observance" of the trade laws in Carolina in the 
future, crown officials warned, would be regarded as an 
"Infraction of those Laws tending to ye forfeiture of our 
Letters Patent for ye Government of that • • • 
Province." 14 While it is entirely possible that the 
impulse to discredit the proprietary colonies may have 
contribute~ to unfounded or exaggerated charges of 
wrongdoing, it also seems likely that sensitivity to the 
issue and fear of its negative repercussions may have 
discouraged proprietary officials from accurately reporting 
the volume of illicit trade and related instances of 
official corruption in their colonies. 
An additional consequence of the debate over the 
proprietary colonies was that it tended to obscure similar 
or worse transgressions that less suspect colonists and 
officials were perpetrating in royal Virginia (and Maryland 
during the period of direct crown control from 1691 to 
1715), precisely the point that Pennsylvania proprietor 
William Penn tried to impress on royal authorities when he 
boldly and indignantly asserted in 1701, "If I cannot prove 
proprietary Governments more Innocent and more Beneficial! 
14 Ibid., I, 504. 
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to the Crown than those that are called the Kings I will 
resign my Pretensions." 15 The Quaker proprietor 
41 
specifically charged that royal Maryland was guilty of much 
greater abuse of the trade laws than his own colony.l6 
These allegations, coming as they did from the founder 
of a proprietary colony, probably had only a limited impact. 
But a 1698 memorial submitted to the Board of Trade by 
Virginia attorney Benjamin Harrison must have been harder to 
ignore. "There is perhaps no place in the King's 
dominions," Harrison maintained, "where the methods of 
managing both the trade and the revenues are so exactly 
calculated to defraud the public, abuse the subject and 
prevent discovery thereof as the present constitutions 
demonstrate Virginia to be." 1 7 
Harrison's document is as remarkable for its source as 
its candid revelations. Testimonials by colonists detailing 
the manner in which illicit trade and customs fraud were 
perpetrated and identifying the participants were extremely 
rare. The reason, the Virginia attorney explained, was not 
that the violations occurred infrequently, but, quite the 
contrary, precisely because the wrongdoing was so pervasive. 
So many colonists, including men of high station, were 
15 Cited in Michael G. Hall, Edward Randolph and the 
American Colonies, 1676-1703 (Chapel Hill, 1960), 211. 
16 Ibid., 210-11. 
l7 CSPC, XVI, #656, p. 330. 
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intimately involved that "those who would endeavour to make 
any reformation" would "never fail to branded as persons of 
turbulent spirits, stubborn and disloyal hearts, and 
treacherous and wicked inclinations." Worse yet, those who 
dared to expose the abuses would be certain to encounter 
"all imaginable opposition and perhaps be pursued with rage 
and violence by those who think themselves likely to lose by 
the alteration."l8 
Harrison, it must be recognized, was not a totally 
disinterested observer. To a certain degree his views 
reflect machinations related to another important aspect of 
the political milieu, the arena of factional strife and 
interpersonal rivalries within each of the colonies of the 
greater Chesapeake. Related by marriage to the powerful and 
controversial cleric James Blair, Harrison not only shared 
Blair's personal animosity toward several members of the 
Council of Virginia but also had a financial interest in 
supporting the commissary against other councilors in a 
dispute over the disposition of lands which had been endowed 
for the founding of a college in the colony. 19 These 
factors undoubtedly influenced the attorney's negative 
characterization of the executive body as a whole including 
the alleged toleration of, and participation in, illicit 
18 Ibid. 
l9 warren M. Billings, John E. Selby, and Thad w. Tate, 
Colonial Virginia: A History (White Plains, N.Y., 1986), 
153, 155, 162, 166. 
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trade and customs fraud by some of its members. Similar 
contention with comparable implications for accurately 
assessing the extent of maritime lawlessness in the region 
also must be taken into account in North Carolina, 
especially in the Culpeper Rebellion and the Blackbeard 
affair, and Maryland, in the conflicts between crown 
loyalists and supporters of the various Lords Baltimore. 
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While the motives of individual deponents may not have 
been entirely selfless, other informants and respected 
government officials often provided corroborative testimony 
of maritime wrongdoing. Such evidence notwithstanding, 
historians have demonstrated a peculiar predisposition to 
portray the royal colonies of the Chesapeake as the obedient 
children of empire in contrast to their unruly siblings, 
particularly the charter colonies of New England, despite 
substantial indications to the contrary. Charles M. 
Andrews, for example, concluded that a decrease in the 
number of complaints about the Navigation Acts after 1673 
demonstrated that Virginians had reconciled themselves to 
the requirements of enumeration and the Plantation Duty and 
that passage by the assembly of an act imposing a two 
shilling per hogshead duty on tobacco exports should be 
viewed as proof that there was no significant opposition to 
the trade laws in genera1. 29 In describing an analogous 
2° Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
138. 
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situation in Jamaica, however, Andrews suggested that relief 
obtained through smuggling, not resignation to or compliance 
with the law, might account for a similar cessation of 
documented objections to trade restrictions. 21 Nor did 
Andrews accept the passage of laws in New England requiring 
obedience to the Navigation Acts as an ipso facto indication 
of intent to comply, as he did with Virginia, but dismissed 
it rather as a mere smoke screen for the conduct of illicit 
trade. 22 
In a study of Maryland trade in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries, Margaret s. Morriss 
displayed a similar inclination to minimize the degree to 
which illicit trade was practiced and to exonerate the 
colonists of any culpability in that regard. After 
compiling an impressive list of ships reported to have 
engaged in illicit trade but never seized, Morriss 
inexplicably concluded, despite the obvious difficulty of 
policing Chesapeake waters against smuggling, that not much 
illicit trade could have gone undetected and doubted that 
the colonists generally collaborated in violating the 
Navigation Acts. 23 
21 Ibid., 139-40. 
22 Ibid., 140-42. 
23 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 119 n. 160, 
127, 129. 
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Almost any suggestion to the contrary, Morriss 
contended, could be attributed to such "prejudiced sources" 
as English customs authorities or colonial governors, and 
therefore could not be trusted. 24 But what other sources 
of information about illicit trade in the Chesapeake region 
might researchers reasonably expect to discover? Those who 
participated in illegal activities were certainly not about 
to volunteer self-incriminating testimony and, as far as 
other colonists were concerned, Benjamin Harrison explicitly 
set forth the reasons why they would have been reluctant to 
provide information. It could also be argued that colonial 
governors had more to lose, from the standpoint of perceived 
ineffectiveness, by reporting the full extent of maritime 
lawlessness within their jurisdictions than they stood to 
gain. 25 
Since the perpetrators and collaborators carefully 
concealed their involvement, it follows logically that the 
bulk of information about illicit trade and customs fraud in 
the greater Chesapeake would have been supplied by the royal 
officials who were assigned to monitor and prevent such 
24 Ibid., 127. 
25 Even Lawrence Harper, who believed that illicit 
trade constituted "only a small fraction of ••• legitimate 
commerce" in the colonies, conceded that "governors 
charged with enforcing the laws tended to find that they 
were obeyed" (The English Navigation Laws: A 
Seventeenth-Centur Ex eriment in Social En ineerin [New 
York, 1973, 248). 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
abuses. 26 Most prominent among these agents was Edward 
Randolph, surveyor general of the customs for the southern 
colonies from 1691 to 17~3, and, to a lesser extent, his 
successor, Robert Quary, who held the post from 1703 to 
1714. Both men, especially Randolph, were extremely 
unpopular during their tenures and most historians have 
tended to be no less disparaging, characterizing each as 
"overzealous" or a "notorious exaggerator," and even, in 
Randolph's case, accusing him of fabricating false charges 
in the absence of any real proof of criminal activity. 27 
Conceding that Randolph often was obsessive in his pursuit 
of trade law violators and that he was sometimes prone to 
exaggeration, other scholars have noted, however, that the 
testimony of contemporary royal governors like Francis 
Nicholson, later ones like Spotswood, and various 
46 
independent sources frequently confirmed Randolph's charges 
and demonstrated the continuity and persistence of illegal 
trade in the greater Chesapeake. 28 
26 Ian K. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The 
Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696-1720 
(Oxford, 1968), 44; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 213. 
27 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 
167-68; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 118, 131; 
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 158; 
Mattie E. E. Parker in NCHCR, 1697-1701, xxix. 
28 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 59; 
Hall, Edward Randolph, 15~; Thomas c. Barrow, Trade and 
Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America 
1660-1775 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 143-45. 
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How extensive was illicit commerce and customs fraud in 
the greater Chesapeake in actuality? Many historians have 
commented on the futility of trying to make any sort of 
realistic quantitative assessment concerning a range of 
activities which, by their very nature, demanded careful 
concealment and discouraged documentation. 29 In the 
absence of any consistently reliable or comprehensive body 
of data, however, it is possible to gain an impression of 
the scope of these activities from the accounts of royal and 
colonial officials who periodically offered estimates on the 
amount of revenue loss due to illicit trade within their 
jurisdictions. How the various functionaries arrived at 
their conclusions is rarely specified, but it appears that 
they drew their inferences from some combination of personal 
experience, reports from subordinates and informers, and, 
undoubtedly in some cases, the desire to influence 
government policy in the direction of either stricter or 
29 Leonidas Dodson, Alexander Spotswood: Governor of 
Colonial Virginia, 1710-1722 (Philadelphia, 1932), 62; 
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 213; Rediker, "Anglo-American 
Sailors," 39; Robert E. Moody, "Massachusetts Trade with 
Carolina, 1689-1709," North Carolina Historical Review, XX 
(January 1943), 46; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 143; Williams, 
Contraband Cargoes, xi-xii. Acknowledging the problems 
intrinsic in any effort to quantify English smuggling in the 
tobacco and other trades during the colonial era, two 
historians nonetheless have made a serious attempt. See w. 
A. Cole, "Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling," Economic 
History Review, 2d Ser., X (1958), 395-410 and Robert c. 
Nash, "The English and Scottish Tobacco Trades in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Legal and Illegal 
Trade," Economic History Review, 2d Ser., XXXV (1982), 354-
72. 
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more lenient enforcement. Recognizing the inherent 
potential for bias, one may still glean useful information 
from these accounts and derive from them a sense of the 
extent of the problem, at least as the various officials 
construed it. 
In the 1662 royal instructions to Governor Berkeley, 
English officials expressed their concern about not only the 
existence of customs fraud in Virginia but also its 
magnitude. The manner in which they did so, asserting that 
the amount of tobacco imported into England was simply "in 
no proportion to the Quantity yearly transported out of that 
our colony," suggests that while crown authorities were 
convinced of the gravity of the problem, they were not 
prepared to estimate, even roughly, the amount of revenue 
lost to smuggling and duty evasion in the Chesapeake. 30 
Other, somewhat less ambiguous assessments in subsequent 
decades convey a sense of continuing frustration with a 
problem which government administrators obviously regarded 
as one of significant dimensions. 
In 1692 and 1693 Edward Randolph estimated that the 
crown was losing between L4,000 and L20,000 annually due to 
customs fraud in Maryland and Virginia. 31 Since a modern 
3° VMHB, III, 18; Gill, "The Naval Office in Virginia," 
6. 
31 Randolph, Letters, VII, 383, 447. Randolph offered 
no clear rationale for the wide disparity between the two 
figures. One possible explanation is that the larger 
number, which the surveyor general vaguely attributed to 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49 
analyst has determined that the net income to the government 
from tobacco duties probably was about Ll~~,0~~ during those 
years, the low figure is not especially noteworthy, but the 
larger one represents a significant percentage of net 
tobacco revenues. 32 Even more exceptional was the 
complaint registered by the Commissioners of the Customs, 
also in 1693, that, because of negligence or collusion on 
the part of customs officials in Maryland and Virginia, the 
Plantation Duty "hath been frequently compounded at little 
more than halfe Vallue." 33 Although such a sweeping 
appraisal seems improbably high, it nonetheless serves as an 
indication of how serious the home government believed the 
problem to be. Five years later, after the loss of the 
royal guardship assigned to the bay region, Randolph warned 
his superiors that unless they replaced the vessel quickly, 
"the King will lose more in his customs than would support 
five men-of-war at home."34 
Some officials and interested private parties offered 
more specific estimates of revenue losses. In 1694 an 
"want of good officers," refers to total revenue losses as a 
result of all illicit trade in the two colonies while the 
smaller estimate may concern only the amount of duties 
evaded specifically through the use of forged certificates, 
an abuse which Randolph had discussed in the previous 
sentence of his letter to William Blathwayt. 
32 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 45-46. 
33 Md. A., XX, 125. 
34 CSPC, XVI, #769, p. 4~2. 
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English customs agent reckoned that the crown was being 
cheated out of L50,000 a year as a result of illegal trade 
between Scotland and the "sugar and tobacco-plantations" in 
America. 35 The same year London merchant Micajah Perry 
alleged that, by means of one tobacco smuggling method 
alone, contrabandists operating between Virginia and 
Scotland were defrauding the royal revenue of at least 
L60,000 per year, a charge corroborated by other English 
merchants. 36 Considering that the crown's total income 
from tobacco duties amounted to about Ll30,000 in 1689, 
these figures are staggering even if, as skeptics might 
argue, they were somewhat exaggerated.3 7 
A certain degree of overstatement may be expected from 
individuals whose personal business profits were being 
reduced by the activities of illicit traders, but the 
motives of others who complained about customs fraud were 
not always as self-serving. Occasional reports concerning 
the evasion of local tariffs in the greater Chesapeake are 
particularly revealing in this context. Because provincial 
duties were enacted by colonial legislators, presumably with 
local interests rather than those of the home government in 
35 Stock, Debates, II, 111. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 124; Margaret M. Morriss' 
investigation of the crown's net tobacco duty receipts 
suggests that Ll30,000 probably was a maximum estimate and 
that the actual revenue likely was substantially less 
(Colonial Trade of Maryland, 46 n. 156). 
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mind, one would expect substantially greater success in the 
collection of such revenues. 
But the record suggests otherwise. In 1736 the 
Virginia assembly passed legislation designed to eliminate, 
or at least reduce, "vast frauds" in the collection of the 
slave duty perpetrated on a scale such that "hardly one half 
of the said duties hath been paid into the treasury." 38 
Almost two decades later, North Carolina governor Arthur 
Dobbs asserted that, in a colony which raised only about 
Ll2,000 in various taxes annually, the revenue from the duty 
on wine and spirits alone could be increased by L2000 a year 
"if duly collected" by "a proper Officer" stationed at a 
location less susceptible to evasion by smugglers than the 
checkpoints which the government currently employed.39 
Such testimony implies that if the colonists indeed engaged 
in customs fraud to a significant degree, at least they were 
indiscriminate about whose duties they chose to evade. 
Apart from direct calculations of monetary losses, 
customs records reflecting the degree of compliance with, or 
infringement of, the Navigation Acts offer further evidence 
of the extent of contraband trade in the Chesapeake. In 
1697 Maryland governor Nicholson sent a letter to the Board 
of Trade describing the resistance he had encountered in the 
colonial courts and assembly to his efforts to restrict 
38 Hening, Statutes, IV, 471. 
39 CRNC, V, 640. 
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illegal commerce. Along with the letter he submitted 
several enclosures including two lists, one of 60 trading 
vessels that had embarked from Maryland and eventually 
produced the necessary documentation to show that their 
captains had completed the voyages in accordance with 
requisite procedures for shipping enumerated goods under the 
trade laws and another list of 115 craft that had failed to 
do so, presumably because they had delivered their cargoes 
to foreign ports. 40 The disparity between the number of 
ships that failed to adhere to the customs laws and those 
that did, a ratio of nearly two to one, is all the more 
remarkable considering that this statistic does not even 
take into account an array of evasive and deceptive 
procedures (not to mention the bribing of customs officials) 
that contraband traders regularly employed while maintaining 
a "pro forma" compliance with official registration and 
inspection procedures. 
Some indirect evidence also suggests that contraband 
trade and duty evasion were far more prevalent than the 
surviving, documented instances of official seizures and 
condemnations would seem to indicate. In June 1699 the 
collector for the Rappahannock River district reported the 
seizure of the Providence of Dublin for the illegal 
importation of goods from Ireland with no certificates or 
40 Md. A., XXIII, 86, i6, i7. 
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cocquets. 41 The arrest itself was rather unusual, but 
what makes the case particularly noteworthy is the recorded 
testimony of sailors and servant passengers indicating how 
fortuitous such seizures were and, conversely, how little 
risk of detection illicit traders normally assumed. The 
declarations of the deponents in the case make it clear that 
the smuggled wares never would have been discovered had it 
not been for the accidental staving in of one of the casks 
which contained the contraband. As an English man-of-war 
approached, witnesses overheard the shipmaster and the 
merchants deliberating about what should be done with the 
goods, "whether they Should be thrown overboard or how 
disposed off." The smugglers finally decided to conceal the 
merchandise elsewhere on board, although it is unclear 
whether they did so because they doubted the ability of the 
warship's personnel to discover the contraband or because 
they feared that they might be spotted heaving the goods 
into the bay. In any event, navy and customs officidls knew 
nothing of the deception until notified by informants after 
the ship had landed.42 
Accidental discoveries like this one combined with 
other factors -- the testimony of informants, regulatory 
officers, and governors; the relative ease with which 
unlawful traders deceived, avoided, or secured the 
41 Reese, ed., Virginia Vice-Admiralty Court, 12-13. 
42 Ibid., 16-17. 
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cooperation of customs officials; and the failure of 
contemporary authorities and modern historians to take into 
account the cumulative effect of the many small vessels 
which regularly conveyed contraband cargoes around the bay 
and along the coasts -- imply that illicit commerce was 
conducted throughout the greater Chesapeake to a greater 
extent than scholars generally have acknowledged. 
Given the imprecise, intermittent, and generally 
problematic nature of contemporary efforts to ascertain the 
magnitude of contraband trade in the region, it also may be 
useful to approach the issue as one might in a court of law, 
by establishing the motives and opportunities for engaging 
in customs fraud. Some historians have theorized that the 
amount of illegal commerce in the colonies was a function of 
two factors, the relative rate of customs duties and the 
ease or difficulty of smuggling. 43 The absolute value of 
any particular set of customs duties was not in itself 
always a critical determinant since a two shilling per 
hogshead duty on tobacco in a prosperous market, for 
example, might have been regarded as considerably less 
onerous than a duty half that amount when profit margins 
were slim or nonexistent. 
Obviously, then, the degree to which duties represented 
impositions worthy of active avoidance depended on the 
43 Shepherd and Walton, Maritime Trade, 295. 
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perceptions and financial circumstances of those required to 
pay them. Colonists who experienced economic privation, who 
felt that they were being exploited and discriminated 
against, and who had occasion to mitigate the effects of 
oppressive regulations by disobeying them without great risk 
or effort would seem to be likely candidates for 
participation in illicit trade. And if it is true that 
incentive and opportunity determined the volume of illegal 
commerce, then there is additional reason to believe that 
circumvention of the trade laws and evasion of customs 
duties occurred more regularly and to a much greater extent 
in the greater Chesapeake than historians traditionally have 
recognized. 
The most obvious inducement to illicit trade and the 
evasion of customs duties was economic hardship, a condition 
which afflicted residents of the greater Chesapeake with 
considerable regularity. The Navigation Act of 1660, which 
listed tobacco as one of the enumerated goods that could not 
be exported to European markets except through England, 
might have been palatable to the Chesapeake planters if 
England herself could have increased consumption, maintained 
stable prices for the commodity, and kept customs rates at a 
relatively low level. But restricting the trade to an 
English market which failed to increase consumption 
substantially after the 1680s instead resulted in an 
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oversupply that reduced prices. 44 Under the home 
government's drawback system, tobacco could be shipped to 
England and re-exported to continental Europe without, in 
effect, having to pay any import duties, but the extra costs 
involved in the process further reduced profit margins.45 
And although Europe replaced England as the principal outlet 
for Chesapeake tobacco after 1790, it was not until an 
expansion of the continental market after about 1715 that 
three decades of hardship in the colonial tobacco industry 
came to an end.46 
Periodically during those thirty years of adversity, 
many planters found themselves in dire economic straits such 
as those that produced the plant-cutting riots of 1682. 
Fifteen years after the disturbances, Maryland governor 
Francis Nicholson reported that "the low price of tobacco 
has obliged many of the planters to try their fortune 
elsewhere." 47 Carolina explorer and chronicler John 
Lawson observed in 1709 that "tobacco is a Commodity 
44 John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy 
of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), 
124; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 88-
89. 
4 5 Andrews, Colonial period of American History, IV, 
88-89. 
4 6 McCusker and Menard, Economy of British America, 
123-24. 
4 7 CSPC, XV, ill78, p. 546. 
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oftentimes so low, as to bring nothing." 48 Two years 
later Virginia merchants and planters complained that they 
actually were having to sell thousands of hogsheads of 
tobacco for less than the amount of the customs duties.49 
57 
Under such circumstances, any duties at all would have 
seemed oppressive. But rather than provide some relief by 
lowering customs rates, the English government periodically 
raised the impost on tobacco imported into England despite 
the protests of those involved in the trade. 50 Scholars 
disagree over the extent to which Chesapeake planters, as 
opposed to English consumers, were made to bear the burden 
of the increased costs of re-exportation and higher duties, 
but the consensus among historians is that, regardless of 
the reality of the situation, the colonists believed that 
the commercial policy of the home government was responsible 
for the hardships that the tobacco growers experienced. 51 
48 John Lawson, A New Voyage to Carolina, Hugh T. 
Lefler, ed. (Chapel Hill, 1967), 167. 
49 ~ C05/1316, p. 69; CSPC, XXVI, wll7, p. 111; Dodson, 
Alexander Spotswood, 43-4~ 
50 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
89, 139; George L. Beer, The Old Colonial System 1660-1754 
(New York, 1933), I, 160-63; Samuel M. Rosenblatt, "The 
Significance of Credit in the Tobacco Consignment Trade: A 
Study of John Norton and Sons, 1768-1775," WMQ, 3d Ser., XIX 
(1962), 389-90. -
51 Although English authorities stated their intention 
that the tobacco impost of 1685 not be "laid on the Planter 
or Merchant, but only on the [English] Retailer, 
Consumptioner, or Shopkeeper," yet the Virginia burgesses 
could not be dissuaded that the tax, "though designed to 
fall on the retailer and consumer, would surely fall on the 
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Contemporary accounts continued to reflect that 
conviction. Despite a generally positive trend after 1715, 
the prosperity of the tobacco industry was chronically 
subject to extreme fluctuations. Describing the planters' 
dilemma in 1724, Hugh Jones lamented that with "the Charges 
and Duties far over-balancing the price of the Tobacco ••• 
of late Years they sometimes get little or nothing by it, 
but Trouble and Loss; because of the great Expence in making 
and sending it Home to Market, and the great Duties which 
are paid out of it, and the small Price it usually 
bears." 52 Nearly a decade later, a Maryland agent 
complained to British authorities about "the exceeding 
poverty of the people ••• occasioned by" tobacco prices 
planter" (cited in Beer, Old Colonial System, I, 162, 163). 
Several months after the impost went into effect, the 
colonists remained deeply skeptical. Virginia governor 
Effingham could not help "but wonder at their cautious, or 
rather, peevish temper" in having been "discouraged, either 
from shiping their present Crops, or planting any for ye 
future" (Henry R., Mcilwaine, ed., Legislative Journals of 
the Council of Colonial Virginia [Richmond, 1918-1919], I, 
67). Amplifying the colonial lawmakers' and planters' view, 
Charles Andrews wrote that the tobacco impost in England was 
"always the most serious incumbrance resting upon the 
tobacco industry in the colonies" (Colonial Period of 
American History, IV, 139). Beer (Old Colonial System, I, 
166-67), and more recently Rosenblatt ("The Significance of 
Credit," 391) and Nash ("Tobacco Trades," 369), however, 
have indicated that the increased cost of the various 
imposts most likely was passed on to English consumers. 
Concerning Chesapeake tobacco growers blaming their problems 
on English commercial policy more generally, see McCusker 
and Menard, Economy of British America, 123. 
52 Hugh Jones, The Present State of Virginia (1724), 
Richard L. Morton, ed., (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1956), 144; 
Elizabeth E. Hoon, The Organization of the English Customs 
Service, 1696-1786 (New York, 1938), 252 n. 2. 
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"so low that the makers of it have been brought to the want 
of many of the necessaries of life."53 
And while the volatility of the tobacco exchange 
constituted a paramount concern for colonial planters, it 
was hardly the only one. Virginia governor Edmond Andros 
explained to his superiors in 1695 that tobacco shipments 
were also "liable to the charge of clearing here, to the 
hazard of the voyage, to payment of duty and to an uncertain 
market, and, if all be well, the time will be long before 
the proceeds can be applied to answer the intent." 54 As a 
result, many Chesapeake planters and merchants considered 
their responses to the succession of trade regulations not, 
as the English authorities did, in terms of criminal 
behavior versus compliance with the law, but rather as a 
question of whether the British colonial system was 
permitting them to earn even a modest living without undue 
restraint. 
Ironically, it was a royal official, Governor Berkeley, 
who in 1651 articulated the views of Virginia planters when 
he charged the Rump Parliament with tyranny in forbidding 
colonists "to buy, or sell but with those they shall 
5 3 CSPC, XL, #61 iv., v., p. 49. For a detailed 
analysis-or-the shifts in the tobacco market and their 
effect on Virginia's planters and the colonial economy see 
John M. Hemphill II, Virginia and the English Commercial 
System, 1689-1733: Studies in the Development and 
Fluctuations of a Colonial Economy under Imperial Control 
(New York, 1985), especially chapters I and II. 
54 CSPC, XIV, #1871, p. 497. 
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Authorize with a few trifles to Coszen us of all for which 
we toile and labour."55 Disenchantment with the 
Navigation Acts persisted when the Chesapeake economy 
shifted from tobacco to grain production. Colonists who 
6~ 
feared that the Molasses Act of 1733 would severely restrict 
their foreign grain markets in the West Indies and limit 
their supplies of rum and molasses widely ignored the 
legislation. 56 
Fueling the colonists' resentment was the suspicion 
that, while they struggled and often failed to make ends 
meet, fellow Englishmen in the home country were profiting 
disproportionately at the planters' expense. In 1673, after 
reminding the Earl of Shaftesbury that, as far as crown 
revenues were concerned, "Virginia is of as great importance 
to his Majesty as the Spanish Indies to Spain," Sir John 
Knight issued a grave warning. So unhappy were the planters 
with the adverse effects of English trade restrictions upon 
their livelihood, "they saying openly that they are in the 
nature of slaves," that "his Majesty's best, greatest, and 
richest plantation is in danger, with the planters' consent, 
to fall into the enemy's hands." 57 Chesapeake residents 
continued to be reminded of the benefits that accrued to 
55 VMHB, I, 76~ Andrews, Colonial Period of American 
History,-yv; 28. 
56 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 211~ Barrow, Trade and 
Empire, 143. 
57 CSPC, VII, #1159, p. 530. 
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Englishmen as result of their labors in the eighteenth 
century. "Your hive of Virginia brings a great deal of Hony 
to this Nation," a Virginia agent in London reported to the 
colony in 1711, "and costs them nothing."sa 
The planters' displeasure focused not only on the 
English authorities who passed restrictive trade legislation 
but also on the merchants, especially London traders, who, 
many colonists concluded, were influencing the government to 
do so. 59 In restating his objections to the Navigation 
Acts in the 166es, Governor Berkeley expressed his 
unwillingness to aggrandize a relatively small group of 
English merchants at the expense of an entire colony. 60 
Responding to imperial exhortations to enact a law 
forbidding the colonial export of tobacco packaged in "bulk" 
(that is, in loose parcels as opposed to hogsheads), a 
committee of Virginia burgesses considered "by what means it 
was Represented to his Matie That We • resideing here 
should desire such a prohibition" as the king evidently had 
been led to believe. After conducting a "strict Examination 
& search to Informe themselves," the burgesses concluded 
that the instigators were none other than "several! 
Merchants ••• in London who conceiving such a law 
58 VMHB, IV, 2e-21; Dodson, Alexander SEotswood, 113 n. 
2. 
59 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Marlland, 192. 
Ge Andrews, Colonial Period of American Historl, IV, 
137. 
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would answer their Pticular Interest & profit ••• did 
boldly and prsumptuously ••• petition his Majestie without 
our privities knowledge & agreement ••• setting forth on 
our behalfes that it would be much for the advancement & 
good of this Country."61 
English factors continued to be objects of colonial 
antipathy in the eighteenth century. In 1709 members of the 
Maryland assembly complained to the king that the London 
merchants, while assuming minimal risk themselves, charged 
exorbitant freight rates on tobacco shipments from the 
Chesapeake. And though, as a result, the planters had 
little to show for their efforts, the "Factors thereby with 
little Hazard most certainly" gathered vast sums "by their 
Commissions and other Perquisites."62 
The colonists also resented the English merchants• 
opposition to measures intended to provide customs relief 
and to stimulate the Chesapeake economy. To encourage ship 
ownership in Virginia, the colonial assembly enacted 
legislation in the early eighteenth century exempting 
Virginians who owned vessels from various provincial duties 
and fees. 63 Within a decade, however, the home government 
moved to disallow the acts as prejudicial to British 
61 ~' 1659/60-1693, 317. 
62 f Md. A., XXVII, 4o5; Morriss, Colonial Trade o 
Maryland, 96. 
63 Hening, Statutes, III, 230, 347, 494. 
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shipowners, provoking the colonists' ire for succumbing so 
thoroughly, the Anglo-Americans believed, to the wishes of 
British merchants. 64 
63 
In 1734 the Board of Trade acted in a similar fashion 
by instructing colonial governors not to permit the 
enactment of "any laws, whereby the Inhabitants of the 
Plantations may be put upon a more advantageous Footing than 
those of Great Britain." Specifically, provincial 
legislators were forbidden "to pass any Law, by which 
greater Duties ••• shall be laid on Ships or Goods 
belonging to the Subjects of Great Britain, than on those of 
the Inhabitants of the Plantations."65 So irritated were 
the colonists by these restraints that they even dared to 
suggest a fundamental alteration of the Navigation Acts. 
But their proposal, one designed to benefit colonial 
planters by permitting the direct shipment of tobacco from 
Virginia to France, stood little chance of approval probably 
because, as the royal governor who supported the measure 
surmised, it would "be disagreeable only to the gentlemen in 
London, who will thereby lose the commissions upon the sales 
of so much tobacco."66 
64 CSPC, XXV, 47~9, p. 408; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 
28~-81; Percy Scott Flippin, William Gooch: Successful Royal 
Governor (Williamsburg, Va., 1924), 15. 
65 C05/5, p. 44; C0324/12, pp. 65-66. 
66 William Gooch to the Board of Trade, 5/15/1739, 
C05/1324, pp. 333-34. Actually, the colonists' proposal was 
not as farfetched as it might seem. In 1707, during Queen 
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Similar tensions had arisen in 1722 when Parliament 
passed an act prohibiting the importation into England of 
tobacco stripped from the stalk. 67 The crown's rationale 
for such a policy had been expressed as early as 1695 when 
Maryland governor Nicholson recommended that the tobacco 
64 
fleet be dispatched from England as early in the new year as 
possible since "the winter being a time of much leisure, the 
people have opportunity of stripping and cutting their 
tobaccos, whereby the King loses near a quarter of his 
customs." 68 For the planters, the requirement to send 
their tobacco unstripped meant not only additional customs 
charges, but increases in all the costs associated with 
greater product weight and volume: additional packing, 
inspection and lighterage fees; more hogsheads; and added 
insurance and freight charges. Although the colonists 
eventually succeeded in persuading Parliament to rescind the 
act, many British merchants opposed the repeal effort. 69 
Anne's War, the Board of Trade itself recommended to the 
king the direct importation of tobacco from the Chesapeake 
to Europe "to Ease the Tobacco Trade," the rationale being 
that "otherwise 'tis to be feared that those Northern 
Countries formerly supplied by your Majesty's Subjects with 
great quantities of Tobacco may in time be wholy furnished 
from another Market" (C05/l362, p. 245). The Dutch were 
particularly active at that time in growing tobacco and 
selling it on the continent. See Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 
pp. 141-43. 
67 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 129. 
68 CSPC, XIV, #1896, p. 509. 
69 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 128-29; Hemphill, Virginia 
and the English Commercial System, 74-75. 
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Colonial disaffection for London traders may have been 
expressed most explicitly in 1732 when Robert Carter, 
president of the Council of Virginia, complained to Micajah 
Perry about the "Oppression of the merchants • • • and • • • 
the many destructive articles that have of late years been 
found to deprive us of the greatest part of the Profit of 
our Labours." 7 ~ Carter was referring specifically to the 
merchants' success in convincing Parliament to pass 
legislation favoring their interests in the collection of 
debts owed by the planters and the British traders' active 
opposition to an excise scheme, proposed by Prime Minister 
Robert Walpole, designed to shift the burden of tobacco 
duties from the Chesapeake growers to the British 
public. 71 The council president chose not to speculate on 
what the consequences of these developments might be, but he 
did advise Perry that the "general crye that hath bore down 
all before it" in the colony recently had been that it was 
"more elligible to relye on the mercy of our Prince than to 
be subjected to the tyranny of the merchants who are daily 
encreasing their Oppressions upon us."72 
7 ~ Cited in Hemphill, Virginia and the English 
Commercial System, 228. 
71 Ibid., chapter VI; Billings, Selby, and Tate, 
Colonial-virginia, 242-44. 
72 Cited in Hemphill, Virginia and the English 
Commercial System, 228. 
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An additional inducement to engage in proscribed trade 
was the desire to obtain scarce and much coveted specie.73 
In the early eighteenth century John Lawson reported that 
North Carolina, otherwise poor and lacking in the natural 
resources to produce significant wealth, was "more plentiful 
in Money, than most, or indeed any of the Plantations on the 
Continent." The source of the coin, Lawson explained, was 
the Dutch island of Cura~ao with which the Carolinians 
carried on a thriving illicit trade. 74 By mid-century, 
however, the North Carolinians appeared to be no better off 
with regard to the availability of specie than the other 
colonies. Noting "the great scarcity of silver & gold," a 
committee of assemblymen in 1746 complained about the "very 
great grievance" of not being allowed to pay their quitrents 
in the "produce of this Province." 75 Geography and 
unsympathetic neighbors combined to create a further 
rationale for Albermarle residents to resort to smuggling 
since the colony's ports could not accommodate large ships 
and Virginia, which offered the closest deep water harbors, 
73 Ibid., 9-10; NCHCM, 1709-1723, xx. 
74 Lawson, Voyage to Carolina, 10. Lawson neglected to 
mention another form of illicit commerce that contributed 
significantly to the colony's accumulation of specie at that 
time: trading with pirates. See below, chapter VI. 
75 CRNC IV, 824. ____ , 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67 
charged prohibitive fees on Carolina commerce and banned the 
export of Carolina tobacco through Virginia ports.76 
If Chesapeake colonists had ample incentive to conduct 
illicit trade they had equal or greater opportunity to do 
so. Although customs collectors and naval officers 
frequently connived with planters and shipmasters to breach 
or circumvent the law, perhaps the greater percentage of 
smuggling and duty evasion did not require the cooperation 
of venal officials at all. The vast stretches of shoreline 
bordering the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries as well as 
the Atlantic coast with its many banks and islands offered 
innumerable possibilities for conducting illicit trade with 
little fear of detection. Even Charles Andrews, who did not 
believe that illicit trade constituted a serious problem in 
any of England's American colonies, conceded that customs 
evasion was easiest in areas with long, indented shorelines 
with many creeks, inlets, and rivers and few established 
ports, precisely the conditions which prevailed throughout 
much of the greater Chesapeake.77 
Contemporary authorities were also well aware of the 
difficulties that the geography of the region created. 
Edward Randolph reported to British authorities in 1692 that 
76 Ibid., II, 762-63; Hugh T. Lefler and Williams. 
Powell, COIOnial North Carolina: A History (New York, 1973), 
49; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 128. 
77 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
238, 241; Moody, "Massachusetts Trade with Carolina," 45. 
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"every vessel runs into a different bay, so that it is 
endless work for a diligent officer to keep an eye on 
them." 78 In many cases, no amount of diligence could 
overcome the remoteness of customs officials from the areas 
of greatest illicit trade activity. "Clandestine trade is 
easy," a deponent informed the Board of Trade about maritime 
law enforcement in Maryland in 1691, "as the collectors live 
far up country.n79 
The situation seems to have improved little in almost 
twenty years when another private individual complained to 
the Board of Trade that Virginia had only four customs 
houses, some of which were far from the principal trading 
entrep8ts, and that many rivers had no customs officials at 
all "to See what is Done by Shiping." Even if the 
government managed to station officers wherever vessels 
normally unloaded and took on goods, the informant 
contended, "1~,~~~ Men Could not performe it. To Keep 
Shiping from Landing And taking of Good by Stelth." 8 ~ The 
problem that geography imposed on the policing of maritime 
trade in the greater Chesapeake was never resolved 
adequately. In 1730 and again in 1743 Virginia governor 
William Gooch had to admit that "after all it is impossible 
altogether to prevent the running of • 
78 CSPC, XIII, 12295, p. 66~. 
79 Ibid., 11951, p. 578. 
prohibited goods, 
8 ~ Cited in Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 62-63. 
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when there are so many landing places remote from the 
inspection of any officer."81 
Geography, however, was only one of several major 
impediments to effective trade law enforcement in the 
greater Chesapeake. Among the most intractable problems 
crown officials had to contend with were those posed by 
local populations which, in cooperation with foreign and 
other Anglo-American confederates, displayed considerable 
ingenuity and resolve in circumventing and deceiving royal 
customs agents. 
69 
81 
"William Gooch, Official Correspondence," 3 vols. 
(Colonial Williamsburg Research Library typescript), vol. 1, 
Gooch to the Board of Trade, July 23, 173g and vol. 3, Gooch 
to the Board of Trade, August 22, 1743; VMHB, III, 118; 
Flippin, William Gooch, 16. ----
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CHAPTER III 
A "Customes Treasure ••• never more infatuated, cheated 
and exhausted": The Ways and Means of Illicit Trade 
The sheer variety of methods used to conduct illicit 
trade in the greater Chesapeake offers a further indication 
of the extensiveness of the practice and also testifies to 
the resourcefulness and determination of those who engaged 
in it. Taking advantage of the venality of customs 
officials, a popular option examined in a subsequent 
chapter, was one way to beat the system, but it had certain 
drawbacks. Bribery, whether in the form of cash or 
commodity payments or some kind of kickback, could be 
expensive and, in districts with scrupulous customs 
officers, risky. Alternatively, those wishing to maximize 
profits through illicit trade could choose from a wide range 
of options which may be classified broadly under the 
headings of misrepresentation and evasion. 
The procedures for "clearing" and "entering" required 
shipmasters to make sworn statements as to the nature and 
volume of their cargoes and to take out a bond obligating 
them to land their goods only at ports permitted by the 
applicable navigation statutes. Upon entering a given port, 
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shipmasters were required to produce all the necessary 
documentation to prove that they had cleared properly from 
their port of embarkation. Local customs officials could 
then check the itemized cargo registers, or "cocquets," to 
verify concordance with the actual shipment. Assuming that 
all was in order, the customs agent then authorized the 
unloading of the incoming cargo before .certifying and 
bonding the outgoing one. 
The simplest method to avoid or reduce duty payments 
when dealing with royal revenue officers was to underreport 
the volume of the lading. Maryland governor Nicholson 
asserted in 1697 that the amount of tobacco that shipmasters 
officially registered in clearing was "commonly less than 
they have on board." 1 Alternatively, shipmasters might 
purposely misrepresent the nature of the cargo, trusting in 
either case to the cooperation of the customs inspector in 
not attempting to verify the declarat~on or to the 
official's inability to do so. One reason why shippers 
could get away with such deceptions was that ships' holds 
were notoriously difficult places to examine under any 
circumstances, but particularly so when filled, even 
1 CSPC, XV, ill78, p. 548. A method of comparable or 
perhaps even greater simplicity involved doing what Governor 
Nicholson reported "Most Masters ••• of Ships doe," that 
is, conduct their affairs however they pleased and then, if 
caught, "to plead Ignorance to such Laws of this Province as 
doe any wayes narrowly touch or concern them" (Md. A., XX, 
278). Such lawbreakers no doubt anticipated, with good 
reason, that a sympathetic jury of their peers would acquit 
them summarily. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72 
partially, with quantities of goods stacked in rows of 
barrel casks. 2 As a result, customs inspectors usually had 
little choice but to rely on the sworn statements of ship 
captains and masters. 
These declarations, known as "custom house oaths," 
acquired such a reputation for unreliability throughout the 
English empire that the term became practically synonymous 
with a lie. As an eighteenth-century merchant reported, 
"many are tempted to Perjure themselves • • • And to this 
End 'tis observable, that in Places of Trade, a Poysonous 
sort of doctrine is slily and artificially insinuated among 
Masters of Ships, Common Saylors and Porters ••• that a 
Custom-House Oath is nothing but a matter of Form." 3 
Despite the flagrant and almost universal disregard for the 
solemnity of such vows, for centuries English officials had 
little alternative but to accept them, and customs agents 
continued to do so in the colonial era. 4 
The problem of having to rely on these statements was 
exacerbated in the Chesapeake region by government 
2 A Maryland collector, for example, complained in 1698 
of the "great Difficulty in Searching of Ships," declaring 
that it was "Morally Impossible to do his Duty thoroughly as 
he Ought by reason of the Narowness & Darkness of the Ships 
holds" (Md. A., XXIII, 4B2). 
3 Cited in Hoon, English Customs Service, 246. 
4 Williams noted that, despite hundreds of documented 
cases of customs fraud in medieval England, there was no 
evidence of even a single prosecution for perjury 
(Contraband Cargoes, 15). 
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officials' chronic inability to examine vessels in many 
dispersed and distant locations, a situation which caused 
Edward Randolph to bemoan the fact that, under the 
circumstances, a customs officer had "nothing to satisfy him 
that the master had been trading legally but his oath." 5 
The dubious value of such pledges notwithstanding, in 1699 
Virginia's attorney general, acting on the governor's 
orders, prepared a new oath requiring shipmasters operating 
in the colony to "give a true and exact accot" of not only 
"all such Tobaccos and other good's and merchandizes as 
shall be taken on board," but also the possessions of every 
passenger. "All this," mariners were admonished sternly, 
"you shall swear without any Equivocation Mentall 
Reservation or other Evasion So help you God." 6 Almost two 
decades later, however, Alexander Spotswood reiterated 
previous arguments for more stringent ship inspection 
procedures "since it seems the Masters have so many 
occasions to make their Oaths of no Effect," with many 
regarding their declarations as nothing more than "so many 
words of form to enter • • • hogsheads at half the weight 
they contain."7 
In customs districts where shipping activities were 
more centralized and collectors and naval officers were 
5 ~' XIII, #2295, p. 66~. 
6 EJC, II, 34. 
7 Spotswood, Letters, I, 29, 76. 
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located more conveniently to oversee them, contraband goods 
ran a greater risk of discovery, particularly aboard smaller 
vessels and in the uppermost cargo rows of larger ones where 
conscientious customs officials could gain access more 
readily. Under the threat of actual inspection, smugglers 
had to resort to more elaborate measures of concealment. 
One method of disguising the contents of shipping 
containers, described by secretary of Maryland Sir Thomas 
Lawrence in 1695, was to pack tobacco in bread casks covered 
with flour at each end. 8 The same year, the Maryland 
governor received reports that "his Mats Duty for Importacon 
of Liquors ••• have been much defrauded by concealing & 
hiding ••• Brandy Rum & other Spirits, And wine wthin 
Caske pretended to be filled with Bisket and ffloore." 9 
Variations of this practice apparently continued well into 
the next century. In 1723 the president and masters of the 
College of William and Mary instructed their agent, John 
Randolph, to inform English treasury and customs officials 
that the revenue from the penny per pound Plantation Duty 
established for the benefit of the college was "very much 
sunk," a principal reason being that shippers "carry out 
Tobaccos in barrels, entered as beef or pork, or concealed 
8 CSPC, XIV, #1916, p. 520. 
9 Md. A., XX, 280; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 
128-29 n. 216. 
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under corn, and hogsheads of Tobaccos at weights much less 
than they really weigh."l0 
A clever tactic employed to deceive customs officials 
about cargo weights was to load heavier hogsheads first so 
that a 400 pound cask, for instance, when removed by the 
collector from the top of the hold to be weighed as a 
75 
representative sample, would be used to calculate the total 
tonnage of the lading. Under this scheme, the lower cargo 
rows actually would be composed of casks of similar size, 
but packed tightly so as to weigh up tc twice as much. 
Scottish merchants and shippers who used this artifice to 
their advantage offered planters an additional two shillings 
and sixpence for each hogshead over 500 pounds. 11 Since 
some duties (as well as transportation and handling charges) 
10 William Stevens Perry, ed., Papers Relating to the 
History of the Church in Virginia, A.D. 1650-1776 (Hartford, 
Connecticut, 1870), 549 (cited hereafter as Perry, Church 
Papers). Some historians have viewed smuggling efforts on 
such a relatively small scale as indicative of the pettiness 
and comparative insignificance of illicit trade in the 
colonies. According to Lawrence Harper, for example, "the 
true significance of the tobacco hidden in the flour" lay 
not in the deception itself, but "in the fact that the fraud 
was measured in terms of casks and not by shiploads" 
(English Navigation Laws, 258). Disguising tobacco as other 
goods constituted only one of many forms of deception, 
however. Others, such as loading after clearing and the 
circumvention of customs authorities altogether, clearly did 
amount to fraud by the shipload (see below, pp. 78-84). 
11 Stock, Debates, III, 461, 462; Theodore c. Barker, 
"Smuggling in the Eighteenth Century: The Evidence of the 
Scottish Tobacco Trade," VMHB, LXII (1954), 387-99, 396. As 
a result of the success of this scam, tobacco re-exports 
from Glasgow in certain years exceeded registered imports, 
according to Neville Williams, by 1,500,000 pounds 
(Contraband Cargoes, 92). 
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were computed according to the number of hogsheads rather 
than their weight, planters and shippers also had a 
considerable inducement to use larger casks.12 Despite 
the passage of legislation in Maryland and Virginia 
regulating the size of hogsheads, Maryland governor 
Nicholson complained in 1695 that coopers continued to 
produce casks "farr exceeding the Dimenssions in the said 
Act ••• to the great prejudice and Lessening of his Mats 
Revenue." 13 
Besides deceiving customs officials about the weight, 
volume, and nature of cargoes, smugglers also occasionally 
76 
sought to conceal the identity of the ships themselves. In 
1698 local customs officers notified the Commissioners of 
the Customs in England that a certain vessel had departed 
from the James River without clearing and was believed to be 
headed for Scotland with a cargo of uncustomed tobacco. 
Although Virginia officials identified the craft and its 
owners by name, English authorities doubted that it would be 
possible to distinguish the merchantman from other vessels 
trading to Scotland as, they had learned, it had long been 
"the practice to change ships' names and otherwise to 
disguise them on such occasions."14 
12 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 129. 
l3 277 Md. A., XX, • 
14 CSPC, XVI, i684, p. 349. 
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Falsification of one or more of the official documents 
used to enter and clear vessels was another popular form of 
deceit. 15 Complaining about the use of forged papers in 
Maryland and Virginia, Edward Randolph advised royal 
authorities in 1692 that "at Glasgow they have false seals 
of the Customs houses of Whitehaven, Beaumaris, etc., and 
also blank certificates, some of which are so exactly filled 
up with counterfeited hands that they deceive the 
collectors."16 Randolph and other officials frequently 
cited examples of vessels which they had seized for 
attempting to pass through customs with forged 
documents. 17 Within days of enacting the 1696 navigation 
law, the Lords of Trade issued a circular to colonial 
governors instructing them to warn customs officials to be 
on the lookout for counterfeit certificates. 18 
Although Francis Nicholson indicated early in 1697 that 
he had instituted effective measures to identify forged 
papers, only two years later naval officers requested the 
governor's assistance in dealing with a duty evasion scheme 
"usually practised heretofore" involving the production of 
15 Randolph, Letters, V, 117; Md. A., XX, 124, 346-47; 
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 2~6. 
16 CSPC, XIII, i2295, p. 660. 
17 6 Ibid., pp. 56, 657, 659; Randolph, Letters, VII, 
348-49; ~A., XX, 124. 
l8 Md. A., XX, 567, 57~; Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American History, IV, 175. 
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false documents indicating that bond had been posted with 
customs officials on the western side of the bay for tobacco 
which was to be picked up on the Eastern Shore.l9 Similar 
instances of attempts to pass off bogus documents continued 
to be recorded well into the next century.20 
An alternative to fooling customs officers directly 
through forgery, false packing, and disingenuous oaths was 
to defraud the system by avoiding the customs apparatus 
entirely. This option was most effectively exercised in 
areas of the greater Chesapeake with relatively protected 
anchorages closest to the ocean (the Atlantic coast of 
Virginia's and Maryland's Eastern Shore and North Carolina's 
Outer Banks, for example, as well as locations within the 
bay close to the Virginia Capes) which afforded authorities 
little opportunity for discovery between the time that 
vessels discharged and reloaded illegal cargoes and made 
their getaway to the open sea. 
Edward Randolph described a very efficient and well 
organized operation on the Eastern Shore of Maryland and 
Virginia in which the practitioners purchased tobacco from 
the mainland which they exchanged for goods from an incoming 
ship, assisting "with Boats Sloops to get the Goods a Shear 
19 EJC, II, 35; CSPC, XVII, #1078, p. 578. 
20 Md. A., XXIII, 86; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no. 
26; Marion L. Starkey, The First Plantation: A History of 
Hampton and Elizabeth City County, Virginia, 1607-1887 
(Hampton, va., 1936), 17. 
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before the Vessel is Entred." All this was accomplished 
without the slightest knowledge of customs agents since "the 
Vessel lying in some obscure Creek 40 or 50 Miles distant 
from the Collectrs Office ••• in a short time is Loaded 
and Sayles out of the Capes undiscovered." 21 A Maryland 
official reported a similar scheme in 1696 executed by 
locals in conjunction with other contrabandists who 
navigated a sloop from Philadelphia into an inlet on the 
ocean side of Somerset County and "having her loading of 
Tob 0 Provision and other Goods ready provided for her, tooke 
the same on board and went away therewith without Entring or 
Clearing." 22 North Carolina governor George Burrington 
described a comparably sophisticated operation in 1734 in 
which a ship carrying prohibited goods landed in the harbor 
of Ocracoke and had its cargo transferred to a local craft 
(undoubtedly of shallower draft) which then navigated 
through Pam1ico and Albermar1e Sounds across the colony's 
northern border where the goods ultimately were delivered to 
Virginia merchants. The governor confessed that neither he 
"nor any of the Custom House Officers knew anything of this 
Stratagem" until well after the series of clandestine 
transactions had taken place.23 
21 Randolph, Letters, v, 118. 
22 Md. A., XX, 463. 
23 CRNC, IV, 170-71. 
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Another class of evasive maneuvers involved diverting 
contraband export cargoes away from the main shipping 
channels, where the possibility of discovery was greatest, 
to regions even less effectively patrolled than the lower 
80 
bay and the Eastern Shore. In 1679 officials of the Customs 
House in England advised against approving a proposal to 
allow North Carolina to export its tobacco duty free, one 
reason being that Virginia planters, it was feared, would 
exploit the situation by sending their produce south, 
representing it "as Tobacco of the growth of Carolina," a 
fraud which, officials concluded, "would be Impossible to 
prevent." 24 Although the proposal was never adopted, some 
Virginia planters evidently used the North Carolina route to 
ship their tobacco duty free anyway. 25 In 1695 Edward 
Randolph suggested that North Carolina be annexed to 
Virginia specifically to "prevent the Shipping of the 
Merchantable Tobacco growing in the Southern part of yt 
Teritory by the Inlets of Corrituck and Roanoak." 26 Eight 
years later Robert Quary, Randolph's successor as surveyor 
general, described the isolated inlet at "Curatucke" as a 
"small hole where much mischief is yearly done." 27 
24 ~., I, 243. 
25 Ibid., III, xvi; NCHCM, 1724-1730, xxv; Randolph, 
Letters,-v;-156, 231. 
26 Randolph, Letters, VII, 476. 
27 CSPC, XXI, #1150 ii, p. 739. 
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A similar type of illicit traffic also developed in the 
northern Chesapeake. In 1692 Edward Randolph reported the 
complaints of shipmasters that their trade was being 
destroyed by individuals who were transporting tobacco 
overland from Maryland's Eastern Shore to Delaware to avoid 
duty payments. 28 According to Randolph, however, the real 
culprit as far as the illegal overland trade was concerned 
was not Delaware per se, but Pennsylvania. 29 William Penn 
angrily rejected the charge, arguing that "If Tobacco be 
carried from Maryland to our side in fraud to the King, Edw. 
Randall [sic] ought to answer for that • • • The crime lies 
on the side of Maryland, where he chiefly resides; and there 
it is such practices should be stopped." Penn went on to 
list a number of cogent reasons why the alleged scam was 
impractical in any case, citing, among other drawbacks, the 
cost and difficulty of transporting heavy and bulky tobacco 
hogsheads up to ten miles overland.3° 
In the same year that Penn refuted Randolph's charges, 
however, Maryland governor Nicholson reported that several 
roads between his colony and Penn's were perfectly adequate 
for conveying "Boats and Shalops of 10 or 12 Tuns upon 
Sleys, or in great Carts" as part of an extensive smuggling 
28 Randolph, Letters, VII, 361. 
29 Ibid., V, 117-24. 
30 Ibid., VII, 508-09. 
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operation. 31 A proclamation issued by the governor in 
1695 testifies to his conviction that such illegal 
activities actually were being pursued and were having a 
substantial adverse effect on the colony's economy: "it is • 
apparent that the Trade of this Province is much impared 
and Damnifyed by Sloops Shallops and Boats ••• of 
Pensilvania • which 
• • • I transporting their loading 
over land • are frequently known to transport in Carts • 
• • large Sloopes, Shallops, and Boats wthout making any 
report or Entrey therof."32 
Naturally, the magnitude of illicit trade conducted 
without officially entering or clearing is impossible to 
calculate, but references to ship seizures and, less 
frequently, condemnations for failure to produce the 
requisite documents suggest that attempts to circumvent the 
customs system entirely occurred fairly regularly throughout 
the 165e-175e period and, under the right circumstances, 
could occasionally be detected. 33 A variation on the 
practice, loading an additional cargo of enumerated goods 
after clearing legally, appears to have lessened the risk of 
discovery considerably. By employing this tactic, a ship 
31 Md. A., XXIII, 87; Morriss, Colonial Trade of 
Maryland, 128. 
32 Md. A., XX, 279-Se; Morriss, Colonial Trade of 
Maryland, 128-29 n. 216. 
33 Md. A., XXIII, 88; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. 
nos. 8, 23, 25, 27; CCR 191, 1/27/1729, 1/28/1735, 
9/23/1735, 11/3/1736, 7/7/1741, 11/19/1743, and le/24/175e. 
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captain could produce official papers, if so required, to 
indicate that he had indeed followed what would have 
appeared to be the prescribed procedures for entering and 
clearing. Unless the searcher, usually a royal guardship 
officer, was willing to make a thorough inspection of the 
vessel and its contents, chances were that the ruse would 
never be exposed as the rarity of such discoveries in the 
documentary record would seem to indicate. 
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Although the infrequency with which such infractions 
were prosecuted might be construed to mean that the offenses 
simply did not occur often enough to constitute a serious 
concern, royal and colonial officials clearly believed 
otherwise. In 1695 the governor of Maryland felt compelled 
to issue a proclamation requiring each shipmaster to swear 
(as if it would do any good) "that he neither will nor does 
design by himself or any other procurement to take in any 
more tobacco • after Clearing other than what he has 
given an Accot off upon Oath." 34 Fifteen years later 
Governor Spotswood tried to ascertain how illicit trade was 
being conducted between Virginia and the islands of Cura~ao 
and St. Thomas by comparing the figures for cargoes cleared 
from points of embarkation with the records of cargoes 
entered at the legal destinations of various vessels. 
Finding no discrepancy between the two sets of numbers, the 
governor eventually discovered that it had become common 
34 Md. A., XX, 278. 
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practice for ships leaving Virginia to "take in great 
quantitys of tobacco after they had cleared with the 
Officer, and by this means ••• easeing all that Tobacco at 
either of those forreigne ports before they went to the 
plantation to which they were cleared."3S 
The following year Spotswood wrote to the Commissioners 
of the Customs requesting additional resources in the battle 
against smuggling since, he had determined, it was "so easy 
for any Master of a Vessell to take in tobacco after he has 
cleared, without giving the Collector any acco't of it." 36 
Whatever remedial measures British authorities may have 
implemented in response, however, achieved no more than 
limited or temporary success. Over a quarter century later, 
former North Carolina governor Burrington wrote the 
Commissioners that there still was "no knowing what 
Quantities of Tobacco are carried because the Masters ship 
it after they have cleared with the Collectors." 37 
The strategy of taking on an additional cargo after 
clearing was normally predicated on the assumption that the 
unregistered goods would be disposed of, often in a 
proscribed foreign port, before reaching the vessel's final, 
approved destination either in England or another British 
colony. In some instances, however, illicit traders 
35 Spotswood, Letters, I, le. 
36 Ibid., 76. 
37 CRNC, IV, 171. 
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apparently succeeded in obviating the necessity for taking 
even this basic precaution. As governor of Maryland in 
1697, Francis Nicholson alleged that colonial smugglers had 
managed to secure the cooperation of customs agents in 
England, some of whom were thought to "suffer the Masters 
and merchants to enter with them more tobacco than they have 
cleared from here ••• so that if they have a chance to run 
it, either before or after the officer's visit, they gain 
their object." 38 
Periods of armed conflict between England and her 
European rivals in America presented new challenges and 
opportunities to the illicit traders of the greater 
Chesapeake. In time of war, trade normally prohibited with 
foreign colonies acquired the additional stigma of a 
treasonable offense. But during such hostilities the 
Chesapeake colonists seem to have been motivated less by a 
sense of patriotic duty than one of economic potential. The 
greater risks associated with maritime commerce during 
international conflict meant greater profits, prompting 
smugglers to develop special techniques to turn the 
situation to their own advantage. 
One form of deception, described by Virginia governor 
Edward Nott in 1705 as "Collusive, fraudulent, & Clandestine 
Captures by privateers," exploited the wartime environment 
to import cargoes of foreign goods which normally would be 
38 ~' XV, #1178, p. 548. 
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prohibited. 39 This ruse involved the staged "capture" of 
a cooperating enemy merchant ship in order to have the 
vessel condemned as a prize so that its cargo could then be 
sold legally. 40 But in view of the very limited 
involvement of Chesapeake-owned and manned privateers in the 
wars between European powers before 1750, it seems unlikely 
that this particular practice was used to circumvent the 
Navigation Acts and wartime trade regulations to any 
significant degree. 41 
A scam which may have been perpetrated more often by 
the owners and operators of Chesapeake vessels and their 
foreign counterparts was to enter an enemy harbor with a 
prohibited cargo under a "flag of truce" on the pretext of 
exchanging prisoners of war. Although Chesapeake colonists 
certainly had engaged in illicit trade with foreign enemies 
during the seventeenth century, English officials do not 
appear to have issued any specific directives against the 
practice until the later years of Queen Anne's War. When 
the home government did become exercised about Chesapeake 
residents' commercial involvement with wartime adversaries, 
it was specifically in connection with the flag of truce 
issue. Instructions to the governors of Virginia, Maryland, 
and other colonies in May 1710 warned colonial officials not 
39 C05/1315, p. 35 (viii); EJC, III, 558. 
40 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 432 n. 62. 
41 Ibid., 371. 
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to permit flag of truce vessels to load any more provisions 
than those absolutely necessary for the voyage and insisted 
that the governors "not under any pretence whatsoever offer 
or allow of any such traiterous and illegal practices as 
have been heretofore used of sending to our • enemys 
• supplys of provisions ••• whereby they have been 
assisted, comforted and relieved." 42 
The British crown's concern over the more general 
problem of its subjects aiding the enemy was spurred by 
testimony earlier that year in which deponents specifically 
identified Carolina as a participant in forbidden commerce 
with the Dutch island of Cura9ao and the Danish island of 
St. Thomas, "by which means the French Islands and their 
privateers are furnished with goods and provisions." 43 
The informants further asserted that there was "hardly any 
Plantation in America that belongs to H.M. but has a 
correspondence with Curacoa." 44 Although the other 
Chesapeake colonies were not mentioned by name in that 
memorial, a subsequent deposition by mariner Samuel Brise 
provided an eyewitness account of ships having arrived at 
42 CSPC, XXV, #213, p. 85. 
4 3 Ibid., i47, pp. 13-17, 51. Governor Nott's 1705 
proclamation against fraudulent seizures by privateers also 
expressly forbade any correspondence with the French, 
especially "Supplying them with warlike or other stores." 
Those found guilty were to be "adjudged ••• traitors & 
Suffer ye pains of Death" (COS/1315, p. 35 [viii]). 
44 CSPC, XXV, #47, p. 15. 
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Cura~ao from Virginia laden with tobacco over a period of 
several years during the war. 45 Two decades later, royal 
authorities still felt obliged to remind North Carolina 
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governor Burrington that "in the late Wars the Merchants and 
Planters in America did correspond & trade with our enemies" 
and instructed him to employ "all possible methods to ••• 
hinder all such trade • in time of war."46 
While trading with the enemy drew significant attention 
in its own right, the phenomenon actually represented little 
more than an extension of the illicit commerce that 
Chesapeake colonists had been conducting routinely with 
foreigners, frequently with the assistance of New England 
mariners. Not long after the establishment of the 
Plantation Duty in 1673, Virginia merchants were complaining 
about northern traders carrying "much tobacco" from the 
Chesapeake to New England and from there to foreign 
countries, but the prominent role played by New Englanders 
in the illicit trade of the greater Chesapeake is most 
dramatically illustrated by the events surrounding 
Culpeper's Rebellion in North Carolina. 47 
Long before the eruption of hostilities in 1677, New 
Englanders had dominated the export trade of the Albermarle 
45 JCTP, II, 114-15. 
46 CRNC, III, 116. 
47 CSPC, VII, il059, p. 475. 
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region's principal cash crop, tobacco. 48 So great was the 
influence of the northern traders that the North 
Carolinians, under the threat of having the price of their 
provisions doubled, persuaded their governor to remit three 
quarters of the Plantation Duty that the New England 
mariners were required to pay to ship enumerated commodities 
out of the colony. 49 The Culpeper insurrection itself was 
precipitated by another attempt to enforce the Navigation 
Acts against New England commercial interests, specifically 
the arrest of trader Zachariah Gilliam by provisional 
governor Thomas Miller for the former's refusal to pay 
duties allegedly owed from tobacco exported the previous 
year. 50 
In the aftermath of the conflict, reports solicited by 
English authorities from colonial officials further 
elucidated the part played by the New England men in the 
disturbance. Albermarle's new collector informed the 
Commissioners of the Customs that about a half dozen traders 
from New England customarily transported most of the tobacco 
produced in Albermarle County and that they were the ones 
largely responsible for setting up John Culpeper as 
collector, "by which means they & he have played such 
48 Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 42; 
NCHCR, 1670-1696, xxxii. 
49 CRNC, I, 292, 309; NCHCR, 1670-1696, xliii. 
S0 NCHCR, 1670-1696, 1-li; Lefler and Powell, Colonial 
North Carolina, 44. 
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notorious pranks with the specious pretences of doing 
justice and preserving the King's rights that a people and 
Customes Treasure were never more infatuated, cheated and 
exhausted." 51 
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In their account of the insurrection, the Carolina 
proprietors acknowledged Thomas Miller's excesses and abuse 
of power, but also concluded that the Culpeper faction and 
the New England men "had a designe to gitt ye trade of 
this part of ye Country into their hands ••• And ••• 
defraud the King of all his Customes." 52 Perhaps the most 
telling manifestation of the prominence of the northern 
traders in the illicit commercial affairs of North Carolina 
is evident in Miller's fate at the hands of the rebels. Not 
only did the New England men help arrest the provisional 
governor during the uprising for having seized hundreds of 
hogsheads of tobacco which they were exporting illegally, 
but at Miller's subsequent trial on what were probably 
spurious charges of making seditious declarations against 
the king and the Duke of York, the shipmasters even managed 
to install "a New England traidr • 
Majty for Customes" as jury foreman. 5 3 
much indebted to his 
Despite their flagrantly provocative influence and 
behavior both preceding and during the rebellion, the New 
51 CRNC, I' 245. 
52 Ibid., 288. 
53 Ibid., 297. 
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Englanders suffered no recriminations in the aftermath nor, 
despite the claim that customs duties subsequently were 
collected "without any disturbance from the people,'' did 
their level of participation in the contraband trade of the 
region appear to diminish appreciably in the long runo 54 
Edward Randolph and the colonial governors continued to 
complain about their activities not only in North Carolina 
but throughout the greater Chesapeake for the rest of the 
seventeenth centuryo55 
A reduction in the number of protests about New England 
involvement in the contraband trade of the region during the 
early years of the eighteenth century suggests that the 
administrative reforms of the 1699s may have succeeded in 
curtailing the northern traders' participation in the 
illicit commerce of the bay area for a brief period. Even 
so, Randolph's successor, Robert Quary, expressed "much 
fear" in 1793 that most of the tobacco grown in North 
Carolina was being "carryed to a wrong market o o o by New 
Engldo men" who continued to conduct the greatest part of 
that colony's tradeo 56 And during an investigation of 
customs abuses in Connecticut five years later, the royal 
5 4 Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 46. 
55 Randolph, Letters, V, 118, 119, 135, 142-43, 216-17, 
231, 279-71; VII, 367; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 
117; CSPC, XIII, #2295, PPo 657, 659; XIV, #1897, ppo 
511-1~ 
56 ~, XXI, #1159 ii, p. 738o 
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agent discovered that "several! vessells that made a Trade 
of running Tobacco from the Out Parts of Virginia without 
entry or clearing came directly to this Government, and 
landed their Tobacco" in New London. There it was illegally 
processed by the local collector whom Quary denigrated as a 
"Pillar of their Church but a great rogue." 57 
By 1710 Virginia officials indicated that New England 
vessels again were foremost among those guilty of abusing 
the customs system by "exporting greater quantities of 
tobacco than they pay duty for ••• to the great prejudice 
of her Majesty and a discouragement of all fair 
Traders." 58 Over a decade later, the masters of the 
College of William and Mary identified evasion of the penny 
per pound duty on tobacco exports by New England shippers as 
another reason for their greatly depleted revenues. Not 
only did the northerners habitually break the law, but they 
apparently did so with a degree of impunity. "The 
New-England men are so bold in their transgressions of the 
acts of trade," wrote the college directors, "that no 
ordinary officer on the Eastern shore cares to meddle with 
them." 59 In 1736, nearly six decades after Culpeper's 
57 Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the 
State of New York, Berthold Fernow and others, eds., (Albany 
1877), v, 30. Cited hereafter as N.Y. St. Docs. 
58 EJC, III, 253; Spotswood, Letters, I, 10, 114. 
5 9 Perry, Church Papers, 549. 
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Rebellion, George Burrington reported that New England 
traders were exporting "great quantities" of North Carolina 
tobacco annually without paying any duties.60 
Besides the New Englanders, the Chesapeake colonists' 
most consistent partners in the crime of illicit trade were 
the Scots and the Dutch. Although the Scots were anxious to 
participate in the legal commerce of the English empire, the 
Navigation Act of 1660 effectively prevented them from doing 
so. The legislation classified Scots as aliens which meant 
that they were not permitted to trade with the colonies; 
their sailors could not be considered English for the 
purpose of fulfilling the requirement that the crew be 
three-quarters English; and their ships could not be used to 
convey goods to and from America. 61 Typical of the 
scottish reaction to the enforcement of the acts was a 
situation in Barbados in 1670 in which a vessel was seized 
and condemned for not having the requisite percentage of 
English sailors despite the presence of an ample number of 
Scotsmen, men who had "hazarded their lives in the last wars 
against the Dutch" and considered it "wondrous unkind to be 
thus debarred the liberty of subjects." 62 
60 CRNC, IV, 170. 
61 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
124; Harper, English Navigation Laws, 65, 284-86, 387 n. 1, 
389. 
62 CSPC, VII, il63, p. 60. 
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In defiance of the prohibitions, the Scots resolved to 
participate in the colonial trade nevertheless and became 
especially active in the illicit commerce of the 
Chesapeake. 63 So effective were they in establishing 
themselves in the trade that by 1689 English merchants were 
protesting that their livelihood was being destroyed by 
Scottish vessels sailing directly to Maryland, Virginia, and 
Pennsylvania. 64 The following year English authorities 
received a report that two ships from the Chesapeake had 
unloaded tobacco in Glasgow without having cleared first in 
England. 65 Two years later Edward Randolph informed his 
superiors about the certificate counterfeiting operation in 
Glasgow and reported the arrival in Maryland of several 
trading vessels which had sailed directly from Scotland. 66 
A significant aspect of the problem, according to 
Randolph, was the considerable support that the Scottish 
traders enjoyed among the local population. The surveyor 
general despaired of remedying the contraband commerce 
63 One way in which the Scottish smugglers reportedly 
secured a commercial foothold in the Chesapeake was by 
consolidating ties with relatives who had been transported 
to Virginia and Maryland by Oliver Cromwell after the 
battles of Dunbar and Worcester following the English Civil 
war (Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 91). 
6 4 Stock, Debates II, 195; Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American History, IV, 151. 
65 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 119 n. 160. 
6 6 Randolph, Letters, VII, 371; CSPC, XIII, #2295, pp. 
657-59. 
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situation so long as one collector remained "a great 
partisan of the Scotchmen in their cases" and a council 
member and another customs agent continued to be "great 
supporters of the Scotch trade." 67 Randolph found 
Somerset County to be a particularly troublesome area, "a 
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place pestered by hundreds of Scotch and Irish families •• 
• who support the interlopers, buy their cargoes and govern 
the whole trade of the Eastern shore." 68 
In 1694 Randolph submitted a list of traders who, he 
charged, had cleared illegally from customs districts in 
Virginia and Maryland. Of the thirteen ships indicated, 
nine were listed as bound for Scotland and Scotsmen were 
identified as the principal merchants in all but two 
instances. 69 English authorities received additional 
reports of Scottish involvement in the illicit trade of the 
Chesapeake from various quarters that year. Patuxent River 
district collector George Plater informed the Privy Council 
that several vessels had embarked from Maryland with cargoes 
bound directly for Scotland. 79 In England, the London 
Customs House calculated a loss of L59,999 throughout the 
empire as a result of illicit trade that year, drawing 
67 CSPC, XIII, 12295, p. 658. 
68 Ibid., p. 659. 
69 Randolph, Letters, VII, 472-73. 
79 Md. A., XX, 65; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 
119 n. 169. 
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special attention to the adverse consequences to the royal 
revenue of colonial tobacco ships unloading at Glasgow.71 
96 
Also in 1694, English merchants repeated their five-year-old 
complaint about Scottish interlopers devastating their 
trade. Beseeching royal authorities to provide "some remedy 
••• against this groaning evil," they recommended that the 
home government provide a small ship to cruise the 
Chesapeake Bay against illicit traders. 72 This time 
English authorities considered the matter serious enough to 
order the Maryland and Virginia governors to hire vessels to 
patrol the bay in search of ships arriving directly from 
Scotland. 73 
In late 1695 English officials became further alarmed 
by the Scottish parliament's passage of an act establishing 
a joint stock company to trade with Africa and the East 
Indies. Edward Randolph contemptuously derided the 
initiative as a mere "pretence" by which the Scots hoped to 
"engage themselves with great sums of money in an American 
trade." 7 4 In England the Commissioners of the Customs 
71 Stock, Debates, II 104, 106, 107-08, 110-12; Hall, 
Edward Randolph, 156. 
72 CTP, I, 354; Md. A., XX, 262, 340-41, XXIII, 87; 
Stock, Debates, II, 111; CSPC, XIV, #1005 I, p. 279. 
73 CSPC, XIV, ill39 I and II, p. 308; #1494, p. 396; 
#1510, p:-399; Md. A., XX, 263; XXIII, 551; APCC, II, #558, 
pp. 272-73; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, 
IV, 153. 
74 CSPC, XIV, #2187, p. 625. 
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also confessed to being "apprehensive that this traffic may 
be increased under colour" of the recent legislation and 
begged the King in Council to take additional remedial 
action. 75 Focusing directly on the Chesapeake, the 
commissioners instructed Collector Plater to keep an 
"Especial! Eye and Reguard to such ships and Vessels as may 
be in any wayes suspected to Come from Scotl. or be bound 
thither" and communicated to Governor Nicholson their 
deepest fear that "a Vigorous Carrying on the Trade to and 
from those parts" might ultimately do no less than "destroy 
the Trade and Navigation of England and Carry it to 
Scotland."76 
The crown's anxiety over mounting reports of illicit 
trade in the Chesapeake and other parts of colonial America 
(in which the activities of Scottish interlopers figured 
prominently), provided the impetus to draft and secure 
passage of the 1696 Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating 
Abuses in the Plantation Trade. The home government's 
preoccupation with the perceived Scottish threat at this 
time was reflected in the circular sent to all plantation 
governors only days after the act's passage, inquiring as to 
75 Ibid., #2237, pp. 638-39. 
76 Md. A., XX, 345. 
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whether any "Scotchmen" were employed in places of trust in 
the colonial governments. 7 7 
Enactment of the legislation appears to have had little 
immediate impact, however, on the volume of contraband trade 
conducted by Scotsmen in the bay region. In 1698 a customs 
officer and member of the Council of Virginia offered the 
Board of Trade a subtle reminder about the persistence of 
illegal commerce between Scotland and the Chesapeake. "I 
need not acquaint you with the sweetness of that trade," he 
wrote, "nor what a prodigious revenue the King may lose if 
it be not well looked into."78 In addition to accounts 
over the next few years of Scottish ships arriving in the 
Chesapeake with cargoes of European goods and departing with 
shipments of tobacco, the Commissioners of the Customs 
advised colonial officials about the reported construction 
in Maryland and Virginia of ships intended for the Scottish 
trade. 79 such a building program would have represented a 
rather remarkable development in view of Maryland governor 
John Hart's declaration, as late as 172~, that his colony's 
inhabitants owned very few ships and "are not inclin'd to 
77 Ibid., 569; Andrews, Colonial Period of American 
History,-yv; 175. 
78 CSPC, XVI, #655, p. 33~. 
79 Md. A., XX, 34~-41; XXIII, 11, 12, 328, 329; XXV, 
73; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 119 n. 16~. 
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navigation, but depend on British bottoms, for ••• the 
bulk of their trade."80 
99 
One way to end Scottish smuggling was to make it legal. 
Under the Act of Union in 1707 Scotland was formally 
admitted to the British empire. By virtue of the Scots' new 
status as British citizens, many of the illicit trade 
activities in which they had engaged previously were no 
longer considered criminal and, as a result, the number of 
recorded trade act violations by "Scotchmen" dropped 
precipitously in succeeding years. Since the Scots were now 
officially British subjects, it is also reasonable to 
suppose that, even when they were implicated in contraband 
trade, they were no longer certain to be identified by 
nationality, thus contributing to further anonymity in the 
subsequent annals of illicit trade in the greater 
Chesapeake. Nevertheless, a Parliamentary committee 
investigating the smuggling of tobacco from Virginia and 
Maryland in 1723 concluded that "great and notorious frauds 
have been committed, upon the importation of tobacco into 
that part of Great Britain called Scotland, by not duly 
8° CSPC, XXXII, i214 iv, p. 129. A quarter century 
earlier Maryland Governor Nicholson had remarked that ship 
handling and navigation were "so contrary to the genius of 
the people" that he could find no local replacement for the 
drowned commander of the sloop assigned to patrol the 
colony's waters against smuggling (Ibid., XIV, 12303, p. 
654) 0 --
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paying the customs thereon." 81 Moreover, historians have 
remarked on the strong Scottish presence in Norfolk in the 
eighteenth century and have speculated on the likely 
connection between that demographic fact and the Virginia 
port city's participation in illegal trade with foreign 
colonies in the West Indies, specifically in violation of 
the Molasses Act.82 
While diminution of the royal revenue caused by 
Scottish breaches of the trade laws may have been mitigated 
considerably by incorporating the transgressors into the 
British commercial system, no such simple solution could be 
found for the problem of Dutch interlopers whose involvement 
in the illicit trade of England dated back to the Middle 
Ages. 83 In the colonial era, the inability of English 
merchants to compete successfully against Dutch commercial 
interests eventually induced Parliament to legislate the 
first of the restrictive Navigation Acts in 1651. 84 The 
phenomenon of Dutch collaboration in the illicit trade of 
the Chesapeake, however, was based on a tradition of 
81 Stock, Debates, III, 464. Robert c. Nash has 
determined that between 1787 and 1722 Glasgow merchants 
probably evaded duty payments on a third to a half of their 
tobacco imports ("Tobacco Trades," 370). 
82 Thomas Wertenbaker, Norfolk, Historic Southern Port 
(Durham, N.C., 1931), 44, 49; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 209. 
8 3 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 21. 
84 c. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire: 1600-1800 
(New York, 1965), 91; Andrews, Colonial Period of American 
History, IV, chapter 2. 
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amicable and mutually profitable relations which predated 
the trade laws by several decades. 
Despite the understanding reached between English 
authorities and officials of Virginia Company in the 162~s, 
colonial planters, including Governor George Yeardley, 
customarily shipped their tobacco directly to Holland aboard 
both Dutch and English ships. 85 By an act of assembly in 
1642/3 Virginia legislators went so far as to codify the 
encouragement of Dutch trade with their colony. 86 The 
attempt by envoys from New Netherland in 1653 to negotiate a 
commercial treaty with Virginia empowering Dutch merchants 
to collect debts owed them by residents of the English 
settlement further testifies to the prior existence of 
extensive trade relations between the two New World 
colonies. 87 In the same year, Eastern Shore planters 
notified their business associates in Manhattan that they 
would maintain the supply of tobacco, in direct defiance of 
the 1651 Navigation Act, if the Dutchmen would send ships to 
Smith's Island to make the exchange. 88 
85 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
17; Wise, Kingdome of Accawmacke, 294-95. 
86 Hening, Statutes, I, 258. 
87 E. B. O'Callaghan, History of New Netherland; or New 
York Under the Dutch, (New York, 1848), II, 235-36; John R. 
Brodhead, History of the State of New York, 2 vols. (New 
York, 1874), I, 562. 
88 Wise, Kingdome of Accawmacke, 147. 
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Except for a brief hiatus during the First Dutch War 
(1652-54), Virginians continued to pursue commercial 
relations with the Dutch throughout the Protectorate 
period. 89 When the English monarchy was restored, New 
1~2 
Netherland dispatched ambassadors to Virginia once again "to 
renew our former and ancient friendship, correspondence, and 
neighborship" and to negotiate a treaty, which was 
successfully concluded, establishing "free trade and 
commerce" between the two colonies. 9 ~ Despite the English 
prohibitions, Dutch merchants appear to have participated 
fully in the economic life of the Chesapeake colony even to 
the extent of joining, on at least one occasion, with 
English and Anglo-American shiprnasters in openly defying 
local customs authorities. When, in 1658, two Virginia 
collectors submitted a list of ship captains who had refused 
to pay the two shilling per hogshead duty on tobacco, the 
roster included the commander of the ship Dolphin, a 
merchant vessel with a registered horne port of 
Arnsterdarn. 91 
89 N.Y. St. Docs., XII, 95 n. 8; Brodhead, History of 
New York, 682; Ames, Virginia Eastern Shore, 45-46, 48-49, 
95; Beer, Old Colonial System, I, 237. 
9 ~ Brodhead, History of New York, I, 683; Frances G. 
Davenport, ed., European Treaties Bearing on the History of 
the United States and its Dependencies (Washington, D.C., 
1917-1937), II, 55-56. 
91 Hening, Statutes, I, 513. 
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The intimacy of the relationship between the Virginians 
and the Dutch traders exceeded that of simple trading 
partners, at least as far as the Chesapeake planters were 
concerned. Governor Berkeley, himself a planter, cast the 
foreigners in the role of economic saviors when, in 
objecting to the Navigation Act of 1651, he complained about 
"the Londoners who would faine bring us to the same poverty, 
wherein the Dutch found and relieved us." 92 Almost twenty 
years later, the Virginians' seemingly greater affinity for 
the Hollanders than the government of their mother country 
took a more ominous turn from the crown's perspective. Sir 
John Knight reported that the "desire of the planters for a 
trade with the Dutch ••• and not to be singly bound to 
England" had motivated them to permit the enemy to land 
during an invasion the previous year. So grave was Knight's 
concern about the loyalty of the local population that he 
advocated building forts near Virginia's harbors and coasts 
partly to prevent the planters "from revolting to the Dutch, 
as," he warned, "it is much to be feared they will." 9 3 
Although the much feared rebellion never occurred, 
residents of the greater Chesapeake continued to conduct 
92 VMHB, I, 77; VIII, 147; Ames, Virginia Eastern 
Shore, 46; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
28. 
93 CSPC, VII, #1159, p. 530. 
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illicit trade with the Dutch. 94 A casual Dutch reference 
to the acquisition of a full load of tobacco from Virginia 
"in the name of an English skipper" indicates one method by 
which the Dutchmen circumvented English customs regulations 
and suggests that the ruse was employed rather commonly.95 
English officials clearly expressed their conviction 
concerning the prevalence and volume of this particular form 
of contraband trade when they asserted, in the royal 
instructions to Governor Berkeley in 1662, that "very much 
Tobacco" was being shipped out of Virginia aboard "Dutch 
Vessels wherein English mariners are entertained for that 
purpose." 96 Virginians did not rely solely on Dutch 
bottoms to conduct the trade, however. In 1684 treasury 
officials gave instructions to the English consul in 
Rotterdam to seek the cooperation of local officials in 
seizing any remaining tobacco ships fro~ Virginia, six of 
which were reported to have arrived during the previous four 
weeks, and sending the vessels to England. 97 For the rest 
94 N.Y. St. Docs., III, 47; V, 3~; Wise, Kingdome of 
Accawmacke, 238, 296-98. 
95 N.Y. St. Docs., II, 253. 
96 VMHB, III, 18. 
97 CTB, VIII, pt. 2, p. 1119; Andrews, Colonial Period 
of American History, IV, 118. Almost two centuries later, 
English officials once again identified Rotterdam as a 
principal center for smuggling tobacco into England. 
Following up on reports of large-scale contraband shipments 
from the Dutch city in 1881, London customs officers 
confiscated a sizable cache of the weed that had been packed 
by hydraulic pressure into two massive, mock marine boilers 
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of the century English authorities continued to receive 
reports of direct and indirect trade between the Chesapeake, 
Holland, and the Dutch colonies in America and the West 
Indies. 98 
By the eighteenth century the Dutch West Indian island 
of Curayao had begun to emerge as the primary shipping, 
receiving, and distribution center for the Dutch contraband 
trade with the Chesapeake. In a 1695 letter to the Council 
of Maryland the Commissioners of the Customs expressed 
displeasure regarding the reported delivery of 6a hogsheads 
of tobacco to "Carasoa" by a ship owned and operated by 
residents of the Patuxent River customs district. 99 Had 
the incident been isolated, it might not have elicited 
serious concern, but within several months English 
constructed especially for the purpose (Harper, The 
Smugglers, 23a-31). 
98 Randolph, Letters, VII, 351; V, 135, 216-17. One 
report which probably did not come to the attention of 
English authorities until considerably after the fact offers 
a further indication of the regularity of contraband trade 
between the Dutch and the greater Chesapeake. The pirate 
journal of Ambrose Cowley contains a 1683 entry concerning 
the capture of "a Holland shipp bound for Virginia with 
negroes" off the west coast of Africa. Recognizing the 
vessel as "an Interloper," the freebooters explained to the 
Dutch captain that "they might as well Rob him as He the 
King, he being bound to Rob the King of his Dutyes" (William 
Dampier, Dampier's Voyages: Consisting of A New Voyage Round 
the World, a Supplement to the Voyage Round the World, Two 
Vo a es to Cam each , a Discourse of Winds, a Vo a e to New 
Holland ••• , John Masefield, ed. London, 1 a6 , I, 532; 
Lionel Wafer, A New Vo a e & Descri tion of the Isthmus of 
America, L. E. Elliott Joyce, ed., Oxford, 1934 , xxx). 
99 Md. A., XX, 366-67. 
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authorities were convinced that the "abuse of Conveying Tob0 
Sugars and Indico from his Mats Plantations to this Dutch 
£factory" already had become established as "a general! 
practice" and that the officials of the Caribbean island, 
far from deterring such proscribed commerce, instead gave 
"countenance and Encouragemt thereunto." 100 The same 
year Edward Randolph reported that many English sailors 
deserted Royal Navy ships in the Chesapeake in order to join 
the crews of vessels trading illegally to "Carasaw."101 
In 1700 Robert Quary, judge of Pennsylvania's 
vice-admiralty court and soon to succeed Randolph as 
surveyor general, undertook to expose and put a stop to 
illicit trade with Curayao. But in seeking the colonists' 
cooperation Quary was dismayed to find "all persons so very 
cold and unwilling to concern themselves" that he felt 
constrained to pursue the matter entirely by himself or, he 
was convinced, "nothing will be effected."102 A special 
agent dispatched to the colonies to assess the status of 
piracy and illicit trade in America reported in 1701 that 
the inhabitants of the proprietary colonies drove "a 
constant trade to Surinnam and Curacoa ••• from whence 
they bring back linnen and other European 
100 Ibid., 523. 
101 Randolph, Letters, V, 126. 
102 CSPC, XVIII, #932 i, p. 653. 
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commodities."103 Two years later, Quary, now surveyor 
general, identified "Curesawe and other places in ye West 
Indies" as the destinations of tobacco exported illegally 
from North Carolina aboard New England vessels.l 04 
107 
Apart from Quary, however, it appears that few royal or 
colonial officials became sufficiently agitated about the 
problem to take any concerted action until the beginning of 
the next decade once new information about the trade had 
been made available. In 1709 John Lawson wrote about the 
thriving commerce between North Carolina and Cura~ao and the 
ships that the Carolinians had built to conduct that 
lucrative trade. 105 The Curayao-Chesapeake connection 
was revealed to officials of the home government in greater 
detail early the following year through the memorials of 
Peter Holt, Samuel Brise, and others. 106 In addition to 
Brise's testimony about the presence of Virginia vessels in 
Cura~ao, the Council of Trade also learned that Carolina had 
been supplying the island with pitch, tar, and even 
ships.l07 
The Commissioners for Trade and Plantations enjoined 
the gove~no~s of all the colonies which had been implicated 
Hn Ibid., XIX, fl:l054, p. 659. 
H~4 Ibid., XXI, fl:ll50 i i, p. 738. 
195 Lawson, Vo;tage to Carolina, 10. 
196 CSPC, XXV, i47 I' pp. 14-17; JCTP, II, 114-15. 
197 CSPC, XXV, fl:l38, p. 51. 
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in the memorials "to make strict enquiry into the truth" of 
the allegations. 1 ~ 8 Later that year, in an unsuccessful 
attempt to discover the Anglo-American participants in the 
illegal traffic between the lower James River and the Dutch 
island, Governor Spotswood found information as difficult to 
obtain as Colonel Quary had a decade earlier. Despite the 
governor's admission that his investigations had "not given 
••• the light ••• expected," the Council of Trade and 
Plantations commended him for his "diligence in endeavouring 
to detect illegal trade with Curacoa" and urged continued 
vigilance to "discourage such illegal practises upon all 
occasions." 1 ~ 9 There is no evidence, however, to suggest 
that the perpetrators of the trade were ever apprehended. 
At the same time, though, the number of specific 
references to contraband trade with Cura9ao appearing in the 
contemporary documents diminishes considerably in succeeding 
years. The relative absence of complaints may not reflect 
the virtual elimination, or even reduction, of the trade, 
however. In response to a royal government query regarding 
the extent of illicit trade in Virginia in 1739, Governor 
William Gooch reported that such traffic no longer existed, 
with the single exception of that which still was being 
1~8 JCTP, II, 111. 
1~9 Spotswood, Letters, I, 18, 87; CSPC, XXV, #437, p. 
233; #449, p. 242. 
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conducted with the Dutch colonies of Surinam and 
"Curassoa."110 Several years later Gooch reported that 
109 
even this trade had ceased, but it is worth noting that the 
contraband cargo of foreign goods mentioned by North 
Carolina governor Burrington as having been destined for 
Virginia merchants arrived about the same time, in 1734, 
thus casting doubt on Gooch's overall assessment. 111 
In the 1730s and '40s prohibited goods continued to 
enter the colonies of the greater Chesapeake, but the route 
by which they arrived is often unspecified in the official 
records and, in some instances, may have been unknown even 
to law enforcement authorities at the time. In 1741, for 
example, a vessel was condemned in North Carolina for having 
imported "forreign rum," Lisbon salt, gunpowder, and "sundry 
other ••• merchandises." The cargo was thought to have 
been loaded in Virginia, but since it arrived "without any 
Lawful! permitts, Cocketts, due Entrys or clearances • 
or any Certificate of bond" it was impossible to determine 
what the previous port or ports of embarkation had 
been. 112 In an unusual case several years earlier, a 
customs agent at Port Roanoke submitted a libel to the North 
110 Flippin, William Gooch, 14. 
111 Ibid.~ Wertenbaker, Norfolk, 44~ "Gooch 
Correspondence," typescript mss. at The Colonial 
Williamsburg Research Center, vol. 1, Gooch to the Board of 
Trade, July 23, 1730. 
112 1 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 191, 7/7 1741. 
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Carolina vice-admiralty court concerning the seizure of 
various contraband goods "of Merchants unknown ••• in 
certain Ship ••• or Vessels ••• as yet unknown." The 
confiscated wares included Indian silks and muslin as well 
as French wine and playing cards.ll3 
The nature of the contraband goods in both cases may 
offer a clue as to the source of the goods. In 1710 the 
Board of Trade listed "muslins, silks and • great 
quantities of ••• powder and shott" among the principal 
commodities that traders from the English plantations 
received from the merchants of Curayao in exchange for 
tobacco, pitch, tar and other products of the American 
continent. 114 Additionally, Cura~ao served as one of the 
main exchange centers for residents of the Chesapeake and 
other Anglo-American colonies seeking to acquire goods 
(primarily sugar and molasses, but no doubt manufactured 
items like playing cards as well) from the French West 
Indies. 115 
As if British authorities did not have a hard enough 
time contending with New Englanders, Scots, and Dutchmen 
113 Ibid., 2/2/1736. 
114 CSPC, XXV, 1138, p. 51. 
115 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 209, 211, 431 n. 46. The 
Dutch island's commercial ties to Britain's colonial rivals 
remained a source of concern for crown authorities for 
decades to come. In 1741 a Royal Navy admiral warned his 
superiors that French and Spanish men-of-war would rely on 
"Statia [St. Eustatius] and Curascoa" for their provisions 
in any ensuing hostilities (EJC, V, 46). 
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conspiring independently to violate trade laws and customs 
regulations with the inhabitants of the greater Chesapeake, 
additional evidence suggests that the three groups operated, 
to a certain degree, in concert as well. In 1696 Edward 
Randolph described a "Combination" of New Englanders and 
Scotsmen to carry on illegal trade between Maryland and 
Scotland and "other places prohibited."116 Randolph 
further delineated the connections between various illicit 
trading interests when he recommended that "fitt persons" be 
appointed as governors of Carolina and Pennsylvania to 
curtail the "illegal Trade carried on by Scotchmen & others 
in vessells belonging to New Engd & Pensilvania, from those 
provinces, to Scotland, Carasaw, & other unlawful 
places."117 
Pennsylvania itself was frequently identified, most 
often by Marylanders, as a cause of, and conduit for, much 
of the illicit trade that plagued the northern Chesapeake. 
Francis Nicholson and Sir Thomas Lawrence each advised the 
Board of Trade in 1695 that the Pennsylvanians, besides 
trading directly with Scotland, Holland, and Cura~ao, were 
sending contraband goods into Maryland and removing 
116 Randolph, Letters, V, 142-43. 
ll7 Ibid., 135. Robert Quary subsequently noted the 
illicit connection between North Carolina tobacco growers, 
New England mariners, and Dutch buyers in Curayao in his 
1703 report to English customs officials (CSPC, XXI, #1150 
ii, p. 738). --
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uncustomed tobacco in exchange. 118 Both officials were 
equally concerned about their northern neighbors' 
deleterious influence, the colonial secretary fearing that 
"the people of Virginia and Maryland going there and 
observing the advantages that they reap by their 
illegal way of trading, are encouraged to do the same in 
their own provinces." 119 Robert Quary agreed that such 
apprehensions were justified, claiming in 1698 that 
Pennsylvania's bad example had "already so far infected 
Maryland that but for the vigilance ••• of Governor 
Nicholson the consequence might have been fatal."l 2 0 
Although outside groups undoubtedly played 
indispensable roles in the contraband trade of the greater 
Chesapeake, their participation should not be permitted to 
obscure the centrality of resident populations in the 
illicit commerce of their region, a phenomenon that 
historians, for the most part, either have overlooked or 
denied. One reason why scholars generally have discounted 
illegal trade as a significant factor in the history of the 
greater Chesapeake may have been a tendency to correlate the 
amount of shipping actually owned and personally conducted 
by members of a given colony with the degree to which those 
individuals participated in illicit trade. But as was the 
118 CSPC, XIV, #1897, p.510; #1916, p. 520. 
119 Ibid., #1916, p. 520; Md. A., XXIII, 84. 
120 CSPC, XVI, #796, p. 415. 
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case with piracy, involvement in unlawful commerce was by no 
means restricted to those who owned, operated, and manned 
the ships. 
Even when New England vessels transported much more 
contraband cargo to and from the greater Chesapeake than did 
local craft, smuggling and duty evasion required the active 
and equal collaboration of colonial agents in the false 
packing and marking of casks and hogsheads, arranging for 
and assisting in the clandestine loading and unloading of 
goods, and the bribing of customs officials. It is also 
apparent that, in the movement of contraband material 
through inland waterways and around the bay itself, small, 
locally owned vessels played a key role which frequently 
escaped the attention of contemporary authorities and which 
modern historians commonly have failed to take into account 
as well. 
In his 17e9 memorial to the Board of Trade, mariner 
Peter Holt stated that it was easy to abscond from the bay 
with a load of unregistered tobacco because authorities paid 
little attention to the small boats which regularly plied 
the waters of the Chesapeake. 121 Describing the volume 
of cargoes seized from such vessels as petty, historian 
Margaret s. Morriss doubted that such small craft could have 
carried enough contraband to have had a significant adverse 
121 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 62-63. 
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impact on either the royal or the colonial economy.122 
Although the amount of goods confiscated as a result of any 
particular seizure might seem insignificant, Morriss failed 
to consider the cumulative effect that dozens of such 
vessels operating simultaneously could produce.l23 
Colonial officials frequently referred to the vital 
role played by sloops, shallops, and other boats in the 
transportation system, both legal and illicit, of the 
greater Chesapeake. Officials of the Customs House in 
London reported in 1679 that, though the amount of tobacco 
grown in North Carolina was considerable, most of it was 
carried in "Sloopes and small fetches to Virginia & New 
England." 124 Commenting on the loss of royal revenue due 
to the evasion of tobacco duties, Edward Randolph informed 
his superiors in 17ee that the North Carolinians and 
southern Virginians who lived near Currituck Inlet 
habitually employed small vessels to run their tobacco to 
New England without paying any customs.1 25 Two decades 
122 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 128-29 nn. 
216, 217. 
1 23 Small craft were so indispensable to smuggling 
operations between England and continental Europe that crown 
officials specifically excluded them from the cross-Channel 
trade in the second half of the sixteenth century (Williams, 
Contraband Cargoes, 3e}. Also, Harper noted that by using 
such vessels in the colonies, contraband traders could 
minimize their financial losses if apprehended (English 
Navigation Laws, 256}. 
124 CRNC, I, 243. 
125 Ibid., III, xvii; Randolph, Letters, V, 231. 
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later the Council of Trade and Plantations reaffirmed that 
the commerce of North Carolina was still "carry'd on by very 
small sloops." 126 Scottish interlopers, Randolph 
asserted, regularly smuggled "Considerable quantities of 
Goods which in a Peddling manner" which they disposed of by 
"running in small boats from River and Creek to another" 
throughout the greater Chesapeake. 127 And to the extent 
that contraband traffic existed between Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, it is clear that the "Sloops Shallops & Boates 
••• which keep runing and Trading up and down • the 
several! Rivers and Creekes • of Maryland", some of 
which were alleged to have been transported overland in the 
movement of prohibited or enumerated goods, were integral to 
the illicit trade of that region.l28 
In addition to attending personally to their local 
shipping needs, by the third decade of the eighteenth 
century Chesapeake residents had assumed a significantly 
greater role in their seagoing commerce "to such a Degree," 
Governor Spotswood reported, "as to carry in there own 
l26 CSPC, XXXII, #656, p. 424. 
127 Randolph, Letters, V, 118. 
l28 Md. A., XX, 279; Morriss, Colonial Trade of 
Maryland, 128-29 n. 216. Responding to Board of Trade 
queries concerning Virginia's commerce in 1730 and 1743, 
Governor Gooch also commented on the "small Shallops which 
are constantly employ'd in the Bay in transporting the 
Country Commodities from one River to another" ("Gooch 
Correspondence," vol. 1, Gooch to the Board of Trade, 
7/23/1730; vol. 3, Gooch to the Board of Trade, 8/22/1743). 
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bottoms almost that whole Trade which used to be managed by 
the People of New England, Bermuda, and other 
Plantations."129 A similar situation developed in North 
Carolina where, according to John Lawson, local shipbuilders 
had constructed ha considerable number of Vessels ••• with 
which they trade to Cuirassau, and the West Indies."l3~ 
As significant as these developments were, the illegal 
activities of local shippers, sailors, packers, and planters 
represent -- to the extent that they are known -- only the 
most direct manifestations of a much more universal 
opposition to the imposition of trade restrictions and 
customs duties on the inhabitants of the greater Chesapeake. 
Illicit traders enjoyed a widespread support among the 
general public which was demonstrated time and again in the 
colonial courts and legislative assemblies and in popular, 
sometimes violent, resistance to the efforts of crown 
representatives to enforce the Navigation Acts. Compounding 
the degree of local complicity was the fact that most local 
customs agents were sympathetic colonists, many of whom were 
not only personally involved in the trade they were 
empowered to regulate, but who also actively engaged in 
bribery, extortion, and other questionable activities for 
personal profit in flagrant violation of the laws they had 
sworn to uphold. 
129 Spotswood, Letters, II, 154. 
13~ Lawson, Voyage to Carolina, 1~-11. 
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CHAPTER IV 
"Their • loose, and vitious way of living; 
and • their Darling, illegal trade": 
Popular Opposition to Trade and Customs Regulations 
In 1697 an exasperated Francis Nicholson wrote to the 
Board of Trade, "I have endeavoured (according to my duty) 
to hinder illegal trade, in doing of which, I have mett with 
great difficultyes, especially in the Courts and 
Assembly." 1 The reason for the persistent opposition by 
the people and their representatives, the Maryland governor 
believed, was that "the cursed thing called self-interest 
too much governs them." 2 More specifically, Nicholson 
charged in a subsequent letter to the Board, some colonists 
were "not satisfied wth his Majestys Government • 
because it curbs them in their former atheistical, loose, 
and vitious way of living; and debars them of their Darling, 
illegal trade." 3 Almost two decades later Virginia 
governor Spotswood expressed similar sentiments when he 
reported that members of the House of Burgesses recently had 
1 Md. A., XXIII, 86. 
2 CSPC, XV, 11178, p. 546. 
3 Md. A., XXIII, 491; CSPC, XVI, 1769, p. 386. 
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accomplished nothing positive, but "on the contrary ••• 
spent much of their time contriving to repeal the Laws 
made to restrain dishonest and fraudulent practices in the 
general dealings of the Country." Such was "their humour 
and principles," the governor added, "y't they would aim at 
no other Acts than what invaded ye Prerogative or thwarted 
the Government."4 
Spotswood's difficulties with the burgesses encompassed 
a broader spectrum of issues, of course, than just those 
relating to maritime affairs. Disputes over Indian policy, 
defense expenditures, land distribution, tobacco inspection, 
quitrent collection, court and parish church appointments, 
and the dispensation of patronage all contributed 
significantly to the contentious atmosphere which 
characterized much of the governor's administration and 
eventually may have caused his dismissal. 5 Clearly though, 
Spotswood found many Virginians' attitudes on matters of 
trade, navigation, and piracy to be entirely consistent with 
the obstinacy and selfishness that he believed they often 
exhibited in their other affairs. Regarding opposition to 
his proposal to outlaw the export of inferior tobacco, he 
cynically remarked, "a few Years' Observation has made me 
4 Spotswood, Letters, I, 129-30; CSPC, XXVIII, #651, p. 
315. 
5 See, for example, Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 
passim, and Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 
chapter a. 
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perceive y't the Vulgar in these parts reckon him only the 
Honest Man who inclines to favour their Interest • • • who 
always carrys Stilliards to weigh to the needy Planter's 
advantage, and who never judges his Tobacco to be Trash." 6 
Spotswood reacted similarly to the assembly's insistence on 
exemptions from certain duties for Virginia-owned ships, 
complaining that there was "no reasoning against Interest, 
the Exemption • is too beneficial a priviledge to be 
parted with ••• while the humour of ye people is more 
intent upon private benefit than ye public Safety, or hon'r 
of the Governm't."7 
Although the courts and assemblies constituted the 
focal points of colonial resistance to the implementation 
and enforcement of the Navigation Acts and related customs 
regulations, inhabitants of the greater Chesapeake by no 
means restricted their contention to those two arenas, at 
times engaging in the sort of open and violent defiance of 
imperial authority which no doubt inspired Governor 
Nicholson's unflattering characterization of their "loose, 
and vitious" life-style. Other forms of subversion were not 
as direct and were less calculated to convey disapproval of 
imperial policy than to enrich individual offenders through 
extortion, connivance, and other forms of corruption. 
Additional factors such as negligence, incompetence, 
6 Spotswood, Letters, II, 48. 
7 Ibid., 137. 
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administrative shortsightedness, and other bureaucratic 
deficiencies all contributed to a furtherance of illicit 
trade and customs fraud. 
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The two decades following the establishment of the 
colonial customs service in English America in 1673 exacted 
a frightful toll on the royal customs collection corps: 
three agents killed, two imprisoned, and one tried for 
treason. 8 All but one of the incidents (including the 
three fatalities) occurred not, as one might expect, in 
notoriously recalcitrant and rebellious New England, but in 
the southern colonies, specifically in the greater 
Chesapeake. Nevertheless, most historians continue to 
portray Virginia, Maryland, and to a lesser degree, North 
Carolina as willing and submissive participants in the 
British imperial system. Rare indeed is the scholar who 
discerns that while much circumvention of the trade laws in 
the North was accomplished by tampering with the legal 
apparatus, in the greater Chesapeake "violence and even 
murder were resorted to for the same purpose." 9 
How is it that such intense outbursts of animosity, 
specifically directed at the executors of English imperial 
trade policy, have not been recognized as manifestations of 
a more deep-seated and generalized opposition to the 
Navigation Acts and their enforcement in the greater 
8 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 21. 
9 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 41. 
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Chesapeake? The answer, in all probability, lies in the 
fact that much of the violence perpetrated against royal 
customs agents in the seventeenth-century Chesapeake 
occurred in conjunction with colonial upheavals that 
historians have come to regard as essentially, if not 
exclusively, political in nature. Furthermore, scholars 
have tended to characterize the political issues involved as 
internal disputes between rival colonial factions, not as 
contests of will between contending colonial and imperial 
interests. Another element that may have helped to obscure 
the significance of trade law issues in the disturbances is 
that the rebels in each instance cannot be identified 
consistently with the anti-trade law faction. Consequently, 
the resentment of restrictive trade regulations and onerous 
customs duties generally has been viewed not as a catalyst 
or contributing factor but as an incidental or irrelevant 
consideration in the colonial rebellions of Virginia, 
Maryland, and North Carolina. 
Of all the violence inflicted on royal customs agents 
during the seventeenth-century disorders throughout the 
greater Chesapeake, opposition to royal customs prerogatives 
probably played the least prominent role in Virginia. Even 
so, there is reason to suspect that resistance to the 
Navigation Acts was a significant factor there. In the 
aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion, Governor Berkeley moved 
quickly to execute the opposition ringleaders. 
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Traditionally, little significance has been attached to the 
fact that one of the unfortunates to receive the death 
sentence, Giles Bland, was the royal collector of the 
Plantation Duty. 1 ~ Although Bland's allegiance to Bacon 
was undoubtedly the principal reason for his hanging, 
Berkeley had other motives for wanting to rid himself of 
this particular rebel. The two men had been at odds for 
some time over the manner in which the trade laws were being 
enforced, the customs agent having complained that he had no 
means to check the considerable amount of illegal commerce 
that was being conducted and, striking closer to home, 
having intimated that the governor himself was engaged in 
illicit trade. 1 1 
The centrality of trade law opposition in the North 
Carolina disorders of the late 167~s is decidedly less 
ambiguous. Despite Charles M. Andrews' conclusion that 
imposition of the Plantation Duty could not have been a 
causal factor in Culpeper's Rebellion since it had only 
1 ~ See, for example, Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American History, IV, 138 and Wilcomb E. Washburn, The 
Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in 
Virginia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957), 92-93, 1~8, 147. 
11 British Museum, Egerton Papers (on microfilm at 
Colonial Williamsburg Research Center) no. 2395, fo. 517; 
Beer, Old Colonial System, I, 29~; Andrews, Colonial Period 
of American History, IV, 137, n. 3; Barrow, Trade and 
Empire, 22 nn. 5 and 6. Ironically, Bland's father, John, 
was a London merchant who advocated repeal of the Navigation 
Acts and open trade with Holland and who also, by his own 
admission, had been involved heavily in illicit tobacco 
trade with the Dutch (Barrow, Trade and Empire, 17; Andrews, 
Colonial Period of American History, IV, 137). 
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recently gone into effect, the importance of anti-trade law 
sentiment as a contributing element to the uprising is 
readily apparent in the affidavits subsequently filed by 
various eyewitnesses. 12 Shipwright Solomon Summers was 
unequivocal in his assertion that, only two or three days 
after the arrival of Albermarle collector and provisional 
governor Thomas Miller, "there was great abuse & affronts 
offered to him," not as a result of any provocation by 
Miller, but "meerly ••• by reason he was his Majtys 
Collectr & had power to accot for his Majtys dues wch in ye 
yeare before ••• they had deposed." 13 Among the abuses 
and indignities which the customs agent suffered was being 
"violently assaulted" by a local resident who swore that "he 
would never have the King's Customes settled there as long 
as he lived."14 
While the behavior of the mob might appear impulsive 
and arbitrary, there was clearly a method to its madness. 
Not content with abusing Miller, the rebels also sought to 
intimidate his subordinates (and anyone else who may have 
considered coming to their aid), to destroy the symbols and 
mechanisms of Miller's authority and, by extension, to send 
an insolent and defiant message to his royal superiors as 
12 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
138; Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 42. 
13 CRNC, I, 296. 
14 Ibid., 296-97. 
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well. Timothy Biggs, a deputy to the collector, 
corroborated Summers' testimony and further indicated that 
the rebels entered his house "wth Muskets and swords & broke 
open Chists & Locks, useing viallence to ye deponants family 
& forceably took away ••• Millers Comissions & 
Instructions ••• & all the Records." 15 Miller and other 
officials were then "clapt in irons" whereupon the "Rabble • 
• • Kept ym close prisoners often Threetening to try and 
hang them," taking advantage of their confinement to reclaim 
the contraband that Miller had confiscated, scratch out 
official markings on tobacco hogsheads, and dispose of the 
goods among themselves and the New England traders. 16 As 
if to underscore the nature and source of their discontent, 
the insurgents punctuated their seditious actions with "many 
irreverend speeches agst his Majts Proclamations" concerning 
adherence to the navigation laws, "some saing if ye 
Govr or Lds ••• were there they would serve them in like 
mannr.ul7 
During the turmoil that attended Culpeper's Rebellion, 
one of the rebels E'··.:.:essed his desire to "freely run his 
knife" through Mille~, a threat which, the potential 
assassin indicated, he would have carried out "were itt not 
15 I bid., 310. 
16 Ibid., 297-98, 310-11. 
17 I bid., 297. 
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for feare of ye law." 18 Not even fear of the law 
succeeded in preventing the killing of two customs 
collectors in Maryland, however, and, judging by the legal 
consequences of the crimes, the perpetrators had little 
cause for concern in any case. During the absence of 
colonial proprietor Lord Baltimore in 1684, the council 
member left in charge, George Talbot, became intoxicated one 
night whereupon he insulted and ridiculed customs collector 
Christopher Rousby and stabbed the unarmed official to 
death. Although Talbot was tried and convicted, his death 
sentence was commuted to five years' banishment from the 
king's dominions, small justice, it would seem, for the 
unprovoked murder of an officer of the crown. 
For those who were ill-inclined toward the customs 
service in Maryland, the reprimand administered to Talbot 
apparently had little, if any, deterrent effect. Less than 
a year after the assailant's term of banishment expired, 
another Maryland customs agent, John Payne, was mortally 
wounded while attempting to board a vessel for inspection. 
Most likely, the collector in this case was, to some extent, 
a casualty of the revolutionary movement that swept through 
Maryland under Protestant leader John Coode in 1689. 
Although some believed that the agent was acting on orders 
from Coode to seize members of the political opposition, 
Coode himself maintained that Payne sought to board Nicholas 
18 Ibid., 296-97. 
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Sewall's yacht simply "to ask why they went to and fro 
without entering and clearing, and was shot dead," the 
explanation apparently accepted by the Lords of Trade who 
concluded that the collector had been killed "in the 
execution of his duty." 19 Modern analysts differ over the 
question of the collector's intent but agree that, 
regardless of his motives, as an officer of the customs 
Payne was legally entitled to examine any vessel within his 
jurisdiction. 29 
In both the Rousby and Payne incidents, plausible 
explanations for the commission of the crimes suggested by 
the immediate circumstances surrounding the killings 
personal animosity and drunkenness in one instance, 
revolutionary turmoil in the other have tended to 
discourage the search for more complex and comprehensive 
rationales. Examination of the events that preceded each 
incident, however, reveals that a history of contention and 
ill will related to trade law enforcement served as a 
prelude to both tragedies. 
The bad blood between Rousby and colonial officials in 
Maryland apparently began sometime before April 1681 when 
the second Lord Baltimore sought to have the collector 
removed from his post. The charges submitted to royal 
19 CSPC, XIII, #797, p. 294; 1787, p. 224. 
29 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 41; 
Barrow, Trade and Empire, 28-29. 
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authorities were for the most part vague, unsubstantiated, 
and laced with personal invective. Assailing Rousby as a 
traitor and a devil, the proprietor disparaged the "insolent 
and knavish" official as "the most lewd, debauched, swearing 
and profane fellow in the whole Government."21 As far as 
Rousby's performance on the job was concerned, Baltimore 
alleged that the customs agent extorted the merchants and, 
in so doing, had driven away a most desirable commerce 
conducted with New England and West Country traders. 22 
Ironically, it was Baltimore himself who had recommended 
Rousby's appointment in the first place. 23 Although he 
claimed to have been dissatisfied with the collector's 
performance for two years, he never mentioned it to Rousby, 
nor did he register any complaint with crown officials until 
shortly after Rousby left the colony to go to England. 
English authorities were singularly unimpressed by the 
proprietor's arguments. After reviewing the evidence, the 
Commissioners of the Customs concluded that "it would be 
much to the King's prejudice and to the discouragement of 
the officers of the King's Customs in Maryland" if Rousby 
were to be dismissed. 24 The Lords of Trade concurred, 
noting that Baltimore had proceeded "in a very unusual 
21 CSPC, XI, 1129, p. 66; 1151, pp. 78-79. 
22 Ibid., XI, 1129, p. 67; #151, pp. 78-79. 
23 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 27. 
24 CSPC, XI, #328, p. 161. 
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manner" and that he had "not sent sufficient proofs of his 
charges to gain them credence." 25 Rousby's subsequent 
reinstatement not only represented a personal vindication, 
but also may be viewed as a validation by English 
authorities of the countercharges that the collector 
articulated in defending himself. Admitting that some New 
England ships had indeed left the province as a result of 
his actions, Rousby explained that this had occurred not 
because he had abused their masters, but because their 
"trade was, in truth, to load tobacco and carry it whether 
they pleased without paying any customs at all." 26 As to 
the motives behind Baltimore's "importunate begging" for the 
collector's removal, Rousby concluded that it was the 
proprietor's design to rid the colony of all royal officials 
and "to place all the offices of Collectors and Surveyors in 
Maryland in the hands of his own creatures."27 One such 
creature was Baltimore's stepson, Nicholas Sewall, whom the 
proprietor had already nominated to replace Rousby's 
successor. 28 Another was Baltimore's nephew, Colonel 
George Talbot. 
Although Talbot never occupied a collector's or 
surveyor's post, he did assume the office of deputy governor 
25 Ibid., 1382, p. 187. 
26 Ibid., 1328 ii, p. 164. 
27 Ibid., p. 165. 
28 Ibid., 1328 ix, p. 166. 
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when the proprietor returned to England in May 1684. In the 
absence of documentation concerning the prior relationship 
between Talbot and Christopher Rousby, one can only surmise 
that the antipathy Talbot displayed toward the customs agent 
on the night of October 31, 1684 derived from one or both of 
two factors: the colonel's close association with Baltimore 
and the resentment that the two probably shared over the 
proprietor's humiliation in the failed attempt to remove 
Rousby and, second, a more general and long-standing 
irritation with the collector's insistence on enforcing the 
Navigation Acts. 
Talbot's bizarre behavior aboard H.M.S. Quaker that 
October evening (which included a series of overt homosexual 
advances toward guardship captain Thomas Allen) only serves 
to cloud the question of the colonel's actual intent when he 
boarded the vessel. Reportedly "inflamed by drink" at the 
time, Talbot later claimed that he had acted not "by malice 
or premeditation, but in the height of passion" (presumably 
anger rather than lust). 29 Some circumstantial evidence, 
however, supports the contention that the crime was 
premeditated, that the collector was "murther'd," as Edward 
Randolph charged, "in Cool B1ood." 3° Communicating to 
English authorities shortly after the killing, Virginia 
2 9 Ibid., XII, 1629, p. 173; #671, p. 188; #773, p. 
216. 
30 Randolph, Letters, V, 265-66. 
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governor Lord Howard of Effingham reported that Talbot had 
instigated the quarrel intentionally and that the murder 
weapon had been "newly prepared and sharpened, evidently for 
some ill design." 31 Captain Allen's account included 
Talbot's statement immediately after the stabbing to the 
effect that nothing troubled the colonel so much "as that he 
had not stabbed more, that he hoped to spill and drink a 
thousand of our bloods."32 
Talbot's remark serves to illustrate the point that 
underlying any personal animus toward Rousby as an 
individual was the aversion he experienced simply by virtue 
of his position as a royal official charged with the 
unenviable responsibility of preventing illicit trade in a 
colony where it was practiced regularly. Rousby undoubtedly 
understood this. All but the most naive customs officials 
in the greater Chesapeake realized that a certain degree of 
odium came with the territory. Over the years Rousby had 
been excoriated as "rogue, rascal, &c." so many times that 
his habitual response to such insults was simply "to pass 
them by as matter of course."33 
Like the customs agent himself, Lord Howard believed 
that what really lay at the heart of the colonists' 
hostility toward Rousby and Baltimore's attempt to replace 
31 
32 
33 
CSPC, 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
XI, 11963, p. 734. 
11963 i, p. 736. 
1328 i, p. 163. 
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him was the collector's determination to enforce the laws 
against contrabandists and customs duty evaders. The 
governor also surmised that Rousby's professional dedication 
was what ultimately drove Talbot to eliminate the royal 
agent in a way that working through official channels had 
failed to accomplish. 34 Whatever actually motivated 
Talbot to attack the customs collector, it is evident that 
Rousby's contemporaries in service to the crown did not 
regard the incident as an isolated or anomalous one. 
Shortly after Rousby's murder, but well before Payne's 
death, Captain Allen presciently observed that "noe officer 
of the Custornes in Maryland can live without a good 
guard." 35 
Rousby's replacement, Nehemiah Blakiston, reported no 
improvement in the level of trade law obedience as a 
consequence of his predecessor's demise. Quite the 
contrary, he informed his superiors in England, he had been 
"continually discountenanced and obstructed" in his efforts 
to serve the crown and he begged English authorities "to put 
and end to the growing and intolerable insolences under 
which the King's officers have always suffered." His chief 
antagonists were colonial officials who, he lamented, "have 
contemned and disowned my commission, torn and burnt my 
certificates ••• and diverted masters from applying to me 
34 Ibid., 11963, p. 735. 
35 Cited in Barrow, Trade and Empire, 28. 
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• • • by which means • • • my transgressors have escaped and 
many frauds have been undetected." 36 The customs official 
described a particularly disturbing situation in which an 
agent of the Council of Maryland would preempt the collector 
by pretending to arrest any vessel he believed Blakiston was 
about to seize for illegal trading. The council's man would 
then strike a deal with the ship captain, condemn the vessel 
at a sham legal proceeding, and auction off the craft, at a 
ridiculously low price, to the very same skipper. 37 
The alleged perpetrator of this series of deceptions 
was none other than Nicholas Sewall, "his lady's son" with 
whom Baltimore had hoped to replace Christopher Rousby. But 
the seriousness of the charges levelled against Sewall in 
this context paled by comparison with the gravity of the 
crime he would soon be accused of directing. Having fled to 
Virginia at the outbreak of Coode's rebellion in 1689, 
Sewall sailed his pleasure boat back to Maryland the 
following year and anchored in the Patuxent River just 
before collector John Payne's attempt to board the yacht. 
Although the proprietor's stepson evidently was ashore at 
the time of the shooting, Coode maintained that Sewall had 
threatened Payne with death before the incident and was 
"proved to have given orders for his men to act as they did. 
3 6 CSPC, XII, #136, pp. 39-31. 
37 Ibid., #136, p. 31; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 28. 
38 CSPC, XIII, #797, p. 294; #792, p. 238. 
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The combined effects of the murder of a second royal 
customs agent and the accession of the Protestant monarchs 
William and Mary to the English throne ensured the success 
of the revolutionary movement in Maryland and even 
facilitated the installation of Blakiston, the royal 
collector, as the colony's provisional chief executive. 39 
But neither of these developments served to eliminate or, by 
any reliable measure, significantly reduce opposition to 
trade law enforcement in the colony. If those who had 
engaged in and supported illicit trade could not achieve 
their objectives through violence and intimidation, they 
successfully employed other means to do so. 
Naturally, any effective campaign against illicit trade 
required not only diligent law enforcement, but also a 
judicial system sympathetic to the crown's interests. No 
matter how dedicated and capable customs collectors might be 
in discovering and seizing vessels suspected of illicit 
trade, failure to have the ships condemned in the colonial 
courts would nullify their efforts. With the establishment 
of royal rule in Maryland in 1691 and the appointment of a 
zealous surveyor general of the customs, Edward Randolph, 
crown officials undoubtedly anticipated a significant 
increase in the number of seizures and condemnations for 
illicit trade. Randolph's diligence insured the former, but 
39 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 29; Aubrey C. Land, 
Colonial Maryland: A History (Millwood, N.Y., 1981), 92. 
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his attempts to successfully prosecute offenders were 
thwarted by the anti-trade-law sentiments of Chesapeake 
juries. 
During his first year in Maryland, Randolph prosecuted 
one vessel three times without success, a clear indication 
of the opposition he would face for the rest of the 
decade. 4e In 1698 the government prosecuted 59 cases 
involving forfeited bonds in Maryland. Only four resulted 
in convictions. 41 Even in the rare instances where 
common-law courts issued judgments in the crown's favor, 
there was no guarantee that the penalty would be paid. Some 
colonists who had been convicted of failing to produce 
certificates for their navigation bonds simply conveyed 
their estates, "with intent to defraud his maty of such 
Judgmts," to a friend or relative. The offenders then could 
claim insolvency and, technically, there would be no assets 
for the authorities to confiscate. 42 
The crown's cause fared no better in Virginia. When 
Governor Nicholson ordered the seizure of the ship William 
and Mary because her captain, Thomas Meech, had been caught 
40 Randolph, Letters, VII 386-87; Md. A., XIII, 320, 
327; Hall, Edward Randolph, 140. Before his arrival in the 
Chesapeake, Randolph had experienced similar obstruction in 
Massachusetts where the governor had sent one jury out three 
times in an unsuccessful effort to convict an alleged 
smuggler (Randolph, Letters, III, 176; Hall, Edward 
Randolph, 60). 
41 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 125. 
42 Md. A., XXIII, 4, 121-22. 
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using counterfeit certificates to trade with Scotland, the 
surveyor general reported that his assistance in prosecuting 
the interloper was "all to no purpose for Court & Jury were 
resolved to cleer the ship." 4 3 Only referral of the suit 
to the Commissioners of the Customs in England saved the 
government's case, eventually producing a plea bargained 
confession by Meech. 44 Just over a year later, Randolph 
appeared about ready to give up. In debating whether or not 
to litigate against the Scottish owner of a ship which had 
departed the colony without clearing, the customs official 
concluded that "No court or Jury will find against him so 
that Its to no purpose to sue them." 45 Randolph struggled 
gamely for two more years before finally admitting defeat. 
In requesting leave to return to England for the purpose of 
developing a more effective legal strategy with treasury and 
customs officials, he confessed to Governor Nicholson that, 
"by the partiality of juries and others" in the greater 
Chesapeake, he could "obtain no cause for his Majesty upon 
the most apparent evidences."46 
As the most avid crusader against illicit trade in the 
colonies Randolph was also, not surprisingly, the most vocal 
critic of the Maryland and Virginia courts. But others 
43. Randolph, Letters, VII, 349. 
44 Md. A., XX, 124. 
45 Randolph, Letters, VII, 445. 
4 6 Md. A., XX, 236-37; Hall, Edward Randolph, 153. 
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shared his exasperation. In 1695 Maryland secretary Sir 
Thomas Lawrence asked English authorities how other colonies 
managed to convict illicit traders, since his own experience 
had been that "country juries • hardly ever find against 
them." 47 The same year another loyal servant of the 
crown, Governor Francis Nicholson, complained that it was "a 
difficult thing to get judges and juries to try and condemn 
illegal traders." 48 Hoping to better understand the 
phenomenon and reverse the trend, Nicholson consulted a 
Maryland attorney who admitted in a rare, if somewhat 
understated, display of candor that "some of our Judges & 
some of our Juryes • • • do oftentimes Judge according to 
the Affection or disaffection they have for the person 
plaintiffe or Defendant, and not according to the merit of 
the Cause or the Law that Arises upon the pleadings 
thereof." 49 
To counteract these sentimental inclinations, the 
governor had to intervene directly in two instances to 
overturn provincial court judgments in favor of shipmasters 
accused of illegitimate trade practices. 50 Nicholson 
maintained that Chesapeake colonists already had begun "to 
pretend Custome" with regard to illicit trade and "claime it 
47 ~' XIV, i1916, p. 520. 
48 Ibid., 11896, p. 510. 
49 Md. A., XX, 439-40. 
S0 Ibid., 128-29, 180-81, 188, 384-85. 
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as their Common Law." Something would have to be done, he 
warned, "for if they be allowed the benefit of their old 
Customs, t'will be in vain for me to prosecute illegal 
Traders." 51 By 1696 Nicholson had grown so frustrated 
with the consistent failure of Maryland's general courts to 
convict contraband traffickers and duty evaders that he 
begged the Lords of Trade to instruct him as to how he might 
punish recalcitrant juries. "If there be no way of 
attainting juries in these parts," the governor insisted, 
"the King will not have justice done to him about illegal 
trade." 52 
Nicholson's idea of attainting juries presented obvious 
practical difficulties in a colony where royal officials 
recently had been killed for provoking the inhabitants to a 
considerably lesser extent than would have been the case had 
crown officers attempted to administer punishment simply 
because of popular sympathy for illicit traders. The 
governor may have made the proposal in a fit of pique or 
frustration and, in any event, there is no indication that 
English authorities considered the recommendation seriously. 
Instead, royal officials proposed another measure which, 
with Nicholson's firm support, they managed to implement 
with some success. 5 3 
5l Ibid., XXIII, 88-89. 
5 2 CSPC, XIV, #2303, p. 654. 
53 Md. A., XX, 340; XXIII, 25. 
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Rather than attempt to influence popular sentiment 
regarding trade law enforcement, the strategy was to limit, 
as much as possible, local participation in the judicial 
process. By establishing vice-admiralty courts, crown 
authorities were able to control the legal machinery in 
colonial maritime cases by eliminating juries altogether and 
authorizing gubernatorial appointment, subject to English 
Admiralty approval, of judges to the maritime court. Under 
the Act of 1696 which mandated such courts for all the 
colonies, a vice-admiralty court with the power to appoint 
judges in North Carolina and the Bahamas was established as 
a permanent feature of Virginia's legal system by 1698. 54 
Shortly thereafter Nicholson, now governor of Virginia, 
advised his superiors in England of the "absolute necessity" 
of maintaining such an institution in the colony. 55 As 
governor of Maryland he had discovered that "it was almost 
impossible to have the illegal traders condemned in any of 
the Courts of Common Law, but in the Court of Admiralty His 
Majesty had justice."56 The Board of Trade soon came to 
regard the establishment of vice-admiralty courts in the 
colonies as a qualified success, declaring in its annual 
54 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 156; 
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 366. 
55 Cited in Philip A. Bruce, Institutional History of 
Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols. (New York, 
1919), I, 792. 
56 ~' XVII, i579, p. 311. 
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report to the House of Commons that "where they have not 
been disputed," the courts had proved to be a "great 
encouragement to legal trade." 5 7 
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The court's jurisdiction was not disputed, for the most 
part, in Maryland and Virginia where, by the end of the 
seventeenth century, royal authority had become established 
firmly. But North Carolina was another matter. Both the 
corporate colonies of New England and the southern 
proprietary colonies generally opposed vice-admiralty courts 
as a matter of principle, claiming that the establishment of 
such institutions infringed upon the rights granted in their 
charters. 58 Already by 1687, well before the creation of 
vice-admiralty courts in the colonies, Albermarle county 
court functionaries had asserted that they were not bound by 
the provisions of the Navigation Acts and announced their 
intention to throw out a case of alleged illegal trade, 
claiming "the Benefit of their Charter" against the royal 
collector who sought to prosecute the suspected 
offender. 59 Ten years later North Carolina joined the 
other proprietaries in unsuccessfully petitioning the House 
of Lords against the installation of the courts under the 
57 Stock, Debates, II, 367; Steele, Politics of 
Colonial Policy, 47 n. 7. 
58 NCHCR, 1697-17Bl, xxv; Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American History, IV, 225-28, 255-58; Rediker, Deep Blue 
Sea, 314-15. 
59 Cited in Barrow, Trade and Empire, 27. 
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admiralty seal, pledging instead to institute vice-admiralty 
courts under their own charters. 6 "' 
Under the new system, the governor of Virginia 
considered that he had some authority over vice-admiralty 
affairs in North Carolina, a situation which might have 
caused considerable contention and resentment had it not 
been for a certain benign neglect on the part of Virginia 
officials. Except for the trial of Blackbeard's crew in 
1718-19, which took place despite the protests of North 
Carolina officials, and another piracy case the following 
decade, no North Carolina admiralty affairs appear to have 
been litigated in a Virginia court. 61 The other exception 
in 1727 involved several pirates apprehended in North 
Carolina whom residents of the proprietary colony 
surrendered to Virginia authorities for trial. North 
Carolina officials apparently realized that they had little 
choice but to act in accordance with the clear precedent, 
established in the Blackbeard proceedings, for Virginia's 
6 1il CRNC, I, 471-72, 473, 49fil-91; NCHCR, 1697-17fill, 
xxvi; Do~British Admiralty Board, 28-29. If they 
achieved nothing else, the petitions alerted royal officials 
to the potential problem areas in implementing the new 
system. In a 1699 circular to colonial governors and 
proprietors, England's Lords Justices wrote that 
"notwithstanding the instructions which have been constantly 
given," crown authorities continued to receive complaints, 
"most particularly in the Proprieties and Charter 
Governments, of great opposition to the establishment of •• 
• Courts of Admiralty" (CSPC, XVII, #61ill, pp. 328-29). 
61 NCHCR, 1697-1701, xxvi-xxvii. 
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admiralty jurisdiction in cases involving piracy.62 Aside 
from these instances, however, even such a likely candidate 
for vice-admiralty adjudication as the looting and salvage 
of a Royal Navy guardship which had grounded on the North 
Carolina coast in 1698 was handled outside the admiralty 
court system, seemingly without protest by Virginia vice-
admiralty officials.63 
Although North Carolina had the authority to convene 
vice-admiralty courts in matters other than piracy, 
inhabitants of the Albermarle region appear to have been 
reluctant to do so. During the first decade after 1698, 
only one North Carolina case is recorded as having been 
tried in a vice-admiralty court as such and, even in this 
rare instance, three of the four presiding judges were 
justices from the general court. 64 For the first quarter 
of the eighteenth century North Carolina's preference for 
settling its maritime judicial disputes in common-law rather 
than vice-admiralty courts persisted and, with the notable 
exception of the two piracy cases, the colony largely had 
its way until the period of transition from proprietary to 
royal control. 
6 2 f!!£, II, 676-77; NCHCM, 1724-1730, liv, 203, 
447-48. 
6 3 NCHCR, 1697-1701, lv-lvii; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, 
Letter of Thomas Harvey, 7/10/1698; CCR 192, Report of the 
Commission Appointed to Survey the Wreck of H.M.S. Swift, 
6/8/1698. 
64 NCHCR, 1702-1708, xxxiv, 467-68. 
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In 1728 the High Court of Admiralty in England directly 
established a vice-admiralty court in North Carolina and 
appointed Edmund Porter judge. 65 It was then that serious 
opposition to vice-admiralty authority began to manifest 
itself. In rendering several decisions clearly intended to 
demonstrate the primacy of vice-admiralty over common-law 
jurisdiction, Porter succeeded in alienating much of the 
populace as well as Governor Richard Everard who complained 
to the Lords of Trade about "our Judge of the Admiralty 
whose proceedings are so violent and arbitrary as to 
occasion many complts against him." 66 In presenting his 
grievances against Porter, the governor subtly intimated 
that the more fundamental problem lay with the court's 
disregard for individual liberties, pointedly appealing to 
their Lordships' "tender regard for the preservation of the 
Com:Laws and the rights and libertys of the Subject and the 
Englishmans Privileges of Juries." 67 
By early 1739 Porter and his vice-admiralty court had 
antagonized a segment of the public to such an extent that 
an angry mob prevented the court from sitting, threatened to 
"murther the Judge of Admiralty," and set up in his place 
65 NCHCM, 1724-1739, 1v. 
66 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 11, 15-17; CRNC, 
II, 762; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History,-yv; 
256-57, 257 n. 1. 
67 CRNC, II, 762. 
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mock justices "in dirission of the Admiralty.n68 
Unquestionably, some of the hostility expressed toward 
Porter was personal and was directed only incidentally 
toward his office. On the other hand, a climate of 
opposition to vice-admiralty courts and royal authority had 
been intensifying in the colony for some time. The previous 
year the marshal of the vice-admiralty court tried to 
deliver a summons to the master of a sloop which had flown 
the Union Jack (a practice forbidden to merchant vessels) 
"several times in a very insulting manner" in Edenton 
harbor. 69 After threatening to kill the marshal, the 
belligerent shipmaster and some of his mates reportedly came 
ashore with pistols and cutlasses, "swearing they valued ye 
Govt no more then they did the Judge of AdtY." Governor 
Everard, obviously no partisan of Porter, described the 
defiant actions as having been perpetrated specifically "wth 
design of insulting the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty." 70 
Suspended by a new royal governor in 1731, Porter was 
eventually reinstated by the Board of Trade, but not before 
North Carolina's general court successfully contested the 
vice-admiralty court's jurisdiction, a tactic not 
infrequently employed in the colonies to obtain acquittal 
68 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no. 19; CRNC, II, 
757-63; III 224-32, 511; Andrews, Colonial Per~of 
American History, IV, 257 n. 1. 
69 3 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 20, 1. 
70 ~., doc. no. 31. 
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for those involved in illicit maritime affairs.71 In a 
case which initially concerned the importation of foreign 
goods without proper clearance papers, Porter fined William 
Little for his impudence and "unparalleled Aspursans" in 
challenging the vice-admiralty court's authority. 72 But 
Little was not intimidated. When Porter attempted to bring 
another charge against him the following year, the defendant 
sought and received a writ of prohibition from the chief 
justice of the general court preventing the vice-admiralty 
court from prosecuting him. 7 3 
Vice-admiralty court records for the very next day 
reveal that an order to take Little into custody for 
contempt of court was crossed out. Instead, the text 
indicates that Porter read the accused's answer to the 
charge which "the Court knows to be falls" and yet, 
remarkably, consented to accept the prohibition. 74 
Registering a counterclaim with the governor against Porter 
and the vice-admiralty court in 1731, Little articulated the 
colonists' clear preference for trials by juries of their 
peers. Reiterating the point made by Everard several years 
earlier, Little charged that Porter had "divested the 
71 CRNC, IV, 224; Doty, British Admiralty Board, 34. 
72 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 191, Vice-Admiralty Court 
Papers, 1/27/1729 and 1/10/1730. 
13 ~., CCR 142, doc. no. 38. 
74 Ibid., doc. no. 39. 
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Subjects of the Benifit of the common Law which is Every 
Englishmans birth right."75 
145 
Popular opposition to the Navigation Acts and customs 
regulations manifested itself in a variety of ways other 
than outright lawlessness and judicial sympathy for accused 
smugglers. As Francis Nicholson indicated in 1697, the 
Chesapeake governors not only experienced considerable 
difficulty in their efforts to hinder illicit trade in the 
common courts, but also in the colonial assemblies where the 
people's representatives frequently thwarted measures 
intended to foster compliance with the trade laws and duty 
payment regulations. 
In 1697, for example, both Nicholson and Virginia 
governor Edmund Andros advocated the establishment of ports, 
or at least "particular places for loading and unloading," 
as a "great means to prevent illegal Traders" and secure the 
royal customs. 76 Eight years later Maryland governor John 
Seymour was still calling for designated landing and 
embarkation locations, but, he advised English authorities, 
"ye Assembly will never consent to have it made a law by 
them, and therefore have hitherto ever opposed it for ye 
sake of clandestinly unshipping the Goods brought from 
England, and Shipping their tobacco at their own Dores, 
75 ~' III, 224. 
76 CSPC, XV, i956 i., pp. 455-56; Md. A., XXIII, 86. 
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which makes it impossible for all the Officers in the world 
to know what is shipt or unshipt." 77 Virginia lawmakers 
did pass several bills in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century authorizing the establishment of ports, 
though not necessarily (as subsequent disapproval of the 
acts by English authorities suggests) for the purpose of 
preventing contraband trade. Virginians were willing to 
accept closer supervision of their shipping activities, 
which they knew would curtail smuggling substantially, but 
only in return for permission to develop manufactures, a 
concession that British authorities were loath to make. 78 
Moreover, the Maryland and Virginia assemblies declined 
to cooperate in the passage of other legislation 
specifically designed to impede unlawful commerce. In 1695 
London merchants complained to the king about the colonial 
practice of shipping tobacco in bulk because it facilitated 
illicit distribution which, in turn, lowered prices in the 
legal market. 79 Although the king ordered the Maryland 
and Virginia governors to enact legis!3tion in the late 
168es prohibiting the procedure on the grounds that it was 
"Detrimental & Ruinous to the Trade" of the two colonies, 
77 CSPC, XXII, 112e1, p. 552; Morriss, Colonial Trade 
of Maryland; 89. 
78 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 133. 
79 Stock, Debates, II, 111. 
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both assemblies refused to comply. 8 ~ It was not until 
173~, with the passage of the comprehensive warehouse 
inspection act (for which Governor Gooch had to campaign so 
diligently and skillfully), that Virginians finally 
consented to proscribe "that pernicious Practice of running 
Tobacco without paying the Duty, which," the governor 
asserted, had been "no less injurious to the fair Trader, 
than prejudicial to his Majesty's Revenues." 81 Gooch was 
able to persuade the colonists to abandon smuggling, as had 
been the case with the town acts, only by offering a 
sufficient financial incentive: higher prices for their 
tobacco. 
Colonial legislatures exhibited a similar reluctance to 
initiate or endorse proposals aimed at improving trade law 
enforcement in Chesapeake waters. Having received orders to 
hire a vessel to cruise the bay against smugglers, Virginia 
governor Andros reported in 1695 that he had been "advised 
not to enforce the charge thereof in the Assembly, as not 
8 ~ EJC I, 88; JHB, 1659/6~, 306, 317-18, 319, 322-23; 
CSPC, XIII, 42300, p:-661; Md. A., VIII, 335; Md. A. XIX, 
90-91: Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 97. 
81 C05/1322, pp. 54-5. As early as 1713 Governor 
Spotswood proposed and the Virginia assembly approved a 
similar tobacco inspection act, but opponents of the law, 
who objected to it for economic and political reasons, 
persuaded the home government to disallow it in 1717 
(Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial System, 40-
41; Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 178, 180-
82, 185). 
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likely to be obtained." 82 Two years later, an irritated 
Governor Nicholson observed that, although Marylanders were 
quick to complain about the illegitimate maritime commercial 
practices of neighboring Pennsylvanians, yet they could "by 
no means be brought to address the King for a frigate to 
cruise about this province," chiefly, he supposed, because 
they feared that it might impede illicit trade. 8 3 
In 1714 the naval officer for the Lower James River 
district petitioned the Virginia assembly for an 
appropriation of L24 a year out of the duty on liquors to 
subsidize the cost of maintaining a small patrol boat, but 
the burgesses declined to grant even this small request. 84 
Several years later Governor Spotswood informed English 
authorities of similar opposition by the assembly to his 
efforts to suppress fraud in Virginia's tar and pitch trade. 
"But as to getting a Law passed here for preventing the same 
Trade," Spotswood lamented, "I must beg leave to inform Yo'r 
Lord'ps of the difficultys of bringing this, or any other 
Branch of the Trade of this Country, under a just 
Regulation." The governor implied that lawlessness had 
become more or less institutionalized in Virginia when he 
asserted that "the Liberty of doing wrong is none of ye 
82 CSPC, XIV, #1871, p. 497. 
83 Ibid., XV, #1178, p. 547. 
84 Spotswood, Letters, II, 103-06, 108; JHB, 1712-26, 
87; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 65. 
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least contended for here."85 Spotswood's sentiments 
echoed those of Benjamin Harrison who, writing about the 
prevalence of illegal trade and customs fraud twenty years 
earlier, despaired that "the course of affairs ••• has run 
so long in the same channel that it now looks like justice 
for it to continue, and 
to argue against it."86 
• it is become almost criminal 
During Spotswood's tenure resistance also took the form 
of demagoguery on the part of colonists holding official 
posts who exploited public antipathy toward royal authority 
for their own purposes. When the governor attempted to 
institute reforms in 1712 to correct the deficiencies of the 
colony's inscrutable accounting system (particularly with 
regard to the two shilling per hogshead duty), he reported 
the following: "I met with an opposition • • • little 
expected from the King's Officers ••• not contented with 
obstinately disputing whatever I proposed ••• they 
endeavor'd to raise the Clamour of the Country against me by 
unfairly insinuating into the minds of the People y't it was 
their Cause they were defending against a Governor who aimed 
at !novations that would oppress them." 87 
Sometimes personal enemies and political opponents 
agitated not simply to thwart the policies and initiatives 
as Spotswood, Letters, II, 300. 
8 6 CSPC, XVI, 1656, p. 330. 
87 Spotswood, Letters, II, 179-80. 
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of royal governors and customs authorities, b~t to discredit 
the officials themselves. An interesting corollary to the 
issue of official venality concerns the fabrication of 
charges, almost invariably by individuals who were under 
suspicion themselves, alleging complicity in illicit trade 
on the part of those government officers who sought to 
enforce the Navigation Acts most aggressively. The patent 
absurdity of some of these allegations often represented a 
desperate and, in some cases, fairly transparent attempt to 
divert attention from the accusers' own misdeeds. 
Sometimes the charges were simply blatant, but 
generalized, attempts at character assassination, as when 
Edward Randolph's enemies in Maryland accused him of "rude 
and insolent behavior" and consorting "with none others but 
Professed Papists and • • • their Majestys open and known 
enemies." In another instance, however, Lieutenant Governor 
William Markham of Pennsylvania, long suspected by Randolph 
and others of abetting pirates, contrived in 1692 to obtain 
a deposition from a merchant stating that the surveyor 
general had offered to discharge a forfeited bond in return 
for a cash payment.88 
The same allegation surfaced again in October 1694 when 
two members of the Council of Maryland, hoping to prevent 
the customs agent's appointment to their committee, accused 
Randolph of actually accepting the bribe "of Twinty peices 
88 Randolph, Letters, V, 86-87, 88-89. 
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of Eight" in Pennsylvania. The rest of the council, 
however, "not seeing cause why their Majties Orders 
relateing to Mr Randolphs Admittance ought not to be 
Observed" peremptorily dismissed the charge and voted to 
admit Randolph. 89 Although the identities of the 
151 
dissenting councilors are not recorded, one of them almost 
certainly was Thomas Tench, a provincial (and, subsequently, 
vice-admiralty) court judge and owner of a ship which had 
been seized and was currently under litigation for trade law 
violations. 90 
A similar episode appears to have occurred in 1698 when 
Council of Virginia member Daniel Parke engineered a 
preemptive attack on the outspoken whistle blower, Benjamin 
Harrison. The same day Harrison was to present his 
startling expose on illicit trade and customs fraud in 
Virginia, Parke first submitted his own memorial which 
amounted to little more than an attempt to disparage 
Harrison (and, indirectly, James Blair as well) by 
intimating that Harrison was involved in a contraband trade 
to Scotland. 91 Aithough the councilor was supported in 
his allegations by a local collector, it is also clear that 
Parke knew that Harrison was about to deliver a searing 
89 Md. A., XX, 155-56. 
90
• Ibid., 106, 128-30, 243-44, 461-62; Randolph, 
Letters, VII, 467. 
91 CSPC, XVI, 1655, pp. 329-30. 
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indictment of the council, a denunciation which included, as 
it turned out, the specific charge that Parke, fearing "the 
fatal consequences of a prosecution to himself," had opted 
to "desist from giving any legal information" concerning the 
venality of a fellow councilor and collector "though ••• 
it was his duty as a magistrate and a councilor to do 
so." 92 Despite a historian's recent intimation that both 
Parke and Harrison probably were guilty of involvement in 
illicit trade, Harrison's subsequent nomination to the 
council and the crown's approval of his appointment suggests 
that it was Harrison's charges, not Parke's, to which royal 
authorities ultimately gave credence.93 
In 1716 Alexander Spotswood bore the brunt of false 
imputations of wrongdoing in the maritime trade sphere when 
a group of anonymous complainants, hoping to oust the 
governor, sent a letter to English authorities accusing him 
of "directing and forcing the Officers of the Customs to 
demand, Extort and take from the Masters or Commanders of 
any Ship or Vessell • • • fees or pretended dues not 
warranted by some Law." Spotswood vehemently denied the 
charges, citing instances in which he had reduced or 
foregone his "undoubted Dues, either for the encouragement 
of Trade or for the relief of unfortunate Masters and Owners 
92 Ibid., 1656, p. 330. 
93 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 155; 
CSPC, XVI, 11038, p. 572. 
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of Vessells." Although there was some truth to the 
allegations -- the governor conceded that he had accepted 
one fee which had not been specifically authorized -- it is 
nevertheless clear that the claims against him were greatly 
exaggerated. 94 
Despite their persistent, vigorous, and sometimes 
violent opposition to the executors of English imperial 
trade policy, the planters and shipmasters of the greater 
Chesapeake realized that, ultimately, they would have to 
reconcile their disinclination to obey the Navigation Acts 
with the home government's insistence that they conform to 
the trade laws through some form of compromise. Over a 
period of years a working arrangement appears to have 
evolved in many customs districts whereby shipmasters would 
pay a nominal duty on their freight and collectors would 
receive their fees, but with the mutual understanding that 
no one would bother to check too carefully on the actual 
volume or nature of exported goods. Having detected a 
pronounced lack of diligence on the part of customs 
officials in Maryland and Virginia, Edward Randolph 
complained to his superiors in 1692, for example, that "not 
one of the Collectors voutsafe to go a'board ships upon 
their arrival • nor appoint persons to do it; but leave the 
94 Spotswood, Letters, II, 191-92. 
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honest Mrs to do as they please. their chief business is • 
to secure ye 2d p Hoggd & their fees."95 
The reluctance of the Chesapeake collectors to 
institute strict inspection and condemnation procedures 
frustrated most conscientious royal governors in Virginia 
and Maryland and absolutely infuriated Randolph, but many 
customs officers explained their behavior as the only 
practical approach to the problem of customs inspection and 
revenue collection. When Randolph chastised Nehemiah 
Blakiston in front of Governor Nicholson for clearing, 
contrary to the surveyor general's direct orders, two ships 
suspected of illicit trade, the collector and councilor 
reportedly replied that governing officials "must admit of 
wt security ye Country afforded or must take none." 96 
Another collector cautioned Randolph that "t'was better to 
be quiett & not disturb the trade of the country: for it 
would be to no purpose." 97 The colonists had adopted this 
attitude, the surveyor general was convinced, "to support 
illegal trade & to tire me out."98 
Other officials also took the position that insistence 
on following the letter of the law in the colonies might not 
prove the wisest course. In one of the many condemnation 
95 Randolph, Letters, VII, 350. 
96 I bid., 359; CSPC, XIII, 12295, p. 656. 
97 Randolph, Letters, VII, 460. 
98 Ibid. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
155 
proceedings in which a seizure made by Randolph was 
overturned by a court or jury, the presiding judge advised 
the surveyor general not to be overly concerned with 
observing the "nicetyes of the Acts of Trade." 99 What 
these vignettes illustrate is the divergent perceptions of 
zealous royal officials, on the one hand, and Chesapeake 
colonists on the other. What one group deemed to be 
flagrant violations of the trade laws and customs 
regulations, the other regarded as a necessary, even 
desirable, flexibility in the system. That which strict 
crown authorities considered criminal, most bay area 
residents viewed as merely practical. 
The permissive attitude toward observance of the trade 
laws was so prevalent among the colonists that even royal 
governors felt the pressure to compromise. Contemplating 
the possibility of Lord Baltimore's return to power in 
Maryland, Governor Nicholson advised the Board of Trade in 
1698 that "his Lordp wi~l consider that the best, if not the 
only way to promote his temporal Interest here, will be not 
to disturb them in their illegal trade, or other ill 
practices: for fear that if they can not injoy them under 
his Lordps Government; they may assume it to them selves: 
which will be no very difficult thing for them to do."100 
None of the colonial governors could have been any more 
99 Ibid., 382. 
100 Md. A., XXIII, 491. 
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earnest in his commitment to safeguarding the king's 
revenues than Alexander Spotswood, but even he found himself 
siding with the colonists in arguing for a liberal 
interpretation of royal instructions forbidding the 
appointment of men deeply involved in colonial commerce to 
customs collection and inspection posts. Strict application 
of the rules, the governor cautioned, would result in the 
disqualification from office of all men of means and 
ability, the same men, coincidentally, whose support 
Spotswood needed in the council and the assembly in order to 
govern effectively.l01 
Toward the end of the governor's tenure, additional 
pressure to compromise began to be exerted from what 
Spotswood, and those who shared his commitment to 
conscientious observance of imperial trade regulations, must 
have considered a most unlikely source: the home government 
itself. From the early 1720s British authorities under the 
direction of Prime Minister Robert Walpole embraced a policy 
of "salutary neglect" with regard to the American colonies. 
Designed to maintain the prosperity of Great Britain and the 
attachment of overseas settlements through "accommodation 
rather than confrontation," this strategy entailed a 
relaxation in enforcement of the Navigation Acts. 102 
101 Spotswood, Letters, I, 179. 
102 Jack P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis 
of the Preconditions of the American Revolution" in Essays 
in the American Revolution, Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. 
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Other developments in the government lent themselves to 
the pursuit of such a policy. Beginning with the accession 
of the first Hanoverian king in Britain in 1715, the Board 
of Trade, the agency most directly concerned with colonial 
commerce and trade law compliance, began to decline in 
influence. 103 As part of an administration in which the 
formulation and execution of policy was subordinated to the 
quest for patronage, by the early 1740s the Board had been 
reduced to a condition of "docile impotence."104 During 
the interim, at a time when many observers felt that the 
American customs establishment was in desperate need of 
reinforcement, the Commissioners of the Customs undertook a 
major cost-cutting initiative in 1725 which resulted in the 
elimination of twelve colonial duty collection and 
contraband detection posts and salary reductions for many 
others. Eight of the twelve discontinued positions were in 
Maryland and Virginia.l05 
The practical consequences of these developments can 
easily be imagined. The departure of so many custom~ agents 
must have looked like a tactical retreat, if not an open 
Hutson, eds. (New York, 1973), 64; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 
115-16; James A. Henretta, "Salutar Ne lect:" Colonial 
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle Princeton, 
1972), 65-66. 
103 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 111; Henretta, "Salutary 
Neglect", 24-27. 
104 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 165, 259. 
1°5 Barrow Trade and Empire, 106-07. 
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invitation, to Chesapeake smugglers. The exigencies of the 
patronage system also meant that, by the 1740s, colonial 
governors no longer had the power to appoint provincial 
naval officers. The insistence of the Duke of Newcastle, 
secretary of state for the southern department, on 
controlling all such appointments himself not only undercut 
the authority of the colonial chief executives, but insured 
that, in at least some instances, less dedicated and 
competent individuals would occupy the customs 
offices. 106 Moreover, the government's policy of 
"appeasement, not ••• coercion," coupled with the 
intransigence of colonial courts and juries, induced some 
customs officials to "compose," or settle out of court to 
their own financial advantage, litigation arising from their 
prosecution of trade law violations. 10 7 
The attempt to resolve the dilemmas of illicit commerce 
and trade law enforcement in the greater Chesapeake may be 
viewed as an effort to narrow the gap between the competing 
interests of the colonists and the royal government. The 
success of the colonial governors in this regard can be 
gauged by evaluating the extent to which they managed to 
reconcile or minimize these conflicts. In that sense 
Virginia governor Gooch's establishment of the tobacco 
inspection system may be considered a virtual tour de force. 
106 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 246-60. 
107 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 116, 127-28. 
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Whether the program itself was responsible for rescuing ~he 
colony from the depression of the 1720s is debatable, but, 
when the economy rebounded after a few difficult years, most 
planters credited Gooch's plan and so became willing 
participants. 108 
The success of the scheme, whether actual or merely 
perceived, significantly reduced the incentive to smuggle, a 
phenomenon which the relatively few documented instances of, 
or complaints about, illicit tobacco trade in Virginia and 
Maryland (which adopted the inspection system in 1747) in 
subsequent years appears to bear out. 109 With the 
economic resurgence of the 1730s, tobacco planters and 
shippers not only complied with the new regulations for the 
most part, but became, to a degree, active proponents and 
defenders of the inspection system. Unlike previous years, 
when Virginia's burgesses resisted or sought to undermine 
imperial directives designed to strengthen the overseas 
customs service, the colonial assembly, after some initial 
108 Janis M. Horne, "The Opposition to the Virginia 
Tobacco Inspection Act of 1730," honors thesis, College of 
William and Mary (Williamsburg, 1977), 118. 
109 Another way in which the tobacco inspection act may 
have reduced the incentive to smuggle was by alleviating the 
chronic currency shortage through the use of warehouse 
certificates (Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 107). 
Previously, the opportunity to obtain scarce specie 
constituted an inducement to Chesapeake colonists to engage 
in illicit trade, sometimes with pirates. 
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vacillation, beat back several attempts to repeal the 
inspection act.110 
But if adoption of a tobacco inspection system by 
160 
Virginians, Marylanders, and, eventually, North Carolinians 
appeared to join Chesapeake colonists in partnership with 
imperial authority, in reality it amounted to little more 
than a marriage of convenience. In 1734 the president and 
masters of the College of William and Mary reported that the 
revenue from the penny per pound duty had become "so sunk, 
that it brings in nothing at all," the reason being that 
smugglers, "by a quick Transportation" over the Potomac 
River managed to avoid the payment of any duties 
whatsoever. 111 It was concern over these and similar 
violations (as well as, one might infer, the laxity or 
connivance of government officials) that no doubt prompted 
110 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 
244-45. It could be argued that Virginians already were 
moving in the direction of adopting an inspection system by 
1726 when the assembly passed legislation aimed at thwarting 
neighboring North Carolinians who, "being under no 
regulation in the manner of making and packing their 
tobacco, do not withstanding make and transport into this 
colony, for traffic and sale, great quantities of tobacco, 
deceitfully packed, and unfit for exportation, and yet pass 
the same as tobacco of the growth and manufacture of 
Virginia, to the great deceit of honest traders, and the 
depreciating the staple commodity of this country" (Hening, 
Statutes, IV, 175; CRNC, II, 683). The original tobacco 
inspection scheme, for which Governor Spotswood took credit 
in 1713, met with almost universal opposition in both the 
colony and the home country (Billings, Selby, and Tate, 
Colonial Virginia, 17&, 180-82, 185; Horne, "Tobacco 
Inspection Act," 12-14; Hemphill, Virginia and the English 
Commercial System, 40-41). 
111 JHB, 1727-40, 211. 
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Virginia legislators to pass a law in 1738 requiring 
inspectors, sheriffs, and constables to vow to report all 
instances of planters disposing of tobacco prior to 
inspection or transporting the weed to Maryland or North 
Carolina without a permit. 112 And, although abiding by 
the regulations for tobacco export generally favored the 
interests of the planters and shippers, nevertheless 
repeated admissions by North Carolina lawmakers that 
161 
previous legislation against frauds in the tobacco trade had 
been ineffectual indicate that local residents continued to 
engage in the "clandestine running" of bulk tobacco well 
past mid-century. 113 Despite considerable success in 
reducing the incentive to engage in contraband activities, 
even the successful innovator of the warehouse inspection 
system, Governor Gooch, had to admit in 1743 that, in the 
final analysis, when an opportunity to smuggle a cargo of 
prohibited goods into the colony presented itself, "the 
Country People are ready upon all Occasions to assist the 
offenders in concealment thereof."ll 4 
112 Hening, Statutes, v, 13; Flippin, William Gooch, 
23. 
113 CRNC, XXIII, 728, 948. 
114 "Gooch Correspondence," val. 3, Gooch to the Board 
of Trade, 8/22/1743; Flippin, William Gooch, 16. 
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CHAPTER V 
"The Contrivance and Corruption of our Officers": 
Fraud, Negligence, and Mismanagement 
in the Customs Administration 
As ineffectual as the colonial courts m~y have been in 
meting out the king's justice to violators of the navigation 
laws, there was at least a chance when a case was brought to 
trial that illicit traders might be punished. But a far 
greater percentage of offenses never went to court, not only 
because detection was difficult, but because customs 
officials frequently were guilty of negligence and 
corruption. So if, in contrast to North Carolina, overt 
opposition to and legal maneuvering against vice-admiralty 
jurisdiction appear to be conspicuously absent in Virginia 
and Maryland, the explanation may have less to do with 
submissive compliance with the law than the fact that in 
most cases there simply was no need to oppose the court 
actively. 
Through the dereliction or connivance of customs agents 
and other government officials, many, perhaps most, 
perpetrators of illicit trade and revenue fraud were never 
apprehended, much less prosecuted. As early as 1692 even 
162 
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the indefatigable Randolph despaired that "all help is too 
little to stem the illegal trade which has b~en encouraged 
by the ignorance of some and the countenance of others."! 
And before the establishment of vice-admiralty courts in the 
greater Chesapeake, those alleged offenders who were brought 
to trial usually could expect sympathetic judges who often 
engaged, or had a personal interest, in some form of illicit 
trade themselves. 
The two most important local customs officials in the 
colonies were the collector and the naval officer. As the 
agents specifically charged with the prevention and 
discovery of illicit trade, these officials formed the first 
line of defense against smuggling and revenue fraud on the 
landward side of the colonial maritime frontier. Naval 
officers, though the term would seem to suggest otherwise, 
performed clerical functions unrelated, in any direct sense, 
either to the actual navigation of ships or to the command 
hierarchy of England's Royal Navy. Governors, as the 
highest ranking officials in the colonies and the ones 
principally responsible for insuring compliance with the 
Navigation Acts, served as the first naval officers. In the 
1670s the governors began to depute others to assume the 
duties of the naval office. Because of the long, indented 
shorelines and the absence of established ports in Maryland 
l CSPC, XIII, #2295, p. 660. 
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and Virginia, governors eventually appointed naval officers 
for six districts in each of those colonies. 2 
In time another official, the collector, carne to 
supersede the naval officer in importance and authority.3 
In theory, the collector assumed primary responsibility for 
the proper entering and clearing of cargoes and payment of 
the requisite duties. 4 The naval officer, meanwhile, was 
charged with the specific tasks of granting certificates, 
administering shipmasters' oaths, taking bonds, and 
examining all ships' documents for their accuracy and 
authenticity. 5 Although crown authorities periodically 
spelled out the duties of collectors and naval officers in 
some detail, there was considerable confusion about their 
respective functions in practice. 6 A 1736 list of fees in 
North Carolina indicates that both officials were 
accountable for "Entring inwards & clearing outwards every 
2 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
180-82; Peter Bergstrom, "Markets and Merchants: Economic 
Diversifica~ion in Colonial Virginia, 1700-1775," Ph.D. 
dissertation (University of New Hampshire, 1980), 68. 
3 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76, 78; Neil Stout, The 
Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775: A Study of Enforcement of 
British Colonial Policy in the Era of the American 
Revolution (Annapolis, 1973), 7. 
4 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76; Andrews, Colonial 
Period of American History, IV, 149 n. 1. 
5 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 187 
n. 2, 188-89; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76-78; Bergstrom, 
"Merchants and Markets," 88-91. 
6 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
148-49, 197, 205; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76. 
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vessell" within their districts. 7 To some degree, this 
duplication of responsibility was intentional. In 1698 the 
Lords Justices of England, "having been informed that the 
Navall Officers ••• generally neglected to comply with the 
••• Act of Parliament for preventing frauds & regulating 
Abuses in ye Plantation Trade," required the concurrence of 
a collector as a "controule upon ye action of every officer 
imployed" in examining cocquets and certificates, taking 
bond, and clearing ships. 8 
Collectors and naval officers came from varied 
backgrounds. Some, like George Muschamp who served as a 
collector in both North Carolina and Maryland, received 
appointments because their fathers had worked for the 
customs service in the home country. 9 Others were 
transferred to the plantations from posts in England or 
Ireland, but the large majority of customs agents in the 
greater Chesapeake appear to have been selected from local 
ranks. 1 ~ Some of these individuals undoubtedly were 
chosen because of their associations with men of influence 
in England, as was the case with Edward Hill and James 
Bowles who made use of English connections to secure 
7 CRNC, IV, 195-96. 
8 Ibid., I, 492. 
9 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 8~; Andrews, Colonial 
Period of American History, IV, 197, 198 n. 1. 
1 ~ Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 6~-61, 77-78. 
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positions as collectors in Virginia and Maryland, 
respectively. 11 Others received appointments because 
166 
they, or one of their relatives, had gained favor with the 
governor or the surveyor general. In 1712, for example, 
when Colonel Richard Lee's "advanced age would no longer 
permit him to execute ••• the duty of Naval Officer" in 
northern Virginia, Alexander Spotswood concluded that he 
"could not better reward his [Lee's] meritt than by 
bestowing that imployment on his son."12 Over twenty 
years later, Henry Lee was able to succeed his brother, 
Thomas, in the same post.l3 
While governors had the authority to appoint naval 
officers (at least until the 1740s), they normally exercised 
little influence over the selection of collectors, who owed 
their appointments to the Commissioners of the Customs in 
England. 14 Consequently, collectors answered directly to 
the surveyors general and, ultimately, to the customs 
commissioners in England. Although the latter usually acted 
favorably on the recommendations of surveyors general when 
it came to filling vacancies among the collectors, men such 
as Edward Randolph and Robert Quary had no official say in 
11 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 79, 81; Andrews, Colonial 
Period of American History, IV, 197. 
12 Spotswood, Letters, I, 179. 
l3 Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 72. 
14 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
187-88; Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 73-74. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167 
the choice of naval officers. As a result, both governors 
and surveyors general sometimes expressed dissatisfaction 
with the performance of local customs officials whose 
assignments they had not sanctioned. Occasionally, though, 
the difficulties that royal officials on the scene 
experienced with local customs agents were of their own 
making. 
In 1692 Edward Randolph recommended Charles Scarborough 
(or Scarburgh) to replace a corrupt collector on Virginia's 
Eastern Shore. Scarborough recently had gained the surveyor 
general's confidence by informing against two illegal 
traders and had impressed Randolph as a person "well 
acquainted wth all ye Intreagues of Interlopers." 15 
Evidently, though, familiarity with the smugglers' schemes 
did not guarantee zeal in their apprehension. Barely two 
years later Randolph identified Scarborough as one of a half 
dozen custom officials in Virginia and Maryland who had 
permitted illicit traders to clear from their districts. 16 
The distinction for the most dramatic and, no doubt, 
embarrassing exercise in poor character judgment belonged to 
Alexander Spotswood, however. In 1715 Spotswood used his 
prerogative to fill the vacant post of naval officer with 
John Holloway, a distinguished Williamsburg attorney, and "a 
person," the governor confidently asserted, "for whose 
15 Randolph, Letters, VII, 37B. 
16 Ibid., 472-73. 
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Capacity and Integrity I can very readily answer."l7 By 
the end of the decade, however, Spotswood reported that 
Holloway had brought suit against the government in an 
"unjust Action in behalf of a notorious pirat" and had 
168 
become the governor's "implacable Enemy" for his consistent 
advocacy of maritime lawbreakers. 18 
Randolph and Spotswood might have consoled themselves 
in the knowledge that unsatisfactory performance on the part 
of colonial customs officers long predated their tenures. 
In fact, English authorities had been complaining about poor 
enforcement of the Navigation Acts in Virginia and the other 
Chesapeake colonies throughout the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Persuaded as early as 1662 that royal 
customs revenues were in no way commensurate with the amount 
of tobacco annually exported from the Chesapeake, English 
officials repeatedly expressed to Virginia governors the 
conviction that "such abuses cannot be committed without the 
apparent negligence of the collectors or their connivance 
with the ••• masters of ships."19 When the 
Commissioners of the Customs advised a Maryland collector in 
1696 of the passage of the Scottish act establishing a 
trading company to America, they pointedly remarked that the 
1 7 Spotswood, Letters, II, 1~6. 
18 Ibid., II, 319, 354. 
19 Leonard w. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to the 
British Colonial Governors, 167~-1776 (New York, 1935), II, 
#924, p. 663. 
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only way the Scots might gain an advantage over their 
English competitors would be through the "Contrivance and 
Corruption" of colonial customs agents.20 
Ultimately, however, English authorit!es held the 
colonial governors responsible for the performance of the 
169 
officers under their supervision in enforcing imperial trade 
regulations. In 1667 the Commissioners of the Treasury 
described wholesale customs violations which, they reported, 
"his Majesty cannot but in great measure impute to the 
neglect of duty in his governors of the said Plantations who 
have not been so careful as they ought in debarring all 
trade with such ships as have come without certificate from 
England, nor in taking bond from such as are permitted to 
trade from other plantations, and returning the same to the 
chief officers of the Customs in London as is particularly 
directed." 21 The Privy Council in 1669 and the Lords of 
Trade in 1675 issued stern orders to the governors of 
Virginia and Maryland to obey their instructions and be more 
conscientious about preventing illicit trade.2 2 
In an effort to instill a greater sense of 
responsibility at the highest level of colonial 
2B 5 Md. A., XX, 34 • 
21 CTB, II, 2B2; Andrews, Colonial Period of American 
History, IV, 144-45, n. 2. 
22 APCC, I, #827-29, pp. 499-501; Md. A., V, 45-48; 
CSPC, IX~75, p. 371; Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American History, IV, 145-47. 
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administration for the suppression of illegal trade 
practices, Parliament insisted that the governors pledge to 
support the provisions of the Act of 1696 against illicit 
commerce. Where warnings had failed in the past, royal 
authorities hoped that the threat of sanctions might 
succeed. The act stipulated that failure to take the oath 
or enforce the regulations would result in forfeiture of the 
governorship and a Ll000 fine. But the legislation seems 
not to have had the desired effect, at least not in the 
short run. Two years later Edward Randolph cynically 
remarked that the governors took their oaths "not in 
obedience to the acts of trade but to avoid the paymt of 
Ll000 forfeited upon their refusall." 23 Instructions to 
the Virginia governor in 1697 and Carolina proprietors in 
1699 clearly expressed the crown's unremitting frustration 
with the level of trade law enforcement in the greater 
Chesapeake, charging that "very great Abuses have been and 
continue still to be practiced • • • wch abuses must needs 
arise from ••• the remisness or conivance of such as have 
been or are Governors." 24 
In fairness to the governors, many of the abuses that 
continued to plague the system lay effectively beyond their 
23 Randolph, Letters, V, 189; CSPC, XVI, #769, p. 402; 
Andrews, Colonial Period of American-History, IV, 162. 
24 Md. A., XXIII, 91; CRNC, I, 504. 
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control. Geography, dispersed settlement patterns, 
insufficient administrative resources, and local opposition 
throughout the greater Chesapeake all conspired against 
effective trade law enforcement, leading Virginia governor 
William Gooch to conclude in 1739 that "For preventing 
Illegal trade the only methods that are or can be used is 
the diligence of the naval officers and collectors." 25 
Due to a combination of ineptitude, indolence, neglect, and 
purposeful malfeasance, however, such diligence was not 
always practiced. 
Some of the customs agents' shortcomings may be 
attributed to simple carelessness, laziness, or 
incompetence, deficiencies which royal officials on the 
scene tended to regard as relatively innocuous compared with 
the more venal behavior that some collectors and naval 
officers displayed. Commenting on a Maryland customs 
agent's signing off on forged certificates, Edward Randolph 
explained the oversight as a result of the man's being 
"honest though ignorant." 26 In 1699 Virginia governor 
Nicholson criticized the general laxity of customs officials 
only mildly with the observation that "As for the management 
of their offices I think they have not taken much pains in 
going on board and visiting ships at their corning in and 
25 
"Gooch Correspondence," vol. 1, Gooch to the Board 
of Trade, July 23, 1739; Flippin, William Gooch, 14. 
26 CSPC, XIII, 12295, pp. 657-58. 
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clearing." 27 Robert Quary's investigation of the Maryland 
customs service in 17~3 revealed "several! mistakes, 
neglects and omissions" concerning which local officials 
promised to be "more diligent and careful for ye 
future." 28 And when Governor Spotswood proposed to the 
Commissioners of the Customs in 1711 the appointment of an 
additional customs agent he contended that "without such an 
Officer, or a greater Diligence in the Collectors, I cannot 
see how illegal Trade can be prevented • • • especially in 
that Lower District of James River, where the weakness, as 
well as the negligence of the Collector gives too great 
encouragement to practise upon him." 29 
Often the distinction between simple negligence and 
active corruption is as difficult for modern analysts to 
discern as it was for royal officials to establish. When, 
for example, Thomas Miller alleged in 168~ that the former 
collector, a Mr. Birde, had "suffred many Vessells to goe 
away wthout paieing ye Kings duty," it is impossible to 
know, without further explanation, what role Birde actually 
played in those instances of customs fraud. 3 ~ Clearly, 
there were times when loyal crown agents could not determine 
the extent to which local officials were responsible for 
27 Ibid., XVII, #579, p. 312. 
28 Ibid., XXI, #115~ ii, p. 737. 
29 Spotswood, Letters, I, 76. 
3 ~ CRNC, I, 265. 
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customs violations known to have occurred in their 
districts. Even Edward Randolph sometimes had trouble 
distinguishing between "The Ignorance remissions or 
Connivance of the Collectors" as the cause of their failing 
to recognize counterfeit certificates; taking security from 
"persons of Small or no Estates;" permitting ships "to load 
in any River or Creek 50 or 100 Miles distant from their 
Offices;" allowing Scottish and Irish vessels to trade in 
the colonies; failing to prosecute shipmasters upon 
forfeiture of their bonds; accepting bribes; and charging 
inflated or unauthorized fees. 31 On other occasions royal 
officials lacked the hard evidence to confirm what they 
strongly suspected. Unable to prove what he firmly believed 
was a case of bribery involving a Virginia collector, 
Governor Spotswood had to content himself with rhetorically 
asking crown authorities "whether any interpretation" could 
excuse the customs agent from, at the very least, "the 
Accusation of Supine Negligence."3 2 
One chronic subject of complaint in which the motives 
of the perpetrators were frequently called into question 
concerned the inability or unwillingness of collectors to 
maintain adequate records or, in some cases, their refusal 
to produce any accounts whatsoever. Having requested to 
review the books of Patuxent River district collector George 
31 Randolph, Letters, V, 117-19. 
32 Spotswood, Letters, II, 105. 
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Plater in 1692, Edward Randolph was shown "a foul entry of 
some vessels made with him ••• , but in no regular 
method." 33 The same year Randolph encountered reluctance 
on the part of collector Nehemiah Blakiston to allow the 
surveyor general to examine the account books for the North 
Potomac district. 34 When Randolph finally did gain access 
to Blakiston's papers, he found them "all in as great 
confusion as you can think of." The collector had provided 
"no account of any money due to their Maties nor," according 
to Randolph, had he done so "for many years."3 5 
Although Blakiston certainly had given the appearance 
of doing his best to uphold the royal prerogative against 
the intrigues of Lord Baltimore's supporters in the 
aftermath of the Rousby affair, the collector's own 
performance failed to withstand the scrutiny of other royal 
watchdogs. Further investigation revealed that Blakiston 
had been in arrears to the king for all the Plantation 
Duties he had collected for the previous seven years, 
amounting to over Llaaa. 36 Ironically, it was Blakiston 
who had taken it upon himself to inform crown officials in 
1685 that the king was losing thousands of pounds of customs 
3 3 CSPC, XIII, #2295, p. 657. 
34 Randolph, Letters, VII, 357. 
35 Ibid., 397. 
3 6 Ibid., 424, 448, 457, 466; CSPC, XIV, #1511, p. 399; 
Hall, Edward Randolph, 149. 
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revenue annually due to the "obstruction and confusion of 
his affairs" in Maryland.37 
By 1694 English merchants trading to Virginia and 
Maryland had become so skeptical of the abilities and 
integrity of Chesapeake collectors in general that they 
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convinced royal authorities to order colonial governors to 
hire "skilful commanders" to inspect the books of local 
collectors as well as cruise against contraband trade. 38 
But even that initiative failed to solve the problem. In 
1699 the collector for the Lower James River district 
reported that he had been unable to obtain the books and 
papers belonging to his office from his predecessors. 39 
And, in addition to the questionable performance of those 
responsible for the collection of the two shilling per 
hogshead duty, contemporary Virginia chroniclers Henry 
Hartwell, James Blair, and Edward Chilton reported in 1697 
that "The Collectors of the Penny per Pound likewise are 
very remiss in laying their Accompts before the Governors of 
the College ••• so that illegal Trade is carry'd on, and 
3 7 CSPC, XIV, #lees I, p. 279, ill39 I, p. 3e8, #lSle, 
p. 399. 
38 Ibid., XII, #136, p. 31. 
39 Ibid., XVII, #242, p. 293. 
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some of these Gentlemen refuse to give any account upon 
Oath." 40 
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Such difficulties were symptomatic of a problem which 
appears to have been endemic to the colony's administration. 
In 1698 Benjamin Harrison reported, with specific reference 
to the collection of customs revenues, that "All the public 
accounts • • • are kept very secret from the sight of 
everybody but themselves, so that it must be an 
extraordinary accident if any abuses are discovered." 41 
Similar accounting irregularities continued to be a source 
of consternation for royal officials in the next century. 
When Governor Spotswood attempted to satisfy the Virginia 
Assembly in 1712 that the revenues from the two shilling per 
hogshead duty had fallen short of government expenditures, 
he discovered that "no such Books had been kept thereof as 
were proper to be delivered to the House of Burgesses for 
their Inspection." 42 And when the governor tried to 
institute measures to redress the inadequacy of the existing 
record keeping system, he "perceived the officers of the 
Revenue to be so utterly averse to alterations, and so 
tenacious of their dark and idle method of keeping 
Accompts," that he considered "any further Reform to be a 
40 Henry Hartwell, James Blair, and Edward Chilton, The 
Present State of Virginia, and the College, Hunter D. 
Farish, ed. (Williamsburg, Virginia, 1940), 71-72. 
41 CSPC, XVI, 1656, p. 331. 
42 Spotswood, Letters, II, 176-77. 
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Work too difficult" for him to undertake solely on the 
strength of his own authority.43 
177 
Although royal officials did not always say so 
explicitly, such instances of manifest incompetence and lack 
of cooperation on the part of colonial customs agents 
invariably raised suspicions of more intentional wrongdoing. 
In 1693 customs agents in Barbados complained to the 
Commissioners of the Customs that vessels arriving with 
cargoes of tobacco from Maryland and Virginia were producing 
certificates which recorded the number, but not the weight, 
of hogsheads and parcels for which payment of the penny per 
pound duty had been made, "thereby rendring the said 
Officers incapable to Discover any fraud ••• in the short 
payment of the said • Duty." In this instance, the 
commissioners declined to speculate on the motives of the 
collectors involved, opting instead to instruct the governor 
of Maryland to insure that customs officials not certify any 
greater quantity of tobacco than that for which the duty had 
first been paid and to make certain that the certificates 
indicated not only the number of hogsheads, but also "the 
exact Weight thereof."44 
Royal officials like Randolph, Nicholson, and Spotswood 
understood that innocent bookkeeping errors might explain 
critical omissions or discrepancies between two accounts of 
43 Ibid., II, 179-80. 
44 Md. A., XX, 125. 
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the same transaction, but conscientious crown agents also 
realized that such mistakes could be used to disguise, or 
provide convenient alibis for, intentional customs fraud. A 
crown official's willingness to accept such miscues as 
honest errors often depended on the past performance of the 
customs agent in question. A mistake considered in the 
context of numerous other allegations of impropriety on the 
part of the same collector or naval officer was certain to 
raise suspicion. 
Thus when Edward Randolph detected a discrepancy 
between Nehemiah Blakiston's account indicating that he had 
collected the king's duty on 18 hogsheads of tobacco and 
another official's list showing that the duty had been paid 
on 8~, the surveyor general was not inclined to attribute 
the disparity to a simple oversight. 45 Similarly, 
Alexander Spotswood refused to accept lower James River 
district collector Richard's Fitzwilliam's accounting of the 
tobacco duty revenues in 1719 not just because it was "only 
Gen'll as to the Quantity of Tobacco Expor~ed in each 
Vessel, without Specifying the Marks, Numbers, and Contents 
of each Cask, as is Customary w'th the other Officers," but 
also because the governor had "some Intimation" that 
Fitzwilliam might not provide him with a "true Acco't, 
having made some former Discovery of other irregular 
45 Randolph, Letters, V, 232. 
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practices in the Execution of his Office."46 
Acknowledging that bookkeeping inaccuracies did not always 
signify "wilful Errors," Spotswood nevertheless insisted 
that Fitzwilliam's behavior could be viewed as "no other 
than a designed fraud." 4 7 
Unfortunately, as far as English authorities and 
sometimes even the colonists were concerned, colonial 
customs officials did not confine their indiscretions to 
manipulating account ledgers. Investigations of charges of 
impropriety not infrequently uncovered evidence of rampant 
corruption and abuse of power as well. In 168e twelve North 
Carolinians gave depositions to the effect that Robert 
Houlden, the crown-appointed collector sent to restore order 
to the,king's customs in the aftermath of the Culpeper 
Rebellion, had committed a variety of offenses related to 
the embezzlement of government property. The most serious 
infraction from the standpoint of the colony's security (and 
the one which appears to have given rise to many of the 
others) was Houlden's conversion "to his owne use" of a 
major portion of the colony's store of powder and shot with 
the result "that when the Cuntrey was in feare of a warr 
with the Indians there was noe ammunition ••• to be gott 
out of the Magazine."48 
46 Spotswood, Letters, II, 326. 
47 Ibid., 328. 
48 NCHCR, 1697-17el, 417. 
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Houlden then took possession and authorized the 
shipment of several hogsheads of tobacco containing "much 
bryers grasse and weeds ••• and much Rottennesse," causing 
one deponent to wonder "what a Devil! made Mr. Holden send 
this rotten tobacco for ••• the King."49 The answer, of 
course, was that the collector was trying to make up for the 
deficiency of customs revenues that he was skimming and 
repay the private supplier of the powder and shot. In the 
furtherance of these ends as well as the general fattening 
of his own pocketbook, Houlden paid no customs at all on at 
least one shipment of his own tobacco (amounting to over 
8,000 pounds) while, at the same time, requiring other 
planters and shippers to pay an exorbitant duty of two 
pounds of tobacco for every pound shipped. 50 
Those whom Houlden suspected of interfering with his 
operation he imprisoned, without bail, in close quarters 
where they were "forced to Eat drink lye and ease Nature" 
until, according to one deponent, they "were almost poysoned 
with the Noysom sent of our owne Excrements." 51 To keep 
them in jail Houlden successfully intimidated members of the 
grand jury into finding the defendants guilty despite a 
complete absence of incriminating evidence. 52 When the 
49 Ibid., 416, 418. 
50 Ibid., 417-19. 
51 Ibid., 420. 
52 I bid., 421, 423. 
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authorities finally caught up with the predatory collector 
and took him into custody, Houlden, apparently fearing 
further revelations of wrongdoing, instructed a confederate 
to reinscribe with the British broad arrow six barrels of 
salt pork that the revenue agent previously had appropriated 
for himself. 53 
Among cases of rapacity by customs officials Houlden's 
is exceptional only in terms of the utterly brazen character 
of his abuse of authority, the disastrous result of a 
virtually unrestricted latitude in action which probably 
could not have occurred under circumstances less chaotic 
than those which prevailed in North Carolina in the late 
167~s. But customs officials in more settled times and 
better regulated colonies still managed to make the most of 
their more limited opportunities. In 1688 fellow colonists 
became so disaffected with the behavior of John Custis, the 
collector for Virginia's Eastern Shore, that the House of 
Burgesses' Committee of Propositions and Grievances charged 
him with "extorting • • • unjust & unreasonable fees from 
Masters Merchants and traders there to the great decay of 
their trade & discouragmt of Navigation." So injurious was 
Custis' avarice to the commerce of the region that, 
according to the committee's complaint, "Masters and 
53 Ibid., 414. 
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deserted the place."54 
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What punitive measures the burgesses undertook, if any, 
are not recorded, but they could not have been very severe 
because by 1692 Custis not only retained the office of 
collector, but also had become the naval officer for his 
district. 55 At that time the Council of Virginia 
reprimanded him for allowing a ship to conduct illegal 
trade, disobeying the council's direct order not to clear 
the vessel, and for "tampering with and Endeavouring to 
discourage the Evidences" against the illicit trader. 56 
Edward Randolph added that, far from being an atypical case, 
the customs agent had abused his charge repeatedly, 
54 JHB, 1659/60-1693, p. 314. 
55 EJC, I, 223. 
56 Ibid., 227; CSPC, XIII, i2199, p. 629. A peculiar 
series of events preceded these latest allegations. On 
April 15 the council considered Custis's petition to be 
relieved from his various official duties on account of age 
and infirmity. Responding to Governor Nicholson's 
solicitation of advice in the matter, members of the council 
offered their opinion, completely disregarding the custom 
agent's tarnished performance record, that "the said Custis 
had all along faithfully and diligently discharged his Duty 
in the Several! ••• Offices he had been Honord with." 
Council minutes for the following day indicate that a bond 
was then prepared "to save the • • • Govr harmless from any 
damage should accrue to him by reason of his appointing the 
said Custis Naval! officer and Collectr of their Mas 
Customes at the Eastern Shore" (EJC, I, 222-23). At the 
next meeting of the executive body on April 26, governor and 
council considered the tampering and collusion charges 
which, despite the unqualified commendation of Custis barely 
ten days earlier, the colonial officials seemed unanimously 
inclined to believe (Ibid., 227). 
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permitting anyone, "even pyrates," to trade in his district 
provided that they paid his "Unreasonable fees." 57 When 
Custis refused to appear before the council to answer the 
charges against him, he was suspended from all his offices, 
both "Civil and Military," but there is no indication that 
he ever was required to serve jail time or pay any fines for 
his transgressions. 5 8 
Custis was hardly the only customs officer in the 
region to abuse his authority in the waning years of the 
seventeenth century. In 1692 Edward Randolph sarcastically 
referred to "upright Nehemiah Blackstone [Blakiston]," 
collector for the North Potomac district in Maryland, who, 
the surveyor general charged, was "used to squeeze what he 
pleases out of the Masters."59 Five years later the 
Council of Maryland decreed that Major John Thompson, naval 
officer of Cecil County, "be dismist from further Acting in 
that Station, Complaints being made of Several! 
Irregularities by him committed ••• to the great damage 
and injury of Several! persons therein concerned." 6 ~ 
Typically, though Thompson was no longer permitted to enter 
or clear ships, he still collected the ten percent duty on 
57 CSPC, XIII, #2295, p. 656; Randolph, Letters, VII, 
367-68. 
58 EJC, I, 247-48; CSPC, XIII, #2284, p. 654. 
5 9 Randolph, Letters, VII, 378. 
6 ~ Md. A., XXIII, 166, 255-56. 
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European goods transported overland to Pennsylvania and was 
allowed to retain his position as a provincial judge.61 
In 1698 Benjamin Harrison identified the "exorbitant fees" 
charged by customs officers as one of the principal 
impediments to the profitable conduct of trade in 
Virginia. 62 The following year the Virginia assembly, 
responding to complaints that naval officers were exacting 
fees up to two and a half times more than those permitted by 
law, passed legislation requiring the customs officials to 
post their legally authorized rates. 63 
Similar infractions continued to be recorded from time 
to time in the next century. In 1705 a large group of 
Eastern Shore residents and merchants submitted a petition 
to Virginia authorities complaining about having to pay an 
unwarranted fee due to "ye Avarice & Illegal, and Oppressive 
Practices, of Some officers ••• who have Extorted Itt from 
Sundry Inhabitants and Traders from Maryland." 64 Two 
years earlier Robert Quary had reported disparagingly of 
David Kennedy, "Collector of Potomock District" in Maryland, 
that absence without leave was "the least part" of his 
61 Ibid., 256, 257, 258. 
6 2 CSPC, XVI, #656, p. 332. 
63 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, Present State of 
Virginia, 34-35; Hening, Statutes, III, 195-97; Flippin, 
Financial Administration of Virginia, 32; Gill, "The Naval 
Office in Virginia," 22. 
64 VMHB, XVI, 74. 
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alleged misconduct, "for the crime laid to his charge is no 
less than forgery and cheat." 65 In the same dispatch to 
English customs authorities, the surveyor general portrayed 
George Luke, collector for the lower James River district, 
as having "lived so scandalously" in Virginia as to make 
himself "ye scorn and contempt of ye meanest in this 
country." Luke was absent at the time, having "left ye 
office in confusion" when he departed for England 
without Governor Nicholson's permission. Quary's 
examination of the district's account books led him to 
declare that he "never saw anything more irregular and 
confused." 66 
Although Quary could hardly have condemned Luke in 
stronger terms, whatever damage he caused to the local 
agent's reputation evidently had little impact on his 
career. In 1711 Luke was still serving in the same capacity 
when Governor Spotswood informed the Commissioners of the 
Customs that he could not be held responsible for trade law 
enforcement in the Lower James River district as long as 
Luke continued to serve as collector there. At first the 
governor believed that "the many miscarriages" which had 
occurred in the district, including Luke's allowing vessels 
to clear without giving bond or paying customs, were simply 
due to the collector's "incapacity and negligence." But 
65 CSPC, XXI, #1150 ii, p. 737. 
66 Ibid., p. 738. 
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Spotswood began to suspect that a more self-serving motive 
was involved when Luke harassed a fair trader, insisting 
"very sturdily to have the Ship brought to a Tryal" while, 
at the same time, according to the shipmaster, having the 
"cuning to propose ways and means to discharge the Ship 
without it, if the Master had consented." 67 
Five months later Spotswood informed the commissioners 
that, although Luke had received more than L2BB of the penny 
per pound duty over the course of the year, he could not pay 
"one farthing when the College Receiver demanded it ••• 
besides a considerable Arier in his former accounts, which 
they are never like to receive." 68 The last straw for 
Spotswood came in 1715 when Luke deliberately disregarded 
the governor's orders strictly limiting the sale of cargo 
from a French ship which had put into a Virginia port for 
repairs. Informing royal customs officials of Luke's 
suspension, Spotswood intimated that the collector had been 
paid off and that his refusal to take an oath in 
vice-admiralty court in his own defense "must occasion 
shrewd suspicions of his Integrity." 69 
Unfortunately for the governor, his troubles with the 
lower James district did not end with Luke's dismissal in 
6 7 Spotswood, Letters, I, 77. 
68 ~., I, 113. 
69 Ibid., II, 195; CSPC, XXVIII, #329, p. 139; #483 i, 
p. 211. 
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1715. Four years later Spotswood concluded that, much like 
Luke, collector Richard Fitzwilliam was a "greater disturber 
of fair Traders than a discourager of illegal ones." 
Suspicious of Fitzwilliam's lack of precision in reporting 
customs revenues and his refusal, upon request, to submit a 
more detailed record, Spotswood alleged that on at least two 
occasions the collector had, "according to his own Acco't, 
sunk in his own pocket" duties paid on a combined total of 
over 2400 pounds of tobacco. The governor further charged 
that, in the case of a naval officer's seizure of a vessel 
for violating the trade laws, Fitzwilliam had opposed the 
crown's interest out of sheer spite. Upon learning that, as 
collector, he would not be entitled to a percentage of the 
proceeds of the condemnation, Fitzwilliam "took upon him the 
Office of an Evidence against the King, and without being 
called offered his testimony to clear that Vessel." 70 
The catalog of alleged improprieties continued. 
Spotswood additionally accused the customs agent of 
underhanded dealings in granting the purser of the royal 
warship Pearl a "Bill of Store," prohibited by the Acts of 
Trade for enumerated commodities, to buy a shipment of 
Fitzwilliam's own tobacco without paying any customs fees. 
In exchange for the duty-free purchase, the purser agreed to 
buy the tobacco, according to the governor, "at a higher 
70 Spotswood, Letters, II, 327-28. 
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was true, it would seem particularly ironic that 
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Fitzwilliam, who allegedly dealt with Blackbeard also, was 
involved simultaneously in a contraband trade which used as 
its vehicle the ship whose crew was responsible for the 
pirate's destruction. What is even more startling (and, 
ultimately, revealing) about Fitzwilliam's case is that, 
despite Spotswood's long list of charges and the governor's 
claim that "all the Neighboring People in that District 
murmur exceedingly at the unnecessary trouble and vexation 
he gives them," the opportunistic collector not only 
retained his post but went on to become surveyor general of 
the customs for the southern colonies and eventually 
governor of the Bahamas.7 2 
Although Fitzwilliam's purported association with 
freebooters does not appear to have affected his 
professional standing, pirates, or at least the mishandling 
of pirate loot, may have figured in the downfall of another 
Virginia customs official. Henry Irwin was a naval officer 
for the lower James River district who "had at sundry times 
received considerable sums of money" which represented the 
confiscated booty of pirates captured in Virginia in 1719. 
By 1721, according to Elizabeth City County records, Irwin 
71 Ibid., 328. 
72 Ibid.; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, 
IV, 202 n:-J. 
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stood "indebted to the King in the sum of 450L ••• for so 
much of the said piratical effects by him received & yet 
unpaid & unsatisfied." 73 The naval officer did convey to 
the king as payment the deed for several lots he owned in 
Hampton, but his reputation for honesty, or at least prudent 
fiscal management, appears to have suffered irreparable 
damage. At a council meeting in 1726 the governor announced 
that Irwin had been discharged from his customs post because 
"no man would be bound for him."74 
Cupidity on the part of customs agents and other 
government officials in the maritime sphere continued to 
afflict the colonial administrative system of the region in 
the succeeding decades. Wartime privateering, which 
traditionally had not been pursued in the greater Chesapeake 
for lack of ships and ready capital, was further discouraged 
during the War of Jenkins' Ear by prize commissioners who 
sought to exploit the situation for their own economic 
benefit. In 1739 William Byrd II wrote to British minister 
Robert Walpole that enterprising privateersmen from Virginia 
had been "plagued with a vexatious attendance and most 
73 VMHB, X, 216. 
74 1 Ibid.; EJC, IV, 99. Irwin was appointed nava 
officer of the lower James district in 1716 to succeed John 
Holloway (EJC, III, 428). 
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exorbitant Fees to the Vultures which hovered for prey about 
the Office." 75 
While the phenomenon of greedy prize commissioners 
might be dismissed as indicative of nothing more than the 
predictable emergence of wartime profiteering, additional 
reports of avidity on the part of customs and other 
regulatory authorities suggest a continuing pattern of 
official corruption in the maritime commercial sphere of the 
greater Chesapeake. In 1730 North Carolina advocate general 
Richard Everard brought a series of suits against Jot~ 
Lovick, former deputy secretary of the province, for 
Lovick's alleged failure to account for proceeds from the 
sales of four ships condemned for contraband trafficking and 
other trade law violations. Everard charged that Lovick, 
who had acted in each case either as the presiding judge or 
the agent in charge of the sale, could not produce the 
missing revenues because he had "Appropriated, and 
converted the same to his own Use & Benefit." 76 
75 VMHB, XXXVI, 357; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 456, n. 
16. 
7 6 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 23, 24, 26, and 
27. The suits against Lovick are also noteworthy because 
they appear to contain the only references to the trade law 
violations that are mentioned therein. Had it not been for 
Lovick's indiscretions, these cases may never have come to 
light, suggesting that even in colonies and for periods 
where records have been preserved, the actual number of 
cases involving illicit trade may far exceed the number that 
have been documented. 
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Two years later the North Carolina vice-admiralty court 
ordered collector and former vice-admiralty court judge 
Samuel Swann to give an account of a piragua he had seized 
for illegally exporting enumerated goods.77 Although 
nearly a year had elapsed since the seizure, Swann had 
failed to initiate any condemnation or prosecution 
procedures and, on the contrary, the court charged, had 
employed the vessel in his own service. 78 Despite the 
issuance of several subpoenas, Swann refused to appear 
before the tribunal. Instead he attempted to transfer 
jurisdiction in the case from the vice-admiralty court to 
the general court where he undoubtedly expected a more 
sympathetic hearing, apparently with more than the usual 
good reason. 79 Vice-admiralty court records indicate that 
the colony's advocate general, the man most likely to handle 
any government proceedings against Swann in the general 
court, not only was aware of the collector's misconduct, but 
had purposely neglected it, and in fact had refused to 
prosecute the case.80 
Even before the specific allegations of Swann's 
malfeasance surfaced, colonial authorities had grown uneasy 
77 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no. 43; CRNC, II, 766; 
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, rv;-209 n. 1. 
78 4 5 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 1 2, doc. no. 4 • 
7 9 Ibid., doc. nos. 45, 50, 51. 
80 Ibid., doc. no. 47. 
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about reports of more widespread impropriety on the part of 
customs officers. In 1731 the North Carolina Lower House 
resolved to ask the governor to issue a proclamation 
"strictly forbidding all officers to take larger Fees than 
is by Law appointed." 81 What prompted the request were 
"Complaints made in most parts of this Province" that the 
extortionate behavior of local customs officials had 
resulted in "the great Discouragement of the Trade ••• and 
the Oppression of the People."82 
Specifically, the assemblymen charged that collectors 
"in General do demand take and receive from the Inhabitants 
and Masters of Vessells • • • Four times more than the Fees 
appointed by the Laws of this Province." 83 Abuse of the 
established fee structure was cited again in 1746 when the 
North Carolina Committee of Propositions and Grievances 
reported that customs officials "under the colour of their 
Office," had exacted "new Fees not warranted by Law, & ••• 
extorted greater Fees than allowed by Law." As was the case 
81 CRNC, III, vii-viii. 
82 Ibid., vii-viii, 262, 267, 269. The alleged abuses 
of a vice-admiralty judge in this regard also may have been 
instrumental in persuading North Carolina legislators to 
initiate some remedial action at this particular time. As 
part of his running legal battle with Edmond Porter in 1731, 
William Little complained that "altho the admiralty fees are 
here stated by Law and verry high too," the vice-admiralty 
judge nevertheless "Arbitrarily asumed to Impose what costs 
he pleases and hath Constantly Done it in a very Exorbitant 
manner" (CRNC, III, 231-32). 
83 CRNC, III, vii-viii, 262. 
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fifteen years earlier, the legislators' concern stemmed from 
the conviction that such infractions were neither isolated 
nor petty, but constituted a general "Oppression of the 
subjects and a very great grievance." 84 
Allegations of official misconduct in regulating the 
maritime commerce of the Chesapeake were not restricted to 
the British customs service per se. The establishment of 
the tobacco inspection system in Virginia in 1730 spawned 
complaints about a new form of official corruption, namely, 
discrimination in judging which or, more accurately, whose 
tobacco was fit for export. 85 Several planters reportedly 
were "ready to strike" Corotoman inspector Joseph Carter in 
1732 for what they considered "very Partial and unjust" 
conduct, the examiner allegedly having "passed very bad 
Tobacco for some people" while condemning the good tobacco 
of others to be destroyed. 86 Unhappy residents of 
Caroline County raised similar objections in 1742 when they 
accused inspector William Alcocke of being "guilty of 
Partiality" in passing one man's tobacco "when he refused to 
pass the same sort" for another. 87 
84 Ibid., IV, 824. 
85 EJC, IV, 305-43; Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 
67, 103-04. 
8 6 ~' I, 218-19. 
87 Ibid., 236. 
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The Council of Virginia, as it turned out, dismissed 
the charges against Carter as groundless, a ruling which 
could be construed to signify simply that the operation of 
any inspection system involving a degree of subjective 
judgment in maintaining a prescribed, but necessarily 
inexact, standard was bound to result in unfounded 
complaints of bias or poor discretion. 88 On the other 
hand, the fact that eighteen inspectors were discharged for 
"Misbehavior" and "Neglect of Duty" in less than two months 
toward the end of 1733 (as well as others in succeeding 
years) has been viewed as an indication that wealthy 
planters were attempting to exercise an undue influence on 
the inspectors at the expense of their poorer 
counterparts.89 In an effort to discourage such behavior, 
the Virginia assembly passed legislation in 1738 preventing 
tobacco inspectors from serving as collectors of any public 
levies and an additional statute in 1742 forbidding 
inspectors to accept any gift or gratuity apart from their 
salaries. 9 ~ 
The customs agents guilty of corruption in the 
instances of official impropriety cited thus far all shared 
88 EJC, IV, 287-88, 293. 
89 Ibid., 307-08, 310-11, 315, 335, 338, 426, 431, 436, 
437; Hor~"Tobacco Inspection Act," 67. 
9 ~ Hening, Statutes, v, 11, 151; Flippin, William 
Gooch, 22. 
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two characteristics 1n common: a determination to exploit 
the system, whether conceived in London or the Chesapeake, 
and a willingness to extort or otherwise abuse merchants and 
fellow colonists in the process. In many cases they also 
displayed an arrogant and blatant disregard for the ability 
of local authorities to discipline them. But not all the 
corruption of colonial customs officials was practiced so 
overtly or at other colonists' direct expense. In fact, 
most customs fraud in which collectors and naval officers 
knowingly participated seems to have been conducted for the 
mutual benefit of revenue officials and colonists or 
shippers alike. The fact that few specific instances of 
cooperative, bilateral corruption were documented should be 
viewed not as an indication that such collusion was 
practiced less regularly, but rather that many more people 
stood to gain than lose by its perpetuation and concealment. 
Clearly, had it not been for the indiscretion of greedy, 
exclusively self-indulgent customs agents in alienating 
traders and local residents and openly defying lawful 
authority, it is unlikely that most of these cases of 
official corruption would ever have come to light. 
Collusion with collectors and naval officers offered 
colonists and shipmasters certain advantages over other 
forms of smuggling and customs fraud. Although forging 
certificates and cocquets, loading vessels after clearing, 
and complete evasion of customs authorities were all 
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effective ways to beat or circumvent the system, they also 
had certain drawbacks. Counterfeit papers and contraband 
cargo were liable to detection and there was always the 
possibility, however remote, that clandestine loading might 
be discovered by a royal guardship, either through direct 
observation or by means of an informer. Of equal or perhaps 
greater concern was the inconvenience and expense associated 
with the acquisition of false papers, the concealment of 
smuggled goods, and having to load a vessel twice and in 
secret. How much simpler and less risky the operation could 
be for potential trade law violators if they could gain the 
cooperation of the local naval officer and collector 
(particularly if those posts were held by the same 
individual, as they often were before 1700) by means of a 
suitable inducement. 
In 1691 deponent John Twitt testified that Maryland 
collectors had permitted the shipment of L3000 worth of 
goods directly from Holland, presumably, according to local 
speculation, as a result of having been suborned. 91 Seven 
years later Benjamin Harrison charged that Rappahannock 
district collector Ralph Wormeley had "used his interests" 
as well as "ill language and menaces" to secure the release 
of two vessels seized for lack of proper papers, arousing 
popular suspicion that "the ships had been let go for 
91 CSPC, XIII, #1951, p. 578. 
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bribes." 92 Governor Spotswood levelled similar charges 
against collector George Luke in 1714 in connection with the 
disposition of goods from a disabled French ship. 93 In 
1731 a North Carolina deponent reported that a local 
collector had seized a cargo of imported goods for which the 
ship's captain could produce no coquets, but "told the 
master he would pass the matter by for a piece of 
Calico." 94 These, however, represent practically the only 
alleged instances of direct cash or commodity payments to 
customs officials in exchange for extralegal services. 
Proven, documented examples are even rarer. And yet, 
Virginia authorities considered the problem serious enough 
to warrant the passage of legislation in 1726 and again in 
1732 stipulating that collectors who accepted bribes and 
shipmasters who offered them would be fined Ll00 each. 95 
What concerned colonial authorities probably was not so 
much the occasional unauthorized release of a seizure or the 
even rarer occurrence of illicit cargo disposition from an 
incapacitated foreign ship, but the practice of less 
conspicuous collusion on a more regular basis. One form 
that such collusion commonly took, according to Edward 
92 Ibid., XVI, #656, p. 332. 
93 Spotswood, Letters, II, 105. 
94 CRNC, III, 227. 
95 Hening, Statutes, V, 146, 313-14; Flippin, Financial 
Administration of Virginia, 46. 
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Randolph, was that collectors who were also great planters 
routinely offered shipmasters a sizable discount on tobacco 
duties provided that the captains agreed to purchase their 
entire lading from the customs agents. 96 The collectors 
then could effect the transaction either by remitting part 
of their share of the duties or by overlooking the shippers' 
bookkeeping chicanery, "Sometymes," as Randolph indicated, 
"Coniveing at their short Entryes." 97 
Much of this type of customs fraud stemmed from the 
fact that collectors and naval officers frequently had a 
significant personal interest in the commerce that they were 
supposed to be regulating, a situation which some crown 
officials regarded as inherently and profoundly injurious to 
the royal interest. Maryland governor Nicholson, for 
instance, considered customs officials "being great traders 
••• to be one of the great causes of illegal trade." 98 
Although royal instructions to the governors from 17ee on 
stipulated that "persons much concerned in trade" not be 
permitted to serve as collectors, some venal customs agents 
nonetheless sought to use their positions to gain a 
232. 
96 ~' XVIII, t9e6, p. 634; Randolph, Letters, v, 
97 Randolph, Letters, V, 232. 
98 CSPC, XV, ill78, p. 548. 
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competitive commercial edge over fellow merchants and 
planters. 99 
199 
In 1711 Governor Spotswood removed naval officer Gawin 
Corbin from office for "no less an offence than forging the 
••• Queen's letter," a crown exemption from the 
requirement to sail with an authorized convoy during 
wartime, in order to clear a vessel of which he was a part 
owner.lee The advantage Corbin hoped to gain, 
presumably, was to insure that his ship would reach the 
English market before the rest of the Chesapeake tobacco 
fleet and thereby be in a position to command a better price 
than his competitors. A similar situation developed in 1717 
when eleven merchants complained to the Board of Trade that 
"contrary to the regulations forbidding officers of the 
Customs to trade, frieght or own ships," Daniel McCarty, 
collector for the South Potomac district, was a "very great 
Trader not only for his own Acct but also • factor for • 
• • others" much to the detriment of rival business 
interests who were "sure ••• to be discourag'd harass'd 
hinder'd & embarrassed by him whose Commission affords him a 
pretext ••• for his many unwarrantable Practices." 1 ~ 1 
99 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
197, 2~8 n. 3. 
l~e CSPC, xxx, #S~e, p. 429; Spotswood, Letters, I, 78; 
EJC, III, 269, 276; Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 
58-59; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 61 n. 87. 
1~1 C05/1318, pp. 91, 92; CSPC, XXIX, #643, p. 341; 
Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 61-n:-84. 
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The obvious conflict of interest represented by customs 
officials' personal involvement in the commercial affairs 
that they were empowered to oversee was compounded by the 
phenomenon of plural officeholding. As Edward Randolph 
reported in 1695, some collectors were also "Traders having 
Offices of Trust and profit in the Government."l02 
Virtually unrestricted for almost the entire seventeenth 
century, the ability of privileged individuals to gain 
additional wealth and power through the acquisition of 
public offices fostered the creation of what one historian 
has described as an "impregnable defense of 
corruption."103 Contemporary observer Benjamin Harrison 
characterized the situation as one in which "the self same 
men, who have been naval officers to enter and clear ships 
and collectors to receive the public duties, have likewise 
hitherto been the Council of State to pass their own 
102 Randolph, Letters, V, 117. 
103 Hall, Edward Randolph, 148. For an alternative 
view see Bergstrom, "Markets and Merchants," chapter 3 and 
pages 60-61 and 91 in particular, which portrays Virginia's 
plural officeholding naval officers as models of official 
behavior who performed their duties "conscientiously, 
honestly and faithfully," and took "just rewards, but no 
more" for their services. Bergstrom's assessment tends to 
disregard the documented or alleged malfeasance of John 
Custis, Gawin Corbin, and Ralph Wormeley; overlooks the many 
complaints that Virginia's naval officers were charging 
grossly excessive fees; and runs counter to the conviction 
of England's Lord Justices in 1698 that naval officers had 
"generally neglected to comply with the • • • Act • • • for 
preventing frauds & regulating Abuses in ye Plantation 
Trade." 
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accounts and to advise the disposal of the money."l~4 
Edward Randolph went so far as to charge that "the 
Collectors places in virginnia" constituted little more than 
"perquisites ••• intended to enrich ye members of ye 
Council!" and functioned only secondarily "to secure their 
Maties Revennue." 1 ~ 5 
Toward the end of the century others began to criticize 
the privileged status of the councilors under the existing 
arrangement and a movement to reform the system gained 
momentum. In 1697 Maryland governor Nicholson suggested to 
English authorities that "Collectors and Naval Officers be 
distinct persons, so that they may be a check upon each 
other, and that neither of them be public traders."106 
The following year the Board of Trade advised the Lords 
Justices of England that "The Collectors and Naval Officers 
have for years past been the same persons, and for the most 
part Councillors, doing their business principally through 
unsworn deputies and rendering their accounts to the 
Council, which is to themselves. The evils of this are 
evident and complaints have not been wanting." 1 ~ 7 
Finally, in 1699 royal instructions to the governors 
1~ 4 CSPC, XVI, 1656, p. 33~. 
1~5 Randolph, Letters, VII, 351. 
1~6 CSPC, XV, 11178, p. 548. 
1 ~ 7 Ibid., XVI, 1767, p. 4~1. 
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expressly forbade councilors from holding the offices of 
collector or naval officer.l08 
The next year Miles Cary, register of the 
202 
vice-admiralty court, submitted what appears to have been an 
unprecedented petition to the Council of Virginia. Having 
recently been appointed naval officer of the York River and 
considering that it was not "suitable yt one and ye same 
person should be obliged to seize Ships and Vessells for 
Illegal traders and be a Party in ye tryall of them," Cary 
requested that he be discharged from the office of 
register. 109 Cary's offer to relinquish his office in 
the vice-admiralty court (which the recent royal directives 
did not require explicitly) points up the fact that customs 
officials not only enjoyed positions in the executive and 
legislative branches of colonial government, but in the 
judiciary as well. And while Cary's influence as register 
probably was relatively insignificant, those privileged to 
serve as judges not only decided the outcome of individual 
cases, but essentially determined the course of trade law 
enforcement in their colony. 
The potential for abuse under such circumstances was 
manifest. As Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton observed, "The 
multitude of Places held by the Council, occasions great 
108 Ibid., XVII, #579, p. 312; JHB, 1698-99, p. 185; 
Hartwel1,-aTair, and Chilton, Presen~tate of Virginia, 59. 
109 EJC, II, 126; CSPC, XVIII, #1055, p. 766; Reese, 
ed., Virginia Vice-Admiralty Court, 57. 
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Confusion, especially in such things wherein the Places are 
incompatible: As when their Collectors Office obliges them 
to inform their Judges Office against an unfree Bottom; or 
when their Honours, as Counsellors, sit upon and pass their 
own Accounts, as Collectors."110 Even that description 
did not define the full extent of their influence, Benjamin 
Harrison maintained, but "the same men also constitute the 
Supreme Court of Judicature in all causes whatsoever, so 
that there is no relief against any judgment they choose to 
give."lll 
Predictably, the decisions these men made as councilors 
and jurists tended to favor their own interests, bo~h 
individually and collectively. In 1694 Edward Randolph 
accused four Virginia general court judges, who also were 
collectors, of not aggressively and effectively prosecuting 
the case of a ship seized for illegal trading because "the 
truth of it is, their Brother collector Ralph Wormeleys 
Honour lay at stake, for if the vessel were condemned 
t'would argue either his Connivance at ye Mr or his 
ignorance in the Acts of trade because he did not seize her 
at the tyme of her Entry." 112 Several years later, 
Benjamin Harrison indicated that such behavior was 
110 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, Present State of 
Virginia, 39. 
111 CSPC, XVI, i656, p. 330. 
112 Randolph, Letters, VII, 459. 
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consistent with the posture that powerful plural 
officeholders customarily assumed with regard to 
disciplining one another. "They will always look so 
carefully to their own interest as to stand by each other in 
opposition to all persons," Harrison asserted, "and if one 
of them chances to speak a little freely of the miscarriages 
of one of his brethren, • • • yet upon second thoughts they 
think it their common interest to agree among themselves and 
generally let such things sleep." 113 In 1701 the Board 
of Trade acknowledged having received such complaints, 
noting that members of the Council of Virginia "were not 
subject to prosecution at law ••• and that • 
inconveniencies had ensued, as well in relation to trade as 
justice, by the methods settled, and ordinarily practised, 
in the administration of that government."ll4 
The problem of multiple officeholding was, to a 
considerable degree, a systemic one. If customs agents, 
councilors, and judges took advantage of the system by 
occupying positions which represented conflicting interests, 
it was largely because the administrative framework of the 
Chesapeake colonies permitted them to do so. Few colonists 
could be expected to surrender such perquisites voluntarily, 
as Miles Cary did, for the sake of principle. English 
authorities eventually did attempt to take some 
113 CSPC, XVI, #656, p. 330. 
114 Stock, Debates, II, 396. 
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comprehensive action in this regard by issuing directives 
forbidding councilors to serve as customs agents, 
prohibiting the same person from holding both the 
collector's and naval officer's posts simultaneously, and 
specifying that those appointed to either position should 
not be too involved in trade personally.ll 5 But the 
larger issue of plural officeholding never was resolved 
satisfactorily. 
Part of the problem was that there simply were not 
enough qualified people in the colonies to assume all the 
positions of responsibility without calling on some 
individuals to perform more than one official 
function. 116 The result, whether due to the consequent 
205 
ll 5 CSPC, XVII, #579, p. 312; XVIII, #523, pp. 310-11; 
Spotswood;-Eetters, I, 8; Hening, Statutes, III, 195. 
116 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
182. An important aspect of the problem concerned education 
which reputedly had become "the sine gua non for holding 
public office" in Europe long before the colonial era 
(Martin H. Quitt, Virginia House of Burgesses 1660-1706: The 
Social, Educational, and Economic Bases of Political Power 
[New York, 1989], 104). In the Chesapeake, though, 
particularly during the seventeenth century, both literate 
individuals and opportunities for instruction were in short 
supply (Ibid., 106; John C. Rainbolt, From Prescription to 
Persuasion: Mani ulation of Seventeenth Centur Vir inia 
Economy Port Washington, N.Y., 1974 , 21-22 • 
Nevertheless, the significance of some sort of scholastic 
background as a qualification for public officeholding was 
illustrated in Bacon's Rebellion when the chief insurgent 
rhetorically asked whether the "extractions and Education" 
of Governor Berkeley's ruling faction had not "bin vile," 
and questioned "by what pretence of learning and vertue they 
could [enter] soe soon into Imployments of so great Trust 
and consequence" (cited in Bernard Bailyn, "Politics and 
Social Structure in Virginia," in James K. Martin, ed., 
Interpreting Colonial America, 2d edition [New York, 1978], 
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conflicts of interest or the overburdening of public 
officials with too much responsibility, was, according to 
Edward Randolph, that "but few discharg one Office as they 
ought to doe." 117 Another aspect of the dilemma which 
proved particularly troublesome was the almost uniformly 
insufficient salaries and commissions that customs agents 
and other public officials received as compensation for 
their efforts. An eighteenth-century New England official 
asserted that "the real cause of the illicit trade" in his 
colony was that customs officials were "quartered upon for 
more than their legal fees and that without bribery and 
corruption they must starve."118 The necessity for 
customs officials in America to supplement their meager 
incomes with emoluments from some other source has led 
several historians to conclude that graft must have been 
widespread and pervasive.ll9 
By all accounts, the situation in the greater 
Chesapeake conformed to the same pattern, a phenomenon which 
illustrates why it was difficult to get honest, competent, 
191) • 
117 Randolph, Letters, VII, 379. 
118 Thomas Hutchinson in Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American History, IV, 215 n. 1. 
119 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
215; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 62; Hoon, English Customs 
Service, 213. 
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and conscientious individuals to serve as customs 
agents. 120 The refusal of Virginia's first customs 
collector to continue in his position after 1673, for 
207 
example, has been attributed to the decision to change his 
form of compensation from a comfortable salary of L250 a 
year to a percentage of the duties he collected.121 In 
1699 a Carolina collector indicated his unwillingness to 
serve in the same capacity any longer because of the large 
expenses he had incurred in prosecuting a case for which he 
had received no allowance or reimbursement. 122 The same 
year Virginia governor Nicholson passed along to the Board 
of Trade a representation made to him by eight council 
members who were former collectors (including Benjamin 
Harrison) stating that the income customs agents derived 
from their offices was "unsuitable as compensations for 
their time and trouble."l23 
Over a decade later the council still maintained that 
"the fees belonging to the Naval Officer alone would not be 
a sufficient encouragement for anyone that's capable and 
fitt to be in so great a trust" without a supplementary 
l20 Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 84-85. 
121 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 21; Flippin, Financial 
Administration of Virginia, 23. 
122 Randolph, Letters, V, 221 •• 
123 CSPC, XVII, #579 xxxi, p. 312. 
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income producing office. 124 When Governor Spotswood 
recommended to the Commissioners of the Customs the 
appointment of an additional customs agent to help control 
illicit trade in the Lower James River district, he 
emphasized the need to pay the official a "Compatent 
Sallary" so as not to be "tempted to supply his want 
either by an unjust vexation of fair Traders, or a 
fraudulent Connivance with the illegal ones."l25 The 
quest for additional fees and commissions inevitably led to 
competition between customs officials which, Edward Randolph 
implied as early as 1692, also fostered collusion with 
planters and shippers. "In Maryland the Officers plye like 
Watermen," the surveyor general observed, "for he that uses 
the Mrs [shipmastersl best has most business."126 
The inadequate income that customs agents received from 
their offices was also used to justify the establishment of 
rates which planters and shippers considered exorbitant. In 
fact, it was as a result of complaints that collectors had 
"exacted and taken greate and unreasonable fees for entring 
and clearing ships" that the Virginia assembly enacted 
legislation in 1679 stipulating, apparently for the first 
time, what the charges for particular customs services 
124 Ibid., XXV, #349, pp. 169-70. The council had 
submitted-a-iimilar memorial in 1706 also (EJC, III, 
117-18). 
125 Spotswood, Letters, I, 75. 
1 2 6 Randolph, Letters, VI, 43; VII, 379. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209 
should be. 127 But when the North Carolina Lower House 
sent a resolution to Governor Burrington in 1731 condemning 
customs officials for charging excessive fees and insisting 
that these be regulated more strictly, the governor 
responded that adopting the proposed measures would leave 
collectors and naval officers no choice but to "Abandon 
their Employments and depart this Province or starve here if 
they take their Fees in the kind manner you prescribe or 
desire." 128 
The negative consequences associated with insufficient 
salaries affected the highest level of colonial 
administration as well. Edward Randolph believed that "the 
many misdemeanors justly charged upon the several! 
Governours in the Proprieties, arise chiefly from a very 
127 Hening, Statutes, II, 443-44. The fee structure 
for customs officials in the colonies does not appear to 
have been established by any imperial decree or act of 
Parliament; instead, the standard procedure, at least after 
1679, evidently was for colonial assemblies to set the fees 
subject to approval by the Privy Council (Barrow, Trade and 
Empire, 155-56). Following the formal division of customs 
responsibilities between collectors and naval officers, the 
Virginia burgesses passed a law in 1699 detailing the fees 
that each agent would receive and specifying that "no 
collector or navall officer shall ••• after the 
publication of this act charge, demand, exact and take any 
more or greater fee ••• than what is hereafter 
particularly enumerated" (Hening, Statutes, III, 195-97). 
128 CRNC, III, 297-98, 309. North Carolina lawmakers 
had passed legislation in 1715 delineating collectors' fees 
and services (Ibid., XXIII, 83). A similar law was enacted 
in 1731, after the Lower House's resolution, which 
additionally detailed the functions and prescribed service 
charges for naval officers (Ibid., III, 160-61). These were 
subsequently amended for bot~ficials in 1736 (Ibid., IV, 
195-96). 
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great neglect in the Proprietrs not taking due care to 
provide an Honorable Maintenance for support of their 
Governors." This, the royal customs agent was convinced, 
was "the true reason why no honest Gentleman of good 
reputation and abilities ••• will leave his Country to 
live upon the Rapine and spoil in the Proprieties, as many 
of them have done ••• For 'tis easy to believe that 
Governors in such necessities will be soon tempted to do all 
unlawful things."129 
Bureaucratic inefficiency paralleled and complicated 
the problems of plural officeholding and inadequate 
salaries. Although crown authorities appeared to have 
worked out the responsibilities of, and the division of 
labor between, customs officers clearly and carefully in 
theory, in practice the system was full of ambiguities and 
contradictions. An exchange of correspondence between 
English officials and Francis Nicholson illustrates the 
confusion that prevailed at the highest levels of colonial 
administration where communication and mutual comprehension 
should have been most lucid. As governor of Maryland in 
1697, Nicholson had been one of the foremost proponents of 
making collectors and naval officers "distinct persons" who 
would act as a check on one another. Two years later, 
though, Nicholson, now governor of Virginia, inexplicably 
129 Ibid., I, 545; V, 157, 271; CSPC, XVI, #451, p. 
211. 
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reversed himself by recommending that the two positions be 
combined "for the conveniency of trade and the proper reward 
of the officer."139 
Flabbergasted members of the Board of Trade, who had 
heeded the governor's advice in the first place, responded: 
"We do not conceive how you came to appoint the same persons 
to execute both the Naval Office and that of Collector of 
the 2s. per hhd., that being directly contrary to your 
Instructions and also to your own opinion, which you writ us 
from Maryland." 131 Nicholson lamely tried to explain 
that the position he had joined to that of naval officer was 
not that "collector, but the Receiver of the 2s. per hhd. 
and the Virginia duties, . . . sometimes called 
collector. nl32 Perhaps ic an effort to deflect attention 
from his own apparent confusion or inconsistency, the 
governor pointed out another glaring administrative 
oversight, that "few of the Collectors and Naval Officers" 
had received "any body of Instructions" to guide them in the 
performance of their duties. 133 
Other deficiencies of the system, on both the imperial 
policymaking and colonial administrative levels, produced 
additional problems or exacerbated existing ones. The 
139 CSPC, XVII, #579, p. 312. 
131 Ibid., XVI II, #8, p. 5. 
132 Ibid., i523, p. 311. 
133 Ibid., #523, p. 310. 
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absence of designated shipping and receiving centers 
combined with the innumerable bays, inlets, rivers and 
creeks in the greater Chesapeake created a situation in 
which complete, or even moderately effective, coverage of 
the various customs districts would have been impossible in 
any event. But the relatively small number of customs 
officials assigned to those areas only served to compound 
the dilemma. 
In 17~~ Edward Randolph complained about the ease with 
which Virginians and North Carolinians ran their uncustomed 
tobacco to New England from the Currituck Inlet area "where 
there is no settled Officer of the Customes."l3 4 Three 
and four decades later Virginia governor Gooch continued to 
observe that illicit trade could not be prevented as long as 
smugglers had virtually unlimited opportunities to collect 
and dispose of contraband far from the prying eyes of royal 
customs agents. 135 Even the establishment of port towns, 
unless they were situated properly, did not improve trade 
law enforcement necessarily. In 1755 North Carolina 
governor Arthur Dobbs requested that the Board of Trade 
appoint a revenue officer for Ocracoke Inlet because "the 
Sound within is so large with many numerous Navigable 
Creeks" that smugglers were able to unload a "great part of 
134 Randolph, Letters, v, 231. 
135 "Gooch Correspondence," vol. 1, Gooch to the Board 
of Trade, July 23, 173~ and vol. 3, Gooch to the Board of 
Trade, August 22, 1743; Flippin, William Gooch, 14. 
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their Cargoes ••• and all prohibited Goods before they 
come to the discharging Ports and by landing them • 
Swear only to the remainder of their Cargoe."136 
The remoteness of many customs officials' residences 
from the areas of greatest shipping activity within their 
213 
districts offered additional opportunities for illicit trade 
and duty fraud. In 1697 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton 
suggested that customs revenues "would turn to better 
Account if ••• the Collectors kept their Offices 
convenient. Many of them do now live at great Distance, and 
trust to unsworn Deputies, and they to unsworn Masters of 
Ships, and other Exporters." 137 A quarter century later the 
president and masters of the College of William and Mary 
lamented the loss of income to the institution as a result 
of diminished Plantation Duty revenues which they attributed 
in part to the fact that customs "offices are given to men 
that live out of the country, and so never reside as to do 
their duty, which has occasioned vast frauds in that 
trade." 138 In 1736 former North Carolina governor 
Burrington apprized the Commissioners of the Customs that he 
"never knew one of the Collectors of Currituck [to] reside 
within the Collection." And since, Burrington noted, "there 
136 CRNC, V, 333. 
137 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, Present State of 
Virginia, 60. 
138 Perry, Church Papers, 549. 
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are many Islands and Rivers between • where the 
Collectors reside and the Inlets, • the Masters have 
Opportunitys to unload prohibited Goods, before they come to 
the Collectors to enter, and also to take in Tobacco, after 
they are cleared."l39 
An additional administrative difficulty had to do with 
the requirement that shipmasters give security before 
clearing that they would deliver their cargoes only in the 
manner and to the destinations prescribed by the Navigation 
Acts. Failure to meet the conditions of such a bond would 
result in its forfeiture and subsequent prosecution by local 
customs officials. In 1684 English authorities issued 
instructions to colonial governors warning them not to 
accept securities from anyone other than "those who are 
sufficient and responsible inhabitants."140 In his 1695 
memorial, "An Account of Several! Things Whereby Illegal 
Trade is Encouraged in Virginia Maryland and Pennsilvania • 
• • ," Edward Randolph reported, however, that naval officers 
regularly accepted securities from "persons of Small or no 
Estates" who then carried their tobacco to Scotland and 
forged certificates in order to discharge their forfeited 
bonds. 141 
139 CRNC, IV, 170. 
140 APCC, II, il62, p. 71; Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American HIStory, IV, 147. 
141 Randolph, Letters, V, 117. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
215 
While royal officials argued that security demands were 
too lenient, Chesapeake residents complained that literal 
application of the bond provisions and the high security 
requirements associated with them subjected the colonists to 
extreme and unjustified hardship. The Maryland 
legislature's Committee of Grievances objected vigorously, 
for example, to Governor Nicholson's effort in 1697 to 
tighten up the system by preventing customs agents from 
taking "such poor and common Securities as was formerly 
used." 14 2 Not only did colonists have difficulty meeting 
the security requirements, opponents of the governor's 
initiative argued, but in 1704 the Maryland Council and 
Assembly charged that "some familyes has been ruined" 
financially and more were endangered by the prosecution of 
forfeited bonds. 143 Besides afflicting the colonists, 
College of William and Mary officials intimated in 1723 that 
the royal government's insistence on demanding large 
securities, instead of promoting compliance with the trade 
laws, actually constituted an inducement to illicit trade. 
and customs fraud. Commenting on a recent act of Parliament 
requiring a minimum security of Ll000 sterling, the college 
men argued that small traders, "being perhaps utter 
strangers or persons in low circumstances, can find no 
142 6 f Md. A., XXIII, 8 ; Andrews, Colonial Period o 
American History, IV, 206. 
143 39 Md. A., XXIV, 4. 
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bondsmen that will undertake for such high summs, and so are 
obliged to let the exportations of tobacco alone, or to run 
it without paying any duty."l44 
The prevalence of collusion between customs officials 
and colonists highlighted another conceptual defect in the 
colonial customs system. Since collectors and naval 
officers normally resided within the districts over which 
they had jurisdiction, it was only natural that their 
affinities would lie, in most cases, with their friends and 
neighbors. 145 Based in part on the advice of men like 
Francis Nicholson, the Commissioners of the Customs 
attempted to address this problem in 1697, having concluded 
that it was "necessary to form a new establishment of 
officers, to be settled in Virginia and other his Majesty's 
Plantations" to execute the navigation laws more 
effectively. Local customs officials were to be replaced 
with men "new and unexperienced in the Plantations" because, 
the commissioners realized, "there could not be that 
reasonable confidence in persons of interest and residence 
upon the place as in persons disinterested in and unrelated 
to the place."146 
144 Perry, Church Papers, 549. 
145 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 144. 
146 CSPC, XV, 11178, p. 548; Hall, Edward Randolph, 
176. 
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Inexplicably, though, the decision does not seem to 
have been implemented, as collectors and naval officers in 
the greater Chesapeake continued to be selected mainly from 
the colonial ranks. The reason cannot have been that the 
commissioners changed their minds because in 1714 they 
reiterated the same conviction in even more explicit and 
compelling terms: "Can anyone believe that a Collr, or other 
officer, unless he has more integrity than wt is usual in 
this Age, will detect his Brother, Uncle, or other Relation 
of any fraud committed to the prejudice of the Revenue ••• 
On the contrary is it not rather to be apprehended that the 
officer and his trading Relation will agree to share the 
profitt of such fraudulent Trade?"l 47 
The divided loyalties of local customs officials (to 
the extent that they experienced conflicting sentiments at 
all), bureaucratic mismanagement and inefficiency, the 
pro-smuggling inclinations of the general courts, and the 
sporadic outbursts of violence against customs officials ·all 
posed formidable obstacles to the successful implementation 
of English imperial trade policy in the greater Chesapeake. 
As serious as these problems were, though, they could be 
addressed and, to a certain extent, overcome by the 
application of various administrative reform, preventive, 
and punitive measures. But the home government's adoption 
of a "salutary neglect" strategy in the 1720s virtually 
147 Cited in Hoon, English Customs Service, 207. 
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ensured that no such corrective initiatives would be 
undertaken until well after mid-century. 
218 
Even the successful resolution of these difficulties 
probably would not have been sufficient to surmount the much 
more fundamental and pervasive problem of which many of the 
other troubles were merely symptomatic. As long as 
Chesapeake residents perceived royal economic policy as 
inimical to their individual and collective interests, trade 
law enforcement would always be hard. Alexander Spotswood, 
who only six years previously had communicated such a 
glowing first impression of Virginia's inhabitants, 
cynically defined this seemingly irreconcilable dilemma from 
the royal point of view. "Such is the temper of a Sett of 
men here," the governor contended, "who look upon every 
benefit that accrues to their Soveraign as so much taken 
from themselves; who envy his Majestie the profits of his 
own proper Estates and Revenues."l 48 
Great as it was, Spotwood's disillusionment in 1716 was 
far from complete, however. Within the next few years, the 
willingness of Chesapeake colonists and proprietary 
officials to tolerate, support, and defend another form of 
maritime lawlessness would bring the governor to a new 
threshold of bitterness and frustration. 
148 Spotswood, Letters, II, 153. 
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CHAPTER VI 
"An Unaccountable Inclination to Favour Pirates" 
On a day in late December 1718 residents of the port of 
Hampton, Virginia, who ventured down to the waterfront 
beheld a gruesome sight. Suspended from the bowsprit of a 
local sloop hung the severed head of Edward Teach, better 
known as the infamous pirate Blackbeard. Fearsome in life, 
the notorious buccaneer's head must have looked especially 
hideous by the time the vessel returned to its home port. 
It had been nearly a month since British navy sailors 
reportedly slashed and punctured Blackbeard with 25 sword 
and pistol shot wounds before finally subduing and 
decapitating the outlaw. 
Spurred to action by apprehensions about the mounting 
pirate threat in the region and by the pleas of Carolina 
traders who had suffered personally from the freebooter's 
depredations, Alexander Spotswood had contracted the sloop 
into the service of the Royal Navy and dispatched it on a 
military expedition to the North Carolina sounds. In the 
desperate and momentous struggle that followed, a battle so 
"closely and warmly engaged" that the surrounding waters 
became "tinctur'd with Blood," naval forces under Lieutenant 
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Robert Maynard sustained heavy casualties but routed the 
pirates, killing many and taking the rest prisoner.! 
Blackbeard's death represented more than just the 
demise of a dangerous and intimidating sea brigand. By 
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seeking out and destroying the marauder in North Carolina, 
Virginia's royal governor served notice to the buccaneers 
and their colonial supporters of the British government's 
determination to extinguish the pirate threat in America. 
Fifteen captives were taken to Williamsburg to be tried. 
Thirteen were convicted and executed. The victors' trophy, 
Blackbeard's grisly head, was set up on a pole at the 
entrance to Hampton's harbor where it constituted a warning 
not only to other pirates, but to the inhabitants and 
1 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 82. Standard 
secondary accounts of the Blackbeard affair and many of the 
pirate episodes discussed in this chapter can be found in 
Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy; Williams, Pirates of Colonial 
Virginia; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake; and Bruce, 
Institutional History of Virginia, I, 677-78, II, 203-26. 
Lee, Blackbeard, offers an alternative view of the behavior 
of the North Carolina and Virginia governments in response 
to the Blackbeard menace. Hughson, Carolina Pirates, and 
Converse D. Clowse, Economic Be innin s in Colonial South 
Carolina, 1670-1730 (Columbia, S.C., 1971 provide some 
insight into the impact of buccaneers, both as trading 
partners and marauders, on colonial economies. Two 
excellent analyses of the social and political environments 
in which pirates operated are Ritchie, Captain Kidd, an 
examination of piracy and the English patronage system, and 
Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, chapter 6, a study of the social 
world of Anglo-American freebooters. 
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officials of the greater Chesapeake as well, that piracy and 
its abettors would no longer be tolerated.2 
Piracy in one form or another plagued the Chesapeake 
intermittently throughout the colonial period, but 
threatened the region most seriously between the 1660s, when 
Governor Berkeley described Virginia waters as being "full 
of pirates," and the early 1720s when Governor Spotswood 
declared the colony "secured against the attempts of pyrates 
on its sea frontiers." 3 The problem became most 
acute between periods of active warfare when buccaneers who 
had been officially authorized to attack enemy shipping as 
privateers were then officially condemned for conducting 
similar activities during peacetime. When the British 
government initiated a crackdown on piracy in the Caribbean 
after Queen Anne's War, many freebooters gravitated to the 
Atlantic coast of North America where they could prey upon 
English colonial shipping or foreign commerce sailing the 
Gulf Stream back to Europe. 4 By the second decade of the 
2 Tyler, History of Hampton, 31-32; Jane E. Davis, 
Round About Jamestown: Historical Sketches of the Lower 
Virginia Peninsula (Hampton, Va., c. 1907), 49. 
3 CSPC, XXXIII, #175, p. 85. 
4 In October 1699 Micajah Perry advised the Board of 
Trade that the coasts of Virginia, Maryland, and Carolina 
were "infested with pirates (CSPC, XVII, #905, p. 502). The 
following June Virginia authorities reported that the colony 
was in "a continual state of war" with the sea brigands 
(CSPC, XVIII, #501, p. 302; #523, p. 308). 
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eighteenth century, American colonists and officials had 
become keenly aware of the war/privateering, peace/piracy 
dynamic. Having suffered from an upsurge in piracy between 
1697 and 1701 after King William's War, Chesapeake merchants 
petitioned the admiralty for the additional protection that 
they anticipated would be required after the conclusion of 
hostilities in 1713.5 
Colonial officials committed to eradicating piracy from 
the Chesapeake in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
faced a formidable challenge. Freebooting had long 
benefitted from a tradition of popular and official 
sanction, collaboration and active participation which, in 
the colonial era, dated back to the earliest English 
settlements in the region. Among the charges that Sir 
Samuel Argall, deputy governor and admiral of Virginia, was 
recalled to England to answer was one that in 1618 he had 
assumed the leading role in outfitting the ship "Treasurer" 
for "Roving on ye Spanish Dominions in the West Indies" and 
committing "sundry Actes of Hostilitie" against the 
Spaniards. 6 Argall's partner in the venture was Robert 
Rich, later Earl of warwick, who, already notorious as an 
investor in piratical enterprises, took an interest in the 
5 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 75. 
6 Susan M. Kingsbury, ed., Records of the Virginia 
Company of London (Washington, 1906), II, 402; Crump, 
Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 59; Andrews, Colonial 
Period of American History, I, 47, 122, 166. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Virginia Company because he considered Jamestown a useful 
staging ground for raids on Spanish New World shipping. 7 
Warwick's influence continued to be felt when, in 1643, 
Parliament designated him Lord High Admiral of the 
plantations in America and chief of all resident colonial 
governors. 8 How news of this appointment was received in 
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the Chesapeake can only be guessed, but it seems unlikely to 
have had any sort of chastening effect on colonial attitudes 
sympathetic toward piracy. 
Predictably, the hard evidence linking colonials and 
pirates is difficult to find. Accessories to crime then as 
now had little interest in publicizing or documenting their 
activities. And yet, the sum total of the available 
evidence -- the repeated complaints by the home government 
about colonies offering refuge to pirates, colonial 
governors' proclamations against citizens harboring the 
outlaws, the favorable treatment pirates received in the 
colonial courts, and the testimony and actions of the 
pirates themselves -- suggests a degree of sympathy for and 
interaction with pirates which historians generally have 
failed to recognize. 
7 wesley F. Craven, "The Earl of Warwick: Speculator in 
Piracy," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), 463-
65~ Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 13~ Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American History, I, 120. 
8 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 33. 
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Most scholars have maintained that the association 
between Chesapeake colonists and pirates was very limited.9 
But such a conclusion fails to address the simple 
observation made in 1699 by Surveyor General of the Customs 
Robert Quary that "if the pirates have not supplies and a 
market for the goods that they plunder and rob, they would 
never continue in these parts of the world."le Few 
officials anywhere could claim to have a better 
understanding of the nexus between pirates and colonists 
than Quary, who in 1686 had been removed from the office of 
secretary in South Carolina as a result of his own collusion 
with freebooters.ll 
There can be little doubt that many colonists viewed 
interaction with pirates favorably. Some may have envied 
the buccaneer's life of adventure and hedonistic pursuits, 
free from the constraints of lawful authority. Others, like 
coastal residents reported to have visited Captain Kidd's 
ship in 1699, probably sought nothing more than to glimpse 
the vast booty rumored to be aboard and to rub shoulders 
9 See, for example, Bruce, Institutional History of 
Virginia, II, 209, Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 132, 
133. 
10 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 2e9; 
Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 88. 
11 Bartholomew R. Carroll, Historical Collections of 
South Carolina; Embracing Many Rare and Valuable Documents, 
Relating to the History of that State from its First 
Discovery to its Independence in the Year 1776 (New York, 
1836), I, 86; Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 88; Hughson, 
Carolina Pirates, 23. 
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with individuals who had attained a degree of roguish 
celebrity in their own time. 12 A few colonists actually 
became buccaneers themselves, but it appears that most of 
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those who became actively involved with freebooters did so 
for economic reasons. As Virginia governor Spotswood 
cynically remarked in 1719, "People are easily led to favor 
these Pests of Mankind when they have hopes of sharing in 
their ill-gotten Wealth."l3 
Pirates became preferred trading partners, especially 
in areas where European manufactured goods were in short 
supply, because, like the Dutch, the freebooters could 
provide these goods at or below market price. 14 The 
Navigation Acts, which raised the cost of European goods by 
restricting their flow to the colonies and adding import 
duties, encouraged colonists to seek alternative suppliers 
to such an extent that the legislation has been identified 
as the principal contributor to piracy in the western 
world. 15 Chesapeake colonists also looked to pirates to 
supply them with gold and silver specie, another commodity 
in great demand. For many years after the founding of 
Carolina, sea brigands were responsible for furnishing most 
1 2 Thomas Wellburn to Edmund Jennings, C05/1411, fo. 
321, 6/29/1699. 
13 Spotswood, Letters, II, 319. 
14 Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 87-88. 
15 Hughson, Carolina Pirates, 15; Davis, Round About 
Jamestown, 45. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
226 
of the currency which circulated in that colony.l6 once 
again English authorities unwittingly drove colonists into 
the pirates' arms, in this case by generally refusing to 
accept commodity payments for quitrents in North 
Carolina. 17 
In return for buccaneer loot and specie, the colonists 
rendered that which the home government generally did not 
require but which the pirates regularly sought: provisions 
of food, naval stores, and occasionally, arms. While the 
majority of Chesapeake inhabitants probably had little or no 
connection with sea brigands at all, those who did developed 
and maintained mutually advantageous relationships based on 
an unwritten, and perhaps unspoken, understanding: that the 
freebooters would continue to view the colonists as 
partners, not prey. As long as the sea robbers respected 
this agreement, there is little to indicate that the 
colonists assisted in their capture and conviction. But 
when their lives and property were threatened, most, though 
certainly not all, Chesapeake residents supported government 
efforts to remove the pirate menace from their midst. 
Unfortunately, the historical record offers little 
insight into the nature of these business relationships, 
particularly in the Chesapeake. It is possible, however, to 
l6 Hughson, Carolina Pirates, 14; Clowse, Economic 
Beginnings, 187 n. 3; Carroll, Historical Collections, I, 
172. 
17 NCHCM, 17~9-1723, xx. 
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extrapolate from similar liaisons elsewhere information 
which probably applied to the Chesapeake as well. A woman 
who sold goods to Blackbeard in Philadelphia, for example, 
recalled that "he bought freely and paid well • was too 
politic to bring his vessel or crew within immediate reach; 
and at the same time was careful to give no direct offense 
to any of the settlements where they wished to be regarded 
as visiters and purchasers."18 Blackbeard, or Teach (also 
represented variously in the literature as Thack, Tach, 
Thach, or Thatch), appears to have behaved in a similarly 
inoffensive manner when he first arrived at Ocracoke Inlet, 
North Carolina. There "he often diverted himself with going 
ashore among the Planters where he revell'd Night and Day" 
and socialized with the colonists by whom "he was well 
received." 19 But unlike Philadelphia, where Blackbeard 
never actually resided and where a more concerted resistance 
to his presence might have been mounted, in North Carolina 
the pirate began to abuse his hosts, sometimes taking 
liberties with the planters' wives and daughters, but, more 
18 Cited in John F. Watson, Annals of Philadelphia, and 
Pennsylvania, in the Olden Time, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 
1884), II, 216-17, 219, 223; Lee, Blackbeard, 79. 
19 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 77; [Charles Ellms], 
The Pirates Own Book, or Authentic Narratives of the Lives, 
Exploits, and Executions of the Most Celebrated Sea Robbers 
(1837; reprint Salem, Mass., 1924), 340. 
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significantly in terms of his ultimate denouement, by 
pillaging the sloops of local traders. 20 
A variety of sources, including accounts by the 
buccaneers themselves, attests not only to the pirates' 
affinity for the Carolina sounds and Virginia's Eastern 
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Shore as places to victual and refit their ships but also to 
the local colonists' willingness to accommodate them. 
Writing to the Board of Trade in 1699 "On behalf of those 
trading to Virginia and Maryland," Micajah Perry and other 
merchants complained of recent buccaneer depredations near 
the Chesapeake and requested the deployment of several 
guardships to cruise the Atlantic coast of America "where 
the pirates do the greatest mischief and is to be feared 
find encouragement."21 
More specifically, the pirate William Dampier, who 
arrived at Accomack on the Eastern Shore in 1682 with 20 men 
and spent a year preparing for a famous piratical expedition 
to Africa and the South Seas, identified Virginia as a good 
place to do business because of the colony's insufficient 
supply of European goods and ample food reserves. 22 The 
following year another pirate crew joined Dampier's company 
and traded its cargo of wines to local inhabitants in 
2 0 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 77; [Ellms], Pirates 
Own Book, 340; Spotswood, Letters, II, 273. 
21 CSPC, XVII, #989, p. 539. 
22 Williams, Pirates of Colonial Virginia, 37-42; 
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 206. 
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exchange for "such Provisions as they wanted," including 
foodstuffs, naval stores, "and every thing necessary for so 
long a Voyage." 23 In 1691 the naval officer for the 
Eastern Shore reported that the islands of his district had 
become a favorite resort of the freebooters; the same man 
testified again, this time as commander of the local 
militia, to the same effect in 1699. 2 4 
Virginia seems to have been an especially popular 
destination for buccaneers who had just completed successful 
freebooting forays and for escaped pirates seeking safe 
haven. In 1688 the royal guardship Dunbarton overtook 
several sea brigands and a black slave who were making their 
way in a shallop across the bay to Virginia where, one of 
the group later reported, they hoped to retire peacefully 
with their booty. 25 The three buccaneers, Edward Davis, 
John Hinson (or Hincent), and Lionel Wafer (or Delawafer), 
were all members of the crew of some seventy marauders 
(including Dampier) that had embarked from the Eastern Shore 
23 Dampier, Voyages, I, 98; Kemp and Lloyd, Brethren of 
the Coast, 85. 
24 John Custis to Francis Nicholson, COS/1411, 
10/16/1699; Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 
207; Williams, Pirates of Colonial Virginia, 40; Middleton, 
Tobacco Coast, 206. 
25 Wafer, Isthmus of America, 131. 
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five years earlier on their well-documented freebooting 
voyage. 26 
Just over a decade later, sea robbers seemed to be 
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heading for the colony in droves. In 1699 the captain of a 
ship owned by New York and London merchants informed one of 
his principal employers, prominent New Yorker Stephen De 
Lancey, that he had just returned from Madagascar with a 
rich cargo and about fifty Red Sea pirates as passengers, 
most of whom, he indicated, "design for Virginia and 
Horekills" in Delaware. 27 The same year colonial 
officials grew apprehensive over reports that close to 
seventy pirates who recently had escaped from jails in New 
26 This particular case has received considerable 
attention since both Dampier and Wafer mentioned it in their 
popular accounts and also because its resolution was partly 
responsible for the founding of the College of William and 
Mary. Although the pirates initially fabricated an 
altogether different story for the arresting guardship 
captain in order to conceal their true identities, they 
later claimed that they were returning to Virginia in 
response to King James's proclamation of 1687 which offered 
a general amnesty to freebooters who surrendered to royal 
authorities. Since they professed not to be "on the 
account" any longer they argued that they were entitled to 
keep their loot. The buccaneers were sent back to England 
where they apparently had some influence in high places. 
The final settlement, believed to have been crafted largely 
through the intercession of James Blair, permitted Wafer, 
Hinson, and Davis to gain their freedom and keep their 
plunder except for L300 which was to be consigned to the 
college's endowment fund (CSPC, XIII, #2059, p. 599~ #2119, 
p. 610~ Wafer, Isthmus of America, xii, xiii, xxix, xlii-1~ 
Dampier, Voyages, I, 533-34, 537-38~ EJC, I, 107-09~ VMHB, 
XX, 5-7; CTB, IX, pt. 3, 1027-30; pt. 4, 1561; WMQ, 1st 
ser., VII~65. ---
27 CSPC, XVII, #512 ii, p. 281~ Karraker, Piracy was a 
Business~-82. 
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England and the Middle Colonies were believed to be headed 
for the Chesapeake in general or Virginia in particular.28 
Even after Blackbeard's depredations and defeat, some 
Virginians apparently had no compunction about offering 
pirates a friendly reception. Four members of a pirate crew 
who put ashore in York County in 1720 "met with good 
Entertainment among the Planters," reveled at a tavern, and 
bought several female indentured servants. 29 Before their 
capture, the pirates managed to lodge much of their booty 
with amicable locals who surrendered the effects only after 
"a great deal of Search and trouble." 30 
Besides the colony's allure as a place in which to 
linger and perhaps reside, Virginia continued to attract 
more transient freebooters bent on further marauding 
adventures. In 1699 the pirate John James visited the 
colony to procure various supplies including naval stores 
and ammunition. 31 The following year Governor Nicholson 
advised the commander of the royal guardship on station in 
the Chesapeake that a pirate named Breholt, recently 
acquitted by a general court in South Carolina, "designed 
either to sail for Smith's Island in Virginia, to get more 
28 Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 116-17. 
29 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 207; EJC, III, 522. 
30 Spotswood, Letters, II, 338, 342. 
31 John Martin to Francis Nicholson, COS/1411, 
7/29/1699; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 104. 
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provisions, or else to Cape de Verd." 32 As late as 1720 
Governor Spotswood lamented the fact that pirates still 
visited the Virginia coast "where they frequently resort to 
furnish themselves w'th provisions."33 
Notwithstanding Virginia's distinction as a preferred 
pirate haunt, North Carolina developed an even more 
widespread and unenviable reputation as a sea robber's 
haven. In 1683 the Lords of Trade complained about the 
"harboring and encouraging of pirates in Carolina • to 
the great damage that does arise in his Majesty's service," 
a charge repeated the following year by the governor of 
Jamaica. 34 A 1707 act designed to encourage settlement in 
North Carolina deplored the fact that the colony constituted 
the only tract of land in English North America in which 
"the Enemy in time of Warr and Pyrates in time of Peace have 
hitherto made use of the Harbours therein to careen and fitt 
their vessells as also to Wood and Water to the great 
32 CSPC, XVIII, #523 XV (11), p. 315. 
33 Spotswood, Letters, II 350; CSPC, XXXII, #523, p. 
328. 
34 CRNC, I, 347. In 1701 a Jamaica governor again 
complainea;-with Carolina no doubt prominent in his 
thinking, that "the insinuations continually made, by the 
proprietary colonies on the continent, of the great 
liberties and exemptions they enjoy under those governments, 
and of the advantages they make by receiving pirates, have 
enticed away much people from Jamaica" (Stock, Debates, 396; 
Hall, Edward Randolph, 212). 
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annoyance of her Majties Subjects trading along the 
Coast." 35 
In 1697 New Jersey governor Jeremiah Basse informed 
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royal authorities that a vessel outfitted for a "piratical 
voyage" had "put in to Carolina, sold all her lading at 
under rates, taken in men and provisions and gone 
privateering." 36 About two decades later, a freebooter 
named Lewis cleaned his sloop on the coast of North Carolina 
where, Daniel Defoe reported, "the Natives traded with him 
for Rum and Sugar, and brought him all he wanted, without 
the Government's having any Knowledge of him." 37 In 1722 
pirate captain George Lowther and his crew spent an entire 
winter in a secluded North Carolina inlet. 38 As late as 
1729 the Lords of Trade expressed the view that "North 
Carolina (ever since t'was a separate Government) has 
only been a Receptacle for Pyrates Thieves and Vagabonds of 
35 CRNC, I, 674. 
3 6 CSPC, XV, il203, p. 568. 
37 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 595; [Ellms], Pirates 
Own Book, 310. Neither Defoe nor Charles El1ms provide any 
dates for Lewis's career. Both authors describe an indirect 
encounter between Lewis and Woodes Rogers, however, which 
appears to have taken place after Rogers had given up 
buccaneering and taken charge of the royal government's 
effort to suppress piracy in the Caribbean. Rogers accepted 
the official post in 1717 ([Ellms], Pirates Own Book, 311; 
Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 595; Kemp and Lloyd, Brethren 
of the Coast, 182). 
38 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 315. 
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all sorts." 39 Pirates, it appears, had become so well 
integrated into the fabric of North Carolina society that a 
citizen could casually remark, in reference to the shortage 
of clergymen in the colony around 173~, that "they that are 
Religiously Inclin'd getts a Tayler or Some old Pirate or 
Some Idle Fellow to Read the Service ••• and then He Hacks 
out a Sermon."4~ 
As is the case with illicit trade, evaluating North 
Carolina's role as a sanctuary and staging ground for 
pirates is complicated somewhat by the issue of royal versus 
proprietary control. Proponents of the extension of 
imperial authority who favored charter nullification had an 
obvious interest in tarring the private governments with the 
brush of pirate collaboration. Edward Randolph went so far 
as to declare that piracy in America would never be 
suppressed as long as Carolina and other proprietary 
colonies remained separate from the crown. 41 In 1697 the 
Council of Trade informed the Carolina proprietors that the 
king had received complaints about "entertainment given to 
Pyrates in ••• the proprieties" with particular reference 
39 CRNC, III, 49. 
4 ~ Edmund and Dorothy s. Berkeley, eds., "'The Manner 
of Living of the North Carolinians,' by Francis Veale, 
December 19, 173~," North Carolina Historical Review, XLI, 
242; NCHCR, VI, xxxii n. 65. 
41 Randolph, Letters, V, 179; CSPC, XVI, #451, p. 211. 
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to "Carolina as too ordinary a Receptacle of Pyrats." 42 
In a 172~ memorial colonial agents John Barnwell and Joseph 
Boone maintained that the North Carolinians "for their 
entertaining Pirates ••• are justly contemned by their 
neighbors, for which reason and that they may be under good 
Government • it would be useful to joyn the same again 
to Virginia." 43 
The extent to which such disparaging views of North 
Carolina were influenced or motivated by a desire to 
discredit proprietary government is difficult to assess; but 
if the debate over charter resumption was responsible for 
exaggerating the level of complicity between private 
colonies and pirates, it may also have had the opposite 
effect. In view of the pressure brought to bear through the 
threat of charter revocation, it is quite conceivable that 
officials in the proprietary colonies felt constrained to 
underreport the level of pirate activity in their 
jurisdictions. 44 
Of the three greater Chesapeake colonies, Maryland 
alone generally seems to have avoided the designation of 
pirate resort or sanctuary, a circumstance which may be 
attributed partly to geography and partly to effective 
public relations. Maryland lay further from both the sea 
42 CRNC, I, 475. 
43 Ibid., II, 396. 
44 Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 88, 92. 
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marauders' Caribbean bases and their favorite Atlantic coast 
hunting grounds in the Gulf Stream (especially near the 
entrance to the Chesapeake bay) than either Virginia or 
North Carolina, and freebooters attending to business 
farther north usually bypassed Maryland in favor of larger 
maritime entrep6ts like Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. 
Additionally, Maryland legislators did their best to quash 
any notion that their colony connived at or abetted any form 
of maritime lawlessness. In response to a 1701 inquiry from 
the Lords of Trade concerning the conduct of the proprietary 
governments and, specifically, the charge that "those 
proprietary Collonys are the Ordinary refuge and retreate of 
Pyrats and illegal traders," the Maryland House of Delegates 
unequivocally declared that "as to Pyrates and illegal 
Traders &c. This House say they never knew of any to be 
harboured or favoured within this Province."45 
Such an emphatic assertion suggests that the delegates 
either were extremely ignorant of their own recent history 
or that they were engaging in a bit of self-serving 
dissimulation. Marylanders, as we have seen, not only had 
countenanced and conducted illicit trade widely during the 
preceding decades, but continued to do so in the eighteenth 
century. "As for piracy," William Penn contended in defense 
of his own colony (which royal officials so frequently 
denigrated as a buccaneer's haven), if Indian Ocean and Red 
45 -43 Md. A., XXIV, 212, 242 • 
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Sea freebooters had not "found a yearly supply of flower and 
ammunition from some of our neighbouring Colonies . . . and 
then have returned these fellows upon us and our coasts 
• we had never a spot upon our garrnent." 46 Although the 
Pennsylvania proprietor neglected to specify the neighboring 
provinces to which he was referring in this instance, he had 
made particular reference earlier in the same 1700 memorial 
to those "pirates, whose carnerades have long sown 
themselves" in a number of colonies including his own, 
Virginia, Carolina, and Maryland. 47 Several years 
earlier, in response to a horne government inquiry concerning 
"which of the Colonies have been more blameable in their 
conduct towards pirates," New Jersey governor Basse 
identified Maryland as one of four colonies (including 
Virginia) where "persons suspected of being concerned in 
these ill-designs have been entertained and settled."48 
Since Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland did not 
boast large seafaring populations, particularly during the 
piracy era, it is not surprising that none of these colonies 
produced many pirates. At one point during Queen Anne's 
War, for example, Virginia officials reported that no 
privateers had been fitted out in the colony to cruise 
4 6 CSPC, XVIII, #366, p. 211. 
47 Ibid., 209. 
48 CSPC, XV, #1203, p. 568. 
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against the enemy and they did not anticipate that any 
would. 49 Nonetheless, a number of colonists did join 
existing pirate bands, including those of Blackbeard and 
238 
Stede Bonnet, and a handful actually organized pirate crews 
of their own. 50 In fact, each of the three greater 
Chesapeake colonies had the distinction of producing at 
least one practitioner of this "home-bred villany," as 
Maryland governor John Seymour termed it in 1707.51 
One of the earliest native Chesapeake pirates was Roger 
Makeele (McKeel, or Meekeele), "a person of not onely evill 
fame, but certainly of very bad life and conversation" who 
in 1685, according to Maryland authorities, was operating 
out of Watts Island in the bay near Accomack County. 
Identified as a Virginia resident, Makeele conducted 
depredations on both sides of the colonial border, but 
perhaps to a greater extent in Maryland where he and his 
accomplices were said to "frequently infest this Province as 
Pirates and Robbers, violently assaulting plundering and 
robbing the good people of this Province and others passing 
to and fro." 52 Though Makeele's waterborne crew was 
49 Howard Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The 
First Century of American Colonial Privateering, 1625-1725 
(Toulon, France, 1926), 221. 
5 0 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 104; Hugh Rankin, The 
Pirates of Colonial North Carolina (Raleigh, 1988), 66, 
70-71. 
51 CRNC, I, 667. 
52 Md. A., XVII, 351. 
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thought to consist of only four men, he was aided by three 
land-based allies on Watts Island and Maryland officials 
suspected that he had additional "Confederates on the 
adjacent Islands." Despite the outlaw's many "villainies 
insolencies and robberies" and a colony-wide call to all 
sheriffs and other provincial officers for his apprehension, 
Makeele apparently managed to avoid capture, possibly by 
seeking sanctuary in North Carolina. 53 
Among the last of the home-grown freebooters in the 
greater Chesapeake during the colonial era was John Vidal, 
whose failed career illustrates and was synchronous with the 
decline of piracy in the region. A former Bath, North 
Carolina merchant who evidently grew impatient with the 
lawful pursuit of wealth, Vidal attempted to seize several 
ships entering Ocracoke Inlet in 1727. After the Blackbeard 
affair, the local population was hardly inclined to support 
or ignore such brazen thievery with the result that Vidal 
and two companions were quickly apprehended. 54 The 
outlaws were sent to Virginia for trial where they were 
convicted and sentenced to death, but a successful petition 
to the governor saved Vidal's life. 55 
53 Ibid., 35e-51; EJC, I, 68. 
54 CRNC, II, 676-77; NCHCM, 1724-173e, liv, 2e3, 
447-48; CSPC, XXXV, #69a, p. 347. 
55 VMHB, XXXII, 242; CSPC, XXXV, #7a7, p. 353; NCHCM, 
1724-173~iv. Among those-responsible for initiating the 
pardon appeal was Richard Fitzwilliam, former customs 
collector for the lower James River district who had been 
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The Chesapeake pirate who caused the greatest alarm in 
the region, though, was Richard Clarke of Anne Arundel 
County, Maryland. Although Clarke first gained notoriety in 
1704, several years after the House of Delegates denied that 
the inhabitants of their colony ever aided or abetted 
pirates, various aspects of his case suggest both a local 
and a regional predisposition to offer sympathy and succor 
to such maritime outlaws. Official anxiety over this 
support, as well as the perceived threat to the colony's 
welfare, may explain the inordinate amount of time and 
energy that Maryland authorities devoted to Clarke's capture 
and the investigation of his activities and 
associations. 56 
Despite the provincial government's virtual obsession 
with Clarke, it was mainly the prospect of his freebooting 
and the contrivances related to it, as opposed to anything 
he actually accomplished on the high seas, that excited such 
great consternation in the highest administrative levels. 
accused of corruption and countenancing pirates in 172~ by 
Governor Spotswood and Captain Brand (Spotswood, Letters, 
II, 326-38). By 1727 Fitzwilliam had been promoted to the 
position of surveyor general of the king's customs for the 
southern colonies (Andrews, Colonial Period of American 
History, IV, 200). 
5 6 Md. A., XXV-XXVII, passim. In July 1705 Governor 
Seymour complained to the Board of Trade that Clarke's 
"treachery and villany" had been "no common misfortunes, 
having allow'd me little ease since my tedious long voyage 
hither" (CSPC, XXII, #1210, p. 550). The governor had no 
way of knowing, of course, that he would continue to be 
preoccupied with the elusive outlaw for almost three more 
years. 
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The only documented, successful case of piracy in which 
Clarke was directly involved apparently occurred sometime 
before September 17B5 when he and his cohorts, "suspected to 
be going on a Pyratical design," commandeered the sloop 
Little Hannah from Maryland's West River. 57 But by the 
time that Governor Seymour issued the latest of several 
calls for assistance in Clarke's capture to the Virginia and 
North Carolina governments in 17B7, Maryland authorities had 
discovered that the outlaw's larger "Pyratical design" was 
far more ambitious, sinister, and threatening than anything 
they had imagined. 
In June 17B7 Seymour reported to the Board of Trade "a 
new discovered peice of Villany that Richard Clarke with his 
Gang of Runaway Rogues had concerted to Seize on our 
Magazine, and burne this Towne and Port of Annapolis, & then 
Steale a Vessell and turne pyrates." 58 A select committee 
of the House of Delegates recently had determined that 
Clarke's intention in setting part of the capital ablaze was 
to create a diversion so that "whilst that Consternation 
continued" the cutthroats might "seize the Magazine and 
Powder House to furnish themselves with Arms and Ammunition" 
for a freebooting expedition which would take them first to 
North Carolina to outfit their vessel and eventually to 
57 EJC, III, 28-29. 
58 6 Md. A., XXV, 2 2. 
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Madagascar to prey on Indian Ocean shipping. 59 Maryland 
officials charged that, in the course of putting this 
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complex, "Cursed and wicked Design" into execution, Clarke 
not only had engaged in piracy, but forgery, tobacco fraud, 
and counterfeiting, and had conspired with hostile forces to 
attack and destroy the colony. 6 ~ 
The search for Clarke and his accomplices is 
significant in several respects. First, some of the outlaws 
were caught which was unusual in itself -- and two were 
taken, of all places, in that infamous pirate haven, North 
Carolina. Seymour's own astonishment is evident in a letter 
to the Lords of Trade in which he describes how the 
Carolinians "exprest their utmost Resentment against those 
Villains ••• by endeavouring to take Clarke and actually 
surrendering ••• two of his associates." 61 Why the 
notoriously recalcitrant North Carolinians were so 
cooperative in this instance is not clearly indicated, but 
it may have had something to do with the colony's history of 
Indian troubles and a perception that Clarke and his cohorts 
represented a real danger in this regard. Among the crimes 
for which Maryland authorities sought Clarke was plotting 
with the "heathen Indians ••• to Cutt off and Extirpate 
S9 Ibid., XXVII, 134-35; EJC, III, 142. 
6 ~ Md. A., XXV, 185, 188; XXVI, 379, 45~-51, 453; 
XXVII, 23, 26, 31, 33, 134; EJC, III, 28-29; VMHB, XVI, 
75-76. - --
6l CRNC, I, 666. 
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the Inhabitants of this Province," and threatening to bring 
3~,~~0 French Indians (not to mention a French naval force) 
to attack the settlement.62 
The most noteworthy aspect of the manhunt and the 
government investigation was the extensive network of 
support for Clarke and his accomplices that they revealed. 
Indeed, according to Governor Seymour in 1707, it was 
Clarke's having been "concealed and harboured by many of his 
Friends" and relations in Maryland and Virginia that had 
prevented his apprehension for nearly three years. 63 And, 
despite the assistance that North Carolinians rendered in 
apprehending Clarke's accomplices, it is clear from various 
depositions that the outlaws felt confident enough in their 
ability to operate safely out of Carolina to select it as 
the staging ground for future freebooting enterprises. 64 
How Clarke managed to garner support throughout the 
greater Chesapeake is something of an enigma. Early notices 
of the malefactor, which portrayed him as an armed bandit 
who had been riding about the province "threatning the Death 
of Several! ••• Subjects ••• and putting the inhabitants 
in Terrour of their Lifes & Robing their houses," hardly 
62 6 Md. A., XXVI, 45~-51, 487, 513: CRNC, I, 66 ; CSPC, 
XXII, #121~, p. 55~. 
63 CRNC, I, 666; ~' XVI, 76. 
64 Md. A., XXVII, 13~-32, 135-36, 139. In 
one deponent reported having been informed that 
living in North Carolina where he had purchased 
land (Ibid., 131). 
March 17~7 
Clarke was 
6~~ acres of 
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seemed likely to endear him to his neighbors. 65 Nor did 
Clarke's image, at least as it was reflected in official 
documents, improve over time. And yet, segments of 
Maryland's population seemed remarkably unperturbed about 
the presence of such an allegedly dangerous felon at large 
in their midst. 
Worse yet, from the royal governor's perspective, a 
widespread sympathy for Clarke and his companions manifested 
itself in the reluctance of Maryland legislators either to 
seek the outlaws aggressively or, once apprehended, to 
punish them harshly, and in the active support that many 
colonists professed and demonstrated for the fugitives both 
before and during their incarceration. Within the colonial 
government, differences of opinion over how to deal with 
Clarke and his accomplices, in terms of both capture and 
sentencing, reflect deeper philosophical divisions between 
the various levels of Maryland's social and political 
hierarchy over the broader issue of what sorts of behavior 
actually constituted lawlessness in, or a serious threat to, 
the colony. 
When, for instance, the Council of Maryland initially 
proposed that the assembly pass an act outlawing Richard 
Clarke for "divers heinous offenses" said to include "riding 
armed to the Terrour of the • • • People in Contempt of the 
Law and breach of his Matys Peace," the members of the House 
65 Ibid., XXV, 185. 
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of Delegates demurred, citing a lack of compelling evidence 
that Clarke truly represented a clear and present 
danger. 66 Conversely, the assemblymen acted with singular 
decisiveness when, after having suggested to Governor 
Seymour that he consider another option besides execution 
for Benjamin Celie, one of Clarke's captured cohorts, the 
chief executive responded that unless the House proposed a 
specific alternative he was inclined to impose the death 
sentence. Quickly taking the matter "into their serious 
Consideration," the assemblymen recommended banishing Celie 
"or any other Thing which may save his Life • we being 
very desirous that his Life may be saved." 67 The idea of 
transporting Celie out of the colony actually had been 
proposed initially by the council (which had expressed a 
similar desire to save the condemned man's life). In view 
of their previous advocacy of swift measures to outlaw and 
capture the criminals, it appears that the councilors were 
treading a middle ground between the conflicting sentiments 
of the English royal governor and the largely native-born 
Marylanders of the lower house. 68 
Perhaps even more disconcerting to high government 
officials were the results of an official investigation 
which indicated that quite a few colonists had been 
66 Ibid., XXV, 185. 
67 Ibid., 51i}l. 
68 Ibid., 459. 
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supporting the malefactor and his "prodigal! Companions" not 
simply in word, but in deed as we11. 69 In April 1705 the 
council examined several suspects under "Violent 
Presumption" of having assisted Benjamin Celie in breaking 
out of jail. 7° Further inquiries revealed that Clarke's 
mother had persuaded the local smith to slip the prisoner a 
file, promising as a reward the termination of his 
"Slavery," since Celie and Clarke were said to "know all the 
Country over." 71 The council also chastised the commander 
of the colony's rangers for not pursuing Clarke "with any 
Sort of Discipline or Sence" and decided not to prosecute 
one Edward Mariarte for providing the fugitive with a horse 
and boat. 72 
If one aim of the government hearings was to discourage 
other colonists from abetting the outlaws in the future, 
they clearly failed in this purpose. By April 1707 a 
frustrated governor and council complained that, although 
grand juries had issued four bills of indictment against 
Clarke over the past several years, "Yet divers evil Persons 
have presumed to Receive Comfort and aide him whereby he has 
been able to avoid Justice ••• Sculking within Tenn miles 
of • the Seate of Government and practiceing and 
69 Ibid., XXV, 265. 
70 Ibid., 188. 
71 Ibid., XXVI, 463. 
72 Ibid., XXV, 186, 187, 190. 
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carrying on his Trayterous and wicked designs." 73 (The 
authorities actually seem to have had Clarke in their grasp 
on a number of occasions, but, according to Governor 
Seymour, the felon had "made many Escapes from the 
Sherriffs, and others who ••• had him in Custody.")74 
Meanwhile, the government's continuing investigation 
produced new and even more disquieting revelations about 
Clarke's support network. Deponents testified that Captain 
Sylvester Welch, whom government officials had engaged to 
lure Clarke into a trap, not only informed the outlaw of the 
plan, but sold three pounds of the colony's gunpowder to one 
of Clarke's accomplices. 75 Another man confessed to 
"harbouring Entertaining and Concealing Richard Clarke in 
his house" and Welch tacitly admitted that he had done the 
same. 76 Perhaps most disturbing of all were the "Oaths of 
two good Sufficient Evidences" that a member of the 
assembly, Joseph Hill, had "Aided Abetted & Corresponded 
with Richard Clarke." 77 Although Hill denied the charge, 
73 Ibid., XXVII, 38. 
74 VMHB, XVI, 76. Since none of these episodes is 
detailed-rn-the documentary record, it is not known whether 
Clarke contrived his own getaways or whether, like his 
accomplice Benjamin Celie, he had assistance from friends or 
relatives. In any event, Governor Seymour advised his 
Virginia counterpart to "give particular Charge for" the 
fugitive's "being well Secured if apprehended" (Ibid.). 
75 Md. A., XXV, 218-19, 220, 222; XXVII, 134. 
76 Ibid., XXV, 221-22. 
• 
77 Ibid., XXVII, 41. 
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the colony's attorney general considered the evidence 
persuasive enough to pronounce him guilty of "high 
misprision," after which the colony's legislators had little 
choice but to expel their peer from the assembly.78 
By July a dejected Governor Seymour seemed to despair 
of ever apprehending the wanted man. Striking at what he 
believed to be the heart of the matter, Seymour lamented to 
the Board of Trade that, although Clarke was "one of the 
Greatest of Villains, Yet • out of a foolish Conceipt of 
his being a Stout Fellow, and Country borne, the Natives 
being now growne up, and most of them in Offices, are very 
backward, if not altogether unwilling to bring him in." 79 
Within a year, though, Maryland authorities had Clarke in 
78 Ibid., XXV, 43, 46-47, 51, 55, 118. 
79 Ibid., 262-63. The governor's characterization of 
the natives as being "growne up" with many holding office 
refers to the emergence in Maryland at the turn of the 
eighteenth century of a social and political elite composed 
of native-born inhabitants as opposed to English immigrants. 
The tension between Seymour and the colonists over the 
latter's alleged complacency in bringing Clarke to justice 
represents one manifestation of the diverging interests of 
the colony and the home government that marked this pivotal 
period in the colony's social and political evolution. That 
the council alternately adopted positions in the Clarke 
affair which seemed closer to those of the governor or the 
assembly reflects the political reality that the councilors, 
though residents of the colony (and, by this time, many of 
them native born), were appointed by the royal governor. 
For a detailed analysis of the demographic factors which led 
to the development of a native-born elite as well as the 
political ramifications of the phenomenon see David w. 
Jordan, "Political Stability and the Emergence of a Native 
Elite in Maryland" in The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth 
Century, Tate and Ammerman, eds., 243-73, especially pp. 
254, 260-61, 270-71. 
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their hands. How he came to be in custody is unclear since 
there appears to be no documentary evidence relating to his 
capture. A letter from Clarke, dated January 30 and read at 
an April 1708 council meeting, expressing "a deep sence of 
the Horrour and detestation of his Crimes" and offering to 
"Submitt himself to his Excys Mercy" suggests that the 
fugitive may have given himself up. 80 Even with Clarke in 
prison, though, the governor and his supporters could hardly 
rest easily. In fact, the stability of the colony seemed to 
grow even more precarious. 
At one council meeting a deponent testified to having 
heard "some very wicked Expressions come out of the Mouth" 
of one William Chew to the effect that if the authorities 
hanged Clarke "they had best do it in private." 81 What 
Chew meant by his remark was clarified by another informant 
who reported a threat by one John Gay that "there would be 
bloody noses before Clarke should be hanged." 82 The same 
witness testified to the devotion of another Clarke admirer, 
a Mr. Stokes, who declared that, though he had never met the 
outlaw, yet "rather Than he should be hang'd he would give 
fifty pounds if he had no more money in the World." 83 The 
concern of some colonists for Clarke's well-being apparently 
80 Md. A. I XXV, 236. 
81 Ibid., 237. 
82 ~., 241. 
83 Ibid. 
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extended to his abettors as well. Regarding the prospect 
that the government might further trouble former assemblyman 
Joseph Hill, William Chew reportedly warned that those who 
had a "Care for the Country will never Suffer it for there 
was three hundred men in Baltemore County • that would 
stand by him," men who were "so intent upon the matter" that 
they were currently "a scouring up their rusty pistolls" to 
come to Hill's defense if necessary. 84 
Apart from those in authority, practically the only 
Chesapeake colonists to disavow Clarke publicly were 
Maryland's Quakers who took pains to "utterly disowne and 
deny" any relationship with a "wicked and ungodly man" who 
had been guilty of such "Villainous abusive and Rebellious" 
behavior against the provincial government. It is apparent, 
however, that another consideration equalled, and probably 
superseded, the Quakers' concern about the morality of 
Clarke's actions. Someone, most likely Clarke himself, had 
sent several letters to the governor "under a Quaker stile" 
in an attempt, adherents of Maryland's Society of Friends 
feared, to render them "obnoxious to this Civil! and 
Moderate Government." 85 As members of a small and 
vulnerable religious minority which had suffered severe 
persecution in England and the colonies, the Quakers were 
understandably sensitive to any aspersions on their loyalty 
84 Ibid., 237-38. 
85 Ibid., 260-61; CRNC, I, 666. 
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as British subjects. In the absence of such a threat it 
seems doubtful that even they would have gone on record as 
opposing Clarke and his confederates (whom the Friends also 
professed to "detest and abominate"), a position which may 
not have been popular with many of their fellow colonists in 
the bay region who clearly sympathized with the outlaws. 
In view of the continued grassroots support for the 
desperado and his history of successful escapes from 
custody, government officials wasted no time in sealing 
Clarke's fate and precluding any public participation in 
that decision. At the same meeting in which witnesses 
related Gay's and Stokes's remarks the governor and council 
resolved that not only would Clarke have no trial by jury, 
but he would have no trial at all. Instead, they condemned 
him to be executed within the week. 86 
As Richard Clarke's case demonstrates, colonial 
governors resorted to various expedients to suppress piracy 
in the region, many of which suggest the colonists' 
disinclination to assist in the capture of pirates or worse, 
their willingness to shelter or actively collaborate with 
the outlaws. During periods of heightened pirate activity 
in 1684, 17BB, and 17BS Maryland and Virginia governors 
issued proclamations which not only requested the citizens' 
assistance in apprehending pirates, but warned colonists of 
86 Md. A., XXV, 24B. 
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the dire consequences for those who offered succor to the 
sea robbers. 87 Late in 1699 the governor of Virginia 
offered a reward for the arrest of pirates who, he feared, 
"may endeavor to • conceal themselves by ••• coming on 
shore • • • in hopes of being harbored by wicked & ill 
disposed persons." 88 Parliament reflected the concern of 
colonial officials when, in passing the 1699 act for the 
suppression of piracy, it prescribed penalties not only for 
convicted freebooters but also for those who aided and 
abetted thern. 89 
After local colonists entertained two groups of pirates 
and helped them secrete their booty in 1720, Alexander 
Spotswood employed a combination of incentives and penalties 
to discourage such behavior in the future. First, he 
proposed instituting a system to reward those who turned 
piratical effects over to the government. 90 On the 
punitive side, Spotswood saw to it that six of eight pirates 
who were apprehended at that time were executed; and, to 
reinforce a message of warning to would-be pirates and their 
collaborators, he considered it "necessary for the greater 
Terrour to hang up four of them in Chains," two at Tindall's 
8 7 EJC, I, 62-63; II, 69-70; III, 69; CSPC, XVIII, 
#234, p.-r28. 
88 EJC, II, 29-30. 
89 Hening, Statutes, III, 178-79; Hughson, Carolina 
Pirates, 42-43. 
90 Spotswood, Letters, II, 340. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
253 
Point on the York River and the other pair at Urbanna on the 
Rappahannock. 91 
Some of the tension between Chesapeake residents and 
royal authorities specifically concerned the colonists' 
alleged willingness to shelter not only established 
freebooters, but also sailors who deserted from merchant 
ships in order to join pirate crews. In 1697 Maryland 
Governor Nicholson expressed to the Board of Trade his "fear 
that if some course not be taken to prevent ••• Pyrats 
being harboured and entertained in these parts of the World, 
as also run away seamen; That when please God, the next 
Virginia and Maryland Fleet shall arrive they will be much 
retarded in their loading, if some not be forced to stay in 
the Countrey, by reason of the seamens running away." 92 
Two years earlier Maryland secretary Thomas Lawrence had 
informed English authorities that the pirates' "sharing of 
such large sums tempts the people of these parts to go along 
with them, and they are a great hindrance to trade, for the 
seamen run from the merchant ships to go with them." 93 
Shortly thereafter, Governor Nicholson apprised the duke of 
Shrewsbury that at least a hundred sailors, enticed by the 
91 Ibid., 338; EJC, III, 522. 
92 Md. A., XXIII 85. 
93 CSPC, XIV, #1916, p. 519. 
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sight of pirate booty, had deserted the Chesapeake tobacco 
fleet and cast their lot with the sea brigands.94 
Official anxiety regarding pirate activity and 
influence in the region intensified once again in the years 
following Queen Anne's War. In 1718 Virginia governor 
Spotswood reported to the Board of Trade that a former 
quartermaster in Blackbeard's crew, William Howard, and some 
other members of "that same gang" had arrived in the colony 
and, "assembling in great numbers with their arms," had 
attempted to "debauch some sailors out of the merchant ships 
to join them." The presence and demeanor of the buccaneers 
were disturbing enough, but what Spotswood found 
particularly disconcerting was that the "Officers of the 
Government could find none to assist in the disarming and 
suppressing that gang." Stung by what he regarded as an 
unconscionable failure to support the rule of law, the 
exasperated governor could offer no explanation for the 
colonists' behavior except as a further indication of their 
"unaccountable inclination to favour pyrates."95 
Underlying the apprehensions of governors such as 
Spotswood concerning the menace that sea marauders posed to 
shipping and trade was the fear, articulated by Governor 
Nicholson in 1692, that "these ••• pirates when they have 
94 Ibid., i1897, p. 511. 
9 5 Ibid., XXX, i8~B, p. 432; "William Howard, the 
Pirate,"~er's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical 
Magazine, I (1919), 36. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
255 
spent lavishly what they have got, then they are ready, if 
not before, to make disturbance in the government." 96 
Nicholson's anxiety clearly had not abated by 17~~ when he 
issued a proclamation ordering all colonial officials and 
inhabitants to seize any "such horrid & hainous offenders" 
who might come ashore "as Spies to discover the State of the 
Country." 97 The threat of an internal pirate insurrection 
obviously worried Maryland officials in 17~5 when, in 
enacting the statute outlawing Richard Clarke, they drew 
attention first and foremost to the accused criminal's "very 
wicked and treasonable conspiracy ••• to Seize upon the 
Magazine • and overturn her Majesties Government." 9 8 
After the pirate infestation of Chesapeake waters 
toward the end of the second decade of the eighteenth 
century, Daniel Defoe expressed his conviction that official 
fears of a pirate uprising were fully justified. "The 
Pyrates had obtained such an Acquisition of Strength," he 
asserted, "that they were in no Concern about preserving 
themselves from the Justice of Laws, but of advancing their 
Power, and maintaining their Sovereignty, not over the Seas 
only, but to stretch their Dominions to the Plantations 
themselves." 99 Indeed, the factor which may have been 
96 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 2~8. 
97 EJC, II, 85. 
98 Md. A., XXVI, 513. 
99 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 87. 
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most instrumental in motivating Governor Spotswood to mount 
the expedition against Blackbeard was the pirate's 
rendezvous with another notorious sea robber, Charles Vane, 
at Ocracoke Inlet, North Carolina; there, the governor 
feared, the buccaneers were seeking to establish a permanent 
base of operations to replace the ones they could no longer 
occupy safely in the Caribbean. 1 ~~ Unfortunately, as 
usual, the pirates themselves generally remained mute on the 
subject. But the hint of a subversive or, at least, 
anarchistic impulse is evident in the contemptuous and 
defiant last words of one buccaneer captured and condemned 
during Spotswood's administration who proclaimed, as he 
stood upon the gallows, "Damnation to the Gov. & Confusion 
to the Colony." 1 ~ 1 
In view of the public's general toleration of, 
willingness to deal with, and, in some instances, active 
collaboration with the freebooters, royal officials in the 
1 ~~ Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 138; (EllmsJ, 
Pirates Own Book, 352. Writing to the Board of Trade a 
month after Blackbeard's defeat, Spotswood prided himself on 
having "prevented a design of the most pernicious 
consequence to the trade of these Plantations • • • that of 
the pyrats fortifying an Island at Ouacock Inlett and making 
that a general rendezvouze of such robbers" (CSPC, XXX, 
#8~~, p. 431). In a subsequent letter to one-or-the 
Carolina proprietors explaining his actions in the 
Blackbeard affair, the governor reiterated his point, 
emphasizing the "necessity of preventing the Growth of so 
dangerous a Nest of Pyrates in the very road of the Trade of 
Virginia and Maryland, as well as of your Lords'p's 
Province" (Spotswood, Letters, II, 275). 
1~1 Cited in Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 224 
and Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 274. 
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greater Chesapeake must have wondered to whom the colonists 
might offer their allegiance in the event that pirates grew 
so bold as to attempt to wrest actual control of a colonial 
government. The deeper suspicion that the sympathies of 
some segments of the populace lay more with the pirates than 
with ruling authorities is evident in official 
communications expressing reluctance to release information 
about plans to capture pirates. When Captain Kidd was 
reported to be in the vicinity of the Eastern Shore in 1699, 
the Council of Virginia ordered colonial officials to do 
their utmost to seize him, but advised against publicizing 
the order "lest intimacon be given, to the said pirates, and 
they thereby Enabled to Escape." 1 ~ 2 In the aftermath of 
the expedition against Blackbeard in 1718 Governor Spotswood 
confessed that he had exercised similar discretion in 
preparing for the attack because of "the many favourers of 
Pyrates we have in these Parts some of [whom] might send 
Intelligence to Tach."l03 
The most revealing aspect of Spotswood's declaration, 
however, concerns his apprehension about announcing the plan 
to anyone, even the highest officials in the governments of 
his own and neighboring colonies. Responding to criticism 
that he had failed to notify the governor of North Carolina 
of the intended attack, Spotswood explained that "the 
1~2 EJC, I, 422-23: ~' VIII, 192. 
103 Spotswood, Letters, II, 276. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
258 
business required such Secresy, that I did not so much as 
communicate to His Maj'ty's Council here, nor to any other 
Person but those who were necessarily to be employed in the 
Execution."104 
The Virginia governor may have distrusted North 
Carolina officials because of a history of suspected 
collusion with pirates dating back to the previous century. 
In 1691 the Carolina proprietors instructed North Carolina 
governor Philip Ludwell to investigate charges that the man 
whom he had replaced in office, Seth Sothel, accepted 
payment from pirates in exchange for privateering 
commissions. 105 Edward Randolph alleged that about a 
year later both Ludwell and Sothel "inriched themselves" in 
a scheme involving pirate booty. 106 The surveyor general 
even accused one of the Carolina proprietors of sheltering 
pirates "for which favour he was well paid by them."107 
By the turn of the century, the predilection of Carolina 
residents and their political leaders for welcoming 
freebooters was accepted universally. "As to Carolina," the 
Commissioners of Trade concluded in a 1701 report to the 
House of Lords, "the misbehavior and ill conduct of the 
104 Ibid. 
105 CRNC, I, 383. 
106 Randolph, Letters, V, 180. 
107 ~., 264i CRNC, I, 545. 
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governors and inhabitants ••• in harbouring and protecting 
• pirates, is notorious."l~8 
In the Blackbeard affair, Spotswood's concern focused 
primarily on North Carolina governor Charles Eden and his 
secretary of state, chief justice, and customs collector, 
Tobias Knight. The extent to which Eden and Knight actually 
collaborated with Blackbeard as accessories to piracy is a 
matter of considerable debate. In the immediate aftermath 
of Blackbeard's defeat Spotswood was careful not to offend 
Eden's superio~s by implicating the suspect governor 
directly. 1 ~ 9 Nevertheless, he advised the Carolina 
proprietors that the "Governm't of No. Carolina admitted 
Thach and his Crew to make Oath" that a French ship which 
the pirate almost certainly seized unlawfully (after 
accepting the king's pardon) had been recovered as an 
abandoned wreck at sea and that the freebooters subsequently 
"went out again on the same piratical design, not without 
the privity of some in principal Stations in that 
Gov't." 11 ~ 
Spotswood's insinuations gained support from other 
quarters. Daniel Defoe reported that, as a result of 
officially condemning the French ship, the governor received 
"sixty Hogsheads of Sugar for his Dividend, and ••• Mr. 
108 Stock, Debates, II, 4~~. 
109 NCHCM, 17~9-1723, XXXV. 
l1~ Spotswood, Letters, II, 318-19. 
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Knight, twenty," while the rest "was shared among the other 
Pyrates." 111 Public criticism of the proprietary 
government also emerged from within the colony itself when a 
group led by prominent citizens and renowned Indian fighters 
Edward Moseley and Maurice Moore sought to discover tangible 
evidence of the government's collusion with pirates. 
Refused permission to. examine the colony's records, the 
company broke into the home of John Lovick, the province's 
deputy secretary (who would later be charged with embezzling 
the proceeds from the sales of ships condemned for illicit 
trade), where many of the documents were kept. Colonial 
officials arrested the group for unlawful entry and further 
charged that "Moseley did Malitiously openly Contemptuously 
and Opprobriously • Speak Publish utter and Declare •• 
• false Malitious Scandalous Opprobrious and seditious words 
and speeches" against government officials. The specific 
accusation levelled by Moseley which seems to have struck a 
particularly raw nerve among the colony's top officials was 
that the "Governor Cheif Justice and others with him • • • 
could easily procure Armed men to come and Disturb Quiett 
and honest men • but could not (tho' such a number would 
have done) raise them to Destroy Thach" who instead "was 
Suffered to go on in his Vilanies."ll2 
111 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 76. 
ll 2 NCHCM, 17~9-1723, 199-2~1, 2~8-~9; CRNC, II, 359. 
If, as the actions of Moseley and company imply, Lovick and 
Eden were partners in collusion with Blackbeard, subsequent 
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Alternatively, a legal scholar has argued in Eden's 
defense that the North Carolina governor's actions in 
granting Blackbeard the king's pardon, performing a marriage 
ceremony for him, condemning the French ship as a prize, and 
accepting a sizable reward in connection with that seizure 
all constituted justifiable and even, in some instances, 
requisite conduct for a man in Eden's official 
position. 113 But most contemporary accounts and 
events demonstrate that there was little honor between these 
alleged thieves. In 1724, several years after Eden's death, 
the former governor's relatives petitioned North Carolina 
authorities for redress against Lovick (whom Eden had 
designated as sole executor of his will) for having 
"Illegally Possest himself of the said Governor Eden Estate" 
and having "fraudulently obtained the same" (CRNC, II, 536). 
Six years later, the colony's attorney general took up the 
cause and sued Lovick for failing to convey or account for 
the money due to Eden's family and for "Intending to defraud 
not only them but his Majesty likewise" (N.C. St. Arch., CCR 
142, doc. 24). 
113 Lee, Blackbeard, 74-84. Lee's argument rests on 
several points: that Eden's performance of the marriage 
ceremony, particularly in view of the dearth of ministers in 
the colony, was in "strict accord" with North Carolina law 
which empowered the governor or any council member to 
conduct such services; that, in the absence of proof that 
the French ship was not a derelict, as Blackbeard insisted 
it was, Eden was obliged to condemn the vessel; and that 
Eden's acceptance of the 60 hogsheads of sugar after the 
condemnation proceeding was simply the governor's lawful due 
as admiral of the colony. Blackbeard's claim of having 
discovered the French ship, undamaged, simply abandoned on 
the high seas must be considered highly dubious, though. In 
defense of Eden's actions, however, Lee contends that it was 
only after Teach's death that any evidence of wrongdoing 
regarding the French vessel came to light and that the 
pirate's story was believable because of similar occurrences 
over the years in the treacherous waters off the North 
Carolina coast (also see NCHCM, 1709-1723, xxxv-xxxvi and 
Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 92-94). 
In particular, Lee cites the cases of H.M.S. Swift 
(1698, see below, chapter 7), the Patriot (1813), and the 
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subsequent analyses tend to agree with the assertion of an 
early nineteenth-century source that "the gold of Black 
Beard rendered him comely in the governor's eyes.nll4 
Whether or not Eden actively sought to profit from piratical 
depredations, it appears that he maintained a cordial 
relationship with Blackbeard and that Spotswood had reason 
to suspect that his North Carolina counterpart might not 
cooperate in the planned attack. Daniel Defoe went so far 
as to assert that, despite Lieutenant Robert Maynard's 
caution in intercepting all the boats he met en route to 
Ocracoke Inlet to prevent Blackbeard from receiving advance 
notice of the foray, the pirate nevertheless "had 
Information of the Design" from none other than "his 
Excellency of the Province," Governor Eden. 115 Whether 
Carroll A. Deering (1921) in which vessels were found washed 
ashore with no one aboard. Although the last case remains a 
complete mystery, Lee curiously neglects to mention evidence 
suggesting that the crew and passengers of the Patriot 
(including Theodosia Alston, daughter of former vice-
president Aaron Burr) may have been captured, murdered, and 
disposed of by pirates (Stick, Graveyard of the Atlantic, 5-
8). In any event, one would think that the rarity of such 
incidents and Blackbeard's past behavior should have led 
North Carolina officials to suspect foul play in the seizure 
of the French ship. 
ll4 [Ellms], Pirates Own Book, 338; Watson, 222. 
William Saunders, editor of the first series of the Colonial 
Records of North Carolina, wrote that Eden's reputation as 
governor had been tarnished "by the not groundless suspicion 
of having been the protector and partner of pirates" (CRNC, 
II, viii). ----
llS Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 79. In an appendix 
to A General History of the Pyrates Defoe subsequently 
reversed himself on the matter of the governor's complicity 
and instead became an apologist for Eden, citing the 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
263 
or not this particular charge was true, it is clear that 
when Blackbeard proceeded to victimize North Carolina 
traders, it was Spotswood, not their own governor, to whom 
the merchants turned for help.ll6 
Knight's complicity is considerably less ambiguous than 
Eden's. A 1717 letter from the church wardens and vestrymen 
of Pasquotank Precinct to the Secretary of the Society for 
the Propagation of the Gospel indicates that Knight's 
integrity as a colonial official was suspect even before the 
Blackbeard incident. Money that had been donated to the 
precinct for the building of a church was then in the hands 
of "Knight who by one artifice or other," the churchmen 
feared, would "in all probability deprive the Parish of that 
money." 117 The suspicion that Knight had colluded with 
Blackbeard in condemning the French ship in order to share 
in the spoils apparently was confirmed when Royal Navy 
guardship captain Ellis Brand questioned the Carolina 
official after Blackbeard's defeat. According to Brand's 
sworn deposition, the secretary initially denied any 
proprietary official's weakness in the face of Blackbeard's 
force of men and arms and arguing that he had proceeded 
according to the law in condemning the French ship. Manuel 
Schonhorn, editor of the most recent ·edition of the pirate 
history, has suggested that Defoe's sympathetic 
re-evaluation of the governor may have been influenced by 
Carolina merchants in London who had employed the author to 
write several tracts for them (Defoe, History of the 
Pyrates, 669). 
116 Spotswood, Letters, II, 273. 
117 ~, II, 292. 
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knowledge concerning the whereabouts of the French goods, 
but when Brand advised him "of the proofs he co~ld bring •• 
• Knight owned the whole matter and the piratical Goods • • 
• were found in his Barn covered over with fodder." 11 8 A 
second piece of incriminating evidence concerned a letter 
dated November 17, only days before Maynard's attack, which 
was found in Blackbeard's cabin addressed to the pirate and 
signed "your real ffriend. And Servant T. Knight." 
Although the letter is vague in its details (probably 
intentionally so), Knight did convey a sense of urgency 
about the need to meet as soon as possible in order to 
discuss "something more ••• than at present I can 
write."119 
The instances in which colonists responded to official 
requests for assistance in the capture of pirates stand in 
stark contrast to the complicity of North Carolina 
authorities in the Blackbeard affair and previous piratical 
episodes. But the public support that was so conspicuous 
and indispensable in the capture of Clarke's accomplices and 
Vidal and his companions represents an anomaly in the 
history of maritime law enforcement in the Chesapeake. Only 
rarely did the many promises of reward and more frequent 
threats of punishment succeed in persuading colonists to 
llS Ibid, 344. 
119 Ibid, 343-44; Lee, Blackbeard, 146. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
265 
stop dealing with pirates and surrender them to the 
authorities. Throughout the seven decades or so that piracy 
seriously threatened the region, the only consistently 
effective and dependable strategy against sea marauders was 
a concerted show of force initiated by a determined governor 
and executed by a stalwart commander aboard a seaworthy and 
well-armed fighting ship. Such decisive action enabled 
Governors Nicholson and Spotswood to fashion stunning 
victories over menacing pirates in 17~0 and 1718, 
respectively. But as zealous as some colonial officials 
were in pursuing pirates, and as successful as they might be 
in capturing them, all their efforts could lead to naught if 
provincial courts failed to convict the outlaws. 
The judicial system in the colonies had already 
developed a reputation for leniency towards sea robbers by 
1688 when English authorities prohibited the trial of 
pirates in the colonies without special permission.l 20 
The previous year the colonial proprietors felt compelled to 
order the suppression of certain legal procedures which had 
been utilized to exonerate freebooters in Carolina.l2l 
In 169~ British officials complained to Virginia governor 
Lord Howard that pirates were being brought to trial in the 
colony too quickly to mount effective prosecutions, thereby 
120 EJC, I 1~7-~8; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 
83. 
121 Carroll, Historical Collections, I, 1~6; Hughson, 
Carolina Pirates, 26. 
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facilitating the acquittal of guilty freebooters by already 
sympathetic juries. 122 Frustration with the reluctance 
of the general courts to convict pirates induced the home 
government to mandate in the Navigation Act of 1696 the 
establishment of vice-admiralty courts in the colonies, a 
measure intended to eradicate complicity between pirates and 
their colonial partners and sympathizers.l 23 
The provisions of the 1696 act took some time to 
implement, however, and even when applied did not always 
guarantee that pirates would be tried in vice-admiralty 
courts. In 1700 the French pirate Lewis Guittar and 90 
members of his captured crew were sent back to England, 
according to the terms of their surrender, for trial and 
eventual execution. 124 But because of a technicality 
concerning the manner of their arrest, three of the pirates 
were tried by jury in the Elizabeth City County 
courthouse. 125 The jury found two of the defendants 
guilty, but acquitted the third, Francois Delaunee, because 
of kindnesses performed on behalf of innocent captives 
aboard the pirate vessel.l 26 When the shocked 
122 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, I, 678. 
12 3 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 313-14. 
124 EJC, II, 76-94. 
125 Trials of John Houghling, Cornelius Franc, and 
Francois Delaunee, C05/1411, fos. 362-415. 
126 Ibid., fos. 391, 392, 394, 395. 
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prosecutor, Attorney General Edmund Jennings, demanded that 
the jurors reconsider the evidence, the colonists insisted 
that they had acted according to their consciences and 
refused to reverse their verdict. Jennings then had to 
arraign Delaunee on a second charge and find another group 
of jurors to indict, try, and condemn him to death.l27 
Similar considerations motivated Maryland authorities 
to take summary legal action in dispatching Richard Clarke. 
Before Clarke's final incarceration, Governor Seymour 
despaired that, even if could bring the outlaw to justice, 
no provincial court would convict him. "Wee shall allways 
want Iurys to do her Matye comon Iustice on the Countrye 
borne," he lamented to the Board of Trade in 17~7.1 2 8 
The following year, with Clarke in custody, he and the 
Maryland council acted on that conviction. Deliberating 
over the question of whether Clarke "being attainted of high 
Treason and Fellony ought to have any day in Court given 
him," the council and provincial court judges decided in the 
negative and unanimously recommended the convicted felon's 
speedy execution.l29 
Similarly, Governor Spotswood managed to avoid any 
potential difficulties with provincial juries in 1718 when a 
vice-admiralty court in Williamsburg convicted and condemned 
1 27 Ibid., fos. 395, 396, 4~4. 
128 Md. A., XXV, 263. 
129 Ibid., 24~. 
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thirteen captured members of Blackbeard's crew to death by 
hanging. But the governor was distressed by other legal 
developments related to the case. In the expectation that 
Tobias Knight would be indicted for his alleged complicity 
with Blackbeard, Spotswood sent Governor Eden depositions 
from the trial which implicated Knight as a pirate 
collaborator. Considering the evidence at a hearing held 
during a meeting of the North Carolina council in May 1719, 
the councilors found Knight not guilty on the grounds that 
four of the witnesses were "no other than foure Negroe 
Slaves ••• and that the other Evidences," which included 
Captain Brand's testimony, were simply "false and 
malitious." 13 ~ Spotswood made no attempt to conceal his 
indignation when he wrote to the Carolina proprietors about 
the behavior of their colonial officials: 
there are some in y't Government y't endeavor to 
justify Thach and his crew as very honest men, and 
to condemn the Officers and Men belonging to the 
King's Ships as Murderers for attacking and 
subduing them ••• And tho' I am Credibly 
inform'd that Affidavits are taken in No. Carolina 
to contradict what has plainly been proved here 
upon the Tryal of the pirats • • • I hope the 
Lords Proprietors themselves w'll give little 
Credit to such Clandestine Testimonials when they 
shall know how dark apart some of their Officers 
have acted, particularly one who enjoyed the post 
of secretary Chief Justice, one of theif 3rord'p's Deputy's and Collectors of the Customs. 
13~ CRNC, II, 345-46. 
131 Spotswood, Letters, II, 318-19. 
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Spotswood grew equally irritated with the conduct of 
some officials in his own colony. Prior to the November 
attack in North Carolina, two guardship officers --
Lieutenant Maynard (leader of the Blackbeard expedition) and 
his commander, Captain George Gordon -- had arrested William 
Howard, Blackbeard's former quartermaster, for conspiring to 
commit piracy. 132 Howard retained John Holloway, a 
distinguished Williamsburg attorney, former naval officer 
for the lower James River district, and Speaker of the House 
of Burgesses for many years, to represent him. In 1719 
Holloway initiated a suit against Maynard and Gordon on the 
grounds that they had falsely imprisoned Howard. Spotswood 
was eager to prosecute the accused pirate in a 
vice-admiralty court and eventually succeeded in doing so, 
but not before encountering "a strong opposition from some 
of the Council agt ••• that manner of trial."133 
The governor ran afoul of Holloway and popular 
sentiment again in 1721 when a Virginia vice-admiralty court 
ordered the arrest of three English shipmasters suspected of 
having traded with pirates in Madagascar. 134 Once more, 
Holloway represented the defendants and was castigated by 
Spotswood, as he had been previously, for being "a constant 
132 Ibid., 353; CSPC, XXX, #8~~, p. 43~; "William 
Howard," 'ifY'ler's Quart:e'rly, I, 36. 
133 CSPC, XXX, #8~~, p. 43~; EJC, IV, 384. 
134 Spotswood, Letters, II, 351; EJC, III, 55~. 
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indiscriminately "from what vile means soever it 
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comes." 135 Two of the defendants, Richard Herbert and 
Chalonce Williams, were dismissed for lack of sufficient 
evidence but the third, Joseph Stratton, was sent to England 
to stand trial as an accessory to piracy. 
The guardship that transported Stratton to England 
departed so quickly that Spotswood was unable to deliver the 
indictment detailing Stratton's alleged offenses. But in a 
peculiar reversal of the situation that so disturbed British 
authorities in 1690, the accelerated pace of justice in this 
case was perceived by angry colonists as a deceitful ploy by 
the authorities to insure the defendant's conviction. As 
the somewhat perplexed governor confessed, "tho' I ••• am 
not entirely satisfied w'th Williams being discharged, yet 
so great is the Clamour here on Acc't of the Carrying off 
Stratton, without allowing him the liberty of taking w'th 
him ye Evidences he had for his Justification, that I durse 
not Venture upon a Re-examination into Williams' 
conduct."136 
Although Spotswood continued to anguish over the pirate 
threat for several years, hesitating to cross the ocean for 
fear of the vengeance that some buccaneers had sworn to 
135 Spotswood, Letters, II, 319, 354. 
136 Ibid. 
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wreak upon him, the impact on piracy in the colonies as a 
result of Blackbeard's defeat was much more profound than 
almost anyone realized at the time. 1 3 7 William Byrd 
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still lamented in 1719 that sea "Rogues swarm in this part 
of the World," and Hugh Jones reported five years later that 
the Chesapeake required nothing so much as strong guardships 
to protect the colony from "pyrates who abominably infest 
their seas and coasts."1 38 But after 1718 the region was 
never seriously menaced by piracy again. By the mid-1720s 
piracy in the Chesapeake area had degenerated into a petty, 
sporadic, and essentially local affair. 
Blackbeard's defeat not only disheartened the pirates 
themselves, but marked the beginning of a gradual, though 
perceptible, change in the relationship between colonists 
and pirates. A mid-nineteenth-century historian concluded 
that "The death of Blackbeard and his immediate companions • 
doubtless broke the connexion with us on shore." 139 
The larger connection between English pirates and the 
British empire had already been under strain for some time. 
Various political and economic factors -- the decisions of 
the European powers to seek advantage through trade rather 
than plunder, the collective realization that piracy was 
137 Ibid., 352. 
138 VMHB, XXXII, 25; CSPC, XXXIV, #210, p. 112; 
Middleton;-TObacco Coast, 356. 
1 39 Watson, Annals of Philadelphia, II, 225. 
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damaging the commerce of all nations, the failure of English 
pirates to restrict their depredations to the shipping of 
foreign nations, and the ability to reduce the size of 
shipping crews and expand cargo areas once the threat of 
piracy was removed -- already had precipitated a general 
decline in piracy in the New world.l40 
More localized phenomena also may have contributed to 
an erosion of support for piracy in the Chesapeake itself. 
In the 1670s both Maryland and Virginia passed legislation 
prohibiting the further importation of convicts from England 
because of growing fears that such traffic constituted a 
threat to the peace of the two colonies. In 1718 the 
English government, which during peacetime could no longer 
absorb convicts into the army, enacted a law nullifying the 
colonial statutes and sanctioning the transportation of 
felons to the Chesapeake. 141 The perception of an 
increased incidence of serious crimes, particularly where 
the convict population was most concentrated, was such that 
after only four years historian Robert Beverley reported 
that "the Country ••• has already suffer'd many Murthers 
and Robberies, the Effects of that new Law of 
140 Shepherd and Walton, Maritime Trade, 81; Ritchie, 
Captain Kidd, 236-37; Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 74-75. 
141 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 165-67. 
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England."142 With the apprehension created by so many 
potentially dangerous criminals having been planted so 
recently in their midst, it seems likely that the colonists 
would have hesitated to encourage the presence of other 
outlaws whose motives could not always be trusted.l43 
The prospect that convicts and pirates might support 
and cooperate with each another at the colonists' expense 
also must have caused some local anxiety. An equally 
alarming possibility, that the dangers normally posed by 
pirates and convicts as distinct entities might manifest 
themselves in combination in the same individuals, appears 
to have actually occurred in at least one documented 
instance. In 1716 British Secretary of State Peter Metheun 
forwarded to Governor Spotswood several lists of "rebel 
prisoners ordered to be transported to Virginia," one of 
which included the name of ''Wm. Howard," almost certainly 
1 42 Robert Beverley, The History of Virginia, in Four 
Parts (London, 1722), book IV, chapter 15, section 67; 
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 165-69; Frederick H. Schmidt, 
"British Convict Servant Labor in Colonial Virginia" (Ph.D. 
diss., College of William and Mary, 1976), 272. For similar 
testimony by Governor Gooch and others, see A. Roger Ekirch, 
Bound for America: The Transportation of British Convicts to 
the Colonies 1718-1775 (Oxford, 1987), 167-68. 
14 3 A. Roger Ekirch has argued persuasively that, 
despite the apprehensions of local inhabitants, transported 
convicts were not responsible for a high proportion of the 
crime committed in the Chesapeake. Nevertheless, what is 
significant in this context is the colonists' belief, 
regardless of its accuracy, that the presence of English 
felons constituted a serious menace to the safety of the bay 
region (Ekirch, Bound for America, chapter 6, especially pp. 
167-77). 
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the same William Howard who later served as Blackbeard's 
quartermaster and so agitated Spotswood with his alleged 
threats to the peace and security of the colony (not to 
mention his lawsuits against the Royal Navy officers who 
arrested him). 144 
274 
Local economic factors also may have played a part in 
the pirates' diminished popularity in the region. It has 
been suggested, for example, that well before Blackbeard's 
time smuggling had already begun to supersede commerce with 
pirates as the preferred means of acquiring European and 
West Indian goods at below-market prices.l4S And 
although specie continued to remain scarce, the 
establishment in 1730 of the tobacco inspection system, in 
which transfer notes functioned as an additional and more 
accessible medium of exchange, probably lessened the 
incentive for colonists to deal with pirates in order to 
obtain foreign coin.l46 
Chesapeake residents also had to re-evaluate their 
personal relationships with pirates, associations which had 
always been based on the assumption that the colonists would 
144 CSPC, XXIX, i310 ii, p. 168. Dated August 1716, 
Metheun•s-reiter also indicates that the home government had 
resumed the practice of transporting felons to the 
Chesapeake well before passage of the 1718 legislation which 
officially authorized it. 
145 Rediker, "Anglo-American Sailors," 54. 
146 Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 107~ Middleton, 
Tobacco Coast, 140. 
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be among the beneficiaries, not the victims, of the 
freebooters' depredations. Blackbeard, who had been so 
careful not to offend his provisioners in Philadelphia or, 
at first, his hosts in North Carolina, violated the terms of 
that unspoken agreement when he plundered local traders in 
Ocracoke Inlet. By doing so, he sowed the seeds of his own 
destruction and, more broadly, the demise of piracy in the 
greater Chesapeake. Only when the Blackbeard case 
demonstrated that pirates could no longer be depended on to 
work with the colonists and exempt them from predatory 
assaults does it appear that Chesapeake residents began to 
realize that supporting piracy might no longer serve their 
interests. 
This change in attitude did not take hold immediately. 
Two years after the death of Blackbeard and his captured 
cohorts, members of a pirate crew who came ashore in York 
County and Hampton received a friendly reception from 
resident planters and local tavern-goers. Yet, despite 
their apparently non-threatening demeanor, the pirates were 
reported to local authorities, arrested, and executed. 
Several years later there is evidence to indicate that 
piracy -- which in the past had been winked at, aided and 
abetted, and even actively pursued by the Chesapeake 
colonists and their government officials -- had by then 
become anathema in the region, even in North Carolina. 
After the arrest of John Vidal for piracy in 1727 an unusual 
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case was brought before the North Carolina general court. 
Roger Kenyon sued Andrew Frazier for alleging that the 
former had refused to assist in apprehending Vidal and for 
"insinuating that the sayd Roger Kenyon was ayding advising 
and abetting the sayd Pyrates By all which • • • The 
plaintiff" claimed to have been "highly injured and 
damnifyed." Kenyon's sensitivity to the "false scandalous 
bass detractions and aspersions" and Frazier's attempt "to 
defame and injure • • • his good name" by linking the 
plaintiff with maritime outlaws suggests that the popularity 
of pirates in the Chesapeake had declined to an 
unprecedented level.l47 
And indeed it had. By 1730 pirates and their 
collaborators in the region had become, for all practical 
purposes, relics of a bygone era. 148 But although piracy 
147 NCHCM, 1724-1730, 448. 
14 8 Ibid. Piracy nonetheless continued to maintain a 
strange hold on the public imagination, a fascination which 
transcended economic motives and reflected a certain empathy 
with and sympathy for the pirates' cause, just as the 
colonists' propensity to acquit pirates in the colonial 
courts had indicated in the past. This peculiar mystique 
manifested itself in odd ways in the popular culture of the 
Chesapeake. When Blackbeard's severed head was brought to 
Hampton along with the surviving members of his crew, it was 
set on a pole as a warning. According to legend, it 
remained there for many years until it was taken down, 
fashioned into a large drinking vessel and long used at 
Williamsburg's Raleigh Tavern (Watson, Annals of 
Philadelphia, II, 221). There, we might imagine, 
eighteenth-century pirate aficionados imbibed from the 
venerable icon, recounting Blackbeard's career, and 
recalling his prodigious drinking feats, perhaps 
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had lost its allure for many of the region's inhabitants, 
other forms of maritime lawlessness clearly had not. 
Chesapeake residents continued to seize opportunities, not 
only as Governor Gooch observed, to engage in clandestine 
trade, but also to benefit illegally from the misfortunes of 
those whose vessels carne to grief along their shores. 
simultaneously emulating them. A strong sense of 
identification with the pirate persisted into the early 
twentieth century when a Virginia genealogist took pride in 
claiming Blackbeard as a native son (despite convincing 
evidence to the contrary), a spiritual descendant of what 
Governor Spotswood disdainfully referred to in 1718 as "the 
many favourers of Pyrates we have in these Parts" (Thomas T. 
Upshur, "Eastern Shore History," VMHB, IX, 95; Spotswood, 
Letters, II, 274). ----
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CHAPTER VII 
"Having not the fear of God ••• and ••• alegiance 
to ••• the King not regarding": Wrecking 
Contraband trading, customs fraud, and, before the 
172~s, even collaborating with pirates represented illegal 
activities which were subject to human control and normally 
involved a degree of forethought, planning, and 
coordination. But another type of lawlessness on the 
maritime frontier of the greater Chesapeake differed 
distinctly in these respects. The looting of stranded 
vessels, or "wrecking," was based on serendipitous 
occurrences (at least from the wreckers' point of view) 
which generally did not result from the active efforts of 
the beneficiaries. Despite, or perhaps because of, the 
spontaneous, irregular, and infrequent nature of these 
episodes, the phenomenon of wrecking offers an opportunity 
to examine how Chesapeake residents reacted when a chance 
for sudden, illegal aggrandizement presented itself, 
particularly in remote areas far from the immediate reach of 
law enforcement officials. Four such incidents between 1698 
and 175~, two involving English royal guardships and two 
involving Spanish treasure fleets, provide insight into not 
278 
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only the behavioral tendencies of the colonists who 
exploited those accidents, but also the attitudes and 
capacities of the governing authorities charged with 
safeguarding royal prerogatives, maintaining order, and 
punishing the lawbreakers. 
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By September 1698 Edward Randolph had finished 
administering an oath to uphold the 1696 Act for Preventing 
Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade to the 
governors of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. For the 
surveyor general the occasion represented something of a 
personal triumph. Having been scorned for years by many 
Chesapeake colonists because of his reports detailing the 
methods and extent of illicit trade in their region, he had 
finally convinced royal authorities of the need for more 
aggressive and responsible law enforcement. Next he planned 
to administer the oath in North Carolina, a colony he had 
often criticized for being soft on pirates and illegal 
trade. "I am at last going to Carolina," the customs 
officer declared, "from whence (if it please God I live & 
escape the pyrates) I shall send an Account of the present 
State thereof to their LordsPPS.nl 
Given Carolina's widespread and unenviable reputation 
as a refuge of freebooters and other lawbreakers, an even 
more detailed and scathing account of improprieties might 
1 Randolph, Letters, V, 192. 
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have been anticipated from Randolph's first visit to the 
province. But such a report would never be composed. 
Ironically, it was not piracy, but another form of maritime 
illegality that prevented Randolph from performing his duty. 
In late January H.M.S. Swift, the royal guardship that was 
to have transported the surveyor general, was driven out of 
the James River by a storm, abandoned by her crew, and 
stranded on North Carolina's Outer Banks where she 
eventually became a total loss. 
The wreck of the Swift must have been profoundly 
disturbing to crown officials for several reasons. Not only 
had a royal guardship been lost due, according to Randolph, 
to the incompetence of her commander, but the coast now lay 
open to depredations by pirates and foreign privateers, not 
to mention exploitation by illicit traders. Perhaps most 
disconcerting of all, those apparently responsible for the 
destruction of the vessel -- or, at least, the failure to 
save it -- were English subjects, local residents of the 
Outer Banks and their colonial officials. Reports from 
various sources suggest that the ship might have been 
rescued had it not been for the rapacity of the local 
population and the alleged failure of the provincial 
government to respond effectively and expeditiously to the 
calamity. 
Foremost among the critics of colonial officials was 
the captain of the grounded vessel, Nathaniel Bostock, who 
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complained that, despite having "used every effort to get 
the ship off," he had "not the assistance that might have 
been procured, and the Government of Carolina protested 
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their inability, though not so good as their promise at 
first." 2 Acknowledging that Bostock initially "seemed not 
to doubt of saving her," North Carolina governor Thomas 
Harvey insisted, contrary to the captain's assertion, that 
his administration had been "very willing if it were 
possible to save the Kings Ship," and had responded to 
Bostock's every request for assistance. 3 By late spring 
the question of who was responsible for aborting the attempt 
to refloat the ship had become academic. A survey of the 
wreck in June noted that the vessel was "Buried in Sand 
Seaven foot" and concluded that she was "irrecoverable."4 
Besides the critical delay in initiating salvage 
operations and the allegation of inadequate support provided 
by Carolina officials, the other major complication in 
saving the ship concerned local inhabitants who viewed the 
wreck not as one of their own nation's military vessels in 
need of assistance, but rather as a providential windfall 
ripe for plunder. On this point, at least, both governor 
2 CSPC, XVI, t76~ iii, p. 393. 
3 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 
7/10/1698; EJC, I, 378. 
4 Ibid., CCR 192, survey of the Swift, 6/8/1698; CCR 
188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 7/1~/1698; Records of the 
Executive Council, 1664-1734, 376, 377. 
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and naval commander agreed. Harvey's description of what 
took place after the guardship grounded as a "Riot" in which 
"every one endeavoured to gett something for themselves out 
of the spoil" essentially corroborated Bostock's report that 
the colonists had robbed the Swift of all her stores and 
provisions. 5 Some individuals, the governor added, had 
been "great Rogues and opportunity made others little 
better."6 
The willingness of local inhabitants, known to their 
contemporaries as Bankers, to waste little time in availing 
themselves of whatever riches the Swift had to offer 
suggests an occupational predisposition. In a treatise on 
North Carolina published in 1709, contemporary chronicler 
John Lawson indicated that "those that inhabit the Banks, 
and Sea-side" dwelled there for the express purposes of 
finding dead whales and "for the Benefit of Wrecks, which 
sometimes fall in upon that Shoar," information which helps 
to explain the Bankers' predatory behavior in the Swift 
affair and subsequent wrecking incidents. 7 
5 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 
7/10, 1698; Records of the Executive Council, 1664-1734, 
375; CSPC, XVI, #518 viii, p. 253. 
6 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 
7/10/1698. 
7 Lawson, Voyage to Carolina, 157. According to North 
Carolina folklore, the Outer Banks town of Nags Head is so 
named because local residents habitually lured ships at sea 
to their ruin by leading horses, with lanterns dangling from 
their necks, up and down the beach at night, creating the 
illusion of a ship's light aboard a vessel sailing safely 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
283 
By itself, the looting probably would not have damaged 
the Swift sufficiently to prevent her from being refloated, 
but the plunderers chose not to confine their actions to 
mere thievery. Subsequent court proceedings indicate that 
some of the wreckers "did ••• Maliciously advisedly and 
Wickedly contrive consult plot and conspire the said ship 
utterly to demolish burne and distroy." 8 This objective 
they accomplished by cutting into the vessel's bottom and 
firing into her hull with one of the Swift's own "Great 
Gunns." 9 
Was it pure malevolence that motivated the wreckers to 
vandalize the ship? Perhaps, but it may be worth noting 
that "amongst the Mischeife done," the pillagers took 
pains to incinerate official correspondence which they 
discovered aboard the vessel including, Governor Harvey was 
informed, "Some Pacquetts from Whitehall to ye Covernmt in 
closer to shore. Despite its diabolical appeal, the legend 
has no demonstrable basis in fact (Gary s. Dunbar, 
Historical Geography of the North Carolina Outer Banks 
[Baton Rouge, 1958), 122, n. 8; David Stick, The Outer Banks 
of North Carolina [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1958], 271-72). The 
persistence and plausibility of the tale, however, may 
derive from dimly recalled depredations of the Bankers who, 
if their indiscriminate attempts to plunder Royal Navy and 
foreign ships alike offer any indication, might have been 
morally capable of conceiving such an invidious and 
self-serving scheme. 
8 NCHCR, 1697-17el, 217. 
9 Ibid.; Randolph, Letters, V, 265. 
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America." 1 ~ Harvey's intelligence was confirmed by 
Captain Bostock who wrote to Francis Nicholson advising him 
of the burning of the Maryland governor's papers "by those 
barbarous people." 11 Why local inhabitants would feel 
compelled to subject the documents to what Governor 
Nicholson referred to as "the fiery trial" remains unclear, 
but some historians have speculated that they did so for 
fear that the papers contained information alleging or 
documenting their complicity with pirates.12 
The wrecking episode took place during the first few 
days of February after which, according to Governor Harvey, 
Captain Bostock "continually pressed for despatch" in 
arresting the offenders until the jail became "full and very 
burdensome." 13 In late March a grand jury convened 
especially for the purpose indicted nine individuals, eight 
men and a woman, tried them in the general court, and issued 
a warrant for the apprehension of another man, Richard 
Sanderson, Jr., suspected of complicity. Most of the 
alleged infractions were relatively petty, as in the case of 
Patrick Maccoon who was accused of pilfering "one Rug one 
1 ~ N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 
7/l~/1698. 
ll CSPC, XVI, i76~ iii, p. 393. 
12 Ibid., i76e, p. 387; Rankin, Golden age of Piracy, 
58; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 96. 
13 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 
7/10/1698; Records of the Executive Council, 1664-1734, 377. 
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pair of Drawers two pair of Wollen Briches etc. to the value 
of threescore shillings."14 The very detailed accounting 
of the goods taken by each defendant seems to leave little 
doubt, however, as to their participation in the pillaging. 
Nevertheless, the juries found six of the nine defendants 
not guilty. 15 
Curiously, the critical factor in the jury's 
determination of guilt or innocence apparently was not proof 
of having despoiled the wreck, but rather the value of the 
goods taken. One person who had stolen L1~ worth of plunder 
and four others who had helped themselves to items appraised 
at less than a single pound were all cleared of their 
charges.l 6 Henry Hamond's cache of goods, deemed to be 
worth 5~ pounds sterling and 4~ shillings, had the highest 
estimated value among those exonerated. 17 The disparity 
between Hamond's verdict and sentence and those issued to 
two other men, Thomas Young and Roger Snell, is quite 
striking. Although Young and Snell were accused of removing 
provisions valued at less than Ll~ more than Hamond had 
taken, they were not only convicted of a felony, but 
14 NCHCR, 1697-17~1, 193. 
15 Ibid., 191-97. 
16 Ibid., 193, 195-97. 
17 Ibid., 191-92. 
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sentenced to "be burnt in the brawn of the Left Thumb with a 
hott Iron having on it the Letter T."l8 
The harshest sentence of all was reserved for Captain 
Anthony Dawson who, "having not the fear of God before his 
eyes and his alegiance to • the King not regarding," was 
accused of masterminding the effort to disable the Swift and 
"Imbezell purloyne and convey away" all of her "sailes 
Rigging apparel! furniture and stores into his 
possession." 19 Despite Governor Harvey's subsequent claim 
that Dawson had acted only with the honorable intention of 
securing the vessel "as a Wreck for the proprietors use," 
the jury evidently disagreed, finding the defendant guilty 
as charged and ordering that Dawson "be carryed ••• to the 
place of Execution and there be hanged by the neck till he 
be dead." 2 e 
The severity of the sentences meted out to Dawson, 
Snell, and Young appears to sustain Governor Harvey's 
contention that the offenders received "judgmt ••• to the 
very utmost of their demerit," but further developments and 
a more impartial review of the proceedings suggest 
otherwise. 21 Not only had six of the looters been let off 
18 Ibid., 192-93, 195. 
19 Ibid., 197. 
20 Ibid.; N.C. st. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas 
Harvey, 7/1e/1698. 
21 N.C. st. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 
7/10/1698. 
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scot-free, but, of those convicted, Roger Snell was granted 
a twenty-year suspension of his sentence "upon 
Consideration" of his being a "very aged and poor man" -- in 
effect, a lifetime reprieve -- and Anthony Dawson's death 
penalty was commuted to exile from the colony, a display of 
clemency which prompted Edward Randolph to complain bitterly 
that "The Chief Offender was Banished onely." 22 Moreover, 
Richard Sanderson "the Younger," who had been "detained in 
prison on suspicion of being confederate with Dawson 
and others in Riffling" the warship, was discharged without 
penalty or trial. 23 Sanderson may have been innocent, of 
course, but being the son of a council member (who was also 
one of the more influential men in the province) and Dawson 
having formerly served both on the council and as the 
colony's attorney general probably did not hurt their 
respective cases.24 
Having adjudicated the looting indictments and not 
wanting to appear derelict in their duty, the members of the 
grand jury convened again in May and arraigned Henry Hamond, 
Thomas Young, and "One Negro of • • • Capt. Anthony Dawson" 
on the separate charge that they "did spoil and deface" the 
22 NCHCR, 1697-17~1, 195, 197, 319; Randolph, Letters, 
v, 265. 
23 NCHCR, 1697-17~1, 191, 2~3-~4, 218. 
24 Ibid., lvi, 199; Records of the Executive Council, 
1664-173~68; John L. Cheney, ed., North Carolina 
Government 1585-1979 (Raleigh, 1981), 13. 
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Swift's hull by cutting into it and that they "did 
with one Great Gun shoote through etc."25 Not 
surprisingly in view of the previous proceedings, the 
288 
general court jury found Hamond and Young not guilty, but, 
perhaps in an effort to compensate for the lenient sentences 
ultimately administered to all other defendants, they did 
find the black man "guilty of firing the Gun." Disregarding 
the obvious fact that no individual could have removed and 
fired the gun by himself and overlooking the mitigating 
circumstance that the slave almost certainly was acting on 
his master's orders in any event, the court ordered that the 
Negro "be punished by receiving thirty one stripes on his 
bare Back during the Courts Sitting." 2 6 
Although the appearance of wrecks on the Carolina coast 
was sporadic and essentially unpredictable, it was not 
unanticipated. As early as 1679 the Carolina proprietors 
had appointed a "receiver of wrecks," in this case the venal 
customs collector Robert Houlden, to secure for their 
benefit derelicts in which their charter entitled them to an 
interest. The proclamation announcing Houlden's appointment 
explicitly warned potential salvors against usurping his 
prerogative, taking pains to "strictly Injoine all persons 
whatsoever from Intermedling" therein. 27 The English 
25 NCHCR, 1697-1701, 216-17. 
26 Ibid., 217. 
27 CRNC, I, 240. 
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crown also had a pecuniary interest, normally one-tenth the 
value of all salvaged goods, in wrecks and other "ejections 
of the sea" recovered within the empire.28 The only 
relevant English statute at the time appears to have been 
the thirteenth-century act entitled "What shall be adjudged 
Wreck of the Sea, and what not," which basically asserted 
the crown's right to wrecked effects for which there was no 
legitimate claim of ownership. 29 
The extent to which the Bankers were aware of royal or 
proprietary restrictions on their freedom to salvage wrecks 
is uncertain. However, it may be worth noting that, in 
pleading not guilty to charges which clearly had some 
validity, none of the defendants is recorded as having 
claimed ignorance of the law as an excuse for their 
conduct. 3 ~ There is no doubt, however, that North 
Carolina authorities were cognizant of the relevant laws and 
edicts and, if the charges against the Swift's looters offer 
any indication, they expected the colonists to be as well. 
The indictments issued in each case clearly defined the 
28 Ibid.; Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 156; 
Stick, Graveyard of the Atlantic, 3. Inspired by New 
England entrepreneur William Phipps's successful salvage of 
a sunken Spanish treasure ship off the Caribbean island of 
Hispaniola, the English crown under James II increased its 
percentage from one-tenth to one half in order to raise 
additional revenues (Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 
156) • 
29 Pickering, English Statutes, I, 79. 
3 ~ NCHCR, 1697-17~1, 192-94, 196-97. 
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behavior of the accused as having been contrary to 11 the 
forme of the statute."31 
Moreover, the severity of the original sentences handed 
down with the four convictions (i.e., those issued before 
commutation) unmistakably signifies that those responsible 
for administering justice in the colony understood the 
gravity that English custom attached to the alleged 
offenses. So serious was Anthony Dawson's crime considered, 
in fact, that the records of North Carolina's higher court 
from 1697 to 1708 contain only one other comparable 
condemnation, a death sentence issued to a black slave found 
guilty of murder. 32 The punishment of branding was 
prescribed with almost equal rarity, only two such sentences 
having been meted out between 1697 and 1723, both for 
manslaughter. 33 
Besides its impact within the colony itself, the Swift 
affair also had repercussions in the realms of intercolonial 
and imperial politics. Part of the "great trouble charge & 
vexation" to which Thomas Harvey complained about having 
been subjected as a result of the episode was an attempt by 
Virginia governor Andros to appoint a judge who would have 
jurisdiction over admiralty matters in North Carolina. 
31 Ibid., 192-97. 
32 NCHCR, 1697-1791 and NCHCR, 1792-1798, passim; 
NCHCR, 1697-1701, 262, 276. 
33 NCHCR, 1697-1701, and NCHCR, 1702-1708, passim; 
NCHCR, 1702-1708, 34; NCHCM, 1709-1723, 283-84. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
291 
Harvey managed to avoid having to comply with Andros' wishes 
(which the proprietary official regarded as a "great 
incroachment upon the powers Granted to the proprietors in 
their Charter") in this instance, but expressed concern 
(justifiably, as subsequent developments would demonstrate) 
about the ability of North Carolina officials to resist such 
initiatives in the future. 34 
While proprietary officials temporarily succeeded in 
fending off the attempt to impose admiralty jurisdiction 
from without, they could not avoid criticism and adverse 
consequences in their relationship with the home government 
as a result of their handling of the prosecution of the 
royal warship's plunderers. In his 17el memorial "High 
Crimes & Encreasing Misdemeanors in the Proprietary 
Colonies" Edward Randolph used the Swift episode as a 
convenient club with which to batter North Carolina on the 
charter resumption issue, pointedly reminding crown 
officials that it was during a proprietary administration 
that Outer Banks inhabitants had pillaged a royal guardship, 
"Fired Great Gunns into her and Disabled her from Getting 
off." Randolph cleverly exploited the incident to support 
his longstanding contention that the North Carolinians had 
"no Settled Governmt amongst Them" and that royal 
authorities therefore ought to assume control over what the 
34 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 
7/le/1698. 
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surveyor general now could portray more easily as a lawless 
and chaotic colony which offered sanctuary to "Pirates, 
runaways, and illegal Traders."35 
If the punitive actions, such as they were, taken by 
North Carolina authorities against the wreckers had any sort 
of deterrent influence on the population of the Outer Banks 
in the aftermath of the Swift's destruction, it was barely 
discernible a decade later. In an episode remarkably 
similar to the Swift affair, another Royal Navy ship, H.M.S. 
Garland, ran aground on a sand bank just south of Currituck 
Inlet in late November 17~9 upon her return to the Virginia 
capes from cruising along the coast. 36 The government's 
normal instinct to save its vessels was heightened by the 
chronic shortage of guardships on the Virginia Station, 
particularly in view of the danger of imminent attack by 
foreign privateers during Queen Anne's war. 37 
Virginia authorities responded quickly to the request 
for aid from the Garland's commander, Captain Isaac Cook. 
Acting governor Edmund Jennings dispatched two manned sloops 
to the scene along with a letter of credit to ensure Cook's 
ability to obtain assistance from North Carolina 
officials.3 8 Jennings later reported, however, that it 
35 ~' I, 547; Randolph, Letters, V, 265. 
3 6 C05/1363, pp. 173-74; CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 5. 
37 ~' III, 229. 
38 Ibid., 228. 
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had been too late in the season to initiate recovery 
operations and that further attempts at salvage would have 
to be postponed until spring. 39 Meanwhile, Virginia 
officials nervously awaited the arrival of the Garland's 
replacement, H.M.S. Enterprise. 4 ~ 
The interlude between the grounding of the Garland and 
the appearance of the Enterprise proved to be difficult and 
costly, not only from the standpoint of defending against 
ship seizures by foreign privateers, but also in terms of 
saving the Garland from destructive natural and human 
agents. 41 Virginia's newly appointed royal governor, 
Alexander Spotswood, reported to the British admiralty in 
September 171~ that before the Enterprise could reach North 
Carolina to rescue the Garland, "the Weather and the Country 
People had broke her to pieces, and the latter had carryed 
away whatever was portable." 42 Several years later 
Spotswood modified his account somewhat to reflect the fact 
that some local residents actually had been instrumental in 
recovering most of the stores that were salvaged, but this 
effort the governor attributed less to the selfless 
motivation of loyal crown subjects than the anticipation of 
39 ~, XXV, #21, p. 5. 
4fa Ibid. and #154, p. 57. 
41 Ibid., #349, p. 171. 
42 Spotswood, Letters, I' 34-35. 
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"great rewards" that the guardship commander had 
promised. 43 
Like Edward Randolph a decade earlier, Spotswood and 
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his immediate predecessor, council president Jennings, were 
highly critical of the North Carolina government's handling 
of the salvage operations. Virginia officials grew 
particularly irritated with the behavior of one of their 
southern neighbor's customs collectors, William Swann, who 
had the responsibility of safeguarding the salvaged effects 
until they could be delivered to admiralty 
representatives.44 
An unsigned letter to Swann, dated April 1719 and most 
likely written by acting governor Jennings, not only charged 
that the collector had "sold and converted" to his own use 
many recovered "Stores of a considble value," but that he 
"likewise pretended to detain all the rest ••• of a far 
greater Value" as a salvage fee. 45 Swann was reminded 
43 Ibid., II, 23. 
44 The Virginia correspondence concerning Swann refers 
to him by last name only, but a signed accounting of "sundry 
Expences Disbursements and wages Expended on ye Salvage of • 
• • her Majesties Ship Garland" in the North Carolina State 
Archives identifies "Wm Swann" as the colonial official in 
charge of the operation. (N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, 
"Vice-admiralty Papers," I, 9, 11/28/1799). 
45 CVSP, I, 139. Though not quite as damning as the 
Virginia allegations, Swann's own record of the expenses 
incurred during the salvage operation nonetheless confirms 
that he was the principal beneficiary of payments made to 
those who contributed goods and services to the effort. Out 
of a total disbursement of slightly over Ll99, the collector 
listed himself as the direct recipient of more than L44, 
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that the stolen provisions were "absolutely necessary for • 
refitting" the recently arrived replacement guardship 
"to enable her to go agst ye Enemy's Privateers" and the 
letter demanded that the customs officer return the goods as 
soon as possible, threatening "Condign punishment" should he 
fail to do so.46 
The author expressed absolute certainty regarding 
Swann's guilt and suggested that, if a sense of duty and 
conscience would not impel him to "Do her Majty that right 
which is due to the meanest person on such unfortunate 
occasions, surely ye Consideration of yr own safety will be 
of some force to engage you." 47 But it was not. Half a 
year later, Governor Spotswood complained to the admiralty 
that, although a considerable quantity of provisions from 
the wrecked ship had been salvaged, there was "no doubt but 
many more of the Stores were saved, and some of them of the 
best value putt into the hands of one Swan, a Collector in 
Carolina, but there's no account to be had of them now.n48 
which he charged mainly for his "trouble Care & attendance" 
at the wreck site and for his "own Salvage" of a length of 
ship's cable (N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, "Vice-admiralty 
Papers," I, 9). 
46 CVSP, I, 139. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Spotswood, Letters, I, 34-5. Although Virginia 
authorities roundly castigated Swann for his venal behavior, 
the collector's reputation does not seem to have suffered 
among fellow North Carolinians. Listed as a representative 
for the precinct of Currituck in the colonial assembly of 
17~9, he was elevated by fellow delegates to the post of 
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Strangely, neither the Colonial Records of North 
Carolina nor the North Carolina higher-court registers 
contain any reference to the Garland incident, which 
suggests that the proprietary government undertook no 
prosecutions against either the wreckers or Swann. Why this 
would have been the case can only be conjectured, but the 
absence of any mention of the event in the colony's official 
documents implies either that provincial officials were 
powerless to take any punitive action, or worse, that they 
may have collaborated actively in a cover-up. 
Virginia governor Spotswood's correspondence makes it 
clear that he, for one, regarded Swann's behavior in 
connection with the salvage operation not simply as the 
petty machinations of a corrupt customs collector, but as a 
manifestation of the pervasive venality and lawlessness that 
characterized North Carolina's legal and political 
administration in general. Following Edward Randolph's 
example once again, Spotswood took advantage of the 
opportunity to castigate the proprietary colony in 
communications with crown authorities. Not only had Swann 
made off with valuable property saved from the Garland, the 
Virginia governor lamented, but there was nothing that 
conscientious royal officials could do about it. Spotswood 
Speaker within two years (Williams. Powell, ed., Dictionary 
of North Carolina Biography, vol. VI [University of North 
Carolina Press, publication pending]; Cheney, Carolina 
Government, 29, 31). 
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complained that it was neither in his power "nor in the 
power of any body else • • • in these parts to recover any 
part of what has been so embazzled in a Country where 
there's scarce any form of Government." 49 
In fairness to the Carolinians, it appears that 
residents of the proprietary colony were not the only ones 
to cast a covetous eye on the guardship's salvaged effects. 
In December 1711 Virginia's House of Burgesses denied the 
claim of George Luke, the dissolute collector of the lower 
James River district, to be reimbursed for "old Iron 
furnished for the Use of ye Battery at point Comfort." In 
rejecting the petition, the burgesses hastened to remind 
Luke that the iron did not belong to him, but had been 
"saved out of her Majestys Shipp the Garland" and that the 
Lords of Admiralty would "certainly demand the price of it 
according to the valuation."50 
In 1713 English authorities undertook the first major 
updating and elaboration of the laws pertaining to wrecks 
since the thirteenth century. The extent to which the Swift 
and Garland episodes inspired the revision is difficult, if 
not impossible, to assess. Certainly other, similar 
incidents had occurred throughout the empire in the 
preceding years. But the similarity of the criminal acts 
49 Spotswood, Letters, I, 34-35. 
50 ~, 1702/03-1712, p. 341. 
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described in the statute and the applicability of specific 
prohibitions and penalties to the behavior of the North 
Carolinians in 1698 and 1709-10 is remarkable nonetheless. 
The preamble to the law explains that its creation had been 
occasioned by "great complaints that many ships • 
have unfortunately • • • run on shore, or been stranded on 
the coasts thereof; and that such ships have been 
barbarously plundered by her Majesty's subjects, and their 
cargoes embezilled, and when any part thereof has been 
saved, it has been swallowed up by exorbitant demands for 
salvage."51 
The legislation itself stipulated that anyone 
attempting to board a wrecked ship or remove any goods 
without the consent of the commander or the local customs 
officer would be required to make "double satisfaction to 
the party grieved."52 Any person caught with provisions 
stolen from the vessel who refused to deliver them 
immediately to the owner would be required to pay triple the 
value of the goods. Whoever made, or assisted in making, 
"any hole in the bottom, side, or any other part of any ship 
or vessel so in distress" would be considered guilty of a 
felony without benefit of clergy. The statute further 
decreed that if, in connection with a wrecking incident, 
51 12 Anne Stat. 2. c. 18, Pickering, English Statutes, 
XIII, 121. 
52 Ibid., 123-24. 
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"any officer of the customs ••• shall, by fraud or wilful 
neglect, abuse the trust ••• reposed in him," such an 
offender would pay triple damages to the injured party, lose 
his job, and never be eligible for employment in the customs 
service again.S3 
Like the Swift and Garland affairs, the circumstances 
surrounding two subsequent wrecking incidents, one in 1715 
and one in 1750, offer striking parallels with one another. 
Both involved the stranding or sinking of vessels from 
Spanish treasure fleets as a result of violent storms. Both 
occurred two years after the formal conclusion of 
hostilities between England and Spain. As a result, each 
episode tested the will of English authorities to maintain 
the peace -- even at the expense of antagonizing British 
subjects by restraining the colonists, through the threat 
of force or otherwise, from plundering the foreign vessels. 
The contrasts between the two incidents are also 
noteworthy. The first episode did not occur in the 
Chesapeake region at all, but on the coast of Florida, and 
the potential lawbreakers of greatest concern to British 
officials were not local residents, but Caribbean pirates. 
The ships and wrecks of the 1750 fleet, on the other hand, 
were strewn along the shores of all three Chesapeake 
colonies, requiring the provincial governments to prevent 
53 Ibid., 124-25. 
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their own and, in some cases, neighboring seaside 
inhabitants not only from plundering the foreign vessels, 
but, where there were survivors, from attacking their crews 
and passengers as well. The events of 1715 and 1750 serve 
to demonstrate that, while the rapacious impulses of 
Chesapeake colonists toward shipwrecks on their shores 
persisted, apparently unabat~p, from the 1690s, by the 
mid-eighteenth century the willingness and ability of 
colonial governments to control wreckers and potential 
pillagers had improved significantly. 
In October 1715 Governor Spotswood included, as a 
postscript in a letter to English authorities, "advice of a 
considerable event in these parts, that the Spanish Plate 
Fleet richly laden, consisting of eleven sail, are, except 
one, lately cast away in the Gulph of Florida to the 
southward of St. Augustin." 54 Since the incident occurred 
so far to the south, it might appear that its impact on the 
Chesapeake would have been marginal, but Virginia governor 
Spotswood had legitimate reasons for concern. English 
opportunists from Jamaica, including pirates, soon descended 
on both the wrecks and the Spaniards who had been dispatched 
by their government to salvage the treasure. 
An emissary from the governor of Cuba levelled charges, 
later supported by a Royal Navy guardship captain, a 
S4 CSPC XXVIII, #651, p. 317; Spotswood, Letters, II, 
-----' 132. 
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colonial secretary, and several merchants, that the crews of 
two British sloops landed on the coast of Florida and, at 
gunpoint, stole more than 120,000 pieces of eight from the 
Spanish salvage camp, allegedly "proceeding so far in their 
tyrannical covetousness that they put those they met to •• 
• punishment and torment, for to know where they had hid 
their treasure." 55 worse yet, in terms of Anglo-Spanish 
diplomacy, the predators apparently had been sanctioned by 
the governor of Jamaica who had issued commissions to "fish" 
the wrecks, under the pretext of cruising against pirates in 
the area, in return for a share of the Spanish booty. 56 
Spotswood clearly was less concerned about the 
depredations committed against the Spaniards, however, than 
the threat posed by the presence of so many pirates in a 
highly strategic area not too far from his own colony. 57 
In July 1716, the same month he jailed one of several 
English pirates who had attacked the Spaniards and then made 
their way north to Virginia, the governor begged the Lords 
of Admiralty to "consider the dangerous Consequences of 
suffering such a Nest of Rogues to settle in the very mouth 
of the Gulph of Florida where ••• the whole trade of this 
Continent may be endangered."5 8 
55 CSPC, XXIX, il58, #158 i-vii, pp. 78-82. 
56 Ibid., #308, pp. 163-64. 
57 Ibid., #240, p. 139; #408 i i 1 iii 1 p. 210. 
58 I bid. I #240, p. 140; Spotswood, Letters, II, 168-69. 
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Some historians have claimed that Spotswood was 
motivated, at least in part, by a concern that the 
activities of the wreckers would threaten British relations 
with Spain, the two nations only recently having concluded a 
peace treaty to end Queen Anne's War. 59 That may have 
been true, but, on the other hand, the governor was not so 
worried about relations with the Spanish that he was 
unwilling to risk them by exploring the possibility of 
recovering some of the treasure for the British crown. 
Besides informing his superiors about the wreck of the 1715 
fleet, Spotswood also suggested that the incident might "be 
improved to the Advantage of his Maj't's Subjects if 
encouragement be given to attempt ye recovery of some of 
that Imense Treasury."60 
Acting on his own initiative in July 1716, the governor 
instructed Harry Beverley, the master of a Virginia sloop 
bound from the Chesapeake to the Caribbean, to gather 
information on pirates and Spanish salvage operations in the 
Gulf of Florida and to recover any treasure that he could, 
provided that it lay within or near British possessions. 61 
At the end of May the following year, Spotswood reported 
5 9 Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy, 86; Shomette, Pirates 
on the Chesapeake, 179-80. 
6 0 Spotswood, Letters, II, 132; ~' XXVIII, #650, p. 
317. 
61 Spotswood, Letters, II, 170; CSPC, XXIX, #240 iii, 
p. 142; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, ~ 
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that Beverley had the misfortune to encounter a Spanish 
warship whose crew boarded the sloop, "beat and stript all 
the men • plundered and carry'd off all the cargo, and 
brought the men prisoners on board the man of war, where 
they were forced naked as they were to work as the Spaniards 
ordered them." The governor implored crown authorities to 
seek the release of Beverley and his crew and begged them to 
consider "on how precarious a footing all the Trade of the 
British ••• to the Plantations must be, if they are thus 
to ly at the mercy of the Spaniards, liable to be seized •• 
• insulted and imprisoned."62 
In conversation with William Byrd fifteen years later, 
Spotswood once again held forth on the "Insolences of the 
Spaniards" and expressed his disappointment with the British 
government which, he believed, had endured the insults "so 
tamely." The former governor also displayed a continuing 
and active interest in Spanish treasure, informing Byrd that 
"both the Galleons and Fleta," the two annual treasure 
fleets, "being confin'd to Sail thro' the gulph, might be 
intercepted by ••• Stationing a Squadron of Men of War" at 
a strategic point near the Florida Channe1. 6 3 
6 2 CSPC, XXIX, #595 iv, pp. 319, 320. 
6 3 John s. Bassett, ed., The Writings of Colonel 
William Byrd of Westover in Virginia Esquire (New York, 
1901), 368. 
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When war between England and Spain broke out again 
later that decade, British naval authorities appear to have 
heeded Spotswood's advice. So seriously did the Royal Navy 
manage to interrupt the yearly sailing of the flotas during 
the wars of Jenkins' Ear and the Austrian Succession that 
only three such convoys, under the protective escort of 
heavily armed vessels of Spain's Havana squadron, reached 
the Iberian Peninsula between the outbreak of war in 1739 
and its conclusion in 1748. 64 That the English continued 
to covet the fabulously wealthy ships throughout the war is 
attested to by a captain in Britain's Caribbean squadron 
who, eager to intercept the 1748 treasure fleet, regretted 
the capture of an "advice-boat from Old Spain, which damp'd 
our spirits with the unwelcome news of a peace."65 
While the cessation of hostilities may have been 
unpopular with British naval officers, it was welcomed 
heartily in Spain where the chronically ailing economy 
depended heavily on the revenues which the arrival of the 
flota provided. So precarious was Spain's economic plight 
and so indispensable were the treasure fleets to relieve the 
financial strain that in 1753 the mere delay of the flota 
occasioned nine bankruptcies in Madrid, Cadiz, and 
64 J.C.M. Ogelsby, "Spain's Havana Squadron and the 
Preservation of the Balance of Power in the Caribbean, 
174e-1748," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIX, 481. 
65 Gentleman's Magazine, XVIII, 523. 
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Seville. 66 Not surprisingly, then, even after the 
fighting ended in 1748, the Spaniards cautiously refused to 
entrust the command of the precious treasure convoys in 1749 
and early 1750 to anyone but a rear and vice-admiral.6 7 
It may be a significant indication of the benign state of 
Anglo-Spanish relations by mid-1750 that the responsibility 
for the safe arrival of the fleet was given not to a 
top-ranking naval officer, but to an expatriated Irishman in 
the Spanish service, Don Daniel Huony. 68 
Accounts of the size of Huony's 1750 fleet range from 
as few as six vessels to as many as thirteen, but the actual 
number probably was eight: La Mariana, Nuestra Senora de los 
Godos, Nuestra Senora de Soledad, Nuestra Senora de 
Guadalupe, El Salvador, St. Peter (San Pedro), a brigantine 
not identified by name, and Huony's 50-gun flagship, La 
66 Ibid., XXIII, 387-88. 
67 Ibid., XX, 283. 
68 Md. A., XXVIII, 482. The commander's name is 
represented variously as Huony, Huoni, Huonij, Mahoney, 
Ohoney, Otlony, and Onness. The most reliable references, 
that is those found in official Spanish documents, identify 
the commander as either "Huony" or "Huoni" (Archive General 
de Indias, Seville [hereafter cited as AGI], "Consulados," 
legajo 856, legajo 861, fos. 79, 81). The former spelling 
is used most often and this is how the captain's name 
appears as the signatory of one letter to Captain Juan 
Manuel de Bonilla (also of the 1750 fleet) as well as 
another to English colonial authorities transcribed and 
printed in the Archives of Maryland (AGI, "Consulados," 
legajo 861, fo. 170; Md. A., XXVIII, 494). 
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Galga. 69 As usual, the cargoes consisted of a great 
quantity and variety of American riches including gold and 
silver bullion, minted silver coins, cochineal, indigo, and, 
aboard the Galga, "some thousands of pounds worth of 
Mahogany • 
Windows &c." 70 
for ••• the King of Spains pallace Doors & 
The man-of-war also carried another cargo, not nearly 
so valuable from a commercial standpoint, but extremely 
volatile from a political one: English prisoners, 30 
according to the most reliable account, who, along with 
their vessels, had been seized by Spanish "guarda costas" 
(literally, coast guards, but, in reality, Spanish 
privateers and their crews) and brought to Havana for 
alleged contraband trafficking. 71 In addition to these 
involuntary travelers, one of the vessels, probably the 
Godos, carried "several Passengers • of Distinction" 
including the governor of Havana and his family, as reported 
69 AGI, "Consulados," legajo 861, fo. 81; S.C. Gaz. 
10/29-11/5/1750; Md. Gaz., 9/5/1750; C05/1338, reports of 
Nathaniel Walthoe, 9/28/1750, and Governor Thomas Lee, 
10/3/1750. Numerous accounts contain the names and identify 
the captains of these vessels; Walthoe's is the only English 
report which lists all the ships enumerated here and no 
others. The St. Peter was one of two Portuguese "annual 
ships" permitted to trade with the Spanish American colonies 
and the only foreign-owned vessel in the fleet. 
70 AGI, "Consulados," legajo 861, fos. 37-38; Md. A., 
XXVIII, 482. 
71 Va. Gaz., 9/5/1751. 
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by one source, and/or the "viceroy out of Chili and his 
lady" according to another. 72 
The fleet departed from Havana bound for Cadiz on 
307 
August 18. About a week out, a violent storm, described by 
some as a hurricane, struck the vessels and raged for six or 
seven days. The fury of the tempest tore away masts, 
rigging, and tillers, strained ships' timbers, and caused 
the vessels, whose decks were constantly awash, to leak from 
below as well. Guns and merchandise were heaved overboard 
to lighten the load and decks were breached so that the 
water on board could drain into the pumps. As the holds 
began to fill up, sailors frantically manned the pumps in a 
desperate effort to save the ships and themselves. 73 
When sea and sky finally calmed, the three ships still 
afloat -- the Mariana, St. Peter, and Godos -- managed to 
reach a safe haven at Norfolk, Virginia. The governor's 
appointed inspectors found the last two in such a battered 
condition that they condemned the vessels as unfit to put to 
7 2 Pa. Gaz., 9/6/1750; Md. Gaz., 9/5/1750; PRO 
C05/1338, 8/30/1750. 
73 Pedro Pumareyo characterized the storm as "un 
furioso Uracan" (AGI, "Consulados," legajo 861, fo. 81). 
The most detailed descriptions of the tempest are the 
Spanish accounts of Captains Pumareyo and Bonilla and 
English versions attributed to Thomas Wright and Captain 
Pumareyo (Pumaryo), both of the Godos (AGI, "Consulados," 
legajo 861, fos. 79, 81-82, 93-94; S.C. Gaz. 
10/29-11/5/1750; EJC, V, 333-34). 
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sea again. 74 Three other ships ended up near, on, or 
under the shores of North Carolina. Despite having 
sustained considerable damage, the Guadalupe succeeded in 
anchoring safely within Ocracoke Inlet.75 The Soledad was 
driven ashore twelve leagues to the south. All the people 
and cargo were saved but the ship, apparently in no 
condition to sail, was abandoned. 76 The Salvador's 
passengers and crew were considerably less fortunate. Only 
three men and a boy survived the violent grounding either at 
Cape Lookout or near Topsail Inlet. Less than a month 
later, little evidence of the tragedy remained. The ship 
reportedly was "stove to pieces and ••• covered with 7 or 
8 feet sand."77 
The last two members of the fleet stranded well over a 
hundred miles north of Ocracoke Inlet along the Eastern 
Shore of Virginia and Maryland. The unidentified 
brigantine, commanded by Don Antonio Barroso, ran aground 
some six leagues to the north of Cape Charles on or near one 
of the barrier islands in Northampton County, Virginia. 78 
74 Colonial Williamsburg Research Center, Microfilm 
Collection "Virginia: Colonial Papers," #M.ll80.3, Folder 
43, nos. 4 and 5. 
75 n S.C. Gaz., 10/29-11/5/1750; CRNC, IV, 130v. 
76 S.C. Gaz., 10/29-11/5/1750 and£!!£, IV, 1305. 
77 ~' IV, 1305. 
78 C05/1338 9/28, 1750; "Virginia: Colonial Papers," 
microfilm #M.ll80.3, Folder 43, #7a. 
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Farthest north of all, the powerful Galga lay helpless, 
having lost her rudder on the Chincoteague Shoals and 
grounded, with seven feet of water in her hold, off 
Assateague Island near the Maryland/Virginia border. 79 
309 
Not long after the warship came to rest, Captain Huony 
set about the tasks of removing the most valuable and 
accessible part of the cargo and transporting it to the 
relative safety of dry land. Two men drowned in this effort 
as did two others who, "attempting to swim ashore," 
obviously with more personal objectives in mind, "had tied 
so much Money round their Waists, that they sunk with 
it." 80 The rest of the Spaniards succeeded in 
transferring themselves and several heavy chests of silver 
safely to shore and from there to Snow Hill, Maryland, where 
they hired two sloops to convey them and their goods to 
Norfolk. 81 
Not all of the Galga's passengers lamented her fate. 
The Spaniards' tragedy proved to be a blessing for the 
English prisoners, all of whom, with the exception of one 
who drowned in the attempt to reach shore, gained their 
freedom when the vessel wrecked. 82 Like the English 
captives, residents of the Eastern shore and the Outer Banks 
79 Md. A., XXVIII, 493. 
80 Md. Gaz., 9/12/1750. 
81 ~.; Md. A., XXVIII, 481. 
82 Md. Gaz., 9/12/1750; Pa. Gaz., 9/6/1750. 
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shed no tears over the Spaniards' misfortunes. On the 
contrary, they quickly availed themselves of the opportunity 
to profit from the mishap just as many of their ancestors 
had done in similar situations in the past. Inhabitants of 
the vicinity where the Galga came to grief soon began 
"fishing" the wreck, within which they reportedly "found a 
considerable booty."83 
As usual, colonial authorities had to decide who was 
entitled to salvage the wrecks, how to dispose of the 
effects, and what rights and assistance to accord the 
Spaniards. The statute most relevant to the disposition of 
goods salvaged from the wrecks seems to have been 12 Anne 
Stat. 2. c. 18., the act of 1713 which had been made 
perpetual by another law passed three years later. 84 As 
recently as 1749, the North Carolina statutes listed 12 Anne 
Stat. 2. c. 18 and its predecessor, 3 Edward I c. 4, as the 
canons of English law pertaining to wrecks that had been 
adopted by the colony.8 5 
In addition to the English statutes, several clauses 
from the 1678 Treaty of Madrid between Spain and England 
83 Md. Gaz., 9/12/175~. 
84 4 Geo. II Stat. 1. c. 12; Pickering, English 
Statutes, XIII, 121-25, 475-76. 
85 CRNC, XXIII, 318, 326. Oddly enough, though, North 
Carolina-a9ent James Abercromby later argued, in defense of 
Governor Gabriel Johnston (see below), that "this statute," 
12 Anne Stat. 2. c. 8, "do~s not extend to the Plantations" 
(James Abercromby to "Rich Nev: Aldworth Esqr," C05/384, 
fo. 91, 2/17/1758/1, N.C. St. Arch.). 
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were particularly applicable. 86 In fact, colonial agent 
James Abercromby would later cite the tenth article of this 
accord in defense of North Carolina governor Gabriel 
Johnston's actions regarding the Guadalupe.87 The 
bilateral agreement specifically provided that 11 if the 
subjects of ••• either confederate shall be driven by 
storm or forced • into the rivers, bays, estuaries, or 
stations of the other confederate, or to land upon any 
coasts in America, they shall be received there kindly and 
with entire humanity ••• and shall be treated with 
benevolence ... 88 Certainly Daniel Huony expected to be 
treated that way. Pleading for justice in the recovery of 
goods pillaged from the Galga, Huony pointed out to Maryland 
authorities that his appeal was 11 Just and Conformable to the 
Amity and treaties Subsisting between Our Royal 
Masters ... 89 Officials in all three colonies of the 
greater Chesapeake seemed to agr~e. Virginia's acting 
governor, Thomas Lee, for example, considered that the 
11 indulgences 11 he granted the Spaniards 11 Were due to their 
86 Royal instructions to North Carolina governor Arthur 
Dobbs in 1754 indicate that a Treaty of Peace and Neutrality 
in America concluded between England and France in 1686 
contained very similar provisions (CRNC, v, 1139-40). 
87 James Abercromby to Richard Nev: Aldworth, 
2/17/1751, C05/304 fo. 91. 
88 Davenport, European Treaties, II, 195. 
89 Md. A., XXVIII, 493. 
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Subjects of a King in amity with His Majesty my Royall 
Master." 90 
312 
Treaties and legalities notwithstanding, residents of 
Northampton County began helping themselves to the effects 
of Barroso's brigantine shortly after the crew abandoned the 
wreck, the Spaniards having salvaged what they could before 
their evacuation to an unspecified destination, presumably 
Norfolk. 91 The citizens of Accomack County, Virginia and 
Worcester County, Maryland displayed even greater zeal and 
initiative. Not content to pilfer simply that which was 
readily accessible, they proceeded, after Huony and 
company's departure, to tear up the Galga's decks in order 
to plunder the goods stored below. So efficient were the 
looters, in fact, that, according to Huony, "all She had in 
her (worth taking) was Plundered and Carried away." In 
doing so, the Virginia looters exploited the uncertainty 
over where the wreck actually lay relative to the colonial 
border. When the sheriff of Worcester County urged the 
wreckers to refrain from any further recovery activities 
until his governor could be consulted on matters of 
possession and salvage rights, they curtly replied, as they 
continued to pillage the wreck, that, since the vessel lay 
9° "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll80.3, 
folder 43, no. 7a; COS/1338, p. 88. 
9l"Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll80.3, 
folder 43, no. 3. 
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in Virginia, Maryland officials had no jurisdiction in the 
affair. 92 
Shortly thereafter, the Maryland sheriff established to 
his satisfaction that the remains of the Galga did indeed 
lie within the bounds of his authority. Once he apprised 
his superiors of the situation, it is remarkable how quickly 
and resolutely the leaders of each colony acted, both 
individually and in concert, to prevent any further 
unauthorized tampering with the vessels. The two governors, 
Samuel Ogle of Maryland and Thomas Lee of Virginia, issued 
identical orders to the sheriffs of the respective counties, 
instructing them to gather and safeguard the remaining 
effects of the vessels and to ascertain the identities of 
those "Evil Minded Persons" who had taken into their 
possession, "contrary to all Law and Justice • Several 
of the ••• Materials • Parcells of Money and other 
goods and Effects" of the Spanish ships. 93 The speed and 
coordination of the gubernatorial responses is all the more 
extraordinary in view of Edward Randolph's observation from 
Maryland in 1692 that there was "no setled communication 
betwixt this place and virginnia."9 4 
92 Md. A., XXVIII, 482, 493. 
93 Ibid., 483; "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm 
#M.ll80.~older 43, no. 7a. 
9 4Randolph, Letters, VII, 355. 
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Acting on his governor's orders, the Northampton County 
sheriff seems to have experienced little difficulty 
recovering the stolen effects and identifying the looters of 
the brigantine. 95 Likewise, the sheriff of Accomack 
assigned an agent who successfully employed members of the 
local population in the retrieval and storage of goods 
pilfered from the Galga. 96 Worcester County officials had 
a somewhat more difficult time, however, encountering as 
they did opposition from not only local citizens but even 
provincial magistrates who "Acted in a most Outrageous 
manner ••• in Contempt of all Law and Government." 
Several offenders had "even dared to Insult and abuse" the 
law enforcement officials. An appalled Governor Ogle 
expressed dismay that "any Body would have presumed to have 
resisted the Sheriffs in the Execution of their duty" and 
commanded all "his Lordships Officers and his 
Majesty's Subjects" to assist in the enforcement of his 
previous orders.97 
Meanwhile, farther south in the sounds of North 
Carolina's Outer Banks, the captain of the Guadalupe, Juan 
Manuel de Bonilla, found himself in an even more precarious 
position than either Huony or Barroso. Although he had 
9S "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll80.3, 
folder 43, no. 7a. 
96 Ibid., no. 13. 
97 Md. A., XXVIII, 489-90. 
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managed to reach Ocracoke Inlet safely, Bonilla soon 
discovered that it was his misfortune to anchor amongst a 
population which only three years before had been pillaged 
by Spanish raiders. Whether the local inhabitants' feelings 
of resentment over this incident actually constituted a more 
powerful incentive than the allure of Spanish treasure is 
uncertain, but, in any case, the colonists soon began to arm 
themselves with the intention of assaulting the ship, citing 
the earlier Spanish raid and one which had occurred in the 
province more recently as justifiable pretexts. 98 
The decision by colonial officials to take seriously 
the threat posed by the armed colonists suggests that the 
Bankers' reputation had not improved substantially in the 
half century since Captain Bostock of the Swift referred to 
them as "those barbarous people."99 In support of his 
contention that the local population might very well "come 
in a Body and pillage the Ships," North Carolina governor 
Johnston portrayed the Bankers as "a set of People • • • who 
are very Wild and ungovernable, so that it is seldom 
possible to Execute any Civil or Criminal Writs among 
them." 100 Johnston considered that his only hope to 
98 CRNC, IV, 13~1, 1306. 
99 CSPC, XVI, 176~ iii, p. 393. 
10 ~ CRNC, IV, 1306. James Abercromby depicted local 
residents-as-"outlaws of that Province, who had on many 
Occasions sworn Revenge against the Spaniards for 
Depredations committed, not only during the War, but after 
the Cessation of Hostilities" (Abercromby to Richard Nev: 
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protect the imperiled Spaniards from the Bankers' 
"Villanious Confederacy" lay in sending an immediate and 
urgent plea for assistance to the captain of the nearest 
guardship on station, H.M.S. scorpion.101 
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The menacing demeanor of local Carolinians was ominous 
enough, but the shipwrecked mariners aggravated their 
predicament by becoming, as colonial agent Abercromby put 
it, "accessary to their own loss." 102 Inexplicably, 
Bonilla failed to make any application to colonial 
authorities for assistance or protection for over a month. 
Moreover, the foreigners, "contrary to all Treaties and 
Usuages and without any permission whatever broke Bulk" and 
twice unloaded and reloaded their ship. 103 By bringing 
cargo ashore and having "likewise trafficked ••• a good 
deal of it • for Things that are not necessarys," the 
Spaniards violated that part of the Treaty of Madrid which 
stipulated that the crews of foreign vessels in distress 
might furnish themselves "with victuals and ••• supplies 
necessary for the support of life, the repair of ships, and 
the continuation of their voyage" provided that "they always 
refrain from unloading any cargo ••• goods or packs and 
Aldworth, 2/17/1751, COS/304, fo. 93). 
101 ~., 1300, 1301, 1306. 
10 2 James Abercromby to Richard Nev: A1dworth, 
2/17/1751, COS/304, fo. 93. 
103 Ibid., 1301. 
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exposing them for sale, and from receiving any merchandise 
from the other party on board their ships."1 0 4 
Internal squabbling caused the Spaniards additional 
problems. The Guadalupe's boatswain staged a mutiny and 
forced Bonilla to unload over a hundred chests of silver and 
thirty of cochineal onto two New England sloops which had 
sailed into the inlet. Luckily for the Spanish captain, one 
of the sloops ran aground and was overtaken. But the other, 
"tho she was a dull Sailer and had not Ten men on Board 
while the Boatswain had ••• fifty," made a clean 
getaway. 105 Bonilla managed to regain control of the 
Guadalupe, but his troubles were far from over. 
When the Scorpion arrived, he petitioned Governor 
Johnston for permission to transfer the remaining cargo to 
the warship for eventual shipment back to Spain. Johnston 
was amenable, but suggested that the Spanish captain pay an 
"adjustment" fee of 4 l/2 percent on the value of the cargo 
to cover expenses incurred by the colonial government. Of 
that amount, which totalled 11,444 1/2 dollars (excluding 
the freight charge), the governor retained 5500 dollars, 
"trifling Gratification," according to North Carolina 
Attorney General Thomas Child, for the benefit of Johnston's 
"generous, important, good Offices." Whether or not Bonilla 
104 Davenport, European Treaties, II, 195; CRNC, IV, 
1304. For the equivalent provisions in the 1686 Anglo-
French Treaty see CRNC, v, 1140. 
105 £!!£, IV, 1306, 1307. 
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considered the commission trifling and regardless of how he 
himself might have characterized Johnston's services, the 
Iberian mariner obviously was in no position to argue. He 
agreed to pay the fee which neither the Maryland nor the 
Virginia governor had attempted to exact from the foreign 
commanders stranded in their colonies.l 06 
In terms of the handling of wrecking incidents by the 
colonial governments overall, the 1750 affair represents a 
significant departure from the irresolute and often 
irresponsible behavior that had characterized official 
reactions in the past. The speed and determination with 
which the Maryland and Virginia (and even, to a lesser 
extent, North Carolina) authorities acted to prevent the 
wanton plundering and destruction of the stranded vessels 
demonstrates how successful royal authorities had been in 
establishing the rule of law and obedience to crown policies 
since the early years of the century. This success was 
particularly dramatic in view of the fact that, whereas 
colonial officials had failed to prevent the colonists from 
destroying their own (i.e., English) royal guardships in 
1698 and 1709-10, Chesapeake authorities managed in 1750 to 
overcome both avarice and national hostility in protecting a 
rich treasure as well as the inveterate and despised foreign 
adversaries to whom it belonged. 
106 Ibid., 1302, 1303. 
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As the various wrecking episodes demonstrate, Outer 
Banks and Eastern Shore residents required little 
encouragement or provocation to prey upon the stranded 
vessels of any nation, including their own, that happened to 
wash up on their shores. But if the coast dwelling 
colonists of the region needed a rationale for such 
behavior, the circumstances surrounding the wreck of the 
175~ fleet certainly might have provided one. Besides the 
English people's traditional hatred of Spaniards as the 
cruel Papists of Black Legend infamy, Chesapeake residents 
had more immediate reasons to resent the Iberians. 1 ~ 7 
Spanish privateers had taken many vessels bound to and from 
the Chesapeake in the recent war and some Bankers had been 
victimized personally by a Spanish raid on their town. 
On the Eastern Shore, local Marylanders and Virginians 
surely must have been affected by the sight of desperate 
Englishmen struggling ashore to escape their foreign captors 
aboard the wrecked Galga. Moreover, some of the newly 
emancipated prisoners took advantage of their freedom to 
tell not only the story of the wrecked fleet, but also tales 
of cruelty suffered at the hands of their Spanish guards. 
Literate Virginians undoubtedly were horrified by an account 
of the tortures to which the guarda costas had subjected 
Andrew Connel, former captain of the sloop Mosguito, and his 
1 ~ 7 Harold w. Temperley, "The Causes of the war of 
Jenkins' Ear," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 
3d ser., III (London 19~9), 199. 
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crew prior to their fateful voyage on the Galga. A Virginia 
Gazette article entitled "Spanish Injustice and Barbarity" 
described how the guarda costas, after seizing the Mosquito 
in the Caribbean on the pretext of illicit trade, 
"immediately began to plunder, strip his people, and beat 
them cruelly, and torment ••• them with Thum-Screws to 
make them confess that they were Contraband Dealers."l08 
In the absence of direct editorial comments by area 
writers on the Galga situation per se, it is difficult to 
assess how the colonists might have reconciled their 
countrymen's experience at the hands of the Spaniards with 
the colonial governments' orders to treat the shipwrecked 
foreigners with civility and forbearance. Certainly there 
is no indication that the Iberians were mistreated 
physically in any way or, in Maryland and Virginia, even 
threatened. On the contrary, Governor Lee wrote that the 
Spaniards had been furnished "with every thing that was 
Necessary as Friends."109 But an impassioned commentary 
on the wreck of the 1750 fleet from faraway Boston suggests 
how individuals closer to the scene might have reacted under 
the circumstances: 
It should seem a little strange that there were 
upwards of 50 English Prisoners on board those 
Ships when they were cast away • • • and the Men 
obliged to work for nothing, as Prisoners and 
108 va. Gaz., 9/5/1751, p. 1. 
109 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #Mll80.3, 
folder 43, no. 6. 
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Servants, to Old Spain ••• and these Prisoners 
have no Notice taken of them by the English, into 
whose Hands their unjust Captors have fell. Might 
it not be queried whether the Spaniards ought not 
to have all been seized, till every Capture they 
have made on the English since the Peace were 
restored? ••• Must not all indifferent Persons 
think we are indeed the Dupes of those People? 
And can any Man who ever suck'd one Drop of 
British milk, or have one Drop of British Blood in 
his_Vein~, hear t~f~ without the utmost 
Ind1gnat1on ••• 
It might be argued that New England merchants and 
321 
shippers, having suffered greater losses due to Spanish ship 
seizures than their counterparts in the Chesapeake, were 
motivated by commercial, rather than patriotic, impulses in 
calling for retribution against the Spaniards.ll1 But 
the traditional English anti-Spanish bias should not be 
discounted as a factor and, in any event, such latent 
hostility certainly was compatible with more immediate 
British anger over ship confiscations. Accordingly, South 
Carolina governor James Glen proposed a course of action 
only slightly different from the one favored by the Boston 
essayist: appropriate the effects of the wrecked vessels, 
rather than detain the mariners, as partial compensation for 
Spanish ship seizures since the official cessation of 
hostilities between England and Spain. 112 Similar 
110 Pa. Gaz., 11/22/1750, p. 1. 
111 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies 
(London, 1982), 273-74. 
11 2 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 294. Glen's proposal 
elicited a sharp rebuke from the Duke of Bedford who warned 
the governor that the king was apt to dismiss from office 
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sentiments, both nationalistic and economic, also must have 
surfaced in the Chesapeake. It seems significant, for 
example, that the Virginia Gazette inaccurately 
characterized Governor Johnston's justification for exacting 
the 4 112 percent salvage and handling fee on Captain 
Bonilla's cargo as a reprisal for guarda costa seizures of 
English ships. 113 
The Gazette's rationale probably would have been no 
less palatable to the British ministers than the one offered 
by the governor himself -- that his salary was badly in 
arrears -- and may have been calculated to elevate an act of 
questionable morality to one of exemplary patriotism in 
response to past Spanish affronts and abuses. 1 1 4 The 
motivation attributed to Johnston certainly was plausible in 
anyone "indiscreet enough, to say no worse, to advise such a 
measure which may, nay must, throw the Nations, now so 
happily united, again into Confusion" (cited in Ibid., 295). 
Bedford's reprimand illustrates the significance that 
British authorities attached to the establishment of 
friendly relations with Spain at this time. For more on the 
development of what has come to be known as the "Seven 
Years' Peace" (1750-1757) between these traditional enemies, 
see Lawrence H. Gipson, "British Diplomacy in the Light of 
Anglo-Spanish New World Issues, 1750-1757," American 
Historical Review, LI (1946), 627-48, and Jean o. McLachlan, 
Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1666-1750: The Influence of 
Commerce on An lo-S anish Di lomac in the First Half of the 
Eighteenth Century Cambridge, 1940). 
113 I I va. Gaz., 5 24 1751. 
ll4 CRNC, IV, 1308. Johnston's salary actually was in 
considerable arrears. The British Treasury owed him Ll2,000 
at the time of his death and, despite subsequent payments to 
his family, still owed over L2000 by the time of the 
Revolution (Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, 
IV, 193 n. 2). 
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view of the prevailing sentiment on the Outer Banks. After 
all, the armed party that threatened the Guadalupe had 
attracted "great Numbers under a Persuasion that • their 
Attempt would be ••• founded on Justice and well warranted 
by the great losses and injuries which their Country had 
• lately received from the ••• Spanish Privateers."115 
In the face of such righteous indignation, the 
determination and ability of all three colonial governments 
to safeguard the Spaniards and their goods are quite 
remarkable and represent a substantial improvement in the 
efficacy of colonial administration over the earlier period. 
All three governors expressed their intention, in one form 
or another, to act in a manner "Conformable to the Treaties 
of Peace and friendship that happily Subsist between the two 
Crowns." 116 A letter from Governor Lee's successor 
attests to the home government's approval of that 
policy. 117 
British officials were not so pleased, however, with 
Governor Johnston's management of the Guadalupe cargo 
shipment. In response to a complaint registered by the 
Spanish ambassador, British legal authorities determined 
that the "Governor ought not to have Demanded any Duty or 
115 CRNC, IV, 1391. 
llG Md. A., XXVIII, 494; CRNC, IV, 1391-92; COS/1338, 
p. 88. 
117 COS/1338, p. 104. 
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Gratification whatsoever" in arranging for transportation of 
the Guadalupe's effects back to Spain. 118 Despite 
Johnston's protest that any governor who was "Ll2ggg in 
arrear in his Salary would not have behaved so 
abstemiously," the disgruntled official was ordered to make 
full restitution of the funds he had "illegally exacted" 
from the Spaniards.119 
Although by the mid-eighteenth century North Carolina 
had long since become a royal colony, Johnston's behavior 
serves as an indication that his province still lagged 
behind the others in the greater Chesapeake in terms of its 
determination and ability to execute crown policy faithfully 
and expeditiously. Some of these shortcomings may be 
attributed to what Attorney General Child described as "the 
Weakness of Civil Power" in a colony "composed ••• chiefly 
• • • of a set of indigent desperate Outlaws or 
Vagabonds." 12g Obviously, though, part of the problem 
lay, as it had in previous administrations, with the 
governing officials themselves, particularly Johnston in 
this case, who, alone among the governors, was officially 
chastised for his conduct in the 175g episode. Consistent 
with tradition once again, Virginia officials sought to 
distance themselves from the activities of their southern 
118 CRNC, IV, 13g9-11. 
119 Ibid., 13g4, 1311. 
12g Ibid., 13gg, 13g3. 
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neighbors. Stung by news of a rumor circulating in London 
that they, like their Carolina counterparts, had extorted 
"exorbitant Sums of the Spaniards in their Distress," a 
Virginia official expressed the hope that the home 
government would "never believe the Contagion extended 
itself to this Colony.nl21 
Apart from the moral issue of exploiting the imperiled 
Spaniards' vulnerability, the Virginia and Maryland 
governors also acted more professionally and effectively 
than their Carolina counterpart in other aspects of the 
case, such as the unauthorized trading of goods from the 
wrecked ships for local provisions. Governor Johnston's 
complaint about Captain Bonilla's having broken bulk to 
barter for nonessential supplies calls to mind Alexander 
Spotswood's intervention when Collector George Luke was 
about to permit a French ship to trade in Virginia under 
similar circumstances in 1715. Unlike Johnston, who did not 
see fit to become involved until well after the fact, 
Virginia authorities in 175~ maintained a vigilance 
comparable to that of their predecessors earlier in the 
century. Only days after three ships of the battered 
Spanish fleet hobbled into the Chesapeake, and before any of 
the Spanish ship captains made formal application to him, 
Governor Lee acted decisively to prevent any illegal 
exchanges, ordering an officer to board the vessels, examine 
121 COS/1338, pp. 1~4-eS. 
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their papers, and take an inventory of their cargoes. Lee 
further instructed the officer to treat the Spaniards "with 
civility, but not to suffer them to carry on, under the 
Cloak of necessity any illicit trade whatsoever."l22 
Virginia officials appeared poised to exercise the same 
sort of firm authority in prosecuting those who had 
plundered the Galga and Barroso's brigantine. Shortly after 
the governor took decisive action to prevent further looting 
of the wrecks, the Council of Virginia considered Captain 
Huony's complaint that "Effects to the value of some Hundred 
Pounds" had been removed from the warship and that four 
Virginians -- Ralph Justice, William Gore, Thomas Crippen, 
and Thomas Bonnewell (or Bonnewall) -- "were principally 
concern'd in it."123 Although the council enjoined the 
alleged perpetrators to appear before the executive body 
about two weeks later, there is no indication that the 
suspects attended the subsequent meeting. 124 Over half a 
year later, in July 1751, the council ordered the delivery 
of a blank summons to the sheriffs of Northampton and 
Accomack "to be fill'd up with the names of and served on 
122 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll8B.3, 
Folder 43; COS/1338, p. 86. 
123 EJC, V, 337. 
124 Ibid. 
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all Persons who have any Effects belonging to the Spanish 
Ships."125 
This time, the "Several Persons" who had been served 
summonses by the sheriffs did appear before the council, 
although their number and identities are not specified in 
the council journal. Mysteriously, the alleged offenders 
327 
had undergone a remarkable transformation in the eyes of the 
council during the preceding months. Initially branded as 
"Evil Minded Persons" for having plundered the Spanish ships 
"contrary to all Law and Justice," they had since been 
elevated to the status of salvors who, far from being liable 
to prosecution, were to be rewarded for having "saved" the 
Spanish effects by receiving "Ten per Cent for their 
Trouble." 126 A subsequent accounting by the Accomack 
sheriff indicates that among those compensated for their 
"ferridges & exspenses" were William Gore, Ralph Justice, 
and Thomas Bonnewell, three of the four main perpetrators 
identified by Huony.l27 
As a practical matter, granting salvor's fees to the 
wreckers probably represented a judicious compromise. Since 
Maryland authorities already had encountered resistance to 
their efforts to recover the stolen effects, Virginia 
125 Ibid., 347. 
126 Ibid., 36g-61. 
1 27 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll8g.3, 
folder 43, no. 13. 
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officials must have carefully considered the consequences of 
any attempt to indict and convict what may have been a not 
insignificant percentage of the population of the sparsely 
inhabited Eastern Shore. North Carolina Governor Johnston 
had faced a similar dilemma when confronted with an armed 
mob threatening to attack the Guadalupe. Realizing that it 
would have been "absurd and fruitless" to rely on the 
militia for help since it was composed of the very same 
people he was trying to restrain, the governor was forced to 
call on a royal guardship to protect the Spaniards and their 
treasure. 128 Under the circumstances, the Council of 
Virginia probably decided that, by offering the looters a 
salvage fee, it could avoid a potentially violent 
confrontation and, at the same time, achieve the objective 
of recovering the plundered goods. By pretending that the 
looters simply had acted as agents of the government in 
saving and safeguarding the effects of the wrecked ships, 
colonial officials could also give the appearance of not 
having countenanced any wrongdoing. 
Maryland authorities eventually may have decided on a 
similar course of action. Although, as he had done with 
regard to Virginia offenders, Huony specifically identified 
the Marylanders principally responsible for looting the 
Galga in a report to Governor Ogle, the colony's records 
give no indication that the perpetrators ever were called to 
!28 f!!£, IV, 13B0-01. 
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account for their actions. 129 It appears, then, that 
none of the wreckers in either colony were prosecuted or 
even indicted, much less punished, for their roles in the 
affair. The only litigation arising from the plundering of 
the Spanish vessels seems to have been a successful suit 
initiated by a Northampton County landowner against three of 
the wreckers/salvors for trespassing on his property.l30 
To help pay off the judgment, the defendants, Abell and 
George Powell and Michael Nottingham, may have used the 
money they received from a Virginia agent as compensation 
for "assisting to bring ashore the sails & rigging" from the 
Spanish brigantine.l31 
Apart from the willingness and ability of the 
Chesapeake governors to protect the Spaniards and assist in 
the recovery of their goods, other aspects of the 1750 
episode suggest that prevailing attitudes about wrecking had 
not changed that much since the Swift and Garland eras. 
Seaside inhabitants of all three colonies seem to have felt 
few constraints in attempting to help themselves to the 
Spanish effects and, as in previous incidents, a venal (or 
in this case, perhaps simply a discontented) official, also 
sought to profit from the shipwrecked mariners' misfortune. 
129 Md. A., XXVIII, 493. 
130 Northampton County Order Book, vol. 22, pp. 292, 
310, 314. 
131 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm iM.ll80.3, 
folder 43, no. 14. 
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Justice, strictly speaking, actually may have regressed. 
While discipline in the Swift affair amounted to little more 
than token punishment (except for the slave), in 1750 no 
one, despite clear evidence of wrongdoing in situations 
where legal precedent had been well established, was even 
prosecuted. 
The creative solution apparently devised by Virginia 
authorities whereby looted goods were handed over in 
exchange for a salvage fee and some assurance of legal 
immunity calls to mind the sort of practical concession to 
reality that typified the relationships between customs 
collectors, shippers, and the provincial courts. The same 
spirit of pragmatic compromise which dictated that colonial 
officials either "admit of wt security ye Country afforded 
or ••• take none" also applied to those rugged outposts of 
the maritime frontier where ships randomly stranded and 
wrecked. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
"There is no depending upon the men of warr": 
The Guardships 
In a 1683 memorial to the Lords of Trade Virginia 
governor Lord Howard of Effingham cogently explained why it 
was "absolutely necessary" that the English admiralty 
station a royal frigate in the Chesapeake. "All the reasons 
that apply to the despatch of men-of-war to other colonies," 
he asserted, "prevail with double force here." Pointing out 
that "the revenue of Virginia exceeds that of all the other 
plantations put together," Effingham maintained that the 
presence of such a vessel would prevent "all such troubles 
as the late insurrection [Bacon's Rebellion], which cost the 
King's customs dear." Moreover, a ship cruising between the 
Virginia Capes would "check illegal traders and advance the 
King's revenue" not only in the governor's own colony, but 
in Maryland as well. "Finally," he declared, a guardship 
would serve to "put down pirates and be an awe to all 
plantations north of the tropic, especially New England." 1 
Royal Navy and colonial guardships represented the 
first, and sometimes the only, line of defense against 
l CSPC, XI, 11273, p. 5~5. 
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pirates and foreign invaders and the principal means of 
apprehending illicit traders who had managed to fool, bribe, 
or evade local customs officials. But the record of these 
vessels, and the officers and sailors who manned them, was 
hardly an exemplary one, particularly before 1700. Owing to 
a combination of factors -- timid, inept, and corrupt 
commanders; unskilled, unwilling, and undisciplined crewmen; 
unseaworthy, insufficiently manned, and poorly equipped 
ships -- the Chesapeake guardships of the seventeenth 
century were often regarded more as liabilities than assets 
by the colonists and their governors. And when one takes 
into account the absence of a coherent policy on the part of 
the home government concerning the deployment and assignment 
of these vessels, often resulting in intervals during which 
no guardships were on station in the bay at all, then the 
relative ineffectiveness against pirates and illicit traders 
comes as no surprise. 
From 1667, when the first royal guardship cruised on 
the Virginia Station (as the Chesapeake came to be known 
until the end of the colonial period), until the last decade 
of the century the colonies as a whole suffered as a result 
of the diminished status accorded America by English 
imperial policy makers. The home government's conviction 
that the navy's best officers should be sent elsewhere in 
the empire fostered the perception that a post in the 
colonies, taking candidates out of the line of promotion by 
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relegating them to obscurity, represented a professional 
dead end. 2 The admiralty's periodic unwillingness or 
refusal to assign Royal Navy ships and commanders to the 
Chesapeake and other colonial regions did little to 
discourage such thinking. Consequently, Royal Navy 
commanders resisted colonial assignments and those who were 
sent constituted what one historian has described as a "bad 
class of officers which the Government of the day thought 
good enough for American waters." 3 During those periods 
when no royal guardship was assigned to the region, English 
authorities sometimes instructed colonial governors to hire 
local vessels and captains. In the absence of such 
authorization, the colonies occasionally made do with no 
guardships at all. 
The performance of several guardship captains assigned 
to the Chesapeake appeared to confirm whatever misgivings 
the English admiralty may have had about sending them to 
more prestigious stations in the first place. Captain John 
Crofts, commander of H.M.s. Deptford in the mid-16Bes, 
provided the most extreme example of unprofessional conduct. 
Members of the Deptford's crew reported that Crofts was 
chronically drunk, abused the men physically, withheld their 
rations, and fought constantly with his wife. During one 
such altercation, Crofts' wife hurled burning embers from 
2 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 63. 
3 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 25. 
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the hearth across the deck with apparent disregard for the 
danger of fire and the proximity of the powder magazine. 
When the ship's gunner complained, Crofts, who had 
"repeatedly beaten and abused" the man in the past, now 
threatened to "break his head." Unwilli~g to confine such 
rash actions to the mistreatment of his own ship and crew, 
Crofts was also accused of unlawfully detaining merchant 
ships until he had extorted a suitable payment of 
merchandise. Called to Jamestown to account for his 
behavior by Effingham, Crofts threatened the bearers of the 
summons with bodily harm and returned the warrant with an 
impertinent message for the county sheriff. 4 
Where insolence and deplorable conduct were concerned, 
Crofts probably had no peer, but poor judgment and bad 
seamanship appear to have been traits more commonly shared 
by the guardship captains as a group. Their record in the 
Chesapeake attests to a high number of vessel losses, 
groundings, and other shipboard mishaps. In what might be 
considered a logical conclusion to the excesses and 
indiscretions of her commander, the Deptford's career ended 
abruptly when she capsized in a squall and sank in the 
Potomac River in 1688, drowning her captain and eight of her 
crew. The sources conflict, however, as to whether Crofts 
4 CSPC, XII, 11264, 11264 I-IV, VIII, XI-XV, pp. 372-
74; Bruce;-Institutiona1 History of Virginia, II, 182-83. 
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or another officer, Captain Thomas Berry (or Barry), was in 
command of the Deptford at the time of her sinking.5 
In 1691 a successor to the Deptford, H.M.S. ~' 
grounded on a shallow bar in the bay between the mouths of 
the York and Rappahannock Rivers and was saved only through 
the strenuous exertions of local colonists. 6 Several years 
later, Thomas Meech, the former smuggler who turned state's 
evidence and then was given command of a small guardship 
sent to assist the Wolf on station in Maryland, drowned in 
an unexplained accident. When Meech's sloop, which had been 
reported missing for several weeks, was discovered, those 
who boarded the craft found one man dead and another near 
death. 7 The next guardship to serve the bay, H.M.S. Swift, 
wrecked on the coast of North Carolina in 1698. 8 Caught in 
a storm and fearing that the ship would be lost, Captain 
Nathaniel Bostock abandoned the vessel which later washed 
ashore, intact, on a beach near Currituck Inlet. Edward 
Randolph, who had expected the Swift to transport him to 
North Carolina, attributed the mishap to Bostock's 
5 CSPC, XIII, #595, pp. 162-63; Bruce, Institutional 
History-or-virginia, II, 183; Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy, 
46. 
6 CSPC, XIII, #1349, p. 394; Bruce, Institutional 
History-or-virginia, II, 183-84. 
7 Md. A., XX, 367; CSPC, XIV, #2393, p. 654; Stock, 
Debates, II, 111 n. 31; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 
126. 
8 See above, chapter 7, pp. 289-92. 
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carelessness. 9 Two years later the ship sent to replace 
the Swift in Maryland was lost at sea. 10 In the 1709 
incident peculiarly reminiscent of the loss of the Swift, 
another royal guardship, H.M.S. Garland, grounded on the 
Outer Banks near Currituck Inlet where she, too, became a 
total loss. 11 
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Royal and colonial officials not only complained about 
the alleged incompetence of guardship captains but of their 
lack of diligence and cooperation as well. In 1690 the 
president of the Council of Virginia informed the Lords of 
Trade of the new guardship commander's progress in 
recovering the sunken Deptford. "In spite of his promises 
to attempt to raise H.M.S. Deptford," the councilor reported 
with thinly disguised disdain, "Captain Rowe writes to me 
that he was sick and the weather cold and anchors and cables 
insufficient, so that it was impossible to weigh the 
ship." 12 In 1699 Virginia governor Nicholson ordered 
Captain John Aldred of H.M.S. Essex Prize to remain confined 
aboard his ship for refusing to allow a local collector, 
9 Randolph, Letters, V, 204; CSPC, XVII, #202, p. 113. 
1° C05/726, pp. 138-39; Morriss, Colonial Trade of 
Maryland, 126. 
11 CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 5; William Popple to Josiah 
Burchett 4/21/1710, C05/1363, pp. 173-74, 180. See above, 
chapter 7, pp. 290-95. 
12 CSPC, XIII, #787, p. 224. 
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acting on the governor's specific instructions, to board the 
vessel and muster its crew. 1 3 
The reputations of the Chesapeake station commanders in 
the seventeenth century also suffered from a perceived 
reluctance to pursue maritime lawbreakers aggressively. 
Roger Jones, captain of the guardship Katherine, was accused 
of having "struck the King's colours" to pirates without a 
fight in 1683. 14 In 1692 the Council of Virginia charged 
Captain Richard Finch with gross insubordination for his 
failure to comply with orders to cruise diligently against 
pirates who reportedly had been active on the Eastern 
Shore. 15 That same year Edward Randolph complained to the 
Commissioners of the Customs that, within the previous eight 
months, 20 ships had sailed out of the Virginia Capes 
carrying illicit cargoes bound for Holland and Scotland "& 
ye man of warr had not discover'd one."16 Three years 
later Maryland secretary Thomas Lawrence proposed to English 
authorities the appointment of a "muster-master and clerk of 
the check to see that the men-of-war ordered on the service 
l3 C05/1411, fo. 294, 9/4/1699. 
14 CSPC, XIII, *2318, p. 665; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 
453 n. 1~ 
15 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 185. 
16 Randolph, Letters, VII, 365. 
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of these governments ••• keep cruising and not lying in 
harbour." 17 
338 
Lawrence's recommendation conveyed a common criticism, 
articulated in 1698 by Virginia's Benjamin Harrison, that 
although a guardship normally was assigned to the Chesapeake 
by the late seventeenth century, "its journals will shew how 
much time it has spent at anchor in one particular place," 
an idleness which rendered the craft "of little use and 
sometimes prejudicial."18 Dissatisfaction with a naval 
commander's apparent unwillingness to patrol regularly and 
oppose pirates forcefully surfaced again in 1699 when the 
Council of Virginia chided Captain John Aldred for making 
repeated excuses to lie at anchor rather than cruise the 
bay. 19 In reply to Aldred's request for a local pilot to 
assist in navigating his vessel, the governor and council 
responded with obvious irritation, "You have been in these 
parts long enough to be acquainted with the coast, 
especially if you cruised according to orders in the Bay 
last summer • Laying aside all excuses and delays you 
17 CSPC, XIV, #1916, p. 519. 
18 Ibid., XVI, #656, p. 331. 
19 C05/1411, fo. 388, 18/25/1699; CSPC, XVII, #871, p. 
467; i891, p. 495; Bruce, Institutional~tory of Virginia, 
II, 187. 
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are to sail with all possible speed to Chisapeake Bay and 
there cruize." 2 ~ 
339 
Perhaps more damning than the council's intimations of 
incompetent seamanship and lack of initiative in matters of 
defense and law enforcement was the charge that Aldred, who 
maintained stores in various parts of the colony, was too 
preoccupied with his own business affairs to attend to his 
responsibilities as a Royal Navy commander. 21 It was even 
suggested that he was vulnerable to bribery. 22 Virginia 
authorities may have been particularly sensitive in this 
regard because of the conduct of previous guardship captains 
whose proven or alleged improprieties made Aldred's pale by 
comparison. 
In 1692 Virginia officials received a report that 
Captain George Purvis of H.M.S. Wolf had loaded a ship for 
England without entering her and that the vessel had then 
been cleared "contrary to law" by collector and councilor 
Ralph Wormeley. 23 That same year Virginia's governor and 
council charged that Roger Jones, commander of the Katherine 
2 ~ COS/1411, fos. 3~3-~5, 11/11/1699; CSPC, XVII, #947, 
p. 516; Bruce, Institutional History of Virgrnia, II, 187. 
21 COS/1411, fo. 3~~, 1~/25/1699; CSPC, XVII, #891, p. 
495. 
22 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 187. 
23 CSPC, XIII, i2~12, p. 59~; #2SB7, p. 713. Wormeley 
tried to lay the blame entirely on Purvis, although he 
generously allowed that the captain had "acted through 
ignorance" rather than with deliberate intent to defraud the 
customs (Ibid., #172B, p. 527). 
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during the previous decade, ''having early learnt to cheat," 
had defrauded the government by drawing wages for twelve men 
when he only had a crew of eight. Worse yet, the council 
accused Jones of not simply having surrendered timidly to 
pirates, but also of having been "one of themselves," 
conniving with freebooters and shipmasters to disobey the 
Acts of Trade in exchange for handsome payoffs which 
supposedly constituted "the foundation of his great 
estate." 24 One of Jones' successors, the outrageous 
Captain Crofts, was once heard to boast of his intention to 
secure an estate for himself before he left the country. 25 
Toward that end, Crofts used his position to extort money 
and merchandise from innocent shipmasters on at least two 
occasions, boarding their vessels and not allowing them to 
proceed until he had seized quantities of goods or received 
a sufficient bribe.26 
It was undoubtedly as a result of such escapades that 
the Maryland Council, when issuing a commission to Thomas 
Meech in 1695 to cruise against smugglers, explicitly 
stipulated that he should "in no wise molest or trouble fair 
traders but ••• apply himself wholy to the detecting 
24 CSPC, XIII, 12318, p. 665; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 
453 n. 19; Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 
180. 
2 5 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 182. 
26 ~.; CSPC, XII, 11264, #1264 V, XI-XV, pp. 372-74. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
341 
unfair and illegal Traders." 27 Two years later, Edward 
Randolph almost certainly had Jones, Crofts, and other 
Virginia Station officers in mind when he recommended that 
the Commissioners of Trade take care in the choice of future 
guardship commanders assigned to the Chesapeake who may "be 
projecting to enrich themselves by indirect ways: some by 
taking money of the Scotch Traders, and others to connive at 
their frauds ••• or sometimes by oppression and exactions 
upon honest Traders, as has not long since been commonly 
practiced by the Commanders of his Majesty's Frigats in 
Virginia, as several! of the Masters of Shipps ••• have 
just cause to complaine." 2 8 
As bad as the local situation may have appeared, the 
improprieties committed by guardship captains in the 
Chesapeake were merely symptomatic of a more universal 
profligacy on the part of officers in the naval service of 
England and the colonies. A 1692 complaint issued by the 
Commissioners of the Customs to the Lords of the Treasury 
concerning the illegal importation of goods from Holland 
into England aboard Royal Navy ships is instructive in this 
regard. Such activity, the commissioners reported, "gives 
us occasion againe to reflect (as frequently we have been 
constrained to doe), upon the unwarrantable proceedings of 
27 Md. A., XX, 249. 
28 Randolph, Letters, VII, 526. 
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the men-of-war, and their ungovernable carriage in relation 
to the customs." 29 
Partly as a result of the allegations against Crofts, 
Purvis, Aldred, and others suspected of involvement in 
illicit trade or other malfeasance on the bay station, the 
Navigation Act of 1696 specified that all ships, "whether 
the same be his Majesty's ships of war, or merchant ships, 
would be subject to the "same rules, visitations, searches, 
penalties, and forfeitures." 30 Also in 1696, the Lords of 
Trade informed colonial governors that the king had "been 
pleased upon Complaints tht have been laid before him of the 
irregular conduct of Some of the Comanders of his Ships of 
Warr in the Plantations" to order that all guardship 
captains in America be under the direction of the governor 
of the respective colony "during their Continuance 
there." 31 In an effort to suppress smuggling by Royal 
Navy officers the following year, the House of Commons 
considered legislation which specifically forbade captains 
of the king's ships to import into England any goods or 
merchandise regardless of how it was acquired. 32 
29 CTP, I, 233-34. 
30 7 & 8 Wm. III c. 22, VI, Pickering, English 
Statutes, IX, 431. 
31 6 Md. A., XXIII, 2 • 
32 Stock, Debates, II, 220 
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In view of such a blemished record of lackluster 
performance and questionable integrity, government officials 
tended to hold the guardship officers in patently low 
esteem. Lord Effingham reportedly disparaged Captains 
Crofts and Thomas Allen by publicly remarking "My footmen 
would make as good captains as they." 33 Edward Randolph 
expressed similar disdain for Captain Finch and his crew 
whom the surveyor general considered "more fitt to be guards 
at Chatham then sent heither to secure the trade." 34 
Francis Nicholson chided John Aldred for his "willful 
neglect of his Majestys Service" and characterized the 
captain's response to the governor's confinement order as 
too "silly, impertinent, and full of pride and vain glory" 
to warrant a reply. 35 Assessing the reliability of the 
guardships on the whole, Randolph concluded that there was 
simply "no depending upon the men of warr."36 
In fairness to the guardship captains, however, the 
responsibility for this unimpressive record cannot be 
ascribed entirely to the officers' personal shortcomings. 
Apart from the corruption and the failure of too many Royal 
Navy commanders to pursue pirates and illicit traders 
33 Bruce, Institutional His tor~ of Vir9inia, II, 181. 
34 Randolph, Letters, VII, 381. 
35 C05/1411, fo. 295, 9/12/1699; fo. 298, 9/22/1699. 
36 Randolph, Letters, VII, 381. 
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diligently, it is also clear that the guardships often 
operated under handicaps that severely reduced their 
potential effectiveness. Chief among these were 
deficiencies related to both ships and seamen. 
344 
Chronically short of manpower, the naval vessels 
assigned to the Chesapeake often carried crews composed of 
poorly trained, inexperienced sailors, many of whom had been 
drafted involuntarily into the king's service. After an 
encounter with pirates in 17~9 Virginia governor Nicholson 
(who witnessed the engagement from the deck of the 
guardship) remarked that "the Shoreham was very weakly 
manned, several of her men appearing raw and unskilful, and 
there being many boys amongst them." 37 Nicholson's 
assessment of the quality of seamen aboard the royal 
guardship not only had implications for the navy's ability 
to beat off pirates, but also to defend against foreign 
enemies and interdict illicit traders. Two historians have 
commented in this last regard that smugglers were "the best 
sailors and watermen in the world -- better far than the men 
of the Navy, many of whom had been pressed from various 
sedentary occupations."38 
The guardships themselves were equally problematic. 
Just as the English admiralty was reluctant to assign its 
best officers to the Chesapeake station so, too, was it 
37 ~' XVIII, #493, p. 239; i591, p. 3~2. 
38 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, I, 183. 
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unwilling to send its better ships to patrol the bay or to 
maintain them properly once they arrived. Colonial 
governors and councils often dismissed persistent complaints 
by Royal Navy commanders about unseaworthy and ill equipped 
ships simply as excuses for inactivity, but the documentary 
record indicates that many of the vessels assigned to the 
bay station actually were in poor condition and lacked 
essential gear and supplies. 
In 1667 the first guardship assigned to the Virginia 
Station, the Elizabeth, required extensive refitting shortly 
after her arrival in the Chesapeake. 39 In 1691 local 
inspectors determined that the timbers of H.M.S. Dunbarton 
had rotted to the point that the hull was no longer 
serviceable. Unable to comply with admiralty orders to 
return the man-of-war to England, the captain had no choice 
but to have the vessel broken up at Tindall's Point on the 
York River. 4 ~ When the replacement guardship, Henry 
Prize, arrived later that year Captain Finch asserted that 
she was an unseaworthy and dangerous vesse1. 41 Two years 
later Edward Randolph reported that "the Man of Warr lyes up 
39 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 337. 
4 ~ CSPC, XIII, #1132, p. 335; #1164, p. 34~-41; #13~2, 
#13~4, p:-382; #13~8 I, p. 383; #14~3, p. 411; #1583, p. 
473. 
41 EJC, I, 231, 232; CSPC, XIII, #2167, p. 62~, #26~~, 
p. 734; XIV, #21, p. 14. 
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in the freshes of James River unfitt for service.n42 In 
1699 Captain Aldred expressed grave concerns about the 
"great leakiness" of the Essex Prize which, he contended, 
contributed to the vessel's "very weak and defenceless 
Condition" overall.43 
In addition to the unsatisfactory condition of many 
346 
guardships, it also appears that some were unsuited or ill 
equipped for the functions they were required to perform. 
The arrival in late 1699 of the advice boat Messenger as the 
bay region's new royal guardship, for instance, inspired 
negative comment throughout the Chesapeake. Maryland 
governor Nathaniel Blakiston was particularly outspoken, 
declaring that "it was a miracle of Providence she ever got 
within the Capes, she is so small and low" and explaining 
that, since there was "not a moneth or two at most in the 
year that she can go out of the Capes to have the prospect 
of coming in again," she could provide virtually no defense 
for the coast. 44 The Council of Virginia resolved not 
even to issue any orders to the vessel's captain until the 
following spring, "the Messenger not being big enough to 
42 Randolph, Letters, VII, 445. 
4 3 C05/1411, fos. 297-299, 10/20/1699; EJC, II, 9. 
44 CSPC, XVIII, #85, p. 55; #459, p. 263; #523 xv (3), 
p. 315. 
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cruize in Chisapeake Bay, and therefore of no use to this 
Government." 45 
Nor were size and condition the only problems 
347 
associated with the Chesapeake guardships. The fair traders 
of Maryland and Virginia complained in 1694 that the draft 
of most guardships was too deep to cruise against 
smugglers. 46 Captain Finch described the Henry Prize as a 
"heavy sailer and ill roader" which, if true, would have 
constituted a serious disadvantage for a vessel required to 
chase maritime outlaws and also lay at anchor for extended 
periods in open waterways. 47 Even so consistent a critic 
of the guardship commanders as Edward Randolph conceded lhat 
"the Alburrow Ketch ••• sayles like a dung boat" and 
warned that "the lords of the Admiralty by sending such 
ships put their Maties to a great charg." 48 In 
recommending to the king the appointment of one man-of-war 
each to Virginia and Maryland in 1699 to pursue pirates and 
prevent illicit commerce, the Lords of Trade urged that 
"especial care ••• be taken that they be good sailers, 
• because the strong currents in them seas do render any bad 
45 Ibid., XVII, 11~70, p. 576. 
46 Ibid., XIV, il005 I, p. 279. 
47 EJC, I, 231. John Aldred experienced a similar 
problem,-aitributing the leakiness of the Essex Prize partly 
to having "strained ye Bows of his Ship in riding at Anchr" 
(COS/1411, fo. 283, 3/8/1699). 
48 Randolph, Letters, VII, 381. 
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sailers altogether useless for the forementioned 
services." 49 
Occasionally, as was the case with attacks by Dutch 
348 
fleets in 1667 and 1673 and Captain Aldred's encounter with 
pirates in 1699, guardship commanders found that their 
vessels were simply outgunned and outmanned, rendering them 
powerless, or nearly so, to prevent the depredations of 
freebooters and foreign enemies. 50 After avoiding a 
confrontation with buccaneer John James in 1699, Aldred made 
a point of certifying to Governor Nicholson that the sea 
robbers had 26 guns and 130 men while the Essex Prize 
carried only sixteen cannon and a crew of 60 and was "but 
ordinarily provided to make a close fight." 51 The 
officer's portrayal of his vessel as too small and weak for 
service in Virginia prompted the colonial council to 
petition the king for a ship of sufficient force to defend 
the region against pirates.52 
4 9 CSPC, XVII, #29, p. 16. The well travelled pirate 
William Dampier also drew particular attention to the 
"Channel between the 2 Capes of Virginia" as a maritime 
thoroughfare through which "the Tides do run very swift" 
(Dampier, Voyages, II, 307). 
5° CSPC, V, 11545, pp. 490-91; XVII, #693, p. 382; 
#719, p.~; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 338-39. 
51 C05/1411, fo. 290, 291, 7/29 and 7/30/1699. The 
clerk who transcribed the captain's disclaimer referred to 
it in the margin notes as Aldred's "Certificat of ••• 
Weakness" (John Aldred to Francis Nicholson, C05/1411, 
7/26/1699). 
5 2 CSPC, XVII, #693, p. 382. 
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Many of these shortcomings reflected a more fundamental 
problem on the policy-making level: the failure to define 
precisely the objectives that the guardships were expected 
to pursue. Were they to serve primarily as warships to 
defend the region against pirates and foreign invaders or 
were they to operate principally as revenue cutters to 
detect and apprehend illegal traders? In practice, they 
could hardly accomplish both. The exigencies of coastal 
defense called for large, well-armed vessels to repulse the 
incursions of powerful enemies. Patrolling against 
smugglers, on the other hand, required the use of small, 
maneuverable craft with the ability to chase lawbreakers 
into the shallows, creeks, and small inlets where they 
sought sanctuary and conducted illegal business 
transactions. 53 
What was really needed, as Virginia governor Alexander 
Spotswood explained in a letter to the Board of Trade in the 
early 1720s, was two vessels, "a 40 or 50 Gun Ship ••• to 
Convoy our Merch't Ships out to Sea and a smaller Vessel, 
such as a Sloop or Brigantine, to pursue little puckaroons 
in Shoal Water where a great ship cannot come at them"~ 
these, he indicated, "would be very serviceable towards the 
Security of our Trade and driving the Pirats from this 
Coast." 54 The home government apparently had come to 
53 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 341. 
54 Spotswood, Letters, II, 350. 
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appreciate the need for two different types of guardships in 
the bay by 1694 when it authorized both the Maryland and 
Virginia governors to supplement the existing force, 
consisting of the large and well-armed Dover Prize, by 
employing one or more ships of 40 tons or less to cruise 
against illicit traders.55 
The presence of these two types of vessels might have 
succeeded in deterring much of the illicit maritime activity 
conducted in and around the bay, had it not been for the 
difficulties encountered in consistently maintaining two 
guardships, or even one, on the Virginia Station for any 
length of time. Although the first guardship assigned to 
the Chesapeake arrived in 1667, it was not until 1684 that 
the admiralty assigned Royal Navy vessels to the bay station 
on a regular basis. 56 Even then, however, a chronic 
shortage of large ships in the English navy and, on the 
Virginia Station, unexpected losses due to navigational 
errors and the physical deterioration of ships resulted in 
periods during which the bay lacked a sufficiently powerful 
vessel for its protection, much less for the prevention of 
illicit trade. During some intervals, such as those that 
55 CSPC, XIV, il511, p. 399. In 1702 Maryland governor 
Blakiston added his voice to those who supported deployment 
of smaller vessels against illicit trade, arguing that "a 
sloop will be of more use than a Man of Warr, by reason she 
is small and can runn into any of those Creeks and Coves 
where Sculking Traders have frequented" (C05/726, p. 138). 
56 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 340. 
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followed the condemnation of the Dunbarton and the wreck of 
the Swift, it appears that the bay lay completely 
unprotected. 
The late seventeenth-century administrative 
reorganization that resulted in the establishment of the 
Board of Trade and passage of the Act for Preventing Frauds 
and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade appears to 
have ushered in an era of substantial improvement in the 
guardship service. After 1700 the Virginia Station 
generally benefited from better ships, more competent 
commanders, and a stronger and more consistent naval 
presence. Dramatic victories such as that achieved by 
Captain William Passenger of the Shoreham over French 
marauder Lewis Guittar in 1700 and Lieutenant Robert 
Maynard's momentous defeat of Blackbeard in 1718 symbolized 
the royal government's determination to rid colonial waters 
of the pirate scourge and demonstrated an enhanced 
capability to do so. 
Despite these improvements, however, some of the 
problems of the previous century persisted. The bay station 
continued to suffer periodically from an insufficient number 
or, less frequently, a total absence of guardships to 
provide military protection and trade act enforcement. In 
June 1707 Maryland governor John Seymour indicated that the 
Chesapeake had been without the protection of any guardship 
for the previous year. Praying for the timely arrival of 
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the "Man of Warr which this Country has long uneasily 
expected," Seymour complained that, in the meantime, both 
Maryland and Virginia had been rendered "obnoxious to the 
Insult of any Rascally Pyrate or Privateer who may come and 
go & burne what Shipping happe[ns] to be in the Countrye at 
pleasure."57 
The Virginia Station was left unprotected for much of 
1708 and 1709, when H.M.S. Garland was ordered to convoy the 
tobacco fleet to England, and for several months in late 
1709 and early 1710 after the Garland wrecked on the 
Carolina coast, causing the Council of Virginia to lament 
that "by the fatal loss of her Majesty's Ship • this 
Country is again left naked and defenseless against the 
insults of the Enemys Privateers." 58 The replacement 
guardship, H.M.S. Enterprise, arrived shortly thereafter but 
had to sail to New York to refit and was then called away to 
the Bahamas before returning to the bay. 59 
Naval demands elsewhere during Queen Anne's War 
deprived the Chesapeake of her two guardships in the winter 
of 1711-12 and the bay was left similarly devoid of 
protection in 1716 and 1717 when the Royal Navy vessel then 
on station was assigned to track down pirates in South 
57 CRNC, I, 667; CSPC, XXIII, #975, p. 472; Md. A., 
XXV, 267-.--- ----
58 EJC, III, 229, 231; CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 5; il54, p. 
57; Middleton, Tobacco Coast~7-48. 
59 CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 4; #208, p. 84. 
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Carolina. 60 Although public safety was undoubtedly their 
foremost concern, colonial officials were also aware of the 
opportunities that the absence of guardships offered for the 
proliferation of illicit trade. As Virginia governor 
Spotswood reported in reference to contraband trafficking 
with the Dutch West Indies in 1710, "It is very apparent 
that the want of guardships here so frequently, has given 
great encouragements to the carrying on of this Trade." 61 
Colonial authorities also continued to complain 
occasionally about the inadequacy of the guardships on 
station for certain tasks. Just as large vessels had proved 
ineffective in the pursuit of illicit traders who retreated 
to the safety of shoal waters in small craft, so too, as 
Colonel Jennings of Virginia reported to the Board of Trade 
in 1709, were sizable guardships unable to apprehend enemy 
privateers that resorted to the same evasive tactic. 62 It 
was for this reason as well as to impede smuggling that 
Governor Spotswood recommended in 1710, and again a decade 
later, that the home government maintain a man of war on 
station constantly and that they also supply "a sloop or 
6 0 Ibid., XXIX, 1239 i, p. 138; 1595, p. 317; EJC, III, 
443, 444; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 216; Middleton, 
Tobacco Coast, 351. 
61 Spotswood, Letters, I, 10. 
6 2 ~' XXIV, 1765, p. 480; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 
348-49. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
354 
other small Vessell well fitted and manned ••• to attend 
the Guard-ship."63 
In 1716, with the increase of pirate activity after 
Queen Anne's War and in response to reports that Caribbean 
freebooters were gravitating toward Florida to "fish" the 
Spanish treasure ships recently wrecked there, Spotswood 
also recommended that the admiralty send another warship to 
protect the merchant trade and "to attack those pyrates in 
their Quarters before they grow too formidable." 64 When 
his plea went unheeded Spotswood repeated the request the 
following year, citing the sea brigands' greatly increased 
strength and the damage that the colony's trade had suffered 
as a result. The guardship then on station, he reported, 
was in no condition to pursue the buccaneers and, even if 
she had been, would still require additional support. 65 
As the_pirate threat grew more acute toward the end of the 
decade, the Council of Virginia, the House of Burgesses, and 
Captain Whorwood, commander of the guardship Rye, joined the 
governor in appealing to the admiralty for more powerful 
ships and support vessels. 66 
6 3 Spotswood, Letters, I, 10; II, 350. 
64 Ibid., II, 168-69. 
6 5 Ibid., 246, 249. 
66 JHB, 1712-26, pp. 310-11; EJC, III, 550; Dodson, 
A1exander-8potswood, 219-20. 
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With the decline of piracy in the 172~s and the decade 
of unprecedented peace that followed between England and her 
national rivals in America, the Chesapeake did not require a 
guardship for military protection. The renewal of 
hostilities with Spain and France in the 1740s, however, 
called for a continual naval presence in the bay which the 
admiralty, much to the distress of the colonists, was unable 
to provide on a regular basis.6 7 
Colonial governors also complained from time to time 
that naval commanders were inattentive to the needs of the 
colonies whose waters they patrolled. The eighteenth 
century began rather inauspiciously for the guardship 
officers as Virginia governor Nicholson admonished Captain 
Aldred in 17~~ to "make ye Kings Service your Principal 
Case, & not absent yor Self from yt to follow other private 
concerns." Exasperated by Aldred's persistent failure to 
cruise despite repeated pleas and threats, Nicholson 
insisted that the commander either set sail within ten days 
or come to Jamestown so that Aldred and his men could be 
discharged "and his Majesty no longer put to an unnecessary 
expense." 68 Several years later, following a 
comprehensive examination of maritime law enforcement in the 
Chesapeake, newly appointed surveyor general of the customs 
for the southern colonies Robert Quary recapitulated several 
6 7 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 357. 
68 COS/1411, fo. 3~6, l/4/1799. 
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of the complaints that had dogged the guardship service in 
the previous century: "ye Capts. are above all command and 
do find one pretence or another always to be at anchor; when 
she should be cruising, she is out of order, her men 
wanting, ye Capt. sick etc."69 
In 171~, by contrast, council president Edmund Jennings 
commended the captain of the Royal Navy vessel on station 
for his diligence in patrolling the bay and coast against 
enemy privateers. 7 ~ But when Governor Spotswood asked the 
Board of Trade to assign an additional guardship to the 
Virginia Station later that year, his specific request for a 
"diligent Commander, or one that had some suitable 
encouragement offered to quicken him in his duty" suggests a 
continuing skepticism regarding the caliber and dedication 
of officers normally assigned to the post. 71 
The governor's doubts hardly were allayed the following 
year when the captain of the Chesapeake guardship declined 
to provide an armed naval force to suppress insurgents in 
the Cary Rebellion in North Carolina. "Because Mr. Cary's 
chief strength consisted in his Brigantine and other 
Vessells w'ch he had filled with armed men," Spotswood 
explained in a letter to Lord Dartmouth, "I endeavoured to 
obtain some help ••• from her Majesty's Ship of War here, 
69 CSPC, XXI, illS~ ii, p. 739. 
7~ COS/1363, p. 33. 
71 spotswood, Letters, I, 15. 
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but the Comodore of the homeward bound Fleet judging it the 
least part of his duty to do any service to this Country, 
refused to afford me any such assistance."72 Also irked 
about the guardship captain's refusal to help transport 
provisions to New York for use in a military expedition to 
Canada, the governor added that "this is not the only 
Disappointment the obstinacy of the Commodore has occasioned 
to her Majesty's service."73 
The conclusive defeats inflicted by Royal Navy 
personnel on the pirate crews of Guittar and Blackbeard 
probably offset such criticism to a considerable degree. 
Though these episodes suggest an elevated degree of resolve 
and proficiency among guardship officers in the eighteenth 
century, the stunning victory over Blackbeard also, 
ironically, served to highlight a number of shortcomings in 
the naval service of the Chesapeake. 
Acknowledging the bravery exhibited by Lieutenant 
Maynard and his crew in defeating the pirates in bloody 
hand-to-hand combat, contemporary author Daniel Defoe 
nevertheless wondered why it had taken the Royal Navy so 
72 Ibid., 84. 
73 Ibid., 86. Spotswood was not alone in believing 
that the guardship commanders cared little for the well 
being of the colonies to which they were assigned. In 1718 
Philadelphian James Logan wrote to the governor of New York 
concerning the pirate threat, "We are in manifest danger 
here, unless the king's ships (which seem careless of the 
matter) take some notice of us~ they probably think a 
proprietary government no part of their charge" (Watson, 
Annals of Philadelphia, II, 218). 
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long to engage the sea brigands in the first place. 
Reminiscent of earlier complaints about the reluctance of 
guardship personnel to pursue pirates aggressively, Defoe 
reproachfully mused, "'tis strange that a few Pyrates should 
ravage the Seas for Years, without ever being light upon, by 
any of our Ships of War; when in the mean Time, they (the 
Pyrates) shall take Fleets of Ships; it looks as if one was 
much more diligent in their Affairs than the other." 74 
The author also cryptically suggested that the reason the 
"Men of War had lain up these ten Months whilst the Pyrates 
infested the Coast, and did great Mischief" was that the 
guardship captains and Governor Spotswood had "their Secret 
Views" in the affair. 75 Defoe evidently was intimating 
that these royal officials knowingly permitted Blackbeard to 
accumulate a hoard of booty, intending all along to profit 
personally from its eventual seizure and confiscation. 
The insinuation was probably unfounded as far as 
Spotswood was concerned, but contained elements of truth 
with regard to the guardship commanders. 76 Contrary to 
74 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 5. 
75 Ibid., 93. 
76 Though the rumors about Spotswood appear to have had 
no basis in fact, the governor's political adversaries in 
the Virginia assembly nevertheless did not hesitate to 
exploit the accusations. A 1719 paper prepared by the House 
of Burgesses charged that Spotswood, "understanding that 
there was a good deale of money and a great many Negroes in 
the case, ••• persuades the King's Men of War to Surprise 
and Kill the men within the Country of Carolina, and to 
Seize the goods and to bring them away to Virginia, where he 
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Captain Brand's orders, Maynard distributed some gold 
discovered aboard Blackbeard's ship as a prize of war to the 
victorious crew. Given the risks these men had taken and 
the hardships they had endured, Maynard's action is 
understandable, if not, from the point of view of strict 
naval discipline, entirely excusable. Brand and George 
Gordon, captain of the other Royal Navy ship from which the 
crew for the Blackbeard expedition was recruited, 
subsequently reprimanded Maynard and ordered that all the 
seized effects be distributed according to rank amongst the 
entire companies of the Pearl and Lyme without distinction 
to actual participation in the battle. Naturally, Brand and 
Gordon would have been the primary beneficiaries of such an 
allotment. 77 
Critics of the Blackbeard action also pointed out a 
serious miscalculation or oversight on the part of the 
officers who planned the attack. According to Defoe, 
had them condemned as Pyrats goods, tho' taken within the 
time limitted in the King's Pardon, and the Money not put 
into the hands of the King's officers as it ought to be but, 
immediately into his own hands, in hopes grants will be more 
easily obtained of it, than if it were to come thro' the 
Treasury" (VMHB, XXII, 410 n., 414-15). 
77 George Gordon to the Board of Admiralty, Adm 1/1826, 
9/14/1721; Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 87. In a letter 
to the admiralty Gordon claimed that, far from seeking to 
enrich himself, he, at least, had distributed "every 
farthing" of his share among the actual expedition members. 
Unconvinced of Gordon's sincerity, however, Maynard 
petitioned the king regarding the "unreasonable and unjust 
Method" employed by his superior officers in "disposeing the 
bounty monney" (George Gordon to the Board of Admiralty, Adm 
l/1826, 9/14/1721). 
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Blackbeard's destruction "was entirely owing to the Conduct 
and Bravery of Lieutenant Maynard and his Men, who might 
have destroy'd him with much less Loss, had they had a 
Vessel with great Guns." 78 Maynard's own account of the 
battle is said to confirm that Blackbeard's heavier 
firepower put his ship at a serious disadvantage. A modern 
analyst has pointed out that Captains Brand and Gordon 
should have obtained intelligence regarding the pirate's 
arsenal and armed Maynard's expedition accordingly. That 
they failed to do so represented "another instance of brave 
seamen losing their lives because of the ignorance or 
oversight of their superior officers."79 
The documentary record does not suggest, however, that 
such tactical blunders were a common feature of the 
guardship service in the Chesapeake after 1700. But other 
indiscretions continued to tarnish the reputations of 
guardship commanders. Although no Virginia Station captain 
emerged to rival John Crofts in egregious and unscrupulous 
behavior, colonists and royal officials continued to 
criticize guardship officers and crews on both sides of the 
78 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 82. 
79 Arthur L. Cooke, "British Newspaper Accounts of 
Blackbeard's Death," VMHB, LXI, 307. Perhaps it was as a 
result of this oversight that when Micajah Perry and others 
trading to Virginia petitioned the admiralty to outfit some 
vessels to attack pirates the following spring, the 
merchants specifically requested that the ships be armed 
with "Pataroras" (patareros), or anti-personnel guns, "for 
the Said Service" (Admiralty Board Minutes, Adm 3/32, 
6/10/1710). 
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Atlantic for pursuing their own financial interests to the 
detriment of colonial security, crown revenues, or the 
livelihoods of those engaged in legal trade. 
In fact, one of the most blatant abuses was perpetrated 
by none other than Captain Ellis Brand upon his return to 
England from the Chesapeake in 1719. In clear defiance of 
the act of 1696 which made Royal Navy ships subject to the 
same rules of search and visitation as English merchant 
vessels, Brand refused entry below decks to British customs 
officials, cursing them as "a Parcel of scoundrel villains" 
for attempting to fulfill their legal obligations. 80 
Whether the captain was concealing pirate plunder or 
commercial contraband (or perhaps both} is unclear, but, in 
either case, his conduct would not have been unusual. In 
1727 Robert Byng, official Solicitor of the Droits of 
Admiralty, reported that "the accounting for the goods of 
pirates has been most shamefully neglected. The Governors 
of Plantations and commanders of the ships of war have 
seized the goods and kept them for their own private 
benefit. When the Captains of H.M. ships of war seize goods 
of pirates they refuse to account for them at home, or to 
agents, and the greatest part is not accounted for." 81 
8 0 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 131. 
81 ~' VI, 476; Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 
118-19. 
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The extent to which guardship captains in the 
Chesapeake actually engaged in illicit trade in the 
eighteenth century is uncertain, but by the end of the 
second decade colonists and merchants were complaining that 
some navy officers had neglected the defense of the coast in 
order to seek profit in personal trading ventures.8 2 The 
Virginia burgesses specifically charged that the "Commanders 
of his Majesties Ships have frequently deserted the Station 
which they were sent on purpose to protect, and under 
pretence of Stress of Weather have Sailed to Barbadoes New 
York or Some of the other Plantations upon their own private 
Business." 83 In a letter to the Earl of Orrery in 1719, 
William Byrd succinctly articulated the injustice and irony 
of a situation in which the home government, in effect, was 
subsidizing guardship captains to undermine the colonial 
merchant trade: 
our Captains of Men of Warr are so intent on Trade 
that they neglect their Stations, and contrive to 
be blown away to the Country whither their 
Traffick calls them. This is so great an Abuse 
that the Nation is at the Expence of building and 
maintaining Ships of War, for the enabling the 
Commanders of them to ruin the fair Traders in the 
Country where they come. For these Gentlemen pay 
neither freight nnor Custome, nor run any risque, 
82 JCTP, 1718-22, p. 238; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 
211; Doty, British Admiralty Board, 77. 
83 JHB, 1712-26, 261, 311. Also in 1714, the Council 
of Barbados complained about a contraband trade being 
conducted by the commander of H.M.S. Sorlings with the 
French island of Martinique for wine and brandy (CSPC, 
XXVIII, #31, p. 14). 
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Byrd's analysis underscores a problem that originated 
in the seventeenth century but worsened in the eighteenth. 
Perceiving the guardship commanders as unfair business 
rivals was certain to lead to resentment, but tension in the 
relationship between colonists and the Royal Navy was, by 
Byrd's time, neither new nor restricted to those involved in 
the merchant trade. Obviously, the excesses of captains 
like Jones and Crofts did little to endear them to the 
colonists whose interests, at least to some degree, they 
were supposed to serve. Instead, the actions of such men 
may have helped to create an impression in the minds of 
Chesapeake inhabitants that guardship personnel were less 
their protectors than their nemeses and, conversely, that 
maritime lawbreakers were less to be shunned than to be 
collaborated with and abetted. 
Besides Jones and Crofts, a number of Royal Navy 
commanders contributed to a legacy of bad faith with the 
colonists. On at least two occasions guardship captains 
enlisted the help of local inhabitants during emergencies 
using false or exaggerated promises of rewards as 
inducements. In 1691, after the vigorous efforts of local 
Virginians saved the grounded guardship Wolf, Captain George 
Purvis failed to make good on the assurances of financial 
84 VMHB, XXXII 25 I o 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
364 
remuneration he had offered so freely when the vessel was in 
danger of becoming a total loss. Purvis' duplicity caused 
an uproar that threatened the peace of the colony, requiring 
government officials to resort to extreme measures 
attempts to garnish Purvis' wages and place a lien on his 
personal property -- in order to force the captain to 
pay. 85 A similar situation developed in 1710 after the 
loss of the Garland when Governor Spotswood was compelled to 
pay some North Carolina salvors "who were necessitous and 
consequently most Clamourous, finding themselves 
disappointed of the great rewards promis'd them by Capt. 
Cook." Spotswood further indicated "that all the stores 
saved • were entirely owning to the care and labour of 
the Country people, and that none of the Sailors would give 
the least Assistance therein."8 6 
Inadequate discipline on the guardships, evident in the 
conduct of sailors ashore and shipboard, provided another 
source of friction between the colonists and the navy. 
Among the many criticisms of Captain Aldred was one that, on 
the pretense of victualling, he lodged the crew of the Essex 
Prize on shore more often than aboard ship. This practice 
85 Admiralty Board MinuteD, Adm 3/6, 1/20/1691/92; 
CSPC, XIII, #1680, p. 516. Purvis' behavior apparently did 
nor-improve after his departure from the Chesapeake. By 
1695 English officials had issued orders to court-martial 
the guardship captain on charges of irregular conduct and 
embezzlement in the West Indies (Stock, Debates, II, 84 n. 
3) • 
86 Spotswood, Letters, II, 23. 
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led to "great Complaints by ye Inhabitants of thefts 
committed by ye Seamen" and charges that the mariners were 
responsible for creating disturbances to the peace at 
night. 87 Royal Navy sailors made comparable nuisances of 
themselves in late 1709 when William Wilson, naval officer 
of the Lower James River district, reported that "diverse of 
the Seamen" who had been brought to Hampton from the wrecked 
guardship Garland had been "very rude to the Inhabitants 
forceing from them Victuals and entertainment." 
Anticipating the possibility of further trouble, the Council 
of Virginia ordered Wilson and the justices of Elizabeth 
City County to imprison the offenders should they "offer any 
Violence" to local citizens. 88 
Fortunately for the colonists, Royal Navy officers did 
not make a habit of allowing sailors to roam ashore freely 
for extended periods. Apart from the incidents noted and a 
time in 1744 when large numbers of seamen and Negroes were 
blamed for many of the "Sundry Robberys, Insults and 
Disturbances" that had occurred in Norfolk, residents of the 
Chesapeake generally were spared the worst behavior of Royal 
Navy personnel.89 
87 C05/l411, fo. 300, 10/25/1699; EJC, II, 15-16. 
88 ~' I, 230. 
89 Wertenbaker, Norfolk, 8-9; Brent Tarter, ed., The 
Order Book and Related Papers of the Common Hall of NorfOlk, 
Virginia 1736-1798 (Richmond, 1979), 63 n. 7. 
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One fatal exception to this rule occurred in 1692 when 
the boatswain and a sailor from the frigate Assurance 
committed the "barbarous Murther" of Captain William 
Marshall, a Hampton resident and Elizabeth City justice of 
the peace. 90 Having administered a severe beating to 
Marshall on shore, the seamen brought him back to their ship 
where the surgeon dressed his wounds and the captain saw to 
it that he was given a comfortable berth. The next morning 
Marshall could not be found, presumably having been thrown 
overboard during the night. News of the incident so enraged 
the colonists, according to Edward Randolph, "that they 
would have fallen upon all the saylers of that frigott" had 
they been given the opportunity. 91 Although it appears 
that the captain was not an accomplice to the brutality, the 
incident nevertheless demonstrates the poor discipline that 
characterized many of the Royal Navy ships on the bay 
station and elsewhere in the English empire. 92 
90 Randolph, Letters, VII, 389; Marvin w. Schlegel, 
"The Shire or County of Elizabeth City, 1634-1700" in The 
History of Lower Tidewater Virginia, Rogers D. Whichar~ 
ed., 2 vols. (New York, 1959), I, 129. 
91 Randolph, Letters, VII, 389. 
92 Ibid., n. 416. In the immediate aftermath of the 
event the guardship captain hypothesized that Marshall, 
"being strange to the ship, • • • must have fallen 
overboard" during the night on his way to the "head," but 
Randolph's belief that the colonist's disappearance was the 
result of foul play was corroborated by a subsequent 
investigation. Two crew members of the Assurance were 
convicted of Marshall's murder and sentenced to death, but 
ultimately reprieved (EJC, I, 296; CSPC, XIII, #2331, p. 
668; #2593, p. 731). - --
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Apart from the animosity engendered by the periodic 
abuses and indiscretions of captains and sailors, the most 
consistent source of conflict between guardship personnel 
and colonists involved the inseparable dilemmas of 
undermanning, desertion, and impressment. The problem of 
undermanning had become acute as early as 1692 when Edward 
Randolph reported that "the ship Henry Capt £finch Commander 
has not 30 able men aboard" out of a normal complement of 
7e. 93 Much of the Henry Prize's crew had deserted to 
North Carolina, a situation which Finch hoped to remedy by 
soliciting the Council of Virginia's help in apprehending 
the runaway sailors. 94 When Captain Aldred came under 
fire in 1699 for his failure to take aggressive action 
against pirates, he complained that the Essex Prize was not 
sufficiently manned to attack the invaders because his 
seamen were continually abandoning the ship. 95 Although 
H.M.S. Shoreham managed to prevail in its battle with the 
pirate vessel La Paix the following year, Governor Nicholson 
observed that the guardship lacked sufficient manpower 
93 Randolph, Letters, VII, 396. 
94 CSPC, XII I, #2177, p. 623; #2388, p. 683; EJC, I' 
231-32. 
95 CSPC, XVII, #265, p. 149. 
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during the engagement to handle the sails and man the guns 
simultaneously.96 
The high desertion rate was undoubtedly due, in large 
measure, to factors which traditionally have been cited as 
characteristic of service in the Royal Navy during this 
period: poor living conditions; low pay; and unevenly 
applied, often harsh, and sometimes lethal discipline. 97 
According to Maryland secretary Thomas Lawrence, pirates 
arriving in the Chesapeake with "large sums" of Red Sea 
treasure induced not only local colonists, but "also many of 
the men from the King's ships" to join them. 98 Edward 
Randolph reported that many young Englishmen specifically 
enlisted aboard English convoy ships to the Chesapeake "to 
avoid being press'd into His Mats Service at home" and that 
they did so with the intention of deserting once they 
reached the bay. Most of these sailors then shipped 
themselves aboard other vessels, but some came ashore where 
they were "harbour'd and concealed by the Planters in the 
Country." 99 
96 Ibid., XVIII, i403, p. 239; i501, p. 302. 
97 See, for example, Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 295, 
304; Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 32-33, 126, 259; and Stout, 
Royal Navy, 138. 
98 CSPC, XIV, il916, p. 519. 
99 Randolph, Letters, v, 126; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 
295. 
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Desertion continued to be a problem in the eighteenth 
century. In early 1710 Virginia officials reported that the 
survivors of the Garland wreck had "with drawn them Selves 
into other parts of this Colony" in order to avoid serving 
aboard the recently arrived replacement guardship, H.M.S. 
Diamond. 10 0 Council President Edmund Jennings and, 
later, Governor Spotswood issued proclamations forbidding 
the harboring of runaway seamen and in October 1710 the 
Virginia assembly passed a bill establishing rewards for 
capturing deserters and penalties for sheltering them. 101 
After the bill's two-year term elapsed it was reconsidered 
and made perpetua1.1~2 
The guardship captains were not satisfied with the 
observance of the law's provisions, however. As a result of 
their complaints the governor issued another proclamation in 
1717 insisting that the officers of the colony make certain 
to enforce the statute. 1 ~ 3 Despite the legislation and 
public notices, the following year Captain Gordon of the 
1~~ EJC, III, 574-55. 
l~l Hening, Statutes, III, 486-89; Spotswood, Letters, 
I, 56. 
1 ~2 Hening, Statutes, IV, 46; JHB, 1712-26, 51 ff.; 
Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 212. 
1 ~ 3 EJC, III, 458. 
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Lyme reported having lost "a great many" of his men on the 
Virginia Station through desertion.l~4 
Perhaps it was the naval commanders' annoyance with 
colonists who harbored deserters or, as Randolph alleged, 
conspired to "allure or entice any Sailor [&c] from his 
service abord ship" that enabled the officers to justify the 
impressment of men from the colonial ranks.l~5 More 
likely, the navy men felt they needed no justification 
beyond the imperative to man their vessels adequately. 
Whichever was the case, there can be no doubt that 
impressment and the harboring of deserters fostered a mutual 
resentment between colonists and guardship officers that 
escalated in the eighteenth century. 
Impressment was causing problems on the Virginia 
Station as early as the last decade of the seventeenth 
century. In 1695 Edward Randolph observed that shipmasters 
"mett with Great Difficulties in loding their tobacco either 
by their Saylers deserting their Service, or by ye Comanders 
of his Maties Shipps of Warr pressing them." Many of the 
104 George Gordon to the Lords of Admiralty, Adm 
1/1826, 3/1~/1718. Besides attracting pirates to the North 
American continent, the lure of treasure from the Spanish 
plate fleet wrecks off the Florida coast also precipitated 
wholesale desertions from a royal guardship in the spring of 
1716. Having lost ten men in two days to salvage crews, the 
captain of H.M.S. Diamond reported that had he remained in 
the area a week longer, he would have lacked enough men to 
sail the vessel home, his sailors "being all mad to go a 
wrecking" (~,XXIX, 1158 iv, p. 80). 
105 Randolph, Letters, V, 127. 
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merchant sailors were being impressed for service aboard the 
guardships that escorted the tobacco fleet to England during 
King William's War. But the shortage of manpower induced by 
the press meant that some merchant ships were unable to load 
the tobacco in time to weigh anchor with the fleet "so 
that," as Randolph reported, "the Convoy left 25 Sayle of 
vessells last yer.re exposed to ye Danger of 
Privateers."106 How bitterly ironic it must have seemed 
to the shipmasters that the guardship captains sent to 
provide a safe escort for their vessels were the same ones 
responsible for depleting the crews of the tobacco ships, 
thereby effectively preventing the merchant vessels from 
participating in the convoy.l 07 
Four years after Randolph made his observation, Captain 
Aldred of the Essex Prize provoked the ire of Virginians by 
impressing several colonists, contrary to Admiralty orders, 
on his own authority. 108 Mary Rickets objected to the 
106 Ibid., 124-25; CSPC, XIV, #2261, p. 643. 
1° 7 Impressment, of course, was greatly resented (and 
sometimes vehemently opposed) in other English colonies as 
well. In 1696 the Council of Barbados complained to the 
governor that "the decay of the Island's trade proceeds from 
the pressing and ill-using of the seamen, and other great 
abuses of the press, that the King's ships never come out 
fully manned" (CSPC, XIV, #2251, p. 641). 
l08 Early in 1697 the Lords of Admiralty informed 
Francis Nicholson that naval commanders in the Chesapeake 
were no longer permitted to press local seamen on their own 
authority. In case of manpower shortages they were to apply 
to the colonial governor for assistance (Admiralty to 
Francis Nicholson, C05/1411, 1/26/ 1696/7). Aldred's 
Admiralty instructions, issued prior to his departure from 
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abduction of her fiancee, "one Sykes," and two local 
business operators complained that Aldred had impressed men 
under their employ because of a personal grudge. 1 ~ 9 
Shipper John Minson stated that the master of one of his 
sloops had been drafted because of "Aldred having some 
difference with him." 11 ~ Ordinary keeper William Smolt 
was more specific, claiming that Aldred had pressed a 
carpenter who was working for him because the proprietor 
would not entertain Aldred's seamen in his tavern. 111 
The Council of Virginia ordered Aldred to discharge the 
men and instructed him in the future not to impress any 
sailors from inward bound ships; the councilors did permit 
him, however, to take one seaman from each outward bound 
vessel with a crew larger than twelve. 112 When Captain 
Passenger arrived in the Shoreham later the same year he was 
ordered not to impress men on his own authority but to 
England for the Virginia Station, included a specific 
warning not to impress colonists himself, but to seek the 
help of "our Vice admiral," the governor of Virginia, should 
he require additional sailors (Ibid., Admiralty instructions 
to Captain Aldred, 9/14/1697). ----
1~9 C05/1411, fo. 296, 9/15-19/1699. 
ll~ The dispute may have involved "pilotage" services 
rendered over seven months earlier for which, Minson 
charged, Aldred had failed to pay (Ibid.). 
lll Ibid. 
112 EJC, II, 43; ~' XVIII, 1152, pp. 8~-81. 
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petition the governor for any conscripts he might 
require. 113 
Passenger deferred to the wishes of council only to 
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have his own and the governor's authority challenged by an 
irreverent young merchant ship captain. The naval commander 
gave Nicholson an account of "the many threats of the law 
and other scurrilous language I met with by executing your 
warrant ••• by one Tregenny, master, who said he valued 
not your order, there was no law for pressing, and if the 
ship came to damage he would lay it to my charge." 
Passenger described the merchant craft skipper as nothing 
more than a "young uppish spark, fitter for a school than a 
master of a ship." But the navy officer was sufficiently 
alarmed by the young man's threat to express anxiety that 
Tregenny might "wilfully or through ignorance" run the 
merchant vessel aground with the result that Passenger would 
be "liable to be laid in jail for it" when he returned to 
England. Indeed, the guardship commander's apprehension 
impelled him to cite a precedent, a case in Barbados where 
locals reportedly prosecuted the captain of H.M.S. Deptford 
for impressing men despite his having received "express 
orders from the Admiralty" for doing so.l14 
113 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 188. 
ll 4 CSPC, XVIII, i523 xv (14), pp. 316-17. Documented 
cases of outright defiance of royal authority on the high 
seas or coastal waterways of the greater Chesapeake are 
relatively rare, but they did occur, or at least were 
alleged, from time to time. In addition to the Two Brothers 
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As a result of similar problems elsewhere in America, 
British authorities extended the policy of restraint to 
other colonies in the Act of 1707, a statute that prohibited 
naval commanders from impressing colonists on their own 
authority and required them to apply to the colonial 
governors to assist with manpower deficiencies. 1 1 5 The 
legislation apparently was enacted solely as a wartime 
measure to encourage trade, but Anglo-Americans tended to 
regard it as a universal condemnation of impressment. 
Although British Attorney General Edward Northey rendered 
his judgment in 1716 that the statute had expired, the 
colonists continued to believe that it remained in 
effect. 116 
Confusion and disagreement over whether or not the law 
was still in force insured that the impressment issue would 
become a major source of contention between colonists and 
guardship personnel, leading to violence and charges of 
lawless behavior on both sides. The dispute lay dormant 
affair in Edenton harbor mentioned in chapter 4, Harry 
Beverley, a Virginian who had been deputed to cruise local 
waters against illicit trade, reported a similar incident in 
1695. Attempting to examine a vessel in Maryland's Severn 
River, Beverley testified that he was confronted by 20 or 30 
members of a hostile crew who "appeared ••• with drawn 
swords, giving me a great many abusive Words & Swore We 
should not come on Board." Richard Hill, captain of the 
merchant ship, subsequently denied the allegations (Md. A., 
XX, 322, 324). 
115 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 115. 
116 Ibid., 116-18. 
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during the peaceful 1730s but flared up again in the next 
decade after the outbreak of the wars of Jenkins' Ear and 
the Austrian Succession. Once again, undermanning and 
desertion created an increased demand for impressment. In 
1742 Captain William Gordon of the royal sloop Hound 
reported from Virginia that he had been plagued by a severe 
manpower shortage ever since his arrival on the bay station, 
his predecessor having left him "most miserably mann'd with 
thirty short of complement." Compounding the problem were 
the "too frequent desertions in this Colony" which Gordon 
attributed to "the high Wages offer'd by Merchant men the 
natural unsteddiness of Seamen and ••• the great number of 
Gallons of Rum which the Masters never fail to promise," all 
of which, the naval commander grumbled, had "weight enough 
with our unthinking people to make them leave."ll7 
Gordon appealed for assistance to Governor Gooch who 
responded by issuing a proclamation declaring that the 
king's ships stationed in Virginia had been "so disabled and 
weakened" by desertions "as not to be in a Condition to 
defend the Coast and Trade, from the Insults of the Enemy" 
and requiring officers and citizens to "use their utmost 
Diligence to detect and apprehend all such Seamen."118 
The edict seems to have had a chastening effect on the 
11 7 William Gordon to Board of Admiralty, Adm l/1829, 
12/30/1742. 
118 Adm 1/1829, 12/15/1742. 
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deserters and their abettors, but it did not entirely 
resolve Gordon's dilemma.ll9 
376 
Six months later the guardship officer acquainted the 
Admiralty Board with what he described as "the greatest 
grievance that ever happen'd to his Majesty's Officers in 
Foreign parts." What had so unnerved Gordon was that "a few 
inconsiderate inconsiderable little traders under the 
managements of a lawyer of the same stamp" had resolved to 
prosecute any guardship captain who dared to impress a 
sailor in Virginia, even if the mariner was a deserter from 
the captain's own ship. In fact, the Royal Navy officer 
indignantly affirmed, a fellow commander had been brought up 
on just such a charge and Gordon himself had been issued a 
summons for allegedly impressing men from an outward bound 
ship, an accusation that he emphatically denied. 120 
The guardship captain also complained of having been 
served a writ by a merchant who threatened to "trounce" him 
for crimping "three Vagrants at a little bawdy house" in 
Hampton even though local justices of the peace had 
sanctioned the impressment. Gordon conceded that the 
"Governor, Councell, and Better sort" were all "highly 
averse to prosecutions of this kind," yet these individuals 
did not act as decisively to curtail the legal harassment as 
ll9 William Gordon to Board of Admiralty, Adm 1/1829, 
12/30/1742. 
120 Ibid., 6/9/1743. 
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the captain would have liked. 121 The admiralty, however, 
did not hesitate to remind Governor Gooch that the 1707 Act 
was no longer in effect and insisted that he put a stop to 
all such proceedings against guardship officers.122 In 
November Gordon reported that the merchants had dropped the 
lawsuits and thanked the Lords of the Admiralty for their 
"speedy regard to the representations of their officers" 
which he felt would probably discourage similar litigation 
in the future. 123 
By foreclosing on the colonists' legal options, 
however, British authorities once again were merely treating 
a symptom of the impressment problem and failing to address 
its causes. Manpower deficiencies in the Royal Navy 
persisted, guardship officers continued to crimp, and the 
colonists remained adamant in their opposition. If 
Virginians could no longer readily harbor deserters or 
resort to judicial means of redress, they found other means 
to thwart or resist the press. 
On September 10, 1744 the Council of Virginia read a 
letter from Lord Banff "Complaining of a riotous and 
tumultuous Behavior of the Inhabitants of • Norfolk 
towards himself & the People belonging to the Ship under his 
121 Ibid. 
1 22 EJC, v, 134; ooty, British Admiralty Board, 119. 
123 William Gordon to Board of Admiralty, Adm 1/1829, 
11/21/1743. 
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Lordships Command." 124 Ten days later the council 
appeared to strike a pose conciliatory to the naval 
commander by ordering Norfolk officials to restrict the 
distribution of arms "upon any Allarm" and requiring local 
magistrates and militia commanders "diligently to discharge 
their Duty in preserving the Peace ••• and to give all 
necessary Assistance to His Majestys Ships of War." 125 
And yet the council, which Captain Gordon had 
characterized as generally sympathetic to the plight of 
guardship officers, also recommended sending a letter to 
Banff which would allot a full share of blame for the 
incident to the commander and his men. The proposed letter 
also, incidentally, shed some light on the nature of the 
disorder since Virginia officials asserted their conviction 
that the fracas had been occasioned by Banff's "Men entering 
the Town in such a Multitude armed with Clubs" and expressed 
the hope that "his Lordship will never permit his People to 
come a Shore in any such Number or Manner" again.l 26 
Though the exact causes and details of the disturbance 
remain obscure, it seems likely that Banff's group 
constituted a press gang and, even if it did not, that the 
citizens of Norfolk perceived it as such. 
124 EJC, V, 158. 
125 Ibid., 161; Tarter, ed., Norfolk Order Book, 62-63. 
126 EJC, V, 161-62. 
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An incident the following year illustrates how 
colonists could resist the press in a less confrontational 
way. In March 1745 Captain Richard Gwynne of the royal 
sloop Falcon sent his lieutenant aboard the merchant ship 
Allen "to Impress for his Majesty's Service all that was 
liable thereto." After a muster and thorough search of the 
ship produced only "the Officers and a few Boys," the 
lieutenant discovered (merely through the coincidental 
arrival of a local man with the getaway craft) that the 
officers had permitted the sailors to "Run away" in one of 
the ship's boats. Incensed "after their Lordships good help 
and Indulgence to the Officers in protecting them from the 
Press, that they should Encourage unprotected Men to 
escape," Captain Gwynne advised the Admiralty Board that he 
had detained the Allen's boatswain and carpenter pending 
notification of their lordships' pleasure in the 
matter. 127 
As was the case in 1744, however, Chesapeake colonists 
did not always seek to avoid conflict in opposing 
impressment. In 1749 a Captain Norbury complained of the 
rough treatment he received at the hands of local residents 
for pressing four vagrants in Norfolk. This time the 
Admiralty was not as supportive as it had been of William 
Gordon six years earlier. With the advent of peace and in 
1 27 Richard Gwynne to Board of Admiralty, Adm l/1830, 
3/11/1745. 
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recognition of a heightened level of colonial opposition to 
the press, the Lords of Admiralty admonished Norbury "to 
behave more discreetly and not render his Majesty's service 
disagreeable to his subjects."l28 
Guardship officers may have exercised poor judgment at 
times and neglected their duty to engage in questionable 
enterprises at others, but they were hardly alone among 
influential royal and proprietary officials in the 
Chesapeake to do so. Just as the improprieties of some 
commanders merely reflected a more widespread profligacy in 
the officer corps of the Royal Navy on the whole, so too, 
were such abuses the products of a system and an age in 
which corruption was countenanced, practiced, and even 
encouraged by many of the king's most distinguished servants 
in both the home and colonial governments. 
128 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 122. 
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CHAPTER IX 
"Perhaps the Mismanagement and Abuses of the ••• Officers 
have Driven them to it": Conclusion 
It is one of the ironies of maritime lawlessness in the 
greater Chesapeake that the royal officials assigned to 
monitor and enforce imperial policy and regulations 
habitually derided bay area residents for their direct or 
supporting roles in wrecking, freebooting, and smuggling, 
but rarely stopped to consider the ways in which official 
connivance and corruption at all levels of imperial 
administration, including their own, contributed to the 
problem. A telling illustration of how pervasive the 
problem was, and how oblivious to it some crown officers in 
the colonies were, is the situation in which Governor 
Spotswood, indignant over John Holloway's legal defense of 
pirates, addressed his complaint to British Secretary of 
State James Craggs. If the secretary was unresponsive to 
Spotswood's grievance, as appears to have been the case, it 
was very likely because he was preoccupied with his own 
predicament, the imminent bursting of the South Sea Bubble 
381 
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in whose fraudulent schemes Craggs soon would be heavily 
implicated. 1 
Considering the extent of corruption in English 
government during the colonial era, is it any wonder that 
many colonists would regard pirates, contrabandists, and 
382 
wreckers as no more opportunistic or immoral than those who 
sought or pretended to bring these "criminals" to justice? 
In this respect many Chesapeake residents probably did not 
dismiss as mere rhetoric pirate captain Samuel Bellamy's 
cynical and contemptuous observation concerning British 
authorities that "they villify us, the scoundrels do, when 
there is only this Difference, they rob the Poor under the 
Cover of Law, for sooth and we plunder the Rich under the 
Protection of our own Courage." 2 
As was the case with the introduction of piracy, 
illicit trade, and wrecking in the early American colonies, 
the example of the home government, its overseas agents, and 
other English notables in overlooking, sponsoring, or 
actually engaging in maritime illegality continued to 
influence the attitudes and behavior of Chesapeake 
1 Spotswood, Letters, II, 305 n. 80; Carswell, South 
Sea Bubble, 219, 229, 234-35; Sperling, South Sea Company, 
35. The secretary of state died of smallpox while under 
investigation and his father, James Craggs, Sr., committed 
suicide the night before he was to appear before Parliament 
to explain his own role in the scandal (Spotswood, Letters, 
II, 305 n. 80; Sperling, South Sea Company, 35; Carswell, 
South Sea Bubble, 243-44). 
2 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 587. 
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inhabitants throughout the colonial period. While royal and 
colonial authorities typically ascribed primary 
responsibility for the commission of such transgressions to 
the planters, shipmasters, and residents of the greater 
Chesapeake, Benjamin Harrison and others offered an 
alternative explanation. If the colonists were indeed 
guilty of lawlessness on their maritime frontiers, Harrison 
suggested, "perhaps the mismanagement and abuses of the 
government and the officers have driven them to it." 3 
Since residents of the bay region seemed to require 
little prodding in that direction, the Virginia attorney 
probably overstated his case in asserting that "so long as 
the evil was tolerable, duty and loyalty ••• kept them 
[the colonists] from doing these things which they saw the 
officers encouraging." 4 Nevertheless, the significant 
number of local customs agents and colonial officials who 
did engage in various forms of corruption obviously failed 
to set the sort of example that English authorities hoped 
the colonists would emulate. Most disturbing of all, from 
the perspective of those royal officials genuinely concerned 
with maritime law enforcement, was the inescapable reality 
that such behavior was not restricted to officials of 
council rank and below. 
3 CSPC, XVI, i656, p. 332. 
4 Ibid. 
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Allegations of graft and corruption on the part of 
royal governors in the greater Chesapeake date back at least 
to William Berkeley's tenure in Virginia. In addition to 
Giles Bland's charges concerning the governor's alleged 
involvement in illicit trade, Berkeley apparently availed 
himself of at least one other morally questionable profit-
seeking opportunity. The issue concerned a custom that 
developed sometime around the mid-seventeenth century that 
shipmasters arriving at Eastern Shore harbors would leave a 
present of wine or provisions for the governor with the 
local collector. Although the practice never was mandated 
by law, Berkeley insisted on its observance, pointedly 
reminding a collector in 1667 that he had not received his 
annual presentation.s 
The custom surfaced as an issue once again, this time 
in a somewhat more controversial context, nearly a half 
century later. When Governor Spotswood was accused 
anonymously in 1716 of various charges related to customs 
abuses (most of which appear to have been without any 
foundation), he was obliged to admit that he had accepted 
one fee not specifically warranted by law, "the Governour's 
Dues at the Cloasing out of Shipping." The rationale that 
Spotswood offered in his own defense was revealing. This 
particular perquisite, he insisted, had "been allow'd of 
even from beyond the memory of Man" and had been "constantly 
5 Wise, Kingdome of Accawmacke, 298. 
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receiv'd" by all of his predecessors. 6 Whether due to 
Berkeley's exertions or those of succeeding governors, the 
custom evidently had become institutionalized over the 
years, establishing a precedent for officially sanctioned 
opportunism which could not have had an edifying effect on 
the colonists. 
Unfortunately for the crown (and, sometimes, the 
colonists as well), the passive acceptance of unsanctioned 
benefits represented only one of the milder forms of alleged 
gubernatorial impropriety in the maritime sphere. Among 
critics of the governors' laxity in seeking to curtail 
smuggling and, more disturbingly, their occasional promotion 
of, and even direct participation in, illegitimate maritime 
affairs, Edward Randolph was, as usual, particularly 
outspoken. Having commended Virginia governor Nicholson in 
1692 for seizing a vessel that collector John Custis had 
permitted to trade illegally, Randolph remarked that the 
effect on contrabandists and corrupt customs agents would be 
to cause them to worry that henceforth the governor would no 
longer "leave the business of ye Customs to their manage 
onely" as previous chief executives Lord Culpeper and 
Effingham had done. 7 
Maryland chief executives were hardly exempt from 
criticism either. Besides the charges of fostering and 
6 Spotswood, Letters, II, 192. 
7 Randolph, Letters, VII, 348-49. 
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conducting illegal trade frequently levelled at Lord 
Baltimore and his subordinates, in 1693 the surveyor general 
accused the new royal governor, Lionel Copley, of permitting 
Scotsmen and New Englanders to conduct illicit trade 
directly to Scotland. 8 Randolph further alleged that 
Copley played an active role in securing acquittals for 
three ships which the customs official had seized for trade 
law violations. 9 In addition to the governor's support of 
Potomac River collector Nehemiah Blakiston in extorting 
"extravigant fees" from shipmasters, the surveyor general 
charged that the chief business of Copley's "second Jacall," 
Patuxent River collector (and subsequently Maryland attorney 
general) George Plater, was "to plye for wine Brandee for 
the Gonr amongst the ships."10 Similar complaints 
continued to be voiced in the eighteenth century. In 1717 
Annapolis resident Thomas Macnemara accused Governor John 
Hart of importing "in partnership with some of the principal 
inhabitants wines sugar, etc. from Lisbon contrary to 
the Acts of Parliament." Macnemara attributed the success 
of the smuggling venture to Hart's having "so farr awed or 
8 Ibid., V, 142-43. 
9 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 127. For 
Copley's indignant and ranting rebuttal to the "base and 
ignominious aspersions" allegedly concocted by Randolph's 
"hot and inveterate brain" see Md. A., VIII, 335. 
1 0 Randolph, Letters, VII, 374, 378. 
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influenced the Customs Officers, that they required no entry 
to be made of the said goods."ll 
Randolph was no more complimentary in his assessment of 
the governors of North Carolina whose "grievous oppressions" 
were said to include "their exacting extravagant Fees from 
Masters of vessells • • • Whereby lawfull Traders have been 
wholly ruined." 12 During the same period, James Blair and 
Benjamin Harrison accused Governor Edmund Andros of 
attempting to sabotage crown efforts to suppress illicit 
trade in Virginia. 13 When the royal government issued 
orders for the Maryland and Virginia governors to hire a 
local vessel to cruise against smugglers, Harrison alleged 
that Andros purposely contracted the vessel "at a very great 
rate" and drew the funds not from the Treasury's account but 
from the colony's standing revenue so that the whole project 
"might be as burdensome as possible and therefore soon laid 
aside." 1 4 The promotion of illicit trade by governors 
from colonies outside the region further compromised the 
crown's ability to control such activity in the greater 
11 CSPC, XXX, #289, p. 141. Hart subsequently informed 
English authorities that he could find no evidence of 
contraband commerce between Maryland and any of the French 
colonies, but there appears to be no record of his having 
made any direct refutation of Macnemara's charge regarding 
illegal trade with Portugal (CSPC, XXX, #417 i, p. 201). 
12 Randolph, Letters, V, 271. 
13 Perry, Church Papers, 14; CSPC, XVI, #656, pp. 
331-32. 
14 CSPC, XVI, #656, pp. 331-32. 
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Chesapeake. In 1692 mariner Thomas Smith submitted an 
affidavit to the officers of the Liverpool Customs House 
indicating that he had navigated a sloop from Bermuda, in 
accordance with orders from the island's governor, to 
Maryland and from there, in clear violation of the trade 
laws, straight to Ireland and Scotland. 15 
In addition to revealing participation in, and 
encouragement of, activities directly antithetical to the 
Acts of Trade, the documentary record occasionally offers 
glimpses of other assorted improprieties committed by 
colonial governors in the maritime sphere of the greater 
Chesapeake. In 1726, for example, former North Carolina 
governor George Burrington was indicted for breaking into 
the home of Edenton resident Thomas Parris. Burrington 
allegedly had threatened to murder Parris and his family, 
but the ex-official's wrath was directed more 
388 
"particularly," it seems, toward another resident or guest 
of the household, local customs collector Adam 
Cockburne. 16 A 173e suit initiated by North Carolina's 
advocate general reveals that another former governor, 
Charles Eden, had failed to submit the king's share of whale 
oil and bone recovered in the colony during his 
administration, an embezzlement of funds which, over a 
1S Ibid., XIII, #2719, p. 752. 
16 NCHCM, 1724-173e, 227. 
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ten-year period, amounted to an estimated loss of L2gg9 in 
crown revenue.l7 
As serious a problem as gubernatorial corruption and 
misbehavior was, it hardly constituted the only high-level 
obstacle to effective law enforcement in the maritime 
sphere. The exertion of influence by socially and 
politically well placed individuals and interest groups and 
the uneven application of justice that resulted certainly 
must have contributed to an erosion of the public's faith 
in, and respect for, the colonial extension of the English 
legal system. The pirate adventure of Henry Munday, member 
of a prominent Maryland tobacco trading family, offers a 
case in point. 
In the summer of 1709, Munday returned to America from 
a trading voyage to Africa where, he reported, his ship had 
been plundered by pirates. 18 The story was convincing 
enough to induce Maryland governor Nathaniel Blakiston to 
issue a proclamation, in advance of Munday's arrival in the 
colony, calling for the pirate captain's apprehension. But 
Munday subsequently aroused the governor's suspicion when he 
entered the Patuxent River with a full cargo of 300 slaves, 
suggesting to Blakiston that the shipmaster "had been no 
great sufferer as he had represented to the Board." 19 A 
17 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no. 24. 
18 CSPC, XVIII, #694, #694 iii, pp. 462, 465. 
19 Ibid., #694, p. 462. 
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search of the vessel additionally revealed a quantity of 
"money and plate" which Munday had neglected to report to 
customs officials. 2 ~ 
Whether the captain and his men obtained the goods 
(which, as it turned out, had been seized from a Royal 
African Company ship) by overpowering the pirates or 
colluding with them is unclear, but Blakiston concluded 
that, in any event, Munday was "more guilty than any of 
them" and his actions "more notorious than any."21 
39~ 
Despite the governor's further conviction that the 
shipmaster also deserved "to be secured more than any," it 
does not appear that Munday was ever prosecuted, a 
circumstance evidently related to the influence of an 
English special interest group. 22 Describing his own 
reluctance to pursue the matter, Blakiston explained that he 
was "always very tender and cautious of giving any just 
grounds to the merchants at home to think they have the 
least difficulty put upon them; for if Munday should be 
secured it might be a means of the ship's miscarrying." 23 
The influence of London merchants also may have played 
a role in both advancing the career of Lower James River 
district customs collector Richard Fitzwilliam and 
2 ~ Ibid., #694 ii, p. 463. 
21 Ibid., #694, p. 462; #694 ii, p. 463. 
22 Morriss, Colohial Trade of Maryland, 131. 
23 ~' XVIII, #694 ii, p. 464. 
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protecting him from charges of corruption in office. The 
report that Alexander Spotswood submitted to the 
Commissioners of the Customs in 1719 not only detailed the 
Virginia governor's personal knowledge of various abuses 
allegedly committed by Fitzwilliam, but also referred to 
representations against the collector "from other hands, 
particularly from the Capt's of the Men of War, who have but 
too much reason to Complain of his behavior in Countenancing 
Pirats," including the specific charge that Fitzwilliam had 
been dealing with Blackbeard.24 
Normally, denunciations by a well respected governor 
and Royal Navy commanders would have been more than 
sufficient to ensure the removal of a mere local customs 
agent from his post. Fitzwilliam, however, was neither 
discharged nor even reprimanded. In fact, his professional 
standing does not appear to have been diminished in the 
least, as his subsequent appointments to the influential 
offices of surveyor general of the customs for the southern 
colonies and governor of the Bahamas clearly demonstrate. 
To what may this remarkable resilience and invulnerability 
to criticism be attributed? Spotswood hinted obliquely at 
the answer when he asserted that the residents of 
Fitzwilliam's customs district would have petitioned crown 
authorities "unanimously" for the collector's dismissal had 
24 Spotswood, Letters, II, 328i Karraker, Piracy was a 
Business, 2~8i Lee, Blackbeard, 156. 
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they not been "aw'd by ye Interest he boasts of, and the 
fear of worse usage upon his return" from a voyage to 
England. 25 
392 
The "Interest he boasts of" almost certainly referred 
to the same group of British merchants whose exorbitant 
freight rates, opposition to measures designed to encourage 
colonial shipbuilding, fulminations against the exportation 
of bulk tobacco from the colonies, and excessive profits at 
the Chesapeake planters' expense had earned them the 
antipathy of many bay area inhabitants. If Richard 
Fitzwilliam had indeed cast his lot with the London traders 
and was indebted to them for his success, he demonstrated 
his gratitude by consistently supporting their commercial 
interests during his tenure as surveyor general. When in 
1729-3~ Virginia planters sought, with Governor Gooch's 
support, to repeal Parliament's prohibition against the 
importation of tobacco stripped from the stalk, Fitzwilliam 
placed himself in the forefront of those opposed to the 
colonial position. 26 Among those who stood to lose the 
most from the proposed repeal were, of course, the English 
merchants whose freight revenues would have been reduced 
significantly had the initiative succeeded. Fitzwilliam has 
also been identified as the principal adversary in England 
of the governor's momentous tobacco inspection act, regarded 
25 Spotswood, Letters, II, 328. 
2 6 Flippin, William Gooch, 27 and n. 67. 
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by many in the colonies and the home country as the best 
hope for resuscitating the severely depressed Chesapeake 
economy. 27 Once again, historians point to the surveyor 
393 
general's influential connections in England as the factor 
which enabled him to oppose a royal governor with impunity, 
a stance which in part earned him the opprobrium of Gooch 
and the Virginia burgesses as a "turbulent Spirit unfit for 
Society." 28 
But if Fitzwilliam had his detractors in the colonies, 
he also had his supporters. Two of his principal allies 
bear names which also, curiously, were associated with 
maritime lawlessness in the greater Chesapeake. When the 
House of Burgesses voted on a petition to remove the 
surveyor general from the Council of Virginia, it was 
Speaker John Holloway, the Williamsburg attorney disparaged 
by Governor Spotswood as a "constant patron and Advocate for 
Pirates," who cast the deciding vote in Fitzwilliam's 
favor. 29 After the measure was defeated, fellow 
councilor John Custis, son and namesake of the corrupt 
Eastern Shore customs officer, wrote to England to assure 
27 Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial System 
1689-1733, 164; Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 41. 
2S COS/1322, p. 64; Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 
45. 
29 Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 41; Spotswood, 
Letters, II, 354; CSPC, XXX, #See, p. 430. 
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the royal customs agent that his allies were protecting 
Fitzwilliam's interests faithfully during his absence. 3 ~ 
Similar connections between individuals known or 
394 
believed to have been involved in various forms of illegal 
maritime activity in the gieater Chesapeake are not 
uncommon. North Carolina governor Charles Eden, for 
example, a principal beneficiary of Blackbeard's freebooting 
and the officiating magistrate at the pirate's wedding, had 
a friendship of sufficient intimacy with the Williamsburg 
attorney and legislator who infuriated Alexander Spotswood 
with his defense of pirates that Eden saw fit to bequeath 
"his Negroe Boy Taphy to the said Govr very good Freind John 
Holloway Esqr in Verginia." 31 Tobias Knight, the North 
Carolina secretary and customs official upon whose property 
Blackbeard's booty was discovered, is said to have consorted 
closely with Virginia collector and alleged Blackbeard 
associate Richard Fitzwilliam. 3 2 
3~ Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 44. 
31 CRNC, II, 538. 
32 Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 163. Fitzwilliam 
also served in the late 172~s on the commission to survey 
the North Carolina-Virginia boundary. Not only did he anger 
Governor Gooch with his insistence on being paid as much as 
the other commissioners, though he quit the survey well 
before the others, but also because he favored the 
proprietors' interest in establishing the border, a stance 
which could be interpreted as a further indication of the 
customs agent's close ties with Carolina officials 
(C05/1322, p. 65). 
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Henry Irwin, the Virginia collector who apparently 
embezzled confiscated pirate effects with which he had been 
entrusted, acted as an agent in a 1728 North Carolina land 
purchase for Samuel Swann, very likely the same Samuel Swann 
called to account four years later for suspected "Male 
Practice" in neglecting to condemn a small vessel that he 
had seized in his capacity as a local customs collector.33 
Due to the existence of two or more Samuel Swanns during 
this period, there is, admittedly, some uncertainty over 
whether the venal official was the same person who was 
involved with Irwin. 34 Even if they were different 
individuals, however, they belonged to the same family 
which, coincidentally, also included William Swann, the 
Carolina customs agent whom Virginia officials accused of 
misappropriating effects and charging excessive fees in 
connection with salvage activities conducted on the wreck of 
H.M.S. Garland. 
One set of suspicious relationships extended beyond the 
confines of the greater Chesapeake to include the home 
country as well. Robert Quary, the former pirate 
collaborator who succeeded Edward Randolph as surveyor 
general, was friendly with Micajah Perry, the prominent 
33 Jones, Present State of Virginia, 242 n. 219; CRNC, 
II, 767; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 43, 45, 47, 50, 
51. 
34 Powell, ed., Dictionary of North Carolina Biography, 
VI, pending. 
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English merchant who in 1689 submitted a petition to English 
authorities seeking a pardon on behalf of three pirates 
apprehended in the Chesapeake. 35 As one of the most 
powerful London merchants in the tobacco trade, Perry quite 
likely belonged to the same group of English traders who 
used their influence to prevent Henry Munday from being 
prosecuted and who, years later, promoted the career of 
another aspirant to the surveyor general's post, Richard 
Fitzwilliam. Like Perry, Fitzwilliam (whose position on the 
Council of Virginia, it should be recalled, was secured by 
pirate defender Holloway's vote) also sought to obtain a 
pardon for a sea brigand, the convicted and condemned pirate 
John Vidal in 1727.36 
The connections between individuals linked with one or 
more forms of maritime illegality reflect an inherent 
interrelationship between the various types of lawlessness 
themselves. Obviously, bartering with pirates for foreign 
booty or removing similarly uncustomed goods from a 
shipwreck constituted trade law violations in a technical 
sense, but a more conscious and intentional tie also 
existed, a circumstance which some royal and colonial 
authorities clearly recognized at the time. Edward 
Randolph, for instance, noted the association in his 
35 NCHCR, 1702-1708, xxi; ~' XIII, #60, p. 19. 
36 CSPC, XXXV, #707, p. 353; VMHB, XXXII, 242. 
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repeated references to North Carolina as a haven for both 
pirates and illegal traders. Near the end of the 
seventeenth century one English official linked the two most 
troubling forms of maritime lawlessness even more clearly by 
characterizing piracy and illegal trade as 11 the beloved 
twins 11 of New York merchants.37 
By 169~, one scholar has observed, the only growth 
areas in the New York economy were those related to Red Sea 
and Indian Ocean freebooting enterprises. 38 The 
Chesapeake also participated in eastern piracy, both 
directly and indirectly, as was apparent in the Henry Munday 
episode and in Governor Spotswood's unpopular efforts to 
send shipmasters accused of trading with Red Sea pirates 
back to England for trial. Predictably, the involvement of 
bay area residents in both local and distant pirate ventures 
paralleled not only that of fellow Anglo-Americans, but also 
one of the Chesapeake's most active and regular illicit 
trading partners, the Dutch of Curaiao. The Caribbean 
island served not only as a clearinghouse for contraband 
3 7 Cited in Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 46. In 
this particular regard, it is worth noting that an 
inspection of Blackbeard's sloop after the battle with Royal 
Navy forces in 1718 reportedly revealed correspondence 
between the pirate captain, North Carolina Governor Charles 
Eden, colonial secretary Tobias Knight, and some New York 
traders, indicating not only the trade/piracy connection, 
but suggesting cooperation between the greater Chesapeake 
and other Anglo-American colonies in its pursuit (Defoe, 
History of the Pyrates, 83). 
38 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 37. 
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trade goods but pirate plunder as well. Edward Randolph 
reported that freebooters from the Red and South Seas 
regularly conducted illegal commerce with "Carasaw and other 
ill places" and the Earl of Bellemont complained that, 
although the governor of the Dutch island pretended "great 
innocence or ignorance • there was never anything • • • 
so publicly managed as the sale of [pirate captain William] 
Kidd's spoils there."39 
If illicit trade and piracy were closely related in the 
minds of American colonists as "beloved twins," another 
historian has suggested that the recovery of treasure from 
sunken wrecks, legal or otherwise, constituted a "sister 
activity." 40 The aftermath of the wreck of the Spanish 
plate fleet in the early eighteenth century offers one of 
the more demonstrable examples of the connection between 
pirates and wrecking. In fact, no single occurrence drew 
sea marauders to the shores of North America to the extent 
that the 1715 Spanish disaster off the Florida coast did. 
As Alexander Spotswood informed royal authorities, the 
swarming of pirates around the sunken fleet and the Spanish 
salvage camp had worrisome implications for the greater 
Chesapeake. Among "those who stole away the Silver which 
the Spaniards had fished up from the Wrecks of the Galleons, 
in the Gulf of Florida" and subsequently made his way up the 
39 CRNC, I, 468; CSPC, XVII, #890, p. 489. 
4° Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 46. 
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coast was Charles Vane, whose rendezvous with Blackbeard at 
Ocracoke Inlet caused the Virginia governor to fear the 
establishment of a pirate stronghold in the greater 
Chesapeake. 41 Samuel Bellamy, whose crew "very much 
infested" the Virginia coast in 1717, was another.42 So 
was Josiah Forbes, whom Spotswood arrested and imprisoned 
after the suspect's arrival in Virginia (along with three 
others who also had sought to profit from the Spaniards' 
misfortune) bent upon "Piratical designs." 43 
During the half-century between 1670 and 1720, 
governors and crown officials periodically expressed the 
fear that pirates or Dutch traders might tap veins of 
popular discontent and foment insurrection in the greater 
Chesapeake. such anxiety implies that forms of lawlessness 
like wrecking, smuggling, and piracy also may have been 
related to other illegal or subversive activities not 
necessarily associated with maritime affairs per se. The 
case of Richard Clarke of Anne Arundel County, Maryland 
provides an unparalleled, documented example of an 
individual who, during the course of his criminal career, 
managed to pursue an impressively broad spectrum of 
illegitimate enterprises. Known primarily for his piratical 
41 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 135; Ellms, Pirates 
Own Book, 349. 
42 CSPC, XXIX, i595 i, pp. 317-18; Defoe, History of 
the PyrateS; 585. 
4 3 Spotswood, Letters, II, 170-71. 
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machinations, Clarke was also accused of forgery and tobacco 
fraud, conspiring with the Indians to attack Maryland 
settlements, and counterfeiting Spanish pieces of eight.44 
Clarke's case is, of course, exceptional and its 
notoriety may be attributed to the sheer diversity of his 
4 4 Md. A. XXV, 265-66; XXVI, 379, 451, 487, 513-14; 
XXVII, 133-34; CRNC, I, 666; CSPC, XXII, #1210, p. 550. 
Since the wrecks-ind subseque~alvage of Spanish treasure 
ships furnished plausible pretexts for the introduction of 
otherwise scarce specie into the Anglo-American colonies, it 
is not unreasonable to suppose that enterprising 
counterfeiters in the Chesapeake might have taken advantage 
of such occurrences to put their wares into circulation. In 
fact, some documented instances of counterfeiting gold and 
silver coins in the greater Chesapeake do coincide roughly 
with Spanish treasure wreck and recovery episodes on the 
North American coast and in the Caribbean. North Carolina 
authorities prosecuted individuals accused of passing 
"Considerable sumrns of Counterfeit Spanish Money" in the 
colony in 1696, for instance, a year after two treasure 
galleons wrecked near Cuba and at a time when Spanish 
officials were stiil trying to reclaim riches that 
Englishmen from Port Royal had salvaged illegally from other 
sunken vessels several years earlier (NCHCR, 1670-1696, 270, 
302; NCHCR, 1702-1708, xxviii, n. 53; Robert F. Marx, 
Shipwrecks in the Americas (New York, 1983), 352, 381-82). 
Not long after much of the Spanish treasure fleet came 
to grief on the shores of the greater Chesapeake in 1750, a 
notorious counterfeiter named Low Jackson was tried, 
condemned, and put to death in Virginia for fabricating 
Spanish "Double Double-loons" (Va. Gaz., 5/9/1751, p. 3; Pa. 
Gaz., 5/16/1751, p. 2; Kenneth Scott, "Counterfeiting in 
Colonial Virginia," VMHB, LXI, 7-8). As it turns out, 
though, warrants for Low's arrest had been issued before the 
Spanish fleet sailed and there is no evidence to indicate 
that he conducted any counterfeiting operations after it 
wrecked. It is interesting to note, however, that the agent 
assigned to capture Low was engaged simultaneously in the 
effort to track down the "Spanish money pirated" by 
opportunistic American mariners from the Guadalupe while it 
was stranded in Ocracoke Inlet (after mutinous Spanish crew 
members naively entrusted the Americans with most of their 
silver chests), suggesting an association between the two 
types of activity in the minds of British authorities (AGI, 
"Consulados," legajo 861, fos. 54, 154, 155; Scott, 
"Counterfeiting in Colonial Virginia," VMHB, LXI, 9). 
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illegal activities and the magnitude of the danger that 
colonial authorities believed he represented. But the local 
support that he enjoyed "notwithstanding his most equisite 
villany" and the difficulty that government officials 
experienced in apprehending such a well publicized and 
reputedly dangerous felon also suggests that many of 
Clarke's fellow Chesapeake residents did not regard his 
pursuits (plotting with unfriendly Indians no doubt 
excepted) as particularly extraordinary, objectionable, or 
threatening. 45 A distressed Governor Seymour noted this 
lack of concern in a 1707 letter to his Virginia counterpart 
requesting Clarke's capture and extradition, complaining 
that Virginians evidently had "forgott" a previous 
proclamation to the same effect despite Seymour's contention 
that the wanted man spent a good deal of time in their 
colony. 46 
The governor specifically identified "the Rose & Crowne 
• in Elizabeth River" as an establishment that Clarke 
was known to frequent, thereby calling attention to a social 
and functional milieu in which many of the illegal 
activities on the colonial maritime frontier were planned 
and conducted. As principal places of assembly, taverns or 
ordinaries served an essential social and communal function 
45 CRNC, I, 666. 
46 VMHB, XVI, 76. 
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in the colonial Chesapeake. 47 Often located near county 
courthouses, they were typically of two sorts as described 
by Virginia gentleman William Byrd II: "an ordinary well 
supplied with wine and other polite liquors for the 
worshipful bench" and "a rum ordinary for persons of a more 
vulgar taste." 48 Many of those who frequented the latter 
type constituted what one historian has identified as a 
"sub-society" composed in part of sailors, vagrants, 
beggars, indentured servants, slaves, free blacks, 
tradesmen, laborers, and fleeing debtors. 49 Neighborhood 
taverns represented major focal points for this group's 
dealings, some of which, as one would expect from a 
sub-society "complete with fences and receivers of stolen 
goods," concerned illicit affairs. 50 
47 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-
1790 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983), 30, 88-90, 94-98. 
48 Frederick H. Schmidt, "British Convict Servant Labor 
in Colonial Virginia," Ph.D. dissertation (College of 
William and Mary, 1976), 244; Isaac, Transformation of 
Virginia, 88-90. 
49 Schmidt, "British Convict Labor," 245. 
Significantly, an important component of the Clarke gang's 
master plan was to attract "Housekeepers of desperate 
Fortunes and other disaffected Persons to their Party." In 
fact, the select investigative committee of the Maryland 
assembly determined that "Clarke by his Prodigality in 
disbursing ••• the Counterfeit Money had so insinuated 
himself into the Minds" of indentured servants and debtors 
that he succeeded in inducing a number of them to join with 
the plotters "in their Cursed and wicked Design and Intent" 
(Md. A., XXVII, 131-35). 
50 Schmidt, "British Convict Labor," 245, 253. 
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Because of their lower-class clientele and the illegal 
or socially unacceptable activities that it pursued, the 
less genteel taverns developed reputations as "Nurseries of 
Vice" and "the common Receptacle, and Rendezvous of the very 
Dreggs of the People." 51 Seamen in particular were so 
notorious for their misbehavior at such establishments that 
Virginia legislators enacted laws forbidding ordinary 
keepers to entertain them without the express permission of 
their ship's commander. 52 It is entirely consistent with 
the dubious distinctions that attended both sailors and 
ordinaries that the two groups of pirates who landed in the 
bay in 1720 appear to have spent most of the time prior to 
their arrest revelling at local taverns near the mouth of 
the York River and at Hampton, respectively.53 
The penchant of pirates for frequenting Chesapeake 
taverns calls to mind the "alehouses" established along the 
Irish coast in previous centuries to entertain freebooters 
and to facilitate the exchange of their plundered goods with 
51 Va. Gaz., 4/11/1751, p. 3; Patricia Gibbs, "Taverns 
in Tidewater Virginia, 1700-1774," M.A. thesis (College of 
William and Mary, 1968), 39. 
52 Hening, Statutes, III, 400; VI, 25, 75. A similar 
law was enforced scrupulously in North Carolina in 1768 when 
the licenses of two female ordinary keepers were suspended 
for selling liquor to seamen without their captain's 
approval (Alan D. Watson, "Ordinaries in Colonial Eastern 
North Carolina" North Carolina Historical Review, XLV, 69). 
53 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 207-08; Shomette, 
Pirates on the Chesapeake, 221. 
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local populations. 54 In the New World such establishments 
(along with bordellos, jails, and the docks of port towns) 
formed an integral part of what historian Marcus Rediker has 
described as an informal "seaman's network" that operated 
along the coast of North America and in the Caribbean to 
provide mariners, including smugglers and pirates, with 
information vital to their professions.55 
The taverns patronized by the "more vulgar" sort 
comprising the colonial Chesapeake's underworld undoubtedly 
epitomized the social environment in which outlaws such as 
Richard Clarke and other undesirables circulated and 
exchanged information in the seaman's network of the bay 
region. Colonial records do not appear to contain any 
evidence of a Rose & Crowne tavern on the Elizabeth River, 
as Governor Seymour had indicated, but in 1702 a Swiss 
traveller noted the presence of just such an inn across the 
James River in Virginia's Elizabeth City County. 56 The 
specific site of the tavern was next to Pembroke Church in 
Hampton, a port town which was distinguished, despite its 
5 4 Senior, Nation of Pirates, 56. 
5 5 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 133-34. 
56 Francis L. Michel, "Report of a Journey from 
Switzerland to Virginia, 1701, 1702," VMHB, XXIV no. 1, p. 
20 n. 30; Luther J. Kibler, "The History of Hampton and 
Elizabeth City County," typescript mss. (Richmond, 1937), 
48, 65b. The mouth of the Elizabeth River lies due south of 
the city of Hampton, formerly a part of Elizabeth City 
County, across the body of water known as Hampton Roads 
where the James River flows into the Chesapeake Bay. 
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modest size, by the remarkable number of ordinaries that 
operated there. Although Virginia law permitted only two 
taverns per town, county records indicate that nineteen 
licenses for ordinaries were granted between 1694 and 
1102. 57 While it is impossible to know how many of these 
actually were in business simultaneously, the number was 
405 
obviously too high for the liking of Governor Nicholson who 
in 1699 insisted that local justices revoke the licenses of 
all but the prescribed number.sa 
The reason for the presence of so many ordinaries in 
such a relatively small town was that Hampton, according to 
one historian, was "thronged with seadogs." 59 Until the 
emergence of Norfolk as a rival shipping center in 
subsequent decades, Hampton functioned as Virginia's 
principal port city and the seat of the collector's office 
for the lower James River district where vessels were 
required to enter and clear. 60 Not only was the lower 
57 Rosemary c. Neal, Elizabeth City County, Virginia: 
Deeds, Wills, Court Orders, etc. 1634, 1659, 1688-1702 
(Bowie, Md., 1986), 32-34, 63. 
58 Kibler, "History of Hampton and Elizabeth City 
County," 49. 
59 Starkey, First Plantation, 16. 
60 Yorktown, which gained prominence as a Virginia port 
during the first half of the eighteenth century, also hosted 
a large transient population and contained a quantity of 
ordinaries sufficient to evoke comment and concern (Edward 
M. Riley, "The Ordinaries of Yorktown," WMQ, 2d ser., XXIII 
no. 1, 23). One observer remarked that "The taverns are 
many here, and much frequented, and an unbounded 
Licentiousness seems to taint the Morals of the young 
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James one of the busiest customs districts in the colony, 
but it was also, according to Governor Spotswood, the one 
"most Commodious for the designs of such as intend to carry 
on an illegal Trade, because of vicinity to the [Virginia] 
Capes." 61 During Spotswood's administration another 
traveller declared that Hampton "had the greatest business 
in Virginia" and carried on a thriving trade with 
Pennsylvania and New York, two colonies which, as previously 
indicated, also gained renown as alleged centers of 
contraband trafficking and support for pirates. 62 
Hampton also appears to have been a popular destination 
for pirates seeking sanctuary and recreation. In addition 
to the freebooters who made merry at a Hampton tavern in 
1720, pirate Lionel Wafer reported that he was heading down 
"the great Bay of Chisapeek to Point-Comfort," a promontory 
in the eastern part of Hampton, where he intended to settle 
before his unfortunate encounter with a royal guardship in 
Gentlemen of this Place" (Anon., WMQ, 1st ser., XV, 222). 
61 Spotswood, Letters, I, 15. Although Spotswood 
identified the Lower James River district as the one where 
illicit trade was "chiefly carryd on," two decades earlier 
Edward Randolph noted the significance of Virginia's Eastern 
Shore for much the same reason. That district, according to 
the surveyor general, required "great diligence & 
Circumspection" not only because it contained "many bays & 
Creeks in it where Scotch & N : England men frequent," but 
also since it lay "Nigh ye entry of ye Capes" (Ibid., 10; 
Randolph, Letters, VII, 367). 
62 Tyler, History of Hampton, 31. 
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1688 spoiled those plans. 63 Considering the role that the 
Lower James River district in general and the town of 
Hampton in particular played in promoting maritime 
lawlessness in the region, it was surely no accident that 
the site chosen to display Blackbeard's severed head as a 
warning to maritime lawbreakers and their abettors was a 
sandy point at the entrance to the town's harbor. 
Because of Hampton's importance in regional trade and 
its proximity to the Virginia Capes, the town's association 
with pirates and smugglers is better documented than that of 
most ports in the greater Chesapeake. Even so, little is 
known about the seaman's network that existed there, much 
less about any criminal activities that it supported. One 
reason for this is that Hampton, like other ports in the 
Chesapeake, did not compare to New York, Philadelphia, or 
Boston in terms of size and concentration of wealth and 
property. Hence, as A. Roger Ekirch has pointed out, the 
population centers of the greater Chesapeake, such as they 
were, failed to attract the criminal element to anywhere 
near the same extent that major colonial cities elsewhere in 
English America did.64 
6 3 Wafer, Isthmus of America, 131; Dampier, Voyages, I, 
537. Fort Monroe, constructed before the American Civil 
War, currently occupies the location referred to as Old 
Point Comfort. 
64 Ekirch, Bound for America, 185-88. 
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Consequently, most of the extralegal activity that was 
planned at local drinking establishments probably was not of 
the sort that would have upset or necessarily drawn the 
attention of local residents. Unlike murder and robbery, 
smuggling and trading with pirates seem to have been 
regarded by most colonists as "victimless" offenses which 
few people, other than royal officials, considered truly 
"criminal." If the history of English smuggling provides a 
reliable guide, though, it was precisely through such small, 
lesser trafficked ports that much of the contraband trade 
was conducted. And with proven or suspected malefactors 
like Collectors George Luke and Richard Fitzwilliam and 
Naval Officer John Holloway in charge of duty collection and 
trade law compliance, opportunities for customs fraud may 
have abounded in this port of entry for the lower James 
River district. 
Despite the general paucity of information about 
maritime lawlessness in the area's principal ports, glimpses 
of illegal activity elsewhere suggest that, like Hampton, 
other harbor towns may have served as local or regional hubs 
of illicit enterprise. Part of the extensive network that 
supported Richard Clarke, for example, seems to have been 
centered in Annapolis where the outlaw and his cohorts 
allegedly conducted "Cabals" to plot their conspiracy 
against the colonial government and recruited local debtors 
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and indentured servants for their pirate expedition.65 
Bath, North Carolina, where Blackbeard reportedly 
resided for a time, also seems to have been a likely venue 
for similar activity, especially during Governor Eden's 
administration. 66 Ocracoke Inlet, the principal 
thoroughfare for ships sailing through the Outer Banks to 
and from Bath, was the site of the infamous meeting between 
Blackbeard and Charles Vane and the place where, Alexander 
Spotswood feared, the pirates planned to create a regional 
bastion. The colony's first official port of entry, Bath 
was also the seat of the collector's office for Pamlico 
Sound where Carolina governors Dobbs and Burrington 
suspected that smuggling was being conducted on an imposing 
scale. 67 In addition to Annapolis and Bath, and 
especially as Hampton's prominence diminished after the 
early decades of the eighteenth century, other maritime 
entrepots such as Norfolk and, by the Revolution, Baltimore, 
began to emerge as centers of both legal and illicit 
maritime activity.68 
65 Md. A., XXVII, 134-35. 
66 c. Wingate Reed, Beaufort County: Two Centuries of 
its History (Raleigh, 1962), 5~; NCHCM, 1724-173~, xxv. 
67 For evidence of the continued participation of Bath 
merchants in contraband trade in the decade preceding the 
Revolution see below, p. 427. 
68 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 2~~-~1, 209, 232, 258-59; 
Wertenbaker, Norfolk, 40-44, 47. Norfolk attracted the 
attention of royal authorities not only as a bulwark of 
resistance to impressment, but also as center of illicit 
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By the seventh decade of the eighteenth century, 
however, it could be argued that widespread maritime 
illegality in the greater Chesapeake had become a thing of 
the past. The "golden age of piracy" in the region had long 
since ended and official handling of the 1750 Spanish plate 
fleet wrecks demonstrated (in contrast to the virtually 
unrestrained pillaging that characterized the 1698, 1709-10 
and 1715 episodes) that colonial governments could exert at 
least some restraining influence on the rapacious impulses 
of the area's coastal inhabitants. Even the intractable 
problem of contraband trade finally appeared to have been 
solved. Virginia governor Francis Fauquier announced in 
1764 that the volume of illicit commerce conducted 
throughout the Chesapeake had become so negligible that "the 
Men of War stationed on our Coast think it hardly worth 
watching," an appraisal corroborated the same year by 
Maryland governor Horatio Sharpe with regard to his 
colony. 69 
But had extensive maritime lawlessness really ceased to 
exist in the bay region? Had illicit trade truly become so 
insignificant, as Governor Fauquier asserted, that it no 
longer warranted serious concern? Certainly those 
responsible for customs receipts in the home government did 
trade. See below, pp. 418, 422-25. 
6 9 C05/1330, pp. 539-41; George Reese, ed., The 
Official Papers of Frances Fauquier (Charlottesville, Va. 
1983), III, 1169; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 213-14. 
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not think so. A 1764 memorial from Treasury officials to 
the Privy Council observed that "through neglect, 
connivance, and fraud, not only is the revenue impaired, but 
the commerce of the colony is diverted from its natural 
course and the salutary provisions of many wise laws to 
secure it to the Mother Country are in great measure 
defeated." 7a Admittedly, the apparent frustration of 
crown officials may have been somewhat disingenuous. 
Charles Andrews has argued, for example, that British 
officials habitually blamed smuggling, piracy and a host of 
other factors for chronic revenue shortfalls when the real 
problems were the mismanagement and corruption of the home 
government itself. 71 No doubt this was true to a 
significant extent, but the incompetence and hypocrisy of 
the English administrators only would have encouraged 
similar inefficiency and official venality in the Chesapeake 
and certainly did not preclude continued contraband 
trafficking by the colonists. 
The evidence from the Chesapeake confirms that 
corruption and customs fraud continued to plague the system 
on the western shores of the Atlantic. The laws of North 
Carolina in 1754 included a statute forbidding the 
exportation of tobacco not packed in casks "forasmuch as the 
7a APCC, IV, #520, p. 569; Andrews, Colonial Period of 
American~tory, IV, 219. 
71 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
278-79. 
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permitting of Tobacco in Bulk or Parcels to be waterborne • 
may give great Opportunity to the clandestine running 
the same on Board ships or Vessels." 72 The passage of 
similar legislation in 1766 and again in 1774 represented a 
tacit admission, articulated explicitly in the body of the 
statutes themselves, that "the Laws heretofore in Force for 
preventing frauds in his Majesty's Customs" had been 
found "ineffectual to answer the Purposes thereby 
intended." 73 In 1766 the Virginia assembly, enacting its 
own law for preventing customs fraud, insisted that naval 
officers furnish receipts for all fees that they collected 
because, experience had shown, it was "almost impossible to 
detect officers, who charge greater fees than ••• are 
allowed." 74 
Skeptics might dismiss the repeated re-enactment of 
anti-smuggling and anti-fraud legislation by colonial 
assemblies as nothing more than token responses designed to 
placate British authorities who were clearly dissatisfied 
with what they regarded as an unacceptably low level of 
trade law compliance in the greater Chesapeake. Evidence 
from other sources, however, suggests that the problem was 
not merely one of politics and perceptions but of substance. 
Barely a month after declaring illegal trade to and from the 
72 CRNC, XXIII, 402-03. 
73 Ibid., 728-41, 948-52. 
74 Hening, Statutes, VIII, 251. 
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Chesapeake to be practically nonexistent, Governor Fauquier 
flatly contradicted his own assessment by reporting to the 
Board of Trade that "European Goods ••• are being brought 
in promiscuously by every Ship which arrives from the Mother 
Country." 75 
But of all the indications of the status of illicit 
trade in the greater Chesapeake during the years immediately 
preceding the Revolution none was more revealing than the 
comprehensive body of evidence compiled in 1770 by a special 
investigator for the recently established American Board of 
Commissioners of the Customs. 76 Appointed the Board's 
first inspector general in 1767, John Williams was assigned 
the task of examining and reporting on the customs service 
of most of the coastal colonies. Arriving in the Chesapeake 
in 1770, he began his investigation in the James River where 
he accused a collector of accepting a bribe to release one 
ship suspected of illicit trade and permitting another to 
75 Reese, Fauguier Papers, III, 1199. The governor 
also called for an increase in the number of customs 
officials specifically assigned to search merchant ships for 
contraband because of the frequency with which illegal trade 
was being conducted. His statement that the only two 
"searchers" operating in the colony at the time were located 
in the lower James River and the Eastern Shore attests to 
the continued significance of these districts as suspected 
centers of illicit trade (Flippin, Financial Administration 
of Virginia, 36). 
7 6 Joseph R. Frese, "The Royal Customs Service in the 
Chesapeake, 1770: The Reports of John Williams, Inspector 
General," VMHB, LXXXI, 280-318i Billings, Selby, and Tate, 
Colonial VTrglnia, 321. 
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unload without proper papers. 77 These allegations 
represented an anomaly, however. Nowhere else in his 
travels through Virginia and Maryland rivers did Williams 
impugn the integrity of local customs officers whom he 
unfailingly portrayed as "men of exceeding good character, 
both as to their public and private sections, and ••• very 
exact in the business of the office." 78 But the praise 
lavished upon these officials also represented an aberration 
because the inspector general consistently found the customs 
operation so deficient and abused in practically every other 
respect that his report easily could be mistaken for any one 
I 
of the standard anti-smuggling diatribes of the preceding 
century. 
Like so many of his predecessors, Williams initially 
remarked on the excellent opportunities for smuggling that 
the region afforded, noting that "in all those rivers there 
are many harbours, bays, and creeks for vessels of almost 
any burthen, and landing places almost at every door where 
they land goods imported, and deliver goods for 
exportation." 79 More specifically, he detected a 
discrepancy between the unusually large number of foreign 
ships that arrived in the Chesapeake, according to their 
282. 
77 Frese, "Royal Customs Service in the Chesapeake," 
78 Ibid., 285-86, 290, 294, 297, 301, 303, 305, 308. 
79 ~., 287, 318. 
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cocquets, "almost wholly in ballast" and the abundance of 
foreign goods available to local consumers. 80 "The 
415 
imports of dutiable goods by their entries are very 
inconsiderable although their consumption must be great," 
Williams concluded, since French wines could be purchased 
"at almost every store upon the river." The only reasonable 
explanation, of course, was that smuggling was being 
conducted on a regular and extensive basis which, the 
inspector general added, "Likewise ••• fully accounts for 
the large quantity of teas, foreign linens &ca, which every 
store is full of."81 
Williams' observations suggest that remarkably little 
had changed from the days when Edward Randolph, Robert 
Quary, Francis Nicholson, and Alexander Spotswood inveighed 
against the trade law violating proclivities of the 
Chesapeake colonists. The region's foreign trading partners 
-- the Dutch and French, primarily, and the Spanish and 
Portuguese as well -- remained the same as did the principal 
facilitators of illicit commerce, the Scots, whose "frauds • 
• • in the exportation of tobacco from Virginia and 
Maryland," Williams determined, "prevails to a very 
considerable degree." Even the same methods of deception 
continued to be employed. Those seeking to avoid payment of 
the penny per pound duty on enumerated intercolonial exports 
80 Ibid., 296, 299, 304, 386, 309. 
81 Ibid., 291-92. 
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commonly shipped their tobacco falsely, the inspector 
general reported, "under the denomination of casks of bread, 
flour, corn, beans &ca."82 
Part of the problem was that, as a result of 
administrative errors or oversights, it was simply too easy 
to commit customs fraud in certain areas. Williams' 
perceptions in this regard are remarkably similar to those 
articulated by Edward Randolph over seven de~ades earlier. 
Because customs houses in some districts were so distant 
from the places where most of the business of landing 
imports and loading exports was conducted, Williams 
maintained that shipmasters entered only "such part of their 
cargoes as they think proper; all which were usually landed 
without the least control or inspection of any officer."83 
Consequently, the customs service throughout the Chesapeake 
lay "greatly exposed to the imposition of smugglers." 84 
As in Randolph's day, low salaries continued to affect 
adversely the performance of local officials. Williams 
identified two districts, the Chester River in Maryland and 
the South Potomac in Virginia, where the "narrow income" of 
customs officers was "in no degree sufficient" to support 
the men and their families. 85 As a result, one collector 
82 Ibid., 315. 
83 I bid., 311J5, 310, 311, 313. 
84 Ibid., 290. 
85 Ibid., 298, 308. 
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continued to be involved in commercial affairs himself, 
contrary to royal instructions promulgated late in the 
previous century, as the owner of a brig which sailed "under 
the management and names of the principal merchants in the 
place." Since the vessel operated under the effective 
control of the merchants, Williams believed it served as "a 
security to them; that if they are inclined to smuggle the 
collector will not proceed against them, neither can he do 
so without risking the loss of his own interest in their 
hands." 86 
The solutions that Williams proposed to remedy the 
inadequacies of the system were likewise reminiscent of 
those advanced by royal and colonial officials in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. So that local 
revenue and inspection officers could oversee cargo loading 
and unloading procedures more effectively, the inspector 
general recommended centralizing customs operations by 
"confining the landing and shipping of all goods in these 
provinces at certain quays and wharfs." 87 Particularly 
for those districts in which customs houses were located far 
from the scene of most shipping activity, but for all others 
as well, Williams emphasized the necessity of establishing a 
"water guard," a term not defined in the report but one 
which presumably referred to small, armed vessels capable of 
86 Ibid., 308. 
87 Ibid., 295, 316. 
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pursuing contrabandists into the shallows much like those 
frequently proposed and periodically stationed in the bay in 
the late 1600s and early 1700s. 88 
Like earlier customs investigators, Williams insisted 
that trade law violations in the Chesapeake represented more 
than occasional or petty infractions which ultimately had 
little impact on total royal revenue receipts. By moving 
the customs house for the Lower James district from Hampton 
to Norfolk (where Williams estimated that 95 percent of all 
of the district's dutiable goods were landed), for instance, 
the inspector general was convinced that having officers "on 
the spot" would constitute such "a great restraint upon 
clandestine practices" that local customs revenues would 
actually double. 89 Taking a more comprehensive, regional 
approach, Williams ascertained that although Maryland and 
Virginia planters raised over 80,000 hogsheads of saleable 
tobacco annually, local customs officials actually cleared 
fewer than 63,000 each year. The "deficiency" of some 
17,000 hogsheads, the investigator concluded, could be 
"accounted for no other way than it is clandestinely carried 
away." Estimating that 5,000 such casks were smuggled to 
other colonies to evade the Plantation Duty, Williams 
surmised that the remaining 12,000 were "secretly landed in 
Great Britain • by which practice the revenue in England 
88 ~., 292, 311. 
89 Ibid., 314. 
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may sustain a loss of about 300,000 sterling per annum." 90 
With revenue losses of this magnitude, British 
officials had to be deeply concerned about the level of 
customs fraud and duty evasion that Williams had discovered 
in the Chesapeake. But the home government must have been 
equally disturbed by other aspects of the inspector 
general's report which suggested the re-emergence of one of 
the more unpleasant concomitants of those practices from the 
crown's point of view: widespread, popular opposition to 
royal authority in trade law enforcement. Despite the 
substantial volume of unlawful commerce which was being 
conducted throughout the bay area, Williams noted that for 
the past several years officials in some districts had made 
few or no seizures whatsoever, a circumstance he attributed 
in part to the officers' inability to obtain "the least 
support" in their efforts from the public, the courts, and 
even the governors.91 
The inspector general cited one case in which the 
customs comptroller for Maryland's Pocomoke River received 
the presiding judge's assurance that the trial of a 
shipmaster accused of falsifying his vessel's register would 
be postponed until the officer could bring a witness back 
from the Eastern Shore to testify for the prosecution. In 
90 Ibid., 315. 
91 Ibid. 288, 303. 
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the comptroller's absence, however, the judge dismissed the 
suit on the grounds that "the offence was not cognizable by 
an admiralty court in Maryland." The government's case 
still could have been salvaged, Williams maintained, if the 
colony's attorney general had been a "good man • who 
would act with spirit in ••• the interest of the crown." 
Instead, the customs investigator pointedly observed (again 
in a manner highly reminiscent of royal officials in 
Maryland during the last decades of previous century) that 
the "King's attorney" had been appointed by the colony's 
proprietor, Frederick the sixth Lord Baltimore, and would 
not "exert himself in any Crown causes where his lordship or 
the peoples' interest" was concerned. 92 (The crown's 
cause fared little better, as it turned out, in royal 
Virginia where Governor Fauquier's successor, Norborne 
Berkeley, Baron de Botetourt, refused Williams' request to 
examine the account books of the colony's tobacco 
inspectors.) 93 
Another aspect of the Maryland case highlighted the 
gap between the "peoples' interest" and that of the crown. 
Not only did customs officials chronically "labour under 
great discouragements in doing their duty," but in the 
aftermath of this particular legal proceeding "the officer 
was exposed by the failure in this cause to the insults and 
92 Ibid., 303-04. 
93 Ibid., 315. 
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abuse of the common people."94 As an isolated incident, 
such an occurrence might not have elicited serious concern, 
but similar episodes in the greater Chesapeake and elsewhere 
in the colonies reflected a pattern of increased popular 
resistance to the navigation laws that had begun to manifest 
itself since the imposition of the Stamp Act in 1765. That 
same year Robert Heron, collector for the problematic 
Pocomoke district, had complained to his superiors that "the 
numberless abuses and continual threatenings to shoot me, 
&c. makes me sensible of the melancholy situation of this 
office," a post, he maintained, which was seated "amongst 
nothing but a gang of smuglers."95 Unfortunately for 
those who sought to uphold the crown's interest in the 
colonies, such antagonism was not always limited to taunts 
and threats. 
Virtually absent in the greater Chesapeake for a half 
century or more characterized, for the most part, by benign 
relations between customs officials and colonial planters, 
merchants, and shipmasters, violence against royal revenue 
officers and those suspected of collaborating with them 
surfaced again in the 1760s and '70s. Collector Heron was 
victimized himself at a public auction when he tried to sell 
a brig he had seized for trade law violations. Not only 
94 Ibid., 303. 
95 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 466; Barrow, 
Trade and Empire, 263; Frese, "Royal Customs Service in the 
Chesapeake," 302 n. 79. 
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would no one bid on the vessel, most of those in attendance 
allegedly "being concerned in the illicit trade" themselves, 
but the captain of the condemned ship, with a number of 
"Scotch" supporters, attacked the customs officer and would 
have murdered him, Heron asserted, had a compassionate 
individual not intervened. Imploring British authorities to 
"contrive ways and means for our better protection from the 
insults of such a Villanious set of People," the collector 
reported that he never ventured out without being "doubly 
armed with a hanger, a pair of pistols in my Pockets, and 
another before me," evidently having reached the same 
conclusion as a royal guardship commander eighty years 
earlier that "noe officer of the Customes in Maryland can 
live without a good guard."96 
By the mid-176es colonial opposition to royal customs 
regulations in the greater Chesapeake was becoming so 
intense that even the mere suspicion of collaboration with 
crown officials was sufficient to trigger a violent 
reaction. In April 1766 William Smith, the captain of a 
merchant schooner, was accused by the ship's owner, John 
Gilchrist, and others of having reported the presence of 
contraband goods aboard another vessel owned by Gilchrist to 
Captain Jeremiah Morgan, commander of the royal sloop Hornet 
in Norfolk. Although Smith insisted then that he had done 
96 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 466: Barrow, 
Trade and Empire, 28. 
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no such thing, an assertion which Morgan later confirmed, 
Gilchrist and company bound the merchant captain's hands, 
tied him behind a cart, and hustled him down to the county 
wharf to be tarred and feathered. "They then put me upon a 
Ducking Stool and threw rotten eggs and stones at me," Smith 
recounted, "by which means I have almost lost the sight of 
my eyes."97 
The poor captain could not even hope for rescue by 
municipal authorities since his tormentors included the town 
mayor who, "instead of suppressing the insult, encouraged it 
and threw stones . . • himself." Gilchrist's gang then 
dragged Smith to the Hornet's anchorage and "bidding 
defiance," threatened to treat Morgan likewise if he carne 
ashore. The incident ended when Norfolk alderman John 
Phripp heaved Smith "headlong over the wharf," nearly 
causing the hapless mariner to drown. 98 Concerned that 
the unfortunate victim might be suspected of exaggeration, 
Morgan insisted that "poor innocent Captain Smith" had not 
recounted "half the story in his letter that I have heard 
from others."99 
97 
"Letters of Governor Francis Fauquier from the 
Bancroft Transcripts, Library of Congress," WMQ, 1st ser., 
XXI, 167; Fauquier Papers, III, 1351-52. ---
98 "Fauquier Letters," WMQ, 1st ser., XXI, 167-68; 
Reese, Fauquier Papers, III,-r352. 
99 "Fauquier Letters," WMQ, 1st ser., XXI, 166; Reese, 
Fauquier Papers, III, 135~. 
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Just over a year later, Captain Morgan himself became 
the principal object of local antipathy when he organized a 
press to "take up all them that did not belong to Ships" on 
the Norfolk waterfront. As usual, desertion was responsible 
for the shortage of sailors aboard the Hornet, a 
circumstance which the guardship officer blamed on local 
inhabitants. "Norfolk hurts the Trade prodigiously," the 
commander maintained, because residents encouraged the 
seamen to jump ship, assisted them in doing so, and profited 
by their actions as well. Morgan claimed that Norfolk had 
become the regional center for procuring sailors, attracting 
from all parts of the Chesapeake shorthanded shipmasters 
whose expenditures while in port invigorated the local 
economy. 1 ~~ 
As had often been the case in the pre-175~ era, the 
colonists did not submit to the press passively. Although 
the guardship officer insisted that he and his men had not 
entered "the door of any House but was either a Publick 
House or a Bawdy House," yet the royal mariners soon were 
confronted by a "Mob" led by the mayor and composed of 
"Whites & Blacks all arm'd." Morgan retreated to the safety 
of his ship, explaining afterward that he did not "care to 
go to Norfolk Goal from the Account I had of the Treatment 
my poor Master and several more of my People had at 
different times received ••• there." Two days later, a 
1 ~~ Reese, Fauquier Papers, III, 15~~. 
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county court tried the commander in absentia and condemned 
him "upon the Riot Act in Norfolk," relying heavily, 
according to Morgan's intelligence, on the testimony of the 
"poor Whores & Rogues depending upon the Sailors & those 
depending upon the Smugglers I have made Seizures from." 
Pleading his case against the colonists to Francis Fauquier, 
the Royal Navy officer implored the governor "to remember 
the many attempts they made upon my Life and yours" and 
added that if the government were to prosecute all the local 
residents who had participated in the disturbance, "there 
would not be twenty left unhang'd" in Norfolk.101 
Given the relatively short interval between the 
unpopular British customs reforms instituted during Prime 
Minister George Grenville's administration and the 
unpleasant experiences of Collector Heron and Captains Smith 
and Morgan, it would be logical to link such riotous 
outbursts in the bay region with the more universal 
revolutionary fervor that was beginning to seethe throughout 
the colonies. Indeed, Morgan reported that the night before 
the attack on Captain Smith "about thirty of ••• the 
principal people of Norfolk," including the mayor, convened 
at a tavern [where else?], resolved that Parliament's 
imposition of taxes on America was "unconstitutional and 
illegal," and decried the fact that, although Virginians had 
been the first to oppose the Stamp Act, they had since 
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become "mute and pusilanimous while ••• other Colonies 
asserted their rights like Sons of Liberty."102 
Clearly, the causal relationship between the new 
imperial measures and the belligerent hostility evinced 
426 
toward royal agents and suspected supporters of crown policy 
is undeniable. But to view these turbulent episodes solely 
as examples of the anti-imperial ferment of the 1760s is to 
ignore their significance as manifestations (albeit in a 
more highly politicized context) of a well established 
tradition of persistent, frequently violent opposition to 
lawful authority that had characterized the coasts and 
waterways of the greater Chesapeake for well over a 
century. 103 
In the decade or so before the Revolution, Virginia 
accounted for far more ship seizures than any of the other 
colonies that joined the rebellion. Based on the available 
evidence from Virginia's vice-admiralty records, however, 
one scholar has surmised that many, if not most, of the ship 
condemnations resulted not from infractions related to the 
Stamp and Townshend Acts, but from violations of the long-
102 
"Fauquier Letters," WMQ, 1st ser., XXI, 165-66; 
Reese, Fauquier Papers, III, 1349. 
103 In attempting to distinguish between the political 
and economic motives of greater Chesapeake activists it 
should be recalled that politics and maritime illegality had 
been inextricably linked in the relationship between the 
Chesapeake colonies and the home government ever since the 
promulgation of the first Navigation Act in 1651. 
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standing Navigation Act of 166e. 1e 4 Public notices in 
early 1767 demonstrate that in Captain Morgan's case, 
moreover, the guardship officer's reputation as a menace to 
illicit trade preceded his arrival in the bay and almost 
certainly contributed to his unpopularity throughout the 
region. In February the Virginia Gazette printed a message 
from Richard Todd of Bath, North Carolina, warning Virginia 
merchants and shippers that Morgan had been "very assiduous" 
in his pursuit of contraband, that he let "nothing escape 
him," and that he and the Hornet were on their way to Cape 
Henry. "I am sincerely glad of his departure from our 
inlet," Todd added, "for was he to stay, we should be ruined 
to all intents and purposes."l05 
The news in the Virginia Gazette also reveals that the 
seamen's network in the greater Chesapeake had undergone a 
profound and significant change. Previously communicated by 
means of a surreptitious, word-of-mouth system operating 
mainly in disreputable establishments throughout the region, 
critical information now was being relayed through the bay 
area's published media. Todd had asked the Gazette to print 
104 Stout, Royal Navy, 133-34. 
105 I va. Gaz., 2/19/1767, p. 1. Todd s notice also 
indicates that New England mariners continued to participate 
in the illegal trade of the greater Chesapeake. The North 
Carolinian reported that the Hornet gave chase to two "New 
Englandmen" whose crews had just enough time to stave in 
seventeen hogsheads of rum and pump out the contents before 
being apprehended. The smugglers were taken into custody 
but released because, having destroyed the evidence, "the 
proof [was] not sufficient to condemn them" (Ibid.). 
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his message so that "it may give a hint to your 
correspondents and customers." By granting his request, the 
newspaper left little doubt as to its principal aim in 
disseminating the information about Morgan. While the item 
may have been considered newsworthy in its own right, the 
Gazette had already demonstrated a commitment to publishing 
such reports as a service to its commercial patrons. In 
January the paper printed a notice "to inform the publick, 
especially the traders to North Carolina, that the Hornet 
sloop of war" lay at Cape Lookout with its two tenders 
"which strictly examine all vessels they meet with." 
Although brief, the bulletin also made a point of describing 
the guardship's support boats and their armament, presumably 
to help contraband traders recognize and avoid the patrol 
vessels. 1 ~ 6 
The official reports of Collector Heron, Captain 
Morgan, and Inspector General Williams offer compelling 
evidence of an extensive, concerted, and sometimes violent 
opposition to law enforcement in the bay region. But if the 
residents of the greater Chesapeake actually engaged in 
maritime illegality more or less continuously from 165~ 
until the Revolution, why is it that such evidence appears 
only sporadically throughout the period? A distinctive 
pattern in the colonial record of maritime law enforcement 
1~6 I I va. Gaz., 1 1 1767, p.2. 
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in the bay area suggests a likely explanation. The two 
intervals during which royal officials registered the most 
urgent and the greatest number of reports about maritime 
illegality the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries and from the 1760s to the Revolution -- were also 
the periods of greatest crown concern with the regulation of 
the empire and its commerce. 
The intervening years, at least up until 1750, were 
guided by the policy of "salutary neglect." Emphasizing 
accommodation rather than provocation, crown authorities 
were content, so long as the empire prospered, to permit 
Anglo-Americans to conduct their commercial affairs largely 
as they saw fit. With so little attention being paid to 
smuggling, it is hardly astonishing that little was 
discovered. The relatively high incidence of complaints 
about, and seizures relating to, contraband trafficking 
during the periods of earnest crown attention to the matter 
implies an obvious conclusion: that the imperial government 
discovered evidence of substantial illicit trade only when 
it bothered to look. 
When it did care to concern itself with the problem, 
the home government's effort to control illicit trade and 
piracy was complicated by its previous, and in some 
instances continuing, encouragement of such activities in 
the Old World and the New. The lionizing of English 
swashbucklers who attacked Spanish treasure ships and the 
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crown's support of contraband trading with Spanish 
settlements fostered attitudes favorable to both practices. 
With the heightened awareness of the difficulties that 
freebooting was causing and the determination to establish 
tighter control over the colonial administrative bureaucracy 
near the end of the seventeenth century, English officials 
did make a vigorous effort to eradicate piracy and enforce 
the trade laws. 
But old habits and convictions were not so easily 
overcome. Chesapeake residents continued to associate with 
pirates until the abuses suffered at the hands of Blackbeard 
and others caused them to abandon their former practice. 
Area inhabitants also persisted in trading illegally with 
England's foreign rivals both during and after Queen Anne's 
war (as they did in subsequent international conflicts), 
much to the chagrin of British authorities whose concurrent 
support of the South Sea Company's contraband activities did 
little to discourage the Chesapeake colonists in theirs. 
Bay area tobacco growers did eventually acquiesce in an 
inspection system that promised to inhibit smuggling, but 
only after they had been convinced of the compensating 
financial advantages of self-imposed regulation. 
Apart from English custom and precedent, the greed and 
indiscretions of colonial governors and other royal and 
proprietary officials in the bay region itself may have had 
a more direct influence on the attitudes of area 
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inhabitants. The issue was not simply that many of these 
officials sanctioned or occasionally engaged in forms of 
431 
maritime illegality, but that they generally placed a higher 
priority on their own prosperity than the welfare of the 
colonies they served. Historians have generally portrayed 
Governors Copley of Maryland and Effingham of Virginia, for 
example, as opportunists who came to the Chesapeake bent on 
amassing wealth at the expense of the colonies over which 
they were to preside. 1a7 Similarly, North Carolina 
governors Eden, Burrington, and Everard have been 
characterized as "needy adventurers, ••• a cormorant brood 
in that day, at least, not equalled in America."l08 
Virginia Station contmanders Jones, Crofts, Purvis, Aldred, 
and Brand all appeared to fit the same mold. The example 
set by such men could only have served to promote the view 
that what constituted lawlessness was, to say the least, a 
matter of subjective interpretation. 
Compared to the transgressions of some public 
officials, smuggling, trading with pirates, and helping 
oneself to the effects of wrecked ships must have seemed 
relatively innocuous to many colonists, hardly the heinous 
crimes that English authorities decried so self-righteously. 
Government policy and historical precedent in the home 
10? Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 41; 
Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 109. 
108 William Saunders in~' II, ix. 
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country, coupled with the standards of personal behavior set 
by past and current leadership both in England and the bay 
region, engendered and reinforced a belief that the imperial 
navigation scheme, including the laws against piracy and 
wrecking, was simply a game in which everyone, with the 
exception of a few zealots, sought to manipulate the system 
to their own advantage. 
Such an outlook manifested itself not only in 
widespread disregard for the Navigation Acts and statutes 
concerning piracy and wrecking, but also in popular 
opposition to maritime law enforcement in the provincial 
courts, assemblies, and perhaps, polling places as well. 
Common-law courts frequently exonerated those accused of 
perpetrating or abetting smuggling, freebooting, and 
wrecking. Colonial assemblies habitually obstructed 
legislation designed to curtail those activities. And when 
it came to choosing legislators to represent them, the 
colonists appeared to have few qualms about electing 
officials who had sought material advantage by actively 
engaging in, or becoming associated with, some type of 
maritime illegality themselves. Moreover, some factional 
alignments within the provincial governments appear to 
reflect the establishment of common cause against what the 
colonists traditionally regarded as unwarranted interference 
by royal officials with customary prerogatives in the 
maritime realm. 
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Benjamin Harrison identified the existence of one such 
clique, consisting not of elected officials but of a 
majority of the Council of Virginia, when in 1698 he alleged 
a conspiracy of silence to protect the interests of council 
members who engaged in customs fraud and other self-serving 
practices. More common, however, was the development of 
factions in the lower houses of colonial legislatures. The 
mutual hostility that developed between Governor Spotswood 
and Virginia's House of Burgesses in the second decade of 
the eighteenth century cannot be ascribed exclusively, or 
even primarily, to disputes over maritime affairs. 
Nevertheless, it does seem a remarkable coincidence that 
some of the most powerful members of the assembly and 
leaders of the faction opposed to Spotswood were men who 
either directly participated in or were closely connected 
with one or more forms of maritime illegality. 
In the divisive election of 1715, for instance, Gawin 
Corbin, the naval officer Spotswood dismissed in 1711 for 
forging the "queen's letter," was not only voted into the 
assembly but subsequently chosen to head the powerful 
Committee on Privileges and Elections. 109 In 1718, one 
year after a group of merchants complained to the Board of 
Trade about the "many unwarrantable Practices" of South 
Potomac district collector Daniel McCarty, the customs 
10 9 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 120; Billings, Selby, 
and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 181-82. 
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officer was reelected to the House where he once again 
assumed the role of Speaker. Corbin, meanwhile, succeeded 
to an even more prestigious chairmanship than his previous 
one, that of the Committee for Propositions and Grievances, 
a post he retained in 1720 following an election in which 
John Holloway, defender of accused pirates and illicit 
traders, also was returned to office. 110 
Although the governor had achieved a reconciliation of 
sorts with his political foes by then, the choice of 
Holloway as Speaker, according to Spotswood biographer 
Leonidas Dodson, "must have warned the governor that the 
spirit of resistance was not yet dead in the lower 
house." 111 Perhaps it is too much to argue that the 
electorate's endorsement of Corbin, McCarty, and Holloway 
constituted a popular mandate in favor of customs fraud and 
abetting pirates, but it does indicate that, at the very 
least, the voting public was not so upset about 
participation in such questionable activities that it saw 
fit to turn legislators out of office for pursuing 
them. 112 
ll 0 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 179; Billings, Selby, 
and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 188. 
111 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 262-63; Billings, 
Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 193. 
112 Though the members of the anti-Spotswood faction 
may have been united in their resentment of the governor 
and, in the cases of Holloway, Corbin, and McCarty, in their 
involvement in maritime activities of questionable legality, 
they do not appear to have been bound by any common ideology 
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Political divisions that may have been based in part on 
conflict over the liberty to conduct illegal maritime 
enterprises are much less in evidence after Spotswood's 
departure from the governorship. The executive styles of 
Spotswood's immediate successors, Hugh Drysdale and William 
Gooch, favored tact and diplomacy over hostile 
confrontation. During Gooch's long and generally harmonious 
term, other circumstances -- primarily the success of the 
tobacco inspection system and Walpole's policy of benign 
indifference toward the colonies -- combined with the 
governor's admirable political skill to prevent, for the 
most part, the eruption of serious disputes either among 
domestic factions or between the colony and the mother 
country. But the more assertive regulation of colonial 
affairs under subsequent British administrations radically 
altered that state of affairs. 
For decades since the mid-172es colonial officials had 
virtually abandoned, in the face of local opposition and the 
disinterest of British authorities, any serious attempt to 
enforce imperial trade policy rigorously. Consequently, 
Chesapeake residents continued to conduct their maritime 
commercial affairs as they customarily had and colonial 
or sense of personal allegiance. In the 173e and 1736 
debates concerning Governor Gooch's tobacco inspection 
system, the fact that Holloway, who stood to gain by having 
two inspection warehouses built on his property, supported 
the system while Corbin led the opposition, suggests that 
self interest was what ultimately motivated these men 
(Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 238, 245). 
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customs agents adapted themselves to the practical reality 
of the situation. As James Henretta has observed of the 
effort to enforce British customs regulations in the 
colonies, "moderate men quickly became aware of the futility 
of the struggle; only zealots ••• persisted in the fight 
for the abstract principles conceived in London."ll3 By 
the time a reinvigorated Board of Trade attempted to tighten 
control of the overseas customs service in 1748, royal 
officers in the greater Chesapeake were unprepared to 
execute the new policy. As a result, John Willliams's 
investigation of customs affairs in the bay region over 
twenty years later revealed a situation essentially 
unchanged since Edward Randolph's era: illicit trade and 
customs fraud on a significant scale, the same problems of 
administration and enforcement, the same contraband 
partners, and even the same smuggling techniques. 
With the accession of George III in 1769 and the 
emergence of George Grenville as chief minister by the end 
of the Seven Years' War, the modus vivendi that had been 
worked out between colonists and customs agents in the 
greater Chesapeake was no longer acceptable to the leaders 
of the home government. Grenville insisted on stricter 
customs regulation partly to raise additional revenues to 
help pay for both the customs service itself and for 
113 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 324. 
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colonial defense, burdens which the colonists themselves 
were loath to assume. 
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What is particularly noteworthy in the context of this 
study is the manner in which bay area residents responded to 
the more rigorous management of their commercial affairs. 
In 1651, when authorities of the home government sought to 
punish Virginians for their support of the losing side in 
the Civil War, they imposed restrictions in the realm of 
maritime trade. over a century later, when Chesapeake 
colonists expressed their discontent with the policies of 
the mother country, they chose tactics adapted to the same 
arena. By thwarting and even attacking customs collectors, 
organizing resistance at the hub of the seamen's network, 
assaulting those suspected of informing on smugglers, 
opposing the press by force and guile, and publishing notice 
of guardship movements as a warning to illicit traders, the 
colonists made the protection of customary prerogatives (or, 
from the crown's point of view, flagrant illegal practices) 
in the maritime sphere a central focus of their resistance. 
The success of the Revolution ensured that 
Anglo-Americans no longer had to pay hated royal customs 
duties or abide by the commercial restrictions that the 
Navigation Acts had imposed. As a result, the incentive to 
conduct illicit trade in the aftermath of the struggle for 
independence was reduced significantly. Now, perhaps, 
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lawlessness would cease to exist as a standard feature of 
the maritime environment of the greater Chesapeake. But the 
express concern of newly independent Virginians over the 
potential for continued outbreaks of illegal, destructive 
behavior suggests that while much of the motivation to 
commit lawless acts had been eliminated, the impulses of 
some greater Chesapeake residents to do so had not. 
The concern related not to customs affairs, but to a 
sphere of coastal activity which remained essentially 
unaffected by the profound political realignments that the 
Revolution produced: the old practice of wrecking ships. 
Recognizing that "many vessels have been and may hereafter 
be stranded on the sea coast, bay or river shores ••• and 
the goods or other property belonging to such vessels may be 
embezzled or stolen," legislators of the young commonwealth 
adopted a new "Act Concerning Wrecks" in 1782 which 
articulated the traditional concerns of the governing 
authority. The statute explicitly prohibited anyone from 
entering (much less removing effects from) wrecked ships 
without the commanding officer's permission. 114 Stiff 
penalties were prescribed for individuals found to have 
tampered with a stranded ship (including "death without 
benefit of clergy" for those who made, or even assisted in 
making, a hole in the side of a vessel in distresE) and for 
any of the authorized "commissioners" of wrecks who "by 
114 Hening, Statutes, XI, 51-53. 
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fraud or wilful neglect" was found guilty of "abusing the 
trust reposed in him." 115 The question of whether or not 
lawlessness actually abated in the wake of the Revolution 
lies beyond the scope of this study, but the Act of 1782 
does reveal Virginia lawmakers' familiarity with past 
criminal behavior and their continued anxiety regarding its 
future repetition on the maritime frontier of the greater 
Chesapeake. 
115 ~., 52-53. 
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